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M E M O R Y I N T H E T H E O L O G I C A L A N T H R O P O L O G Y O F ST. A U G U S T I N E : 
"INMEMORIA EST COGITANDI MODUS'՝ 
P A I G E E V E L Y N H O C H S C H I L D 
The place o f memory in the theological ant feopology o f St. August ine has its 
roots i n the platonie epistemologica! t rad i t ion . August ine act ively engages w i t h 
th is t rad i t ion in his early wr i t ings i n a manner that is both ph i losophica l ly 
sophisticated and doctr inal ly consistent w i t h his later, more over t ly theologica l , 
wr i t ings . F rom the Cassiciacum dialogues th rough De musica, August ine points 
to the central importance o f memory : he examines th is power o f the soul as 
something that mediates sense-perception and understanding, wh i l e exp l ic i t l y 
deferr ing a more pro found treatment o f i t un t i l Confessiones and De trinitate. I n 
these t w o texts, memory is the foundat ion fo r the locat ion o f the imago Dei i n the 
m i n d . I t becomes the basis for the spir i tual experience o f the embodied creature, 
and a source o f the pro found anxiety that results f r o m the sensed oppos i t ion o f 
human t ime and d iv ine t ime (aetema ratio). Th is tension is contained and 
resolved, to a l im i ted extent, i n August ine 's c fø is to logy, i n the ab i l i t y o f a 
paradoxical incarnat ion to un i f y the temporal and the etemal ( i n Confessions 11 
and 12), and the l i fe o f fa i th (scientia) w i t h the promised contempla t ion o f the 
d iv ine {sapientia, i n De trinitate 12-14). 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
For August ine, i t is through memory that m i n d meets the w o r l d . Present 
percept ion o f th ings outside the body are in te l l igent ly apprehended by means o f 
memory ; the understanding o f intel lectual objects, even the m i n d itself, occurs 
th rough the media t ion o f memory . Mos t impor tant ly , memory is at the heart o f 
wha t i t means to be consti tuted in the image o f God . I t declares a fundamental 
relatedness o f what is changing to what is unchanging, and i n this re lat ion w e find 
the fu l f i l lmen t o f what i t means to be human. 
M e m o r y is o f course only one part o f the human t r iad o f memory , 
understanding and w i l l (or love) , and must be seen i n the end as inextr icably 
l inked w i t h these.^ Th is means that m i n d meets the w o r l d in a manner that is 
o r d e r l y ― b o t h as br ing ing an order to паШге that is not obvious to the senses, and 
as b r ing ing to l igh t a prov ident ia l order that is imp l i c i t i n the sensible——and i n a 
manner that is ideal ly intent ional and deliberate. "The bounds o f thought 
{cogitandi modus) are i n the memory " , August ine writes.^ W h e n memory is seen 
as a habitus, i t is the intent ional i ty o f the intel lect. M e m o r y is indeed receptive to 
the w o r l d , but i t is also a too l for the m ind to s i f t through the data o f sense-
percept ion by br ing ing to l ight , and even impos ing , modus and ordo. 
' Trin. 10.11.17-18, 
ᄂ Ibid. "Memory is the mind's eye formed or directed in a certain way. When Augustine 
speculates on tne connection between memory, understanding and w i l l , he sees them as aspects o f 
a single substance, the mind {mem). The category o f relation IS appropriate. Just as understanding 
is understanding o f something and w i l l is w i l l to effect something, so too memory is memory o f 
something: the terms, the activities to which they refer, cannot be understood in an absolute sense, 
as can 'substance' or ' l i f e ' or even 'mind' . . . . Memory is indeed the mind, but engaged in certain 
pursuits, directed in a certain way and in relation to certain objects." о'Daly (1987)， pp. 135-136. 
A l t hough the m i n d cannot be reduced to memory solely, memory is clearly 
the basis for a phenomenology o f embodied l i fe . Th is dissertat ion begins w i t h i n 
the discipl ine o f ph i losophica l psychology. The f i rst part considers the th ink ing o f 
Plato, Ar is to t le and Plot inus on memory and its re lat ion to sense-perception and 
understanding. I n th is, w e w i sh to observe that August ine 's o w n ref lect ions occur 
w i t h i n a context o f r i ch ph i losophica l re f lect ion on this topic. W e are not arguing 
in any new manner for direct textual inf luences, but rather observing the of fer ings 
o f a t radi t ion that August ine considered author i tat ive, even when it was received 
through an eclectic var iety o f reported sources. A l t h o u g h Plot inus alone takes 
memory not merely as a psycholog ica l category, but as a spir i tual habitus, i n the 
end we find August ine more at home w i t h Ar is to te l ian epistemology, and the 
mature ref lect ions o f Plato on the nature o f dialectic.^ O n the other hand, the first 
3 A n important but deliberate omission should be explained at this point. It is quite true that 
memory has a significant place in the Latin rhetorical tradit ion, but we shall deliberately neglect 
this tradition as peripheral to our study. It is possible to overstate the philosophical influence o f 
Cicero upon Augustine. According to Cicero, it was Simonides o f Ceos who invented the 
"mnemonic art o f memory" {De oratore 2.86); Plato, in Phaedrus, scorns this technique o f 
remembering as ''sense-memory without understanding." Cicero is indeed mainly interested in 
artif icial memory (as distinct from natural memory), the rules and techniques that an orator might 
use for the recollection o f images. Augustine however would not share Plato's harsh estimation o f 
the value o f memory in this sense. For Cicero, memory is also a part o f prudence {De inveทHone 
2.53.159). The orator is the teacher o f history, and the instructor o f citizens in virtuous behaviour; 
in order to be effective, he must be mindf t j l both o f the character o f his hearers, and o f the subject 
matter upon which he draws. Augustine clearly has Cicero in mind in the fourth book o f doctr. 
chr. (4.5.8)， when he insists upon the right use o f the rhetorical arts. We shall also observe an 
influence in the conception o f a developed "habi t " o f memory, although for Augustine this has the 
distinct sense o f a "mindfulness" o f God. This idea has a more l ikely influence from Plotinus' 
thinking on memory. Cicero's influence is l imited by his own lack o f interest in the 
anthropological and epistemologica! conditions for remembering: this is widely manifest in the 
Tusculan Disputations, where he speaks o f memory as a power o f the divine mind without any 
attempt at explanation or inquiry. Excellent work has been done on the mfluence o f Cicero and 
Seneca on Augustine; for the pJrposes o f a study o f theological anthropology, this is relevant, but 
secondary. See Janet Coleman, Ancient and Medieval Memories (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1992), p. 13, p. 4 1 ; John Gavadini, "The Sweetness o f the Word: Salvation and 
Rhetoric in Augustine's De doctrina chr։stianď\ in De doctrina Christiana: A Classic of Westerห 
Culture, Duane Arnold and Pamela Bright, eds. (University o f Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 
1995)， p. 165; on Cicero's philosophical import, see Stephen Gersh, Middle Platonism and 
Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition, 2 vols. (Uni versity o f Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1986), 
Vo l . Upp . 119-154. 
part o f the dissertat ion also inv i tes an increased wonder at precisely the or ig ina l i ty 
o f the central impor t o f memory in August ine 's wr i t ings. 
The second part o f the dissertat ion begins w i t h contra académicos and 
ends w i t h de musica. In i t i a l l y , memory arises as a topic here and there, but is 
del iberately deferred as requ i r ing fbrther examinat ion at a later date. August ine 
shows h imse l f to be engaged w i t h the epistemologica! issues surrounding memory 
and sense-perception, as raised in the first part. The larger goal o f these texts, 
however , is very d i f ferent , and i t is our pr imary task to observe the contexts i n 
w h i c h memory becomes impor tant : intel lectual i l l um ina t ion in soliloquia, 
providence i n creat ion i n de ordine, the intel l igence o f sense-perception and the 
ab i l i ty o f signs to instruct i n de magistro and de musica. De musica concludes 
w i t h number as the fundamental pr inc ip le o f creation, since number is an idea that 
can mediate oneness and mu l t i p l i c i t y . I t is the recognized need fo r mediat ion in 
creation——as w e l l as a paral le l med ia t ion in the un ion o f soul and body i n man—— 
that is the f ru i t o f these early wr i t i ngs , and w h i c h l inks the second part to the th i rd 
part. 
Our analysis o f confessiones 11 and 12 forms the core o f the dissertation. 
W e begin w i t h B o o k 10, the f i rst h a l f o f w h i c h is generally considered the classic 
" t ex tbook " on what August ine says about memory . Th is approach is inadequate, 
however , because this text on its o w n does not te l l us why it is important that 
August ine seeks after G o d w i t h i n the scope o f memory. Book 10 does however 
show h o w memory becomes the basis for the spir i tual anxiety that frames the 
Chr is t ian via, and it of fers the Incarnat ion as an enigmatic response to this 
problemat ic . We show h o w Books 11 and 12 develop this response. F ina l ly , we 
tu rn to de tľimtate, focussmg on Books 12-14, i n w h i c h the d icho tomy scientia-
10 
sapìentia paral lels that o f temporal-eteraal developed bo th i n conf. and trin. This 
d icho tomy explains the foundat ional place o f the image- t r in i ty o f memory , 
understanding and w i l l , and the incarnat ional response to the spir i tual distractio o f 
the embodied l i fe . 
Th is study therefore intends to contr ibute to a picture o f what an 
Augus t in ian " theory o f know ledge" m igh t look l i ke . A s such, i t addresses the 
absence o f any book- length study on the topic."* Mos t art icles or monographs that 
ment ion memory do so in an abstract manner that is not attentive to the context o f 
Augus t ine 's o w n wr i t i ng . Our method is therefore appropriately h is tor ica l , and 
largely exeget ical . I t is p r imar i l y concerned w i t h what is said i n a part icular place 
about memory , but u l t imate ly has as its goal the i l l um ina t ion o f the larger 
argument o f texts. There is no intent to reduce r i ch and many- layered passages 
s imp ly to memory and its importance. However , the neglected s igni f icance o f 
memory as the foundat ion for August ine 'ร anthropology is j us t l y brought to l ight . 
Theo log ica l anthropology is therefore where this essay ends, and not w i t h 
a theory o f knowledge. For August ine, memory delineates the inescapable 
condi t ions o f embodied l i fe : here the Incarnat ion of fers a hope o f med ia t ion , and 
therefore transcendence. Bu t the central place o f the Incarnat ion i n August ine 'ร 
theology o f creat ion requires h i m to see what m igh t be l im i ta t ion to Plot inus 
rather as a via, and as a reason for hope, for the Chr is t ian th inker. I n conf. 10， 
August ine observes that a l l people desire happiness, and supremely, the happiness 
o f the blessed l i fe . But f r o m what experience have they come to k n o w what this 
happiness migh t look l ike, such that they can desire i t , g iven that they have never 
4 The most "classic" secondary work on Augustine's use o f memory is found in the Notes 
Complémentaires o f the volumes from the Bibliothèque Augustinienne, especially those o f A . 
-Ш\¿^ш fQ^r Cöղfešsюm, Vols. 13 & 14 (Desčiée de Brouwer: Paris, 1962). See นาfrā for further 
references. 
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possessed it?5 Chr is t as the verax mediator is indeed an answer to this quest ion, 
as developed in Books 12 and 13: G o d moves the intel lect and w i l l through the 
knowledge that comes through the memory . The universal , fo r August ine, can 
only be perceived է Խ օ ս § հ the part icular. Th is must therefore happen through 
history, t l i rough the v is ib le , sensible works o f Chr is t , t feough the practice o f the 
vir tues, the love o f one'ร neighbour, the l i fe o f the Church , its sacraments, and 
above a l l i ts scripture. F r o m these experiences, a person has an in t imat ion o f what 
the happiness o f the caelum caeli consists in . The temporal heal ing o f fa i th 
transforms the distracţia o f memory into the intentio o f meditatio. The cont inu i ty 
o f fa i th is guaranteed by the cont inu i ty o f memory i n the l i fe o f the resurrected 
body.^ Th is cont inu i ty i n tu rn conf i rms our thesis concerning the pract ical 
impl icat ions o f memory at the heart o f the nature o f man. 
՝_Conf._ 10.20.29. O 'Daly (1987, pp. 205-207) wrongly thinks this question unanswered. 
' Trin. 14.2.4-14.3.5. 
12 
P A R T I : 
P H I L O S O P H I C A L T R A D I T I O N 
C H A P T E R 1: 
P L A T O 
There is a general consensus that August ine read some Platonic dialogues: 
C icero 'ร translat ion o f Timaeuร and parts o f Republic, translations oîPhaedo and 
Phaedrus} M u c h o f this may have come to h i m th rough the media t ion o f Stoic 
and M i d d l e Platonic sources, and par t icu lar ly th rough doxographies? A direct, 
though selective, inf luence o f Plot inus upon August ine is, i n m y op in ion , more 
transparent. W h i l e August ine c la ims a k insh ip w i t h P la ton ism at var ious stages in 
his career, when reading Plato, one is deeply aware o f the great d i f ference 
between their respective intel lectual universes, both in terms o f phi losophical style 
and re l ig ious spir i t . So much scholar ly i nk has been spi l led over the nature o f the 
libri Platonicorum so famously ment ioned i n conf. 7.9. The context is o f ten 
over looked, for this passage speaks o f the "monst rous p r i de " o f the one who 
del ivered these books to August ine.^ 
Nevertheless, to "P la ton i sm" i n general August ine attr ibutes his f reedom 
f r o m phi losophica l mater ia l ism and, related to th is , a concept ion o f ev i l as a 
p r iva t ion o f the Good . 4 Though free f r o m this part icular error {falsum)^ August ine 
describes h imse l f as we ighed d o w n by the "hab i t o f the flesh" {''pondus,., 
consuetudo carnalis''). The body i tse l f and its w a y w a r d inc l inat ions are clearly 
See the entry on "Platonism" by Frederick Van Fleteren in Augustine Through the Ages: An 
Encyclopedia, ed. A l lan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), pp. 651-
654, 
՜ A. Solignac, "Doxographies et manuels dans la formation philosophique de saint August in" , 
Recherches Augustiniennes 1 (Etudes Augustiniennes: Paris, 1958), pp. 113-148. 
3 On the libri Platomcorum, see iìrfra. For an historical account o f scholarship on this question, 
see c. Starneš, Augustine ՝ร Conversion (Wi l f red Laurier University Press: Waterloo, 1990), pp. 
202-203. 
4 See сол /7 .9 -17 . 
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dist inguished, the one good by nature and the other fundamental ly flawed; and yet 
their close relat ionship w i l l g ive rise to ideas and problems discussed later i n this 
section. I t is p r imar i l y our in tent ion i n th is section to consider the inf luence o f 
Plato on August ine 'ร concept ion o f memory in the context o f basic issues o f 
sense-perception and body-soul dua l ism. W e w i l l argue for a direct thematic 
inf luence w i t h respect to memory , as w e l l as s igni f icant, indirect parallels ( fo r 
example, in Plato 'ร understanding o f the role o f sense-perception i n d ia lect ic) . 
A s to recol lect ion ш part icular , and the nature o f memory , the most 
exp l ic i t reference to Plato made by August ine is found i n trin. 12.15.24. Even this 
is a cur ious passage, however , since August ine is reject ing only a part icular aspect 
o f the doctr ine o f recol lect ion, namely , the imp l i ca t ion o f pre-existence and 
reincarnation.^ I n its place, he suggests an onto logy o f i l l umina t ion . The 
connect ion between memory and i l l um ina t i on is also developed in COทf 10. 
Whether that connect ion actual ly has a source i n Plato 'ร texts w i l l be considered. 
The greatest d i f f i cu l t y i n l ook ing for echoes o f Plato in August ine l ies in 
the challenge o f the Platonic texts themselves. I t is very d i f f i cu l t to extract 
"doc t r ines" f r o m the Platonic dialogues wh i l e being sensitive to the larger context 
o f the work . W e are not aided by the fact that much m o d e m scholarship on Plato 
rejects the "doct r ine o f reco l lec t ion" as hav ing much explanatory power or 
phi losophica l usefulness.^ Moreover , P la to 'ร dialogues clearly manifest a 
development i n his t h i nk ing , especial ly w i t h respect to larger onto log ica i 
questions about the nature o f the fo rms and their relat ion to the sensible th ings o f 
Plato has Socrates insist that he need not maintain every aspect o f the story o f the disembodied 
immortal soul {Phaedo 114d). 
6 See, for example, Gail Fine, " Inqui ry in the Meno^\ in The Cambridge Companion to Plato 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1992), pp. 200-226; Dominic Scott, ' 'Platonic 
Recollection", in Plato: Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Vo l . 1 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
1999), pp. 93-124. 
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w h i c h they are the forms. W h i l e the Timaeuร is not the last w o r d on this subject, 
i t nevertheless tends to cast a shadow over the rest o f the later dialogues because 
o f its deeply in f luent ia l role i n post-hel lenist ic and early medieval t h o u g h t / 
T o w a r d the end o f his l i fe , the characters in Plato 's dialogues speak w i t h less 
author i ty and f ina l i t y about crucia l matters o f on to logy . Іп Іефге Ї Іуе issues arise 
pr ior to any discussion o f an epistemologica! or psychologica l nature. We w i l l 
po in t to these issues at the conclus ion to the f i rst part o f this section. 
W i t h these concerns i n m i n d , we w i l l attempt to sketch a p ic ture o f sense-
percept ion and memory i n Plato 'ร Avritings, s taying closer to the texts August ine is 
thought to have read. Thus we w i l l l ook main ly at parts o f Philebus, Phaedrus 
and Republic, parts o f Timaeuร w i l l be par t icu lar ly considered, and on ly b r ie f l y , 
Mem. W e w i l l refer to other dialogues ch ie f ly when they i l luminate what is f ound 
in these. The later dialogues w i l l enter into p lay on ly to prov ide a r icher sense o f 
a Platonic teaching on the nature o f dialect ic as ph i losophica l pract ice. These 
chapters on phi losophica l sources are c i rcumscr ibed i n scope by a mindfu lness o f 
the specif ic debt at t r ibuted to Platonism by August ine 8， and by the 
epistemologica! issues o rb i t ing the topic o f memory i n the early dialogues. 
A ''mythological theory of soul 
A picture o f Plato 's understanding o f the паШге o f the t r ipart i te soul can be 
d rawn f r o m parts o f Republic, especial ly Book 4， Phaedrus and Timaeuร, Th is 
aspect o f Plato 'ร teaching is held to be o f l i t t le account by m o d e m scholars o f 
7 See discussions on the place o f Timaeuร in the Platonic софиร in "The relation o f the Timaeuร to 
Plato's later dialogues", H.F. Chemiss in Studies in Plato 'ร Metaphysics, R.E. A l len , ed. 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1965); see also "The place o f the Timaeuร in Plato's 
dialogues", by Ģ.E.L. Owen in the same volume. 
8 In conf. 7. 
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Plato, occasional ly dismissed as mere ly " m y t h o l o g i c a l " or re l ig ious, and hardly 
consistent w i t h the rest o f his wr i t i ngs . I t is however the ab id ing image to w h i c h 
Plato returns, and i t originates his most poignant ref lect ions on the relat ion o f soul 
and body . 9 I t is very l i ke ly that August ine encountered th is image in more than 
one text. 
I n Republic 4， the soul is described as hav ing three "par ts " , the rat ional , 
the spir i ted, and the appet i t ive. ' " Plato does not describe these merely as aspects 
o f the soul , but as veri table and dist inct " f o r m s " that are "ac tua l ly e x i s t i n g . " " In 
Book 10 he a l lows that the composi te nature o f the soul w o u l d seem to 
compromise his argument for its immor ta l i t y , and he responds by saying that soul 
in its essential nature is s imple and pure. I t is on ly by v i r tue o f its relat ionship 
w i t h body that i t becomes var ied, says P l a t o . I t s s impl ic i ty is attr ibuted to its 
highest part: the d iv is ions are real , and not mere ly a func t ion o f the soul 's 
operations. Timaeuร, a later d ia logue, essential ly con f i rms this explanat ion o f the 
tr ipart i te structure o f the soul , and consequently the immor ta l i t y o f on ly the 
highest, rat ional part o f the soul . '^ 
Guthr ie argues that wh i l e the dividedness o f the soul is associated w i t h the 
body, i t is not actual ly caused by the body.14 H e points to a shi f t away f r o m 
9 Consider the ordering o f the articles in the " M o d e m Studies in Philosophy" volumes on Plato. 
Relegated to the small" dusty section at the end o f the second volume on "Rel ig ion" are two o f the 
best essays on Platonic epistemology: E.R. Dodds, "Plato and the Irrational Soul" (pp. 206-229), 
and W.K.C. Guthrie, "Plato's Views oil the Nature o f the Soul" (pp. 230-243) (ed. Gregory 
Vlastos (Doubleday: New York, 1971)). 
' 0 439d-e (logistibn, epithumetikon, thumoedes). 
" The English translation we are using is that o f Paul Shorey in the Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith 
Hamilton and Huntington Caims (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1961), originally prmted 
in the Loeb Classical Library, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1930). 
՚՜ 6 П a-d. This way o f speaking w i l l be powerful ly echoed by Plotinus and Christian writers, such 
as Origen, influenced by the early Neoplatonic tradition. 
" 44d and 90a-b. 
Cf. art. cit., pp. 234-236. 
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prov ing the immor ta l i t y o f the soul f r o m s impl ic i ty o f nature, to a p r o o f based on 
the se l f -mov ing capacity o f the soul in Phaedrนร}^ Plato there uses an image to 
describe the nature o f the soul that qual i f ies the hierarchical р ісШге that we have 
sketched. 
(The soul is) l ikened to the un ion o f powers i n a team o f w inged steeds and 
their w inged charioteer. N o w al l the gods ' steeds and al l their charioteers 
are good, and o f good stock, but w i t h other beings i t is not so. . . ( O f the 
steeds,) one o f them is noble and good, and o f good stock, wh i le the other 
has the opposite character. . . . Hence the task o f the charioteer is d i f f i cu l t 
and t roublesome. '^ 
We have the three elements o f the soul in a s imi le . Guthr ie notes that bo th gods 
and men have t r ipar t i te souls and that the souls o f men destined for bodies already 
have a l l toee parts in place. Wha t d i f fers is not the structure o f the soul , but the 
character o f the lower parts. The souls that are caught in the earthly cyc le o f 
reincarnat ion, w h i c h have not yet attained phi losophica l w i s d o m , are subject to 
unru ly impulses. I n the end, Plato does not indicate a dissolut ion or loss o f the 
appeti t ive and spir i ted parts o f the soul , but rather that they be exercised and 
mastered by the highest part o f the soul , w h i c h is m i n d . A s Ar is to t le and Plot inus 
w i l l agree, i t is l i fe according to nous that br ings peace to the who le person. Body 
per se is not real ly the p rob lem fo r the soul ; i t is a means to an end, the end o f the 
l iberat ion o f the m i n d . 
Sense-perception 
I n Republic 6 (511d-e) , Plato of fers a d iv i s ion i n the parts o f knowledge; 
l i tera l ly , they are af fect ions (pathemata) or operations o f the soul : in te l lect ion 
{ทoesis), discursive reasoning (dianoia), be l ie f Qjistis) and image-mak ing 
" 245c-246e. 
՚ 6 246b. 
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{eikasià)}^ The latter two are proper to the rea lm o f what is sensible, or " v i s i b l e . " 
Since the physical w o r l d is constantly changing, i t cannot be a stable g round fo r 
faiowledge. The first t w o div is ions pertain to the knowledge o f the fo rms. For 
Plato, there is no knowledge o f sensible th ings; wh i l e there is such a th ing as 
sense-perception, i t cannot procure any rel iable in fo rmat ion about the w o r l d . 
Thus, at Phaedo 65e-66a， Socrates says to S immias : 
D o n ' t y o u th ink that the person who is l i ke l y to succeed i n this attempt 
( i .e. at knowledge) most perfect ly is the one w h o approaches each object , 
as far as possible, w i t h the unaidied intel lect , w i thou t tak ing account o f any 
sense o f sight i n his th ink ing , or dragging any other sense into his 
reckon ing—the man who pursues the t ru th by app ly ing his pure and 
unadulterated thought to the pure and unadulterated object , cut t ing h imse l f 
o f f as m u c h as possible f r o m his eyes and ears and v i r tua l l y a l l the rest o f 
his body, as an impediment wh i ch by its presence prevents the soul f r o m 
at ta in ing to t ru th and clear th ink ing? Is not th is the person, S immias, w h o 
w i l l reach the goal o f real i ty, i f anybody can?*^ 
This passage makes i t clear that what the body takes i n by the senses can be a 
hindrance to true knowledge. The passage above f r o m Timaeนร raises the 
quest ion o f the mora l i t y , as i t were, o f sense-perception. The image o f the cave 
f r o m Republic 514b suggests that those who operate p r imar i l y w i t h i n the scope o f 
sense-perception are w i l l f u l l y bound in the darkness, m is tak ing transient images 
si lhouetted on a w a l l fo r real i ty. The soul , acco rd๒g to Phaedo, must re f ra in f r o m 
using the senses as much as possible, since thei r object is var iable and deceptive. 
The same is the case for emot ions, such as pleasure or pain. I t is " ch ie f l y v is ib le 
th ings" that have deceptive inf luences, for the soul falsely takes an impression to 
be true, w h i c h i n m m gives rise to an emot ional effect֊֊even though we are o f ten 
՚ 7 The fourth word,  eikasia,  is di f f icult to translate because it is rarely used เท classical Greek; 
yarjous translators render it as " imaginat ion", "conjecture", "picture th ink ing" or " i l lus ion. " 
՚ 8 Trans. Hugh Tredennick. 
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mistaken, th ink ing that what is t ru ly real is the cause o f emot ional reactions. 
Thus, 
Every seeker after w i s d o m knows that up to the t ime when phi losophy 
takes i t over his soul is a helpless pr isoner, chained hand and foot in the 
body, compel led to v i e w real i ty not d i rect ly but th rough its pr ison bars, 
and w a l l o w i n g in utter ignorance. A n d ph i losophy can see that the 
impr isonment is ingeniously ef fected by the pr isoner 'ร o w n active desire, 
wh ich makes h i m first accessory to his o w n conf inement . W e l l , 
phi losophy takes over the soul i n this cond i t ion and by gentle persuasion 
tries to set it fгee.^^ 
The danger is that the images taken i n through the senses w i l l be mistaken for 
actual knowledge. Though the prisoner is helpless i n h is bonds, he is in a 
condi t ion o f his o w n mak ing . I t is on ly by the in tervent ion o f ph i losophy that he 
can be freed. 
The picture o f the tr ipart i te soul f r o m Timaeus is more posi t ive. I t is clear 
here that error can arise not s imply f r o m the w i l l f o l l y cu l t ivated habits o f the soul , 
but f r o m the nature o f sense-perception itself. Op in i on marks the l im i t o f sense-
percept ion, and recti tude o f op in ion is accidental . What , then, is sense-perception, 
and o f what use? A n d h o w does i t pertain to be l ie f and " image-mak ing"? I n 
Theatetus, the basis o f the explanat ion is that the universe " rea l ly is mot ion and 
noth ing else."^^ M o t i o n can be considered i n bo th an act ive and a passive sense: i t 
w o u l d appear as though physical objects act ively move upon the sense organs, 
wh i le sense organs are moved in a passive, receptive w a y . 2 i The result o f this 
two - f o l d mo t ion is a percept ion and the th ing perceived (156b) . These two things 
"come to b i r t h " at exact ly the same t ime. 
82e֊83a. 
՜*^ 156a (trans. Francis M. Comford), in  Plato 'ร Theory of Knowledge (Macmil lan Publishing 
Company: New York, 1957). This understanding o f motion partially underlies Aristotle'ร 
conception o f the distinction between active and passive. 
21 157b5 makes it di f f icul t to move beyond the idea o f the sensible as motion simply, to the extent 
o f reifying a gi ven "object" or "recipient organ", or granting priority to one or the other. 
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A s soon, then, as an eye and something else whose strucณre is adjusted to 
the eye come w i t h i n range and give b i r th to the whiteness together w i t h its 
cognate percept ion . . . then i t is that, as the v is ion f r o m the eyes and the 
whiteness f r om the th ing that jo ins in g i v ing b i r th to the co lour pass i n the 
space in between, the eye becomes f i l l ed w i t h v is ion and n o w sees and 
becomes, not v i s ion , but a seeing eye; wh i le the other parent o f the co lour 
is saturated w i t h whiteness and becomes, on its side, not whiteness, but a 
whi te th ing , be i t stock or stone or whatever else may chance to be so 
coloured.^ 
A s Ar is to t le w i l l agree, Plato concludes that sense-perception is in fa l l ib le . Under 
normal circumstances, w i t h the body funct ion ing proper ly , the senses relay data 
re l iably. Since the physical w o r l d is understood in terms o f m o t i o n , Plato w i l l 
accept to an extent Protagoras' m a x i m that " m a n is the measure o f a l l t h i n g s " ― a t 
least w i t h respect to sense-perception.^^ Each perspective is un ique, and therefore 
the " t r u t h " o f percept ion is relat ive to the perceiver. I n Timaeuร (45c-d) , the 
process is described somewhat d i f ferent ly . Accord ing to the pr inc ip le o f the 
a f f in i t y o f s imi lar th ings, the l igh t o f day "coalesces" w i t h the "s t ream" o f v i s ion ; 
when this "af fected s t ream" o f v i s ion encounters an object, the mot ions are 
" d i f f u s e d " over the body o f the one seeing, un t i l they reach the soul , thereby 
causing sight. The important qua l i f i ca t ion o f this later account is the locat ion o f 
dual causali ty i n the l ight and i n the seer, w h i c h makes sense-perception less 
passive than i n Theatetus. 
Theatetus and Phaedo do not prov ide us w i t h a much more detai led picture 
than that. Plato seems more interested i n d is t inguishing knowledge f r o m sense-
percept ion than i n seriously invest igat ing the latter.^^* However , w e must add to 
" 156d-e. 
23 ІбОе-ІбЗа. 
2 4 This is Comford 'ร conclusion; however, the problem remains o f the absence o f any coherent, 
ontologicai or psychological basis for this explanation o f sense-perception in Theatetus; cf. 186e. 
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this generally pessimist ic account the perspective o f the later Timaeus, one w h i c h 
August ine certainly read, and in w h i c h we find a d i f ferent tone altogether. 
Sight, i n my op in ion , is the source o f the greatest benefit to us, for had w e 
never seen the stars and the รนท and the heaven, none o f the words w h i c h 
we have spoken about the universe w o u l d even have been uttered. Bu t 
n o w the sight o f day and n ight , and the months and the revolut ions o f the 
years have created number and have g iven us a concept ion o f t ime, and the 
power o f inqu i r ing about the nature o f the universe. A n d from this source 
we have der ived ph i losophy, than w h i c h no greater good ever was or w i l l 
be g i ven by the gods to mor ta l m a n . . . . God invented and gave us sight to 
the end that w e migh t behold the courses o f intel l igence in the heaven, and 
apply them to the courses o f our o w n intel l igence wh i ch are ak in to them, 
the unperturbed to the perturbed, and that we， learning them and par tak ing 
o f the natural t ru th o f reason, m igh t imi tate the absolutely unerr ing courses 
o f G o d and regulate our o w n vagaries. The same may be a f f i rmed o f 
speech and hear ing . . . . [For ] harmony, w h i c h has mot ions ak in to the 
revolut ions o f our souls. . . is meant to correct any discord w h i c h may have 
arisen i n the courses o f the soul , and to be our al ly in br ing ing her in to 
harmony and agreement w i t h herself, and rhy thm too was g iven by t hem 
for the same reason, on account o f the regular and graceless ways w h i c h 
prevai l among mank ind general ly, and to help us against them. 
Th is passage is part o f the " c rea t i on " story o f Timaeus, and Plato is clearly 
a l l ow ing that the etemal order o f the forms֊or, here, o f the d iv ine i n t e l l i g e n c e ― 
can be perceived th rough the phys ica l , created order. Th is rea lm, i n Timaeus, is 
described as an im i ta t ion , and therefore an image, o f the in te l l ig ib le order (48e). 
He re -a f f im is the vo lat i le nature o f the phys ica l , but he locates this vo la t i l i t y in the 
elements that constitute th ings, especial ly the "receptacle" , the unformed mat r i x 
o f " a l l generat ion." Nevertheless, mo t i on here is not merely the endless flux o f 
the sensible i n Theatetus, but somehow the product o f soul and the p roo f o f its 
v i ta l i ty . 
' 47a-e (trans. Benjamin Jowett). 
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Knowledge as recollection in the early dialogues: M e n o and Phaedo 
Plato br idges the g u l f between the sensible and the in te l l ig ib le w i t h his 
mature understanding o f dialect ic. I n the earlier dialogues, however , a d i f ferent 
mode l o f knowledge predominates. The most impor tant th ing for Plato i n these 
texts is the preservat ion o f knowledge f r o m sense-perception and its inf luences. 
The image o f the d iv ided l ine f r o m Republic 4 ment ioned above attr ibutes error 
both to sense-perception and op in ion. The f irmness o f the d iv is ion between 
knowledge and op in ion creates a prob lem i n account ing fo r the acquis i t ion o f 
knowledge. The theory o f recol lect ion is intended to answer this p rob lem, i n that 
it establishes a relat ionship between the m i n d and some sort o f " i nna te " pr inc ip les 
or ideas. The fami l ia r " learner 'ร paradox" o f Meno asks h o w one can seek after 
knowledge unless one already has some sense o f what i t is that is sought after.^^ 
Recol lec t ion is supposed to prov ide an explanat ion for a direct apprehension o f 
the forms. 
Socrates of fers an account o f the role o f recol lect ion, but even he rejects 
the explanatory value o f mainta in ing the pre-existence o f the soul as a part o f t h a t 
account. I n m y op in ion , Plato is ready to do this because he has said that 
recol lect ion is s imultaneously the reject ion o f the false impressions taken in by the 
senses, and the " rea l i za t ion" o f the immediate ly avai lable ideas. B o t h o f these 
aspects suggest that the soul does not exist i n a transcendent, supra-temporal state, 
as do the ideas. The l im i ta t ion o f the theory as presented in Meno l ies in the fact 
that i t on ly explains the former: what guarantee can there be that the soul , after 
hav ing its false opin ions removed, is not immediate ly occupied by opin ions more 
false than the first? The pre-existence o f the soul explains, i n a mytho log ica l 
80c. This trope o f the paradox o f "seek๒g" persists throughout Augustine's writ ings, even 
through to later, mature theological writings (e.g. conf. 1.1.1;/пи. 15.28.51). 
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fashion, h o w the soul m igh t have come to be in the body ; but i t is apparently not 
necessary i n order to mainta in recol lect ion as a theory o f learning. The idea o f 
recol lect ion establishes a necessary i f unspecif ied re lat ion to concepts in general, 
and demands that a methodology be established for the acquis i t ion o f faiowledge 
over a per iod o f t ime. 
Phaedo should be read as a ref inement o f th is theory. Discussions o f the 
nature o f the soul a f f i r m recol lect ion as a theory o f l e a r n i n g . T h e question o f 
pre-existence occurs again, since i t (or at the very least, immor ta l i t y ) seems to 
f o l l o w f r o m the a f f i rmat ion o f the eternity o f ideas such as Beauty and Goodness. 
The inter locutors ask whether the soul 's knowledge is gained before its b i r th into 
the body, or whether i t is gained at precisely the moment o f b i r th , and 
immediate ly forgotten.^^ The latter explanat ion is dismissed. I n this dialogue, the 
eternity o f the ideas is assumed, and the immor ta l i t y o f the soul is proved as a 
consequence?^ A s such, the argument becomes more o f an onto log ica i account 
for h o w things possess their attr ibutes, namely, by par t ic ipat ion i n the etemal 
ideas to w h i c h the attributes correspond. A paral le l method o f learning is 
suggested as an "hypo the t i ca l " method, i n the context o f the discussion o f 
par t ic ipat ion as causation: 
. . . [One] w o u l d ho ld fast to the security o f your hypothesis and make your 
answers accordingly. I f anyone should fasten upon the hypothesis itself, 
y o u w o u l d disregard h i m and refuse to answer un t i l y o u cou ld consider 
whether its consequences were mutua l ly consistent or not. A n d when you 
had to substantiate the hypothesis i tself, y o u w o u l d proceed i n the samie 
way , assuming whatever more ul t imate hypothesis commended i tse l f most 
to y o u , un t i l y o u reached one w h i c h was satisfactory. Y o u w o u l d not m i x 
the two things together by discussing both the pr inc ip le and its 
72e;91e. 
' 76d-e. 
2 9 100b. Contrast wi th Mem, where the soul's pre-existence, or immortal i ty, is not argued for. 
Thè proof for immortality in Phaedo should be compared wi th Augustine's proof o f immortality 
based on the nature o f truth in imm. an. 
24 
consequences, l i ke one o f these destructive c r i t i c s ~ t h a t is, i f you wanted 
to discover any part o f the t r u th . . . But you , I imagine, i f y o u are a 
phi losopher, w i l l f o l l o w the course w h i c h I descr ibe/^ 
The relat ionship between the m i n d and the forms or ideas is here el ic i ted as a 
method: i t is a process o f ver i f i ca t ion , w i t h the character o f an ascent to the 
knowledge o f cer t i f iab ly true pr incip les. A s Sayre points out, whereas the cr i t ical 
method o f Socratic dialect ic i n Meno concerns on ly the necessary condi t ions for 
t ru th , this method, in examin ing the consequences o f an hypothesis, concerns both 
the necessary and the suf f ic ient condi t ions for t ruth.^ ' What Meno had to assume 
in order to expla in h o w knowledge is b o m in the soul , Phaedo must acณal ly 
prove. Moreover , essential to recol lect ion is the no t ion that al l the aspects o f 
knowledge subsist i n an order ly fashion, such that one recalled fact w i l l b r ing w i t h 
i t a host o f other log ica l associations. I n Mem, this process is conceived in a 
basical ly negative way , in terms o f the conversion o f op in ion into knowledge."^^ 
I n the Phaedo, w e have a process o f ascent la id out as a series o f steps: posit a 
hypothesis, then ve r i f y by its consequences, and so on. Th is suggests a mental 
content that, when brought to l igh t as understanding, is log ica l , complex and 
in tu i t ive , apparently hav ing no th ing to do w i t h sense-perception or ordinary 
experience. The sense o f "ascent" here is o f a movement away f r o m the temporal 
and spatial, away f r o m the dist ract ion o f experience. Recol lect ion is not a method 
so 101d-102a (trans. Hugh Tredennick). 
3 ' Kenneth Sayre, Plato 'ร Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved (Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, 1983), p. 194. This is one o f the most important books on the late dialogues o f Plato, 
historical and textual in its approach. M y іпїефгеїаїіоп o f Philebus in the context o f Plato's larger 
project depends on Sayre's reading o f the argument o f Philebm. However, we differ from Sayre 
on several points, in particular his conviction that Plato abandons recollection as an explanatory 
model, setting aside references to recollection in middle and later works as merely "metaphorical." 
We w i l l fo l low the example more o f H.G. Gadamer on the place o f recollection in Plato's 
understanding o f mental activity as dialectic; cf. infra. 
32 Janet Coleman, Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1992), pp. 6-9. 
25 
o f b r ing ing again before the m ind ' ร eye some part icular mental content or image 
by means o f mnemonic tags, ordered by custom or habit . I t is a restorat ion to the 
m i n d ' s eye o f clear relat ionships o f logical necessity. The object o f recol lect ion is 
what is universal , and universal ly true for a l l . The m i n d that remembers is not 
extended over t ime to encompass a greater number o f part iculars. I t is rather the 
m i n d attuned to what is s imple. However , says Socrates in Phaedo, "even i f y o u 
f i n d our or ig ina l assumptions conv inc ing, they st i l l need more accurate 
considerat ion."^ ' ' The "assumpt ions" i n quest ion here are the fo rms, and Republic 
speaks to this need. 
Before consider ing relevant passages o f Republic, i t is w o r t h not ing that 
Phaedrus, a d ia logue w h i c h August ine may have read34， strongly a f f i rms a sense 
o f memory as something transcendent, de-temporal ized. Socrates tel ls a story i n 
order to h igh l igh t the importance o f a higher func t ion o f memory , as dist inguished 
f r o m the process o f remember ing by means o f "externa l marks . " He speci f ical ly 
cr i t ic izes w r i t i n g i n this dia logue, because it has the "ve ry opposite o f its true 
effect. I f men learn this, i t w i l l implant forgetf i i lness in their souls; they w i l l 
cease to exercise memory because they rely on that w h i c h is wr i t ten , ca l l ing 
things to remembrance no longer f r o m \¥1էհտ."՛՛^ Th is exchange comes at the 
conclus ion o f a dialogue concerning the Beautifbl, and the way i n wh i c h i t is 
desired through the love o f the beloved. I n place o f the wr i t ten word, 
conversation, and speci f ical ly dialectic, is he ld up as the " l i v i n g w o r d " or " l i v i n g 
speech.，'36 The dia lect ic ian "selects a soul o f the right type, and in i t he plants and 
' 107b. 
' Cf. F. Van Fleteren in Augustine Through the Ages, pp. 651-654. 
5 275a (trans. R. Hackforth). Memory here is one, even i f i t is exercised ๒ different ways, 
vhether by the wri t ten word, or (preferably) by the teacher o f dialectic. 
6 276a. 
26 
sows his words founded on knowledge."^^ H is words f l ou r i sh and g row to the 
extent that they manifest t ruthfulness. The speeches he produces str ict ly for the 
sake o f instruct ion are his in ter ior ch i ld ren, and are inscr ibed in the soul o f the 
l istener as " l eg i t ima te " brothers and sisters. Nevertheless, Socrates blesses the 
poet and the po l i t ica l speechwriter i n the end, so long as i n the act o f w r i t i ng they 
w o r k " w i t h a knowledge o f the t r u t h " and w i t h a conv ic t ion o f the in fer ior i ty o f 
the wr i t ten format compared to the thought i tse l f signif ied.^^ Here we have a 
recogni t ion o f the place o f verbal images in recol lect ion^^, and therefore in 
dialect ic. Moreover , th rough the act iv i ty o f dialect ic, we g l impse a way i n wh i ch 
memory can serve as a basis for commun i t y by the necessary dependence on the 
other. 
Divisions in the way of knowing: Republ ic 
Republic o f fers several impor tant developments. The boundary between 
the sensible and in te l l ig ib le realms remains firmly d rawn. The div is ions in 
cogni t ive act iv i ty (cf. supra) correspond appropriately to a " t w o - w o r l d on to logy" , 
to use Say re 's termino logy. A new element is the i l l umina t i ve power o f the Good. 
I t is an open question whether the Good for Plato is to the forms or ideas primus 
inter pares: Plato suggests both possibi l i t ies in Republic. The most important 
passage for understanding Plato 's concept ion o f dialect ic describes the Good as 
shin ing d o w n upon reason and its objects, much l ike the sun i l lumines both the 
eye and its objects, g i v i n g rise to the act iv i ty o f seeing.^*^ I t is the highest 
276e. 
' 278c. 
' A t Phaedo 74b. 
' 508c. 
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in te l l ig ib le principle, and yet i t transcends what is true and knowab le as cause o f 
both the act o f knowledge, and the very "essence and existence" o f i ts օեյ60էտ. ՛" 
The in te l l ig ib le l igh t o f the Good extends to the sensible as we l l as the 
intel l ig ible, and as a result o f this, the sensible can be described as a l im i ted 
ref lect ion o f the intelligible. The epistemologica! picture reflects the ontologicai. 
Plato dist inguishes between phi losophical, epistemic knowledge  (noesis)  and 
mathematical, "d ianoe t i c " knowledge. Wh i l e the sensible rea lm is o f course on ly 
conducive to opinion, the in te l l ig ib le rea lm corresponds to the dialect ical method 
w i t l i wh i ch we are famil iar, described here again i n terms o f ascent, as a power 
that reason uses, " t reat ing its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but l i tera l ly 
as hypotheses... springboards, so to speak, to enable it to rise to that wh i ch 
requires no assumpt ion and is the start ing point o f Th is is contrasted w i t h 
the method o f mathemat ica l knowledge that moves f r om assumptions to 
conclusions, mak ing "use o f the v is ib le fo rms and ta lk ing about them, though they 
are not th ink ing o f them but o f those things o f wh i ch they are a likeness." Th is  a 
posteriori method is contrasted w i t h true dialectic, wh i ch ascends and descends, 
remain ing a lways w i t h the ideas; nevertheless i t is a legi t imate f o rm o f 
knowledge, even though i t requires the use o f images. Plato discerns the need to 
ref ine his concept ion o f an hypothet ica l method, namely, to inc lude a var iety o f 
objects o f knowledge. He does not want to abandon, however, a method that 
depends upon the direct apprehension o f the ideas. 
The highest pr inc ip le i n Phaedo is cal led by the name o f t ru th ; here, i t is 
referred to as the Good. I n this context, Plato br ings before us the vir tues and 
character o f the dialectician, or true philosopher. Th is is impor tant to the larger 
4 ' 509b. 
' - 5 l i b (trans. P. Shorey). 
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sense o f dialect ic being developed. No t on ly does the d ia lect ic ian g ive an exact 
account o f the essence o f each thing, and as such discerns the Good ; he also seeks 
after p ropor t ion and order, and this is ref lected i n his way o f l i v i n g / ^ He 
embodies the vir tues o f "magn i f i cence o f sou l " and f r iendl iness; he is gracious, 
generous, courageous and քՅՄ.՛՛՛՛ Mos t important, wh i l e the average man is 
" fo rge t fu l o f his own soul", the phi losopher is a man o f memory, and thus a lover 
o f \¥1տճօու.՛՛^  A s we observe in  Phaedrus,  ph i losophica l ac t iv i ty does not have its 
end in a sol i tary contemplat ion o f the Good, but i n a descent to the fe l lowsh ip o f 
men, to the l i fe o f the virtues, and the duties o f instruction. Memo r y funct ions to 
retain a constant and l i v i ng l i nk to the l igh t o f the Good. I n  Republic,  the ideas 
are ordered to the Good, j us t as the vir tues are ordered to the practice o f 
knowledge. There are in t imat ions here o f a hierarchical set o f relationships—— 
hence the recurr ing references to "o rde r " and " p r o p o r t i o n " ― b e t w e e n the forms, 
and between the forms and the Good . This idea is developed more by later 
disciples o f Plato. Recol lect ion, as dialect ic, can be conceived as a movement , 
upward and downward , w i t h i n an intr icate pattern o f log ica l relat ionships. The 
sense o f recol lect ion f r o m Mem no longer seems adequate; instead we have here 
memory {mneme) as a v i r tue, a hexis, a mode o f being rather than a 
methodolog ica l sketch o f the m i n d ' s relat ionship to the fonns . 
The practice of dialectic: a "new " role for memory 
The idea o f the fo rms as interconnected and hierarchical ly ordered to a 
first causal pr inc ip le , is shown by Sayre to be most f u l l y developed i n Philebus. 
4 3 534b; 486d. 
4 4 503c; 505a-b. 
՚ " 486d; 487a; 490c; 503c. . 
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The essays o f Hans-Georg Gadamer on dialect ic argue that i n Philebus we also 
see a fu l l representation o f reco l lect ion t ransformed into dialect ic "as a way o f 
life.""*^ Sayre argues that this constitutes a re ject ion o f the explanatory usefulness 
o f the idea o f recollection."^'' Reco l lec t ion intends to expla in a direct apprehension 
o f the forms apart f r o m the interference o f sense images. Dia lect ic includes a 
knowledge o f the fo rms, but as part o f a p rogram o f v i r tue conceived in a social 
context. Against Sayre, we w o u l d respond that recol lect ion in Mem never attains 
the status o f a tecl in ique. Plato is c lear ly u n w i l l i n g i n Republic to abandon his 
conv ic t ion o f a s imple and direct k i n d o f knowledge , as dist inct f r o m 
mathematical knowledge. Sayre is qui te r ight , however , that Plato does not 
overcome in Republic the ftindamental d i l emma o f the knowledge and staณs o f 
the sensible w o r l d . Plato appeals to the idea o f par t ic ipat ion on several occasions 
as an onto logicai response, but as w i t h reco l lect ion in Meno, this seems l i t t le more 
than a metaphor. Since it is general ly agreed that August ine d id not have access 
to the later dialogues ( w i t h the notable except ion o f Timaeuร^^), we can propose at 
this point that he inheri ts some f o r m o f the Platonic d i lemma f r o m Republic, 
I t w i l l be o f great use to our examinat ion o f August ine 'ร early wr i t ings to 
note the avenues taken by Plato i n order to tackle the issues at hand. I n br ief, i n 
Philebus we find that a " t w o - w o r l d o n t o l o g y " is superceded, and part ic ipat ion 
takes on a stronger role in exp la in ing h o w forms and the things that part icipate i n 
them are "on to log ica l l y homogenous."'*^ I n the early and midd le dialogues, the 
46 He argues that this idea is present to some extent in earlier dialogues such as Mem and Phaedo, 
See "The Idea o f the Good in the Timaeuร'\ in Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermemutical 
Studies on Plato, trans, p. Christopher Smith (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1983). 
4 7 Sayre, p. 193; p. 219. 
4 8 In which a firm " two-wor ld ontology" stil l predominates, despite the appeal to participation in 
order to explain the relationship between forms and thmgs. 
՚*^ Sayre'ร term๒ology, p. 15. 
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fo rms have the character o f d iv in i t ies : transcendent, absolute, unchanging. 
Parmenides is wr i t ten i n part to show the absurdity that f o l l ows f r o m this pos i t ion. 
I n Philebus, the fo rms are produced and ordered by a higher, in te l l igent p r inc ip le : 
this m u c h is fami l ia r f r o m Republic. I n addi t ion to a single, highest p r inc ip le , the 
forms themselves are expla ined w i t h reference to t w o higher pr inc ip les, un i t y and 
p lu ra l i t y , or l i m i t {peras) and un l im i ted (apeiroท).^^ What remains is described as 
the " m i x e d " (synkrasis). The way i n w h i c h the highest pr inc ip le governs is 
th rough order, p ropor t ion and measure, and for this reason the fo rms are of ten 
described i n Philebus i n numer ica l te rms . 5 ' Number , as Gadamer points out , is a 
concept that includes bo th un i ty and p lura l i ty . Part icular, even sensible, th ings are 
the product o f " m i x i n g " ; they are no longer mere " b e c o m i n g " or " f l u x " , and 
therefore s imp ly un in te l l ig ib le , as i n Theatetus. Here, they are described as the 
product o f l i m i t and un l im i ted just like the forms: they are a " com ing - i n to -be ing " 
by v i r tue o f the "measure" achieved " b y the aid o f the l imi t . "^^ Bo th fo rms and 
tMngs are subordinated to and ordered by a first causal pr inc ip le . 
O n the epistemologica! side, we observe Socrates det feon ing reason f r o m 
its place o f sole supremacy: "reason and pleasure al ike [are] dismissed as be ing, 
neither o f them, the good itself, inasmuch as they come short o f se l f -suf f ic iency 
and the qual i ty o f being sel f -sat is fy ing and perfect."^^ Even as Philebus 
concludes by a f f i r m i n g that " in te l l i gence" is greater than p l e a s u r e ― n o t a 
controversial c la im for P la to֊both are ordered together in a f ivefold, descending 
' Philebus 23c. 
64d. 
52 26d (trans. R. Hackforth). See also 27b: they are "the being that has come to be by the mixture 
o f these two " (the unlimited and the limit). Admittedly, we are neglecting the careful strucณre o f 
the argument in Philebus. The ontological reflections come about only as a result o f a lengthy 
reconsideration o f the relationship between reason and pleasure, as described below. 
'67a. 
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hierarchy o f goods: measure (metros),  that wh i c h is "proport ioned, beau t i f u l " 
{symmetros, ԽԽտ),  reason {поиร)^ th ings proper to the soul such as science, art 
and r ight op in ion {episteme, îechne, orthe doxe), and finally the pleasures 
(hedone) o f the soul.54 Th is l ist appears to del iberately exclude the l i fe o f the 
body. Ear l ier in the dialogue, however , Socrates explains h o w the "pleasures" or 
af fect ions o f the soul come to pass. They are described as the product o f memory , 
w h i c h is in tu rn the product o f e x p e r i e n c e . S e n s a t i o n is a "d is tu rbance" 
(seísmos) w h i c h "penetrates" both the body and the soul i n a way that is "pecul iar 
to each and common to b o t h " ; this is proper ly cal led a single movement and 
therefore a single affection/^^ This language o f the body and soul func t ion ing 
together i n order to produce an " a f f e c t i o n " is remarkable compared w i t h the 
host i l i ty between soul and body described i n Mem and Phaedo, I n the earl ier 
dialogues, for the soul to be subject to the movement o f the senses i n any way 
w o u l d fundamental ly compromise the pur i t y and immutab i l i t y o f soul , and 
therefore its characteristics o f rat ional i ty and immor ta l i t y . 
Toward the end o f Philebus, Plato approaches Ar is to t le in main ta in ing that 
there is no memory pr ior to experience: the soul cannot forget what i t has not 
perceived. M e m o r y is the "preservat ion" {soteria) o f sensation, or o f sense 
images. Recol lect ion, on the other hand, is the "passing over " o f images retained 
by memory , such that what was once experienced by bo th soul and body is now 
experienced by soul alone.^^ What was in Phaedo the recol lect ion o f universals 
5 4 66a-c. 
5 5 33c; 33e. 
5 6 33d-34a. Compare Augustine, ord. 2.2.6. 
" 34b. Socrates appends to this a brief discussion about judgment and the manner in which we 
accounrfor and attempt to correct false sense impressions (3^b). It is remarkably similar to 
Aristotle's exDlanatioท่ of how error occurs in De anima. 
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alone is n o w the recol lect ion o f particulars֊֊or, at least, part icular af fect ions and 
impressions, abstracted f r o m their part icular instances. I t is recol lect ion as the 
active aspect o f memory that makes the "un i ve rsa l i z i ng " o f the part icular possible. 
Recol lect ion ณ m s the gaze o f the soul upward to the ideas, and downward , as i t 
were, to the l i ved experience o f the person. The universal is abstracted f r o m the 
part icular i n a manner approaching Ar is to t le . Th is abstraction fo l l ows a 
deposit ion o f the f o r m s ― n o t that they lose thei r measure o f transcendence, but 
rather are required also to account fo r the par t icu lar i ty o f things. 
H o w has Plato come to this po int? W e have seen h o w the forms, a long 
w i t h the things that part ic ipate i n them and thereby possess their attr ibutes, are 
themselves ordered by the pr inc ip les o f measure, propor t ion and beauty: indeed, 
says Socrates, " the good has taken refoge i n the character o f the beaut i fu l . "^^ The 
soul is subject to these same pr inc ip les. Thus when Plato a s k s ― i n an echo o f the 
question m o v i n g Meno: " h o w do w e inqui re after what we do not k n o w ? " ֊ h o w 
the body desires what i t lacks, he can respond that i t is not the body that desires 
but the soul , because the soul mediates the principles of measure and order for the 
body. 
This echoes the image i n Phaedrus o f the soul as standing between being 
and becoming. Dia lect ic is central to the concept ion o f phi losophical ac t iv i ty , 
s imultaneously o f "ascent" and "descent" , that mediates between what is and what 
is coming- to-be. Th is is w h y Philebus concludes by arguing that the best life is 
what is m i x e d , even a mix tu re o f pleasure and i n t e l l i g e n c e . T h e good l i fe 
includes knowledge o f what is, and the pleasures that are proper to a l i fe o f v i r tue. 
The latter are described i n terms o f the v i r tuous " m e a n " , w h i c h standard becomes 
ІІ64Є 
61b: "the good is the mixed l i fe. ' 
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in te l l ig ib le because dialect ic reveals to the soul order, measure and beauty. W e 
have, Socrates concludes, "an іпсофогеа і , ordered system for the r igh t fu l cont ro l 
o f a corporeal subject i n w h i c h dwel ls a տ օ ս Լ " ՛ ՛ ՛ ՛ 
Gadamer argues that recol lect ion reveals the f u l l d imens ion o f d ia lect ic: 
"d ia lect ic is not demonstrat ion or p roo f i n the scient i f ic sense o f a p r o o f 
(apodeixis), w h i c h cogent ly deduces things f r o m presupposit ions. O n the 
contrary, the dia lect ical art o f d i f ferent ia t ion presupposes antecedent fami l ia r i t y 
w i t h the subject matter and a cont inu ing prev iew of, and prospect t owa rd , the 
th ing under d iscussion."^ ' Philebus shows h o w recol lect ion must func t ion both i n 
terms o f an "ascent" f r o m experience, and a "descent" f r o m the ideas. I n th is 
context , reco l lect ion includes a l l k inds o f knowing^^: understanding, mathemat ical 
knowledge, and knowledge based upon the experience o f the soul " i n " the body. 
Hence knowledge is f u l f i l l ed in v i r tue, and the art o f dialect ic is not mere ly an 
exercise in de f in i t ion , but a hexis and a way o f l i v i ng . 
^"64b. 
6 ' And so Gadamer concludes, "Aristot le was right." The Idea of the Good in Platonic-
Aristotelian Philosophy, trans, p. Christopher Smith (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1986), p. 
42 and p. 52. 
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C H A P T E R 2: 
AmSTOTLE 
Even more than Plato, Ar is to t le can on ly be considered an indirect 
ph i losophica l inf luence on August ine, again th rough doxographies, Stoic authors Լ 
and most impor tant ly , Plot inus and possibly Рофһу гу . The chapter on Plato 
concludes by f ind ing Philebus on a trajectory toward a more "A r i s t o te l i an " 
concept ion o f the role o f the forms i n th ink ing , and addi t iona l ly toward a 
psychology resonant w i t h what we f i nd i n the later chapters o f De anima 3. The 
presence o f a section on Ar is to t le i n a dissertat ion in tending to investigate the 
wr i t ings o f August ine is jus t i f i ed largely by his p ro found in f luence on Plot inus. 
W e k n o w that August ine was fami l ia r w i t h parts o f A r i s to t le ' ร log ica l 
works , k n o w n as the Organon^ i n conf.^ he ment ions that he read Categories and, 
to his credit , found i t re lat ively easy to understand. Be ing under Manichaean 
inf luence at that t ime o f his l i fe , he may have misunderstood this text.2 A n 
important assumption o f our discussion is that we w i l l take the t radi t ional 
approach o f grant ing a certain ph i lo log ica l and doctr ina l un i ty to Ar i s to t le ' s texts 
as w e have them.^ We w i l l look ma in l y at De anima and De memoria et 
reminiscentìa. The latter text is concerned so exc lus ive ly w i t h memory that i t 
l im i ts its o w n interpret ive possibi l i t ies w i t h i n the Parva Naturalia; i t must also be 
read in the larger context o f Ar is to t le 's psychology. 
1 Chiefly Cicero; there is no way o f knowing whether Augustine was famil iar wi th any later 
іпїефгеІегБ o f Aristotle, even Christian Greek writers such as Anatolius. 
-Cow/4 .16 .28 . 
3 As an alternative to the "genetic" approach fathered by Werner Jaeger which still dominates 
sélíõlãrship ö f Aristotle, see the writ ings o f Giovanni Reale, especially The Concept of First 
Philosophy^and the Unity of the Metaphysics ofAristotle (SUN Y Press: Albany, 198p).^. —  
35 
Ar is to t le ' s method, when turned to the task o f psychology, is o f ten 
described as "natura l is t ic . " I n De anima, he begins i n a fami l ia r style w i t h a 
doxography o f previous posi t ions o n the nature o f the soul. He states his o w n 
posi t ion clearly by lay ing out the tr ipart i te aspects o f the soul : vegetat ive, an imal 
(sensate) and intel lectual . The sou l , for Ar is to t le , is not a dist inct, personal ent i ty 
as August ine m igh t conceive o f i t ; however , this d id not prevent medieva l 
ітефге їегз o f Ar is to t le f r o m at tempt ing to find in his wr i tmgs a d is t inct ly 
Chr ist ian no t ion o f the soul . A r i s to t le ' ร o w n understanding emerges w i t h greater 
c lar i ty and depth as the argument o f De anima progresses. He describes the soul 
as the pr inc ip le o f l i fe (arche ton zooný, a part icular th ing i n the sense o f a 
substance {tode t i ý , and f ina l l y , a "substance (ousia)" as being " the f o r m o f a 
natural body w h i c h potent ia l ly has l i fe . "^ The body is not in i tse l f the o r i g in and 
pr inc ip le o f its being al ive. To say that the soul is its f o r m means that i t is the 
actual i ty or act iv i ty o f the body ' ร be ing a l ive. We w i l l discuss Ar is to t le 's 
te rmino logy later. A t this point , let us s imp ly note that we are to th ink o f the un i ty 
o f soul and body in terms o f " a c t i v i t y " or fonction. 
The vegetative pr inc ip le o f l i fe is lowest and С0ПШ10П to a l l fo rms o f 
l i v i ng th ings. The sensitive p r inc ip le is reserved to animal l i f e ; this he discusses 
i n the second book o f De anima and in the early chapters o f the th i rd book. He 
considers the operat ion o f each o f the senses i n tu rn , and then i n more general 
terms, the need for a c o m m o n ground in the soul in order for sense-perception to 
communicate in fo rmat ion about the w o r l d meaningfu l ly . The t ransi t ion into a 
4 402a8; we are using the translation o f พ . ร . Hett in the ᄂoeb Classical Library (Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, 1936). 
5 402a25. 
' 412a21 . 
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discussion o f the intel lectual soul i n the th i rd book is subtle, because i t is very 
d i f f i cu l t i n practice to separate the operations o f percept ion and in te l lect ion, 
according to Ar is to t le . I n an enti ty endowed w i t h intel lectual soul , that pr inc ip le 
f igures inescapably at the level o f sense-perception, i n acts o f j udgment , op in ion 
and recol lect ion. 
The structure o f the argument o f De anima therefore f o l l ows a pattern o f 
ascent th rough the var ious facul t ies֊or, better, operations֊֊of the soul . Th is 
ascent is reversed when we reach the intel lectual soul i n its highest capacit ies. 
The operat ion o f intel lect necessarily pervades every level o f psycholog ica l 
act iv i ty . However , intel lect in its purely act ive capacity, Ar is to t le says famous ly 
at 3.5, is i n p rmc ip le separable, and even d i v i ne . ' Bu t he does not develop th is 
re f lect ion i n th is text. Instead, he concludes De anima pragmat ica l ly by 
consider ing the intel lectual soul as i t operates i n man , exp lo r ing h o w the w i l l and 
appetite func t ion together in acts o f pract ical w i s d o m . 
The func t ion o f memory is unjust ly neglected i n De anima. W e shal l l ook 
at passages where Ar is to t le raises questions about t ime-consciousness and 
judgment , but w e can on ly speculate that Ar is to t le h imse l f was addressing this 
neglect w h e n he spoke about memory and recol lect ion i n the lectures we have as 
part o f the Parva Naturalia. Ar is to t le does say quite a b i t about imag inat ion 
(phantasia) i n De anima, and much can be inferred f r o m the exp l ic i t associat ion 
o f memory and imaginat ion. The treatise De memoria et rėminiรсешіа does not 
connect memory in much detail w i t h the higher funct ions o f the soul. T o address 
this, we shall draw out associations between the operat ion o f memory and the 
passivi ty or potency o f intel lect, as Ar is to t le does i n De anima 
430al8. 
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De memoria et reminiscentia 
This short text is t rad i t ional ly presented i n t w o chapters; the first, 
concerning memory , and the second, concerning recol lect ion or reminiscence. 
F rom the first, there is a clear d is t inct ion between lower and higher funct ions o f 
memory . Ar is to t le insists that animals possess memory i n a l im i ted , inst inctual 
manner, since they have a capacity for a sort o f j udgmen t based on sense-
perceptions. However , he says that memory proper ly belongs to those creatures 
that are conscious o f t ime, and w e w i l l see that this consciousness funct ions 
d i f ferent ly on d i f ferent psychologica l levels.^ 
Ar is to t le says that w e remember what is past, not what is present nor what 
is to come. I t is based on experience. M e m o r y is related to both sense-perception 
and the th ink ing facul ty , but i n d i f ferent ways ; Plot inus w i l l agree w i t h this. 
Ar is to t le wr i tes: 
But memory , even o f objects o f thought , impl ies a mental p icture {ouk 
aneu phantasmatoš). Hence i t (memory ) w o u l d seem to belong 
incidental ly Ųiata sumbebekos) to the t h i nk ing facu l ty , but essentially 
{kath ' auto) to the pr imary sense-faculty.^ 
Ar is to t le distinguishes not between k inds o f memory objects, but between the 
manner in wh i ch the objects o f memory are related to thought (wh i ch uses them as 
necessary) and to sensation (wh i ch necessarily gives rise to them). M e m o r y is 
properly der ived f r o m an af fect ion o f the senses (the " c o m m o n sense" or "p r imary 
sense-faculty") , because Ar is to t le says that t ime-consciousness is the result o f the 
8 '^Chronoน aisthanetaľ (449029). The translation o f De memoria et reminiscentia is also by W.S. 
Hett, in the same volume o f the Loeb Classical Library as De anima. See also the translation and 
commentary o f Richard Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory (Duckworth: London, 1972). 
^450a l3 . ― 
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measurement o f mo t i on and magnitude.*^ Since it is not an af fect ion o f the m i n d , 
i t is not p r imar i l y i nvo l ved w i t h the m i n d , but only incidentally.^^ Th is way o f 
speaking m igh t seem strange, since judgment , for example, involves the 
intel lectual combina t ion o f concepts over a per iod o f t ime. The issue concerns the 
preservat ion o f the act ive func t ion o f m i n d even wh i le i t is i n some sense 
dependent on the body fo r knowledge. W e w i l l discuss t h i s ― t h a t is, the relat ion 
o f imag inat ion to t hough t֊in more detai l when we consider part icular texts f r o m 
De animo. 
I n exp la in ing the re lat ion between imaginat ion and memory , Ar is to t le 
makes a c lar i f ica t ion. He says that the objects o f memory are not the af fect ions o f 
the senses themselves; hence, i n remember ing, we do not precisely re-experience 
what i t is that we have remembered.*^ Memor ies rather have a dual aspect: on the 
one hand, they are likenesses o f some th ing , wh i le on the other hand, they are 
objects o f contemplat ion i n themselves, apart f r o m their fiinction as signs. 
Ar is to t le conceives this loosely as the di f ference between a thought and a 
memory . W h e n we see a picture o f someone, on the one hand we see a portrai t 
w h i c h is a l ikeness o f some person, and therefore an " a i d " or too l for the memory ; 
450al0. Thus imagination can be Tairly described as a tool for the operation o f memory. 
" Michael W e d ๒ calls this a "weak relation": "thought involves imagination not on its own terms 
but ๒ virtue o f something else." See Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (Yale University Press: 
New Haven, 1988), pp. 107-109. 
ւ շ 450a23. This is an important clarification for Plot๒us. See conf. 10.14.22: "Perhaps, then, just 
as food is brought from the stomach in the process o f rumination, so also by recollection these 
things are brought up from the memory. But then why in the ทใind or 'mouth ' o f the person 
speak๒g, that is to say reminiscing, about past gladness or sadness is there no taste o f sweetness or 
bittemess? Or is this a point where the incomplete resemblance between thought and rumination 
makes the analogy misleading? Who would wi l l ing ly speak o f such matters if, every time we 
mentioned sadness or fear, we were compelled to experience gr ief or terror? Yet we would not 
speak about them at all unless in our memory we could find not only the sounds o f the names 
attachmg to the images imprinted by the physical senses, but also the notions o f things themselves. 
These notions we do not receive through any bodily entrance. The mind itself perceives them 
through the experience o f its passions and entrusts them to memory; or the memory itself retains 
them without any conscious act o f commitment." 
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on the other hand, we s imply see a picture and we perceive i t as such. One is 
referent ia l , the other is not. 
Be ing based upon experience, memory is natural ly fo rmed over a per iod o f 
t ime , however brief. Recol lect ion d i f fers in that the conscious passage o f t ime is 
added to the act o f remember ing. Recol lect ion is an act ive, in ferent ia l process 
whereby an af fect ion is brought again before the m ind ' s eye by a series o f 
associations and connections.^^ These associations may be necessary ( log ica l ) or 
else customary. He ment ions, possibly w i t h Plato i n m i n d , that s imple 
recol lect ion is not the same as learning, a l though i t is a sel f - in i t iated process.^"* 
M o s t impor tant ly , remember ing is related to sense-perception in a way that 
reco l lect ion is not, since the latter does not begin f r o m the actual a f fec t ion, but 
rather f r o m an association o f ideas. A s such, recol lect ion as Ar is to t le describes i t 
shares some attributes w i t h Platonic recol lect ion. However , even recol lect ion in 
some way depends on the soul 's re lat ion to body since, Ar is to t le argues, 
phys io log ica l dif ferences between men can 0 Օ Մ € տ թ օ ո ժ to di f ferences in the ab i l i ty 
to reco l lec t / ^ 
Th is is a very b r i e f account o f the argument o f a short text. The most 
impor tant po in t we w i sh to h igh l ight is the relat ionship that memory has to sense-
percept ion o n the one hand, and to th ink ing o n the other. The s igni f icance o f the 
" i nc iden ta l " and "essent ia l " relat ionships can only be i l luminated w i t h fur ther 
451b5, 
' 4 Al though he says it " is possible for the same man to learn or discover the same thing twice" 
(451b8). 1 don't think that this passage is a strong and deliberate response to Plato, since his 
description o f recollection here has lilrtle resemblance to recollection as described by Plato in his 
earlier dialogues. The most significant difference between their teach๒gs lies in Aristotle's 
insistence that, at the first moment o f learning, no time has elapsed, and therefore no memory. 
՚ 5 453а32. "Dwarf ish people and those who have large upper extremities have poorer memories 
than their opposites, because they carry a great weight on üieir organ o f perception... The very 
yoüñg and very old have inferior memories because o f the forces at work in them; for the latter are 
in a state o f rapid decay, and the former in a state o f rapid growth." 
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reference to De anima. These d i f ferent relat ionships correspond to the dif ferences 
between memory and recol lect ion, the former hav ing the passive sense o f the 
reception o f sense images over a passage o f t ime, and the latter or ig inat ing in the 
del iberat ive func t ion o f the intel lect. Ar is to t le , character ist ical ly, does not 
speculate on the broader impl icat ions o f what he concludes about the nature o f 
memory . N o r does he develop the questions o f direct interest to our project that 
are posed in this text, such as " w h y it is impossible to th ink o f anything w i thout 
cont inu i ty , or to th ink o f th ings w h i c h are t imeless except in terms o f t ime . " ' ^ 
De anima: imagination mediating sense-perception and intellection 
I n order to appreciate better the signi f icance o f memory and t ime-
consciousness i n general i n Ar i s to t le ' ร psychology, w e need to understand the 
operation o f the imaginat ion. There are references t l i roughout De anima 
developing the idea o f imaginat ion , bu t 3.3 is par t icu lar ly concerned w i t h i t . 
Memory is closely a l igned i n func t ion w i t h the imagmat ion . A s w i t h imaginat ion, 
however, Ar is to t le never th inks o f memory as a " f a c u l t y " in its o w n r ight . The 
only dist inct aspects o f the soul are the vegetat ive, sensit ive and intel lect ive, and 
even here, we must resist t h ink ing o f them as parts. The act iv i ty o f the soul 
crosses the сопсерШа І boundary between them. Imag ina t ion , for example, unites 
sense and intel lect, and thus soul and body, in act. W i thou t i t , the images taken i n 
t feough the senses cannot be coherent ly apprehended and ordered, and therefore 
neither j udgment nor speculat ion are possible. W h i l e mediat ing sense-perception 
and understanding, however , imaginat ion maintains their distinctness by di f ferent 
modes o f relat ing to them. 
'450a8. 
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Ar is to t ł e 'ร understanding o f sense-perception is admit tedly complex. '^ 
Our analysis w i l l focus on his explanat ion o f i t i n tenns o f " ac t i v i t y " and 
"pass iv i t y " , since we w i l l see that a pre-occupat ion w i t h this language runs 
tooughout the wr i t i ngs o f Plot inus and August ine i n his early per iod. B o t h have 
d i f f i cu l t y w i t h the no t ion o f sense-perception as something fundamenta l ly passive, 
i n w h i c h the soul is s imply " s tamped" w i t h impressions received th rough the 
senses. Th is w o u l d seem to compromise the independence and superior i ty o f soul 
over and against the body. 
W h i l e Plot inus avoids language suggesting that the soul is i n any way " i n " 
the body, Ar is to t le insists that in some sense i t is. He wants to argue for the un i ty 
and par t icu lar i ty o f the ind iv idua l composite o f body and soul. I t is not accidental 
that a soul is the f o r m o f a particular body. The forms o f souls are indeed 
part icular, and their ind iv idua l i t y is not der ived s imply f r o m the fact o f thei r 
physical par t icu lar i ty . 
Ar is to t le is not however unmindfial o f the abovement ioned concerns. 
Ear ly i n the second book o f De anima he points out that the sort o f "be ing acted 
u p o n " Qjaschem) that occurs i n sense-perception is in fact an act ion (eทergein), 
even i f i t is an act ion in some way incomplete. '^ Th ink ing , he says, is not an 
al terat ion i n the state o f the m i n d , but rather " the real izat ion o f a nature" ; sense-
percept ion is analogous to th ink ing , w i t h the ma in di f ference that i t is external 
' 7 The scholarly literature is vast. See G.E.R. L loyd and G.E.L. Owen, eds., Aristotle on Mind and 
the Senses (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1978); see the articles in the fourth volume 
o f J. Barnes, M . Schofield and R. Sorabji, eds., Articles on Aristotle (Duckworth: London, 1979); 
D.W. Hamlyn, "Ar istot le 'ร Account or Aesthesis in the De anima". Classical Quarterly 9 (1959), 
pp. 6-16; Franz Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle, trans. Ro l f George (University o f 
California Press: Berkeley, 1977); J. Owens, "Aristot le's Definit ion o f Soul" in R. Palmer et ai, 
eds.. Studies in Memory of Philip Merlan (Martinus Ni jhof f : The Hague, 1971); see also the 
commentaries o f Alexander o f Aphrodisias, Philoponus, Simplicius and Thomas Aquinas. On 
imagination in particular, see the writ ings o f Michael Wedin (cf. supra) and Seth Benardete. 
'Ml7b2. 
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{exothen)}usX as the objects o f sense-perception are e x t e r n a l . T h i s fo l l ows , 
accord ing to Ar is to t le , because the senses perceive part iculars, whereas the m i n d 
apprehends universals, w h i c h exist一"in a way Qjosy՝一in the soul . Ar is to t le thus 
a f f i rms the clear, Platomc d is t inc t ion between the realms o f sense-perception and 
knowledge based on the opposi t ion o f external i ty and in ter ior i ty . Operat ional ly 
speaking, he w i l l a f f i rm their simultaneous and complex interdependence, wh i l e 
demonstrat ing the relat ive f reedom o f thought as contrasted w i t h the necessity o f 
sense-percept ion―f ree, precisely because no external ' t h i n g ' is required for the 
act o f understanding. 
Ar is to t le says that the objects o f the senses are threefo ld i n nature. The 
most basic level o f sense-perception is the apprehension o f proper sense-objects 
by the appropriate senses: sight perceives colour , hearing perceives sound, and so 
on . The percept ion o f what are cal led " c o m m o n sensibles" or c o m m o n "ob jec ts " 
such as movement , magni tude, number or shape, is shared by several o f the 
senses. They are perceived i n this manner "because w e happen to have a sense for 
each o f these qual i t ies, and so recognize them when they occur together; 
otherwise we should never perceive them except inc identa l ly , as e.g., w e perceive 
o f C leon 'ร son, not that he is C leon 'ร son, but that he is wh i te ; and th is wh i te 
object is inc idental ly C leon 'ร son."^° 
Ar is to t le considers each o f the senses i n tu rn in some detai l . I n general, 
sensation ftinctions s imi lar ly in every case. D i rec t contact is required, or else the 
presence o f a med ium that activates the sense organ. A t first, an object is 
potent ia l ly sensible, and the sense-organ potent ia l ly perce iv ing. Sensation occurs 




dist inct f r o m the perce iv ing subject, a certain ident i ty comes to pass between the 
t w o w i t h the result that the subject is act ively sensing "such and such" a th ing. 
The organs in quest ion do actual ly take on the attributes perceived^' , and for th is 
reason Aristotle——like Plot inus after llim֊֊֊describes sensation as a sort o f mean 
between extremes. For example, our sk in does not report the sensation o f a 
substance that is the exact same temperature as our flesh, qua temperature; o f 
course, the presence o f the substance may be reported by some other means (e.g. 
pressure, texture). Bu t we on ly perceive the extremes that fa l l to either side o f the 
mean embodied by our part icular sense organ, e.g. something hotter or colder than 
our sk in temperature. 
Ar is to t le assures us that the passivi ty o f this account o f sense-perception is 
on ly part o f the p ic ture, and that the recept ion o f in fo rmat ion acณally occurs after 
the manner o f an act iv i ty . The common ly noted example o f a stamp mak ing an 
impression in w a x can be gravely mis leading. The way that sight funct ions of fers 
a better illustration——and, indeed, th is i l lust rat ion f igures prominent ly as an image 
for how both sense-perception and knowledge occur. Sight requires the med ium 
o f transparency, and this transparency is "ac t i va ted" by l ight . Transparency is 
perceptible on ly by v i r tue o f the co lour o f something else, and i t is l ight that 
makes colour v is ib le . Thus transparency is necessary: its negat iv i ty is the 
possibi l i ty o f something that can be seen, and as activated by l ight , it in tu rn acts 
upon the sense organ to make i t actual ly Տ661Ո£.՛^^ Ar is to t le describes a s imi lar 
mechanism for the sense o f hearing.^^ 
423b8, ff. 
'419a l5 . 
'՝ 420a3, ff. 
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Ar is to t le concludes his in i t ia l discussion o f sense-perception by observing 
that sense (aisthesis) is " that w h i c h is receptive o f the f o r m o f sensible objects 
w i thou t the mat ter" , and that, as we have noted, this recept ion happens after the 
manner o f an act iv i ty? '* He clar i f ies at a later point i n the th i rd book , saying that 
the essence o f the sensed object and the sensing organ remain dist inct , but that 
they are ident i f ied i n the act iv i ty o f sensation through the intel lectual f o r m . 
Wha t exists is either sensible or in te l l ig ib le ; and in a sense կ}օտ) 
knowledge is the knowab le and sensation the sensible. W e must consider 
i n what sense th is is so. Bo th knowledge and sensation are d iv ided to 
correspond to thei r objects, the potent ial to the potent ia l , and the асша ї to 
the actual. The sensit ive and cogni t ive facult ies o f the soul are potent ia l ly 
these objects, viz., the sensible and the knowable . These facult ies, then, 
must be ident ical either w i t h the objects themselves or w i t h their fo rms. 
N o w they are not ident ical w i t h the objects; for the stone does not exist i n 
the soul , but on l y the f o r m o f the stone. 
The "ac t " o f the th ing sensed is a ftinction o f its actual ly being sensed. I t is not an 
act iv i ty that causes a resul t ing react ion i n the sense organ. W h e n Ar is to t le says 
that the f o r m o f the th ing sensed is received "w i t hou t mat ter" , this does not mean 
that there is no transference o f physical attr ibutes. The image o f the sense organ 
as a mean should i l lustrate th is. Rather, the sensing organ takes on the attr ibutes 
o f the th ing sensed i n a l im i ted fashion, proper to its o w n mode o f rece iv ing 
in fo rmat ion , w i thou t becoming physical ly ident ical w i t h the th ing sensed, or even 
necessarily coming in to physical contact w i t h the th ing sensed. 
B o t h o f these aspects ho ld true in a compar ison between sense-perception 
and th ink ing , w h i c h Ar is to t le describe as having an "ana log i ca l " re lat ionship. 
T h i n k i n g , he says, is l i ke sensation: in both cases " the soul judges and knows 
what is."^^ Sensation pertains to things external and part icular, and th i nk ing to 
' 424a l8 . 
'431b22-432al . 
' ^'Krinei ti... Ы gnorizei ton onton" (427a20). 
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things internal and universal . The mode o f apprehension occurs after the same 
manner, but since objects o f thought have no matter f r o m w h i c h the forms must be 
abstracted, they are ident ical w i t h the m i n d i n act: hence, " i n general, the m i n d 
when act ively th ink ing is ident ica l w i t h its օԵյ60էտ."՛^ ^ Because ideas are 
immater ia l and therefore do not exist i n "some p lace" outside o f the m ind before 
they are actual ly thought , Ar is to t le describes the intel lectual soul as the "place o f 
fo rms . " - * 
That Ar is to t le intends to describe between sense and intel lect a 
propor t iona l relat ionship o f qual i ta t ive ly d i f ferent facul t ies, and not j ստէ 
di f ferences o f degree, is evident f r o m the fact that he is careful to cr i t ic ize "o lder 
th inkers" who made no d i f fe rent ia t ion between thought and sense-perception, and 
w h o sought to l i nk thought w i t h a mere ly bod i l y fbnc t ion . Since the perception o f 
proper objects, such as "redness" , is a lways true^^, and since intel lectual 
apprehension is l ikewise t rae, error comes into p lay somewhere i n the complex 
inter-relat ionship between thought and sensation, that is , j udgmen t act ing upon the 
data o f imaginat ion (considered as a repository o f sense images). 
Asser t ion, l i ke a f f i rma t ion , states an attr ibute o f a subject, and is always 
either true or false; but th is is not a lways so w i t h the m i n d : the th ink ing o f 
the de f in i t ion i n the sense o f the essence is a lways true and is not an 
instance o f predicat ion; but jus t as wh i l e the seeing o f a proper object is 
always true, the j udgmen t whether the wh i te object is a man or not is not 
always true, so i t is w i t h every object abstracted from its տՅէէ6ք.՝՛*՛ 
The issue o f the nature o f j udgmen t arises at t w o points i n de anima з , i n the 
context o f the discussion o f imaginat ion (СҺ.З), and i n the context o f the 
431b l8 ; cf. 431b23: "knowledge is the knowable"; 4 3 l a l : "knowledge is identical wi th its 
object." 
28 429a28. 
2 9 Cf. supra. 
3 ° 430b24-32. See 432al6: "the judging capacity... is a fijnction o f the intellect and sensation 
combined." 
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discussion o f the pract ical intel lect (Chs.6-8). Judgment dist inguishes amongst 
what is brought i n by the var ious senses, e.g. what is tasted f r o m what is heard; 
more impor tant ly , i t enacts the combina t ion and d i f ferent ia t ion o f concepts in 
such a way that the par t icu lar i ty o f sense impressions is subordinated to the 
universal i ty o f conceptual izat ion. Whereas sensations can occur on ly in a 
temporal succession, j u d g m e n t must occur w i thou t any interval o f t ime; thus we 
say " I ทOM' see that there is a d i f fe rence" , and not " I see that there is now a 
d i f ference."^ ' Ar is to t le i l lustrates: 
I f the th ink ing is concerned w i t h things past or піШге, then w e take into 
account and inc lude a no t i on o f t ime. For falsehood always lies i n the 
process o f combina t ion , for i f a man calls wh i te not -whi te , he has 
combined the no t i on no t -wh i te . I t is equal ly possible to say that a l l these 
cases invo lve d i v i s ion . A t any rate i t is not merely true or false to say that 
C leon is wh i te , bu t also that he was or w i l l be. The pr inc ip le w h i c h uni f ies 
is i n every case the ՈՍՈ(3.՝՛^ 
Judgment reveals the presence o f thought i n sense-perception precisely in its i n 
being tempora l ly " u n i t i v e " , yet , as Ar is to t le points out, i t is also discursive i n that 
it br ings together many diverse elements. For this reason, Ar is to t le speaks o f 
judgment as a mean, and po in t o f s ingular perspective: " the last th ing to be 
affected ( i n judgment , whether o f sensible or in te l l ig ib le things) is a single ent i ty 
and a single mean, a l though i t has more than one aspect."^^ Judgment can un i f y 
what is diverse because i t is d is t inct from տ6ՈՏ6-թ6ք06թէւօո^՛*, and because i t 
presupposes t w o aids, m e m o r y and imaginat ion. 
3 ' 426b27. 
32 430a32-430b6. This passage in 3.6 clearly implies that, apart from the instance o f mind as pure 
act in 3.5, all knowledge utilizes judgment and therefore is concerned wi th the past and the fijture 
in some combination. 
33 43 l a l 7-20. 
34 427al 4. In this emphasis on "distinctness" there is a foreshadowing o f Plotinus' fundamental 
principle o f the distinctness o f the uni fy ing principle, considered in the next chapter. 
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I n br ief , imaginat ion serves to make what is perceived by the senses 
avai lable to thought in the f o r m o f images. The organs o f sense receive 
in fo rmat ion by the communica t ion o f physical attr ibutes. The imag inat ion takes 
th is in fo rmat ion to a first level o f remove f r o m part icular acts o f sensation. 
M e m o r y gathers the temporal succession o f sense images i n a k i n d o f cont inu i ty : 
these are ''phantasmatď\ likenesses w h i c h are the product o f imag inat ion 
(phantasia). M e m o r y thus first ftinctions at the basic level o f enab lmg coherent 
sensuous in fo rmat ion , an ab i l i ty shared by animals, according to Ar is to t le , 
Secondly, memory enables the recombinat ion o f images necessary for deliberate 
j udgmen t and recol lect ion. The re lat ion o f memory to both sense-perception and 
th i nk ing is a func t ion o f imaginat ion , since what is remembered is a product o f the 
imaginat ion : an image or l ikeness (phantasma). M e m o r y adds to the process o f 
image fo rmat ion a consciousness o f t ime elapsed."^^ 
There are however t w o aspects to the higher fonction o f memory 
accord ing to Ar is to t le . First , the "unconsc ious" sense o f memory , i n w h i c h 
j udgmen t is enabled by the extension o f m i n d over a per iod o f t ime ; second, the 
act ive and del iberat ive recol lect ion o f images. A d d i n g these t w o aspects to the 
basic image- fo rm ing operat ion o f imaginat ion gives us the threefo ld d is t inc t ion i n 
types o f in ter ior act iv i ty that came to be enshrined for the West i n the medica l 
treatises o f Galen. Th is source w o u l d be v i ta l for bo th Patrist ic and later 
scholastic wr i ters , such as Aqu inas and Avicenna.^^ 
3 5 Janet Coleman, Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1992), p. 17. 
36 Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1990)， pp. 52-53. 1 think it would be more true to Aristotle's text to 
align the dual aspects o f memory wi th the distinction Aristotle himself makes between the purely 
receptive sense o f imagination, and the "deliberative" imagination (cf. 434a8), but as Carruthers 
points out, Galen is part o f a long tradition attempting to reconcile Aristotle w i th some version o f 
Platonism. 
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I n De anima, however , Ar is to t le does not develop his ref lect ions for us in 
much detai l . There is on ly a b r i e f discussion o f the sense i n w h i c h memory 
enables judgment , and he considers hard ly at a l l the necessity o f recol lect ion for 
knowledge. We can however in fer much from his idea o f passive intellect.^^ We 
have seen that sensation and thought , w h i l e d i f ferent , are nevertheless considered 
analogous. Passive and act ive aspects are necessary fo r thought as much as for 
sensation. These are not "pa r t s " o f the m i n d , but rather a way to describe h o w the 
forms o f thought асШаІІу come to be i n the soul . Ar is to t le speaks o f the passivi ty 
o f the intel lect i n order to emphasize the pur i ty o f func t ion o f the active intel lect, 
especial ly its distinctness f r o m sense-perception. The intel lect is i n fact noth ing 
unt i l i t th inks, says Ar is to t le , except for the capacity for t h i nk i ng ; i t is potent ia l ly 
ident ical w i t h al l objects o f thought . I t comes to be ident ica l w i t h the forms o f 
thiıжing by v i r tue o f its act ive func t ion . W h i l e the passive "becomes" al l th ings, 
the active "makes" a l l th ings. The act ive intel lect is described as " a posi t ive state, 
l ike l i gh t . . . essentially an act iv i ty . "^* The act ive intel lect inscribes, as i t were, the 
forms o f thought i n the passive intel lect , l i ke a hand w r i t i n g on a slate. I n do ing 
so, passive becomes act ive, and the m i n d i n act becomes actual ly ident ical w i t h its 
th ink ing . This process is described as abstract ion because the ch ie f source for the 
forms is the i m a g i n a t i o n ― a l though the fo rms exist fo r thought more easily since 
they do not require abstraction f r o m matter. The senses perceive the attr ibute 
"s t ra ight " , but the intel lect perceives the essence, w h i c h is "straightness." 
Thought apprehends a universa l , wh i l e sense perceives a part icular. I n this 
example, o f course, w e see h o w the apprehension o f the universal depends on the 
temporal ly pr ior percept ion o f the part icular. Th is is the po in t at w h i c h a firm l ine 
This IS found mainly in De anima 3.4. 
'430al6-18. 
49 
is o f ten d rawn between Ar is to t le and a Platonist, because i t is c lear ly the case that, 
to the extent that the operat ion o f the intel lectual soul depends on the sensit ive 
soul , the m i n d is dependent on a process o f abstraction for its content. Then 
again, perhaps Platonic dialect ic is not so very un l ike Ar is to te l ian abstract ion, 
especial ly g iven that, fo r bo th , a concept o f intel lectual i l l um ina t i on undergirds 
the act iv i ty o f th ink ing.^^ 
The passivi ty o f inte l lect speaks to the abid ing necessity o f m e m o r y ; i n 
fact, Ar is to t le observes that th is passiv i ty points to a temporal d is junct ion տ 
knowledge for w h i c h j udgmen t is actual ly a correct ive. " A c t u a l knowledge is 
ident ical w i t h its ob ject " , says Ar is to t le , and so the passage o f t ime is not relevant 
for act ive intel lect. M i n d as pure ly act ive "does not th ink intermittently." '*^ 
Consequently act ive intel lect alone w o u l d not reqiüre memory for knowledge. 
Bu t this is c lear ly not the case fo r the composi te, man, who possesses i n addi t ion a 
sensit ive and vegetat ive soul . M a n has active intel lect in some sense, since the 
act ive element, be ing log ica l ly and e f f ic ien t ly pr ior , ini t iates the process o f 
abstract ion; but because he is not s imp ly active intel lect, he depends on the 
imaginat ion , and therefore sense-perception. For this reason, he says that the soul 
never th inks w i thou t " a menta l image.""** Plot inus w i l l largely agree, so long as 
"menta l image" can include verbal as we l l as other k inds o f images. W h e n w e 
39 On abstraction, cf. 432a l - l 1. "The soul, then, acts like a hand; for the hand is an mstrument 
which employs instruments, and in the same way the mind is a form which employs forms, and 
sense is a form which employs the forms o f sensible objects. But since apparently nothing has a 
separate existence, except sensible magnitudes, the objects o f thought——both the so-called 
abstractions o f mathematics and all states and affections o f sensible things֊reside in sensible 
forms. And for this reason, as no one could ever learn or understand anything without the exercise 
o f perception, so even when we think speculatively, we must have some mental picture o f which to 
think." The innate presence o f the forms in Mem] which are unearthed wi th the help o f the 
teacher o f dialectic, is arguably near to this. 
4a 43Oal9-22. This passage is considered textually controversial by some scholars, such as พ . D . 
Ross, but I am choos๒g to take the Greek text as traditionally received. 
4 ' ''Phantasma'' (43 l a l 7 ) . See note 38， above, as wel l as431b2 on how the th ink๒g faculty can 
only think the forms in mental images." 
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contemplate the idea o f just ice, w e can f o r m no concept ion o f jus t ice apart f r o m 
wha t we have learned exper ient ia l ly (whether personal ly or by the instrument o f a 
teacher) o f the part icular attributes o f jus t actions or persons.^*^ The acquis i t ion o f 
language and concepts is necessary not on ly fo r mst ruct ion, but for understanding. 
M e m o r y enables learning, precisely because there is no innate possession o f either 
language or concepts. Nevertheless, memory does not precede learn ing, because 
there is no remember ing before t ime has elapsed. 
The dependence upon imaginat ion, and therefore on sense-perception, has 
been explained in terms o f an "essent ia l " re lat ionship i n De memoria et 
reminiscent ia. Th is is more clear ly understood as part o f a series o f analogous 
dependent relat ions. F r o m the " t o p - d o w n " perspect ive o f the act ive operat ion o f 
the intel lect, the imaginat ion is a too l used fo r the purpose o f t h i nk i ng : the 
intel lect does not passively receive images as the senses receive attr ibutes o f what 
they perceive. Recol lect ion, the act ive operat ion o f memory , is a part o f the 
act ive, del iberat ive func t ion that imaginat ion has i n re lat ion to the act ive intel lect. 
The fact that this relat ionship is " i nc iden ta l " f o l l ows f r o m the fact that m i n d , i n its 
essential паШге as act, is eternal and unchanging and therefore i n pr inc ip le not 
subject to t ime-consciousness i n the usual sense. W h i l e memory looks to bo th 
sense-perception and inte l lect ion, i t is more proper ly associated w i t h the former, 
as per ta in ing to what comes into be ing and passes away. I t is associated w i t h the 
latter by the necessity required by the inescapable un i ty o f f o r m and matter, soul 
and b o d y ― b u t , o f course, the necessity is considered f r o m the side o f the 
potent ia l , the mater ia l , wh i ch , apart f r o m its f o r m , is basical ly no th ing . 
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Concluding remarL· 
Let us t ry to respond to several questions le f t unanswered by De memoria 
et reminiscentìa. W h y do we need tempora l cont inu i ty for thought to be possible? 
In the opening sentences o f Metaphysica, Ar is to t le says that experience is the 
product o f m e m o r y / ^ True h u m a n ― a s opposed to animal֊֊experience is the 
creative o f fspr ing o f remembered events, and i t requires the w o r k o f j udgment and 
del iberat ion. Understanding is consequently l im i ted by experience. A n account 
o f h o w active intel lect funct ions explains h o w thought is possible, but not h o w i t 
actually occurs for the embodied, inte l lectual soul . M e m o r y plays an essential 
mediat ing func t ion , mak ing temporal cont inu i ty in te l l ig ib le . Becoming is more 
than flux; th rough the lens o f memory , i t is un i f i ed , order ly series o f discrete 
events. A s a too l o f the image-making facu l ty , and therefore for judgment , 
memory translates what is merely discursive into a language for thought. 
I f memory gathers in to a mean ing fu l un i ty what is extended over a per iod 
o f t ime, w h y then does i t not enable us to th ink " t ime less ly " what is t imeless? I n 
a certain sense, i t does. W e have seen that the proper objects o f thought are 
universals, abstracted f r o m their physical instantiat ions. Judgment, closely l i nked 
to the operat ion o f the imaginat ion , does not s imply universal ize the part icular i ty 
o f experienced impressions. Rather, i t is the nature o f j udgment to ho ld together 
the part icular i ty o f the th ing perceived w i t h the universal i ty o f the th ing 
understood, the "s t ra igh t " w i t h the "straightness." Ar is to t le remains commi t ted to 
' 980b28. 
" Aristotle distinguishes between imagination as it functions in animals and in intelligent persons: 
" in what sense could they have imagination? Perhaps, just as their movements are ๒determinate, 
so they also have imagination and desire, but only indeterminately (aoristos). Imagination in the 
form o f sense is found, as we have said, in all animals, but deliberative imagination only in the 
calculative (logistikes); for to decide whether one shall do this or that calls at once for calculation, 
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a realist epistemology because he depends upon a realist (or natural ist ic) 
psychology. T o the extent that the m i n d is associated w i t h body and the senses, 
even i f this re lat ionship be described as " inc iden ta l " , the operations o f the m i n d 
must be understood i n terms o f the body and the dependence o f m i n d on the 
senses. Thought , again, does not occur w i thou t mental images (phantasmata); 
even i f we speak o f the contemplat ion o f the idea o f just ice, our concept ion o f 
jus t ice is fonฑed by the part icular instant iat ion o f just ice that occasioned our 
t h ink ing i n the first place. That the two are dist inct indicates that Ar is to t le has 
some sort o f concept ion o f an intel lectual f o r m . For Ar is to t le , memory has a 
proper role w i t h respect to both֊֊the f o r m in itself, and the f o r m i n the composi te 
t h i n g ― a n d i n th is respect he leaves us w i t h a more un i f ied ant feopolog ica l p icture 
than either Plato or Plot inus. 
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C H A P T E R S : 
P L O T I N U S 
General remarL· on the nature of soul 
Acco rd ing to Plot inus, intel lect is a procession and image o f the One, and 
soul is analogously a procession and image o f intel lect . ' These processions are 
not to be understood in temporal terms, but rather as movements f r o m un i ty into 
p lura l i ty . I n mytho log ica l terms, the processions are at once the result o f an act o f 
a p r imord ia l " /o /ma"^ and the necessary result o f the product ive character o f the 
first pr inc ip le . The integr i ty and uni ty o f bo th intel lect and soul is restored by 
their " convers ion " to the higher pr inc ip le , ef fected by an act o f contemplat ion and 
desire. W h i l e procession and return are bo th expressions o f a desire fo r be ing, 
u l t imate ly each ''hypostasis" is proper ly understood i n re lat ion to the higher 
pr inc ip le . Thus Plot inus w i l l say that soul most proper ly is i n te l l ec t / and intel lect 
acts as a cause on ly in an instrumental re lat ion to the ef f ic ient causal i ty o f the 
Soul , generally speaking, subtly mediates between the in te l l ig ib le and 
sensible realms. I t expresses the fo rma l causali ty o f the f i rst p r inc ip le i n 
movement and i n t ime, and therefore in body. The p r imary ac t iv i ty o f soul ( i ts 
" recept ive" funct ion) is the contemplat ion o f intel lect ; its secondary act iv i ty (its 
' Many translations use the term "expression" (logos prophoriL·s) to describe the lower 
hypostases; see Plotinus, Emeads, 7 vols., trans. A . H . Armstrong (Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, 1984), 3.5.9.19, 5.1.3.9 and 5.1.6.45. 
՜ Em. 5.1.1; see also 4.8.5. on the idea o f soul both " fa l l i ng " and being "sent." 
3 А.Ң. Armstrong. "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus" տ Dionysius 1 (1977), pp. 49-68. 
•՚ L loyd P.Gerson, Plotinus (Routled^e: London, 1994), p. 58. 一 
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"p roduc t i ve " funct ion) is to be the pr inc ip le and source ornature.^ A s such, i t 
animates the heavens and the earth, remain ing who le and one wh i l e being 
everywhere present and at w o r k : 
A s the rays o f the รนท l igh t up a dark c loud , and make it shine and 
give i t a go lden look, so the soul enter ing into the body o f heaven gives i t 
l i fe and immor ta l i t y and wakes what l ies iner t . . . . For soul has g iven i tse l f 
to the who le magni tude o f heaven, as far as i t extends, and every stretch o f 
space, both great and smal l , is ensouled. . . . A l l things l i ve by the who le , 
and al l soul IS present everywhere, made l ike to the father w h o begat i t 
{gennesanti) i n its un i ty and universal i ty.^ 
W e must d is t inguish between soul as the universal pr inc ip le o f nature (the 
" w o r l d s o u l " or "sou l o f the a l l " ) and soul i n its ind iv idua l instantiations. Though 
the dist inct ion between universal and part icular soul is not as final for Plot inus as 
for later wr i ters , he clearly has some concept ion o f ind iv idua l persons^ 
Ind iv idua l i ty depends on the relat ionsMp between the soul and the Mghest part o f 
the soul, proper ly conceived o f as its intel lect. Th is part is o f ten described by 
Plot inus as transcendent, undescended, inhab i t ing the in te l l ig ib le rea lm, and 
fundamental ly ind iv is ib le : he compares the soul to a l ine that has " f l owered ou t " 
f r o m its center po in t , remain ing above and who le พЫ1е depart ing f r o m itself.^ 
Soul is not, str ict ly speaking, d iv ided i n its descending, but on ly i n its 
"man i fes ta t ion" in body and t ime. Plot inus wants to say that this d iv is ion is a 
matter o f perspective o n l y ― a l t h o u g h this is a controversial aspect o f his 
՜ Em. 3.8.3 and 2.2.1.37. Soul does this by contain mg all o f the reasons (logoi) o f nature, and by 
being the motive w i l l o f nature. See the explanation o f Emile Bréhier in Ĺa Philosophie de Flotin 
(Boivin et Compagnie: Paris, 1928), p. 53: "En effet, parce qu'el le est une âme, la force naturelle 
n'est pas seulement une force motrice et active, mélangée à l'a matière qu'elle ordonne, elle est 
encore l'activité contemplative qui contient en elle l 'ordre qu'elle impose, parce qu'elle a 
contemplé cet ordre dans l'mtelligence. Par un côté, l'âme touche à l' intelligence qui est l 'ordre 
même; par un autre côté, elle touche à la matière qu'elle organise." 
6 Enn. 5.1.2, trans. A . H . Armstrong. 
՚ Cornelia de Vogel, "The Concept o f Personality in Greek and Christian Thought" in Studies in 
Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 2 (Catholic University o f America Press: Washington, 
D.C., 1963), pp. 20-60. See also John M. Rist, "Forms o f Individuals in Plotinus" in Classical 
Quarterly 13.2 (Nov. 1963), pp. 223-231. 
s Enn. 4.2. 
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teaching.^ The d iv i s ion o f soul is not actually an af fect ion {pathema) o f soul , but 
rather o f body. Such a fo rmu la t ion at first sounds incoherent. Th is way o f 
speaking springs f r o m Plo t inus ' desire to distance h imse l f f r o m both an 
Ar is to te l ian and a Stoic concept ion o f embodied or immanent f o r m . I n defending 
the coherence o f what he sees as a Platonic concept ion o f f o r m , Plot inus insists 
that, i n order for a " r u l i n g p r inc ip le " to t ru ly be a pr inc ip le and cause o f 
something, i t must transcend what i t purports to e x p l a i n / ^ Th is idea w i l l 
dominate a l l o f P lo t inus ' th ink ing about soul and sense-perception, and w i l l have 
a manifest in f luence i n August ine 'ร early wr i t ings. 
Ind iv idua l soul , i n its essence, is " o f the same k i n d " as the universal w o r l d 
soul : " w h e n y o u look at i t w i thou t its accretions and take i t i n its pu r i f i ed state y o u 
w i l l find that very same honourable th ing wh i ch we said was soul , more 
honourable than every th ing w h i c h is body."* 1 Because ind iv idua l souls and the 
w o r l d soul have a c o m m o n o r ig in in nous^ they share {sympatheis) a " c o m m u n i t y 
o f feel ing."^^ However , w h i l e the w o r l d soul has made and cont inues to make the 
w o r l d , ind iv idua l souls on ly tend it as "gardeners", b r ing ing into being th rough 
ar t ( i f ice) wha t is potent ia l ly present. Moreover , wh i le the w o r l d soul 
contemplates intel lect absolutely, ind iv idual souls look on ly to the part ia l 
intel lects to w h i c h they pertain. Thus ind iv idua l souls possess the nature o f the 
9 See the chapters on Plotmus and lamblichus in Carlos Steel, The Changing Self. A Study on the 
Soul in Later Neoplatonism: lamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus (Verhandelingen van de 
Koninkl i jke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van Belgie: Brussels, 
1978). 
1° Enn. 4 .1 . Plotinus explains in this text that soul is divisible in the sense o f being in many places 
at once precisely because it is intell igible and distinct from body; moreover, it is ¿ í e to unify and 
actually be a " ru l ing principle" because it remains one. 
'' Ibid 5.1.2. 
Ibid 43.%. —— 
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eternal and unbounded (apeiron), even though they are i n a str ict sense 
numer ica l ly one. '^ 
Soul and body 
W e have said that soul pertains to the rea lm o f t ime and movement . 
Respecting the idea that the " r u l i ng p r inc ip le " o f a th ing must be dist inct f r om it i n 
order to be w h o l l y present to the th ing that i t explains, Plot inus insists on a clear 
separation between body and soul. H e rejects Ar is to t le 's no t ion o f the soul as the 
f o r m o f the body and the particular cause o f its l i fe . Instead, he dist inguishes 
between soul, the forms that are in bodies and bodies t h e m s e l v e s . P a r t o f the 
soul remains undescended, abid ing as a pure, "s ing le expression o f in te l lect . " '^ 
Another part o f the soul looks to the physical w o r l d , and i n un ion w i t h the body, 
we have what is sometimes referred to as the "compos i te . " 
Here we f i n d the same tension between necessity and f reedom that applies 
to the procession o f intel lect f r om the One, and w o r l d soul f r o m the intel lect. 
Plot inus says that each soul has a body prepared for i t according to its 
"d ispos i t ion . " ' ^ When a soul chooses to "go f o r t h " , i t w i l l produce (gémesei) a 
place, and therefore a body, for i tself. A t the same t ime, however , he says that i f 
body d id not exist, soul w o u l d not go fo r th , since there w o u l d be no place to 
w h i c h i t could go. '7 Plot inus wants to preserve the active and free characteristics 
"Ibid 
'4 ！bid. 4.1.1. These three are described, consecutively, as "one and many", "many and one" (e.g. 
a quality) and "many only." A . H . Armstrong, in a note to this text in the Loeb edit ion, points out 
that the obscure differentiation here between soul and the forms o f bodies raises the troubling 
question o f whether Plotinus has in fact distinguished between a soul and a quality. 
15 A .H . Armstrong, "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus", p. 56. 
'6 This is a manner o f speaking very close to that o f Origen; cf. De principas 1.7-8. 
17 Emt 4.3.9. and 4.3.12. In chapters 13 and 18 Plotinus repeats this dichotomy, saying that the 
soul has a natural-tendency to its proper place, whose time is determmed as the natural growth o f 
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o f the soul . He bypasses the tension o f this pos i t ion by insist ing on the 
fundamental goodness o f every th ing. The physical wo r l d cannot s imply be the 
product o f some ev i l , p r imord ia l " f a l l " , but i n fact must be regarded as the product 
o f the G o o d ֊ e v e n i f i t is the lowest and therefore most mora l l y ambiguous 
product o f its act iv i ty . ' ^ Plot inus speaks most strongly o f this i n 2.9， "Aga ins t the 
Gnost ics." The fact o f body is not the d i f f i cu l t y for the ind iv idua l soul , but rather 
the al ienat ion o f soul f r o m its home (nous); body offers a tremendous potent ia l for 
distract ion to the soul , w h i c h should be constantly ef fect ing its return to nous by 
contemplat ion. Mat ter becomes a pr ison by v i r tue o f the state o f the sou l - in -
exi le. '^ 
The soul is therefore d iv ided between the realm o f intel lect, its proper 
home and o r i g in , and the rea lm o f body, its ordained dwe l l i ng place. For th is 
reason, Plot inus ident i f ies the nature o f a person w i t h soul precisely to the extent 
that it looks to intel lect. Th i s raises the question as to what part soul plays i n the 
lesser funct ions o f a person, such as sense-perception. In reject ing the 
Ar is to te l ian concept ion o f an embodied soul,20 Plot inus ef fect ively detaches 
personal i ty f r o m the l i fe o f the body: 
W e ourselves are not Intel lect . We are i n accord w i t h i t by our rat ional 
power w h i c h first receives i t . For w e perceive through percept ion, even i f 
I t is not we ourselves w h o are the perceivers: do we then reason l i ke th is , 
and th ink through Intel lect l i ke this? N o , i t is we ourselves who reason 
and we ourselves make the acts o f intel l igence տ discursive reasoning; fo r 
this is what we ourselves are. The act iv i t ies o f Intel lect are from above i n 
the same way that those o f sense-perception are f r om be low; we are this, 
the pr inc ipa l part o f the soul , i n the midd le between t w o powers, a worse 
things ； and yet this tendency is also a function o f "natural blame", the result o f a justice 
determined by "secret reasons." 
'* This concern is fundamental to the ex-Manichean Augustine: he too, like Plotinus, consistently 
invokes the goodness o f creation even whi le he wams against the habit-forming power o f body 
over the soul. 
'9 To be fair, other texts offer a less optimistic reading; cf. ท. 49 below. 
Em. 4.7.8. 
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and a better, the worse that o f sense-perception, the better that o f Intel lect. 
B u t i t is general ly agreed that sense-perception is a lways o u r s ― f o r we are 
a lways perceiving一but there is disagreement about Intel lect , both because 
we do not a lways use it and because It is separate; and it is separate 
because i t i tse l f does not incl ine towards us, but we rather look up towards 
it . Sense-perception is our messenger, but Inte l lect is our k ing .^ ' 
The soul , then, uses the body as an instrument for sense-perception; this language 
resonates strongly w i t h that used by August ine i n the twe l f t h book o f De Genesi 
ad lìtteram, where he describes sense-perception as a "messenger" in service to 
the տօսԼ ՛^^ Soul , however , approaches intel lect in l ikeness when i t is reasoning, 
even as i t derives its power f r o m intel lect. Plot inus cou ld w e l l say that the 
re lat ion o f body to soul here is analogous to that o f soul and intel lect, to the extent 
that body is m o v e d and i l luminated by the soul . He w o u l d not say however , as 
Ar is to t le does, that soul is " i n " body, but rather that body is i n soul , ab id ing 
perpetual ly i n the higher pr inc ip le, der iv ing its being and we l l -be ing f r o m the 
sameż" Th is p icture o f soul as mediat ing between the sensible and the intel lectual 
f igures p rominen t l y i n August ine 'ร early dialogues一with the important d i f ference 
that, for Augus t ine , nous and the One (or the Good) are col lapsed in to one d iv ine 
person. Th is makes i t more sensible that August ine should not contemplate a 
d iv i s ion w i t h i n the very nature o f the soul , but on ly a d i v i s ion i n terms o f 
" a f f ec t i on . " 
Sense-perception and affection 
H o w then does sense-perception actual ly occur? Plot inus sees sensation as 
fundamenta l ly passive, and for this reason, certam texts indicate that the soul 
Ibid. 5.3.3. 
• 12.24.51. 
' Enn. 4.3.22. 
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plays very l i t t le part i n i t . The soul is the pure ly act ive p r inc ip le ; i t is receptive 
only w i t h regard to what comes to i t f r o m above. O f course, this raises questions 
about how we can say that " w e " perceive anyth ing at a l l . Plot inus resists 
Ar is to t le 's image o f an " i m p r m t " or stamp made on the soul . To the extent that 
Plot inus is responding to , and at t imes, act ively arguing against, Ar is to t le , his 
explanat ion o f the mechanism o f sense-perception can be d i f f i cu l t to c lar i fy . 
When discussing pleasure and pa in , Plot inus makes a d ist inct ion between 
the affect ions (wh i ch occur i n the body on ly ) and the knowledge o f these 
affect ions (wh i ch occurs in the տօս1).^՛* H e wr i tes i n Enneads 4.4.19: " the 
af fect ion {to pathos), then, is there i n the body, but the knowledge belongs to the 
perceptive soul , w h i c h perceives i n the ne ighbourhood o f the af fect ion and reports 
to that in w h i c h the sense-perceptions t e m i n a t e . " He does not use this manner o f 
speaking i n other passages, re ferr ing instead to the " w h o l e sou l . " I n this case, the 
soul is not af fected, but knows that there is an a f fec t ion i n the body, because i t is 
"s iณated next to i t . " So the soul perceives, so to speak, the af fect ion, but w i thou t 
in any way being affected. W e therefore say that a person is affected only 
analogously, and not proper ly . P lot inus ' explanat ion o f the necessity o f this 
conclusion is remarkable: 
(As for the knowledge o f pa in , i f ) i t is knowledge i t is unaffected, so that i t 
can k n o w and g ive a sound report. For a messenger w h o is affected, i f he 
gives h imse l f over to the af fect ion, either does not del iver his message or 
IS not a sound and rel iable messenger.^^ 
Sense-perception is discussed i n th is context, as a part o f a f fec t ion. The soul , 
" l i ke a mother t r y ing to make out the wishes o f the suf ferer" , responds w i t h a 
certain desire, " w h i c h is the f ina l stage o f t h a t w h i c h begins i n the body . " Sense-
– ՚ ՚ / ա . 4.4.19-23. 
Ibid. 4.4.19.27-30. 
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percept ion provides the image for the soul whose act is to desire or w i l l . Based 
upon th is , the soul judges whether flight or resistance is cal led for. The 
relat ionship o f soul to sense-perception in this picture is basical ly negative. 
I f the soul is not af fected by sense-perceptions, Plot inus surmises that 
there must be some th i rd te rm between the soul and the sensed object, " w h i c h w i l l 
receive the f o r m o f a t h i n g . " Th is bod i l y organ is a sort o f propor t ional mean 
between the two extremes o f sensible and in te l l ig ib le , w i t h 
the capacity bo th o f rece iv ing and o f t ransmit t ing in fo rmat ion , suitable to 
be assimi lated to each o f the extremes. For since it is the organ o f a k i nd 
o f knowledge i t must not be the same either as the knower or what is go ing 
to be k n o w n , but suitable to be assimilated to each, to the external object 
by be ing af fected, and to the internal knower by the fact that i ts a f fect ion 
becomes form.^^ 
Th is language is very much reminiscent o f Ar is to t le . Plot inus is exp la in ing how 
there can be an image o f something sensible present to the perce iv ing subject, 
w i thou t the th ing i tse l f being phys ica l ly present " i n " the body. 
I n another treatise, Plot inus conf i rms this reading o f 4.23: 
The desir ing part is i n matter, and so, too, is the part w h i c h governs 
nu t r i t i on , g row th and generat ion, w h i c h is the root and pr inc ip le o f the 
desir ing and af fect ive f o rm . B u t i t is not proper to any f o r m to be 
disturbed or i n any way af fected, but i t remains static i tself, and its matter 
enters in to the state o f being affected, when it does so enter, and the f o r m 
stirs up the a f fec t ion by its presence. For, o f course, the growth-pr inc ip le 
does not g r o w when i t causes g rowth , nor increase when It causes increase, 
nor i n general , when i t causes mot ion , is i t moved . . . . So, then, the actual 
паШге o f the f o r m must be an act iv i ty , and produce by its presence, as i f 
the melody proceeding f r o m i t p lucked the strings?^ 
I n the same treatise, and i n other wr i t ings on the soul and sense-perception, 
Plot inus seems to present us at once w i t h a d i f ferent pos i t ion, one w h i c h 
7 Ш . 4.4.23.28-33. 
' Ibid. 3.6.4.32-44. 
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emphasizes the act ive aspect o f sense-perception.^^ Soul cannot be affected i n 
qui te the same w a y as the composi te o f soul and body. Soul i n i tself, as f o r m , is 
static. L i k e the Stoics, Plot inus wants to say that a f fect ion begins in o p i n i o n ― 
i tse l f based upon sense-perception一and never actual ly moves beyond that 
o r ig in?^ One must be attentive to the dual referent o f the w o r d " s o u l " , whether as 
separate, or as part o f the composite. One cou ld argue that this approach evades 
the who le issue o f whether the soul as such perceives anyth ing at a l l . 
T h i n k i n g back to Ar is to t le , especial ly the f ina l chapters o f the th i rd book 
o f De anima, we see that sense-perception i n the an imal endowed w i t h intel lect is 
d i f ferent f r o m sense-perception i n поп-іпїе11есШа1 animals. For the former , 
j udgmen t (krisis) is present and enters in to p lay at every level o f psychic act iv i ty . 
There is no pure ly animal ist ic sense-perception for a human being. A r i s to t le ' ร 
argumentat ive method in De anima, beg inn ing f r o m the lowest, most basic 
facult ies o f the soul , mov ing " u p w a r d " to separable intel lect , deceives i n th is 
regard; i t is w i t h per i l that many stop reading at 3.5, w i t h the impression that he 
has la id out t ru ly dist inct "pa r ts " o f the sou l֊or at least separable psychic 
operat ions. I n m u c h the same spir i t , Plot inus points out that percept ion must 
a lways be act ive to the extent that i t must a lways be cogni t ive. Plot inus does not 
confuse knowledge and sense-perception, but rather shows their inter-
connectedness: "sense-perceptions are not af fect ions but act iv i t ies concerned w i t h 
impressions {pathemata) and judgments ; af fect ions be long t o . . . the body qua l i f ied 
2 8 See in addition to 3.6, "On the Impassiblity o f thmgs without matter", 3.8, 6.6， 6.7 and 6.9. 
Kevin Corrigan, in Plotinus ' Theory of Matter-Evil and Question of Substance: Plato, Aristotle, 
and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Peeters: Leuven, 1996) confirms our sense that Plotinus presents 
apparently contradictory positions on the nature o f sense-perception; see pp. 134-145. 
£ / 3 « . 3.6.4. 
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i n a part icular way , but j udgment belongs to the soul."^° Against Stoic, material ist 
conceptions o f the mechanism o f sense-perception, Plot inus denies that the soul 
can passively receive the impression o f a sensible th ing i n the same manner that a 
bod i l y organ receives impressions. For j udgmen t to occur, the soul must have 
some sort o f impressions, but these w i l l be o f a non-physical nature.^' 
L o o k m g back at the passage w e quoted above concerning bodi ly organs as 
a mean between the extremes o f soul and physical object , we need to ask whether 
Plot inus is speaking there o f body per se, or o f body as part o f the soul and body 
composite. I f the latter, we cou ld not say that af fect ions or sense-perceptions are 
ever s imply " s tamped" on the bod i l y organs, but rather that the who le p e r s o n ― 
that is, the sel f as soul using the body as its servant and instrument֊֊perceives and 
is af fected. Th is reading o f Plot inus is possible g iven Plot inus ' appropr iat ion o f 
Ar is to t le 'ร understanding o f j udgmen t in percept ion. I t is also necessary w i t h 
respect to the pr inc ip le that the parts o f a composi te be ing are made to cohere and 
act on ly by v i r tue o f the presence o f the higher, govern ing pr inc ip le . 
Memory 
I n the context o f the problemat ica l d is t inc t ion between body and body-soul 
composi te, we shall consider P lo t inus ' remarks o n the nature o f memory . General 
observations w i l l be made concerning relevant passages i n the large treatise on the 
soul (4 .3-4) , and then we shall conclude w i t h a detai led reading o f the short 
treatise " O n sense-perception and m e m o r y " (4.6) . 
3° Ibid. 3.6.1. See also E.K. Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1988), pp. 121-124. 
3' Comgm. (pp. 139-140) defends this view o f sense-perception as truly realist (i.e. in whic the 
thing sensed is directly apprehended) and not representationalist or solipsistic (i.e. ๒ which the 
phenomenon o f sense-organ stimulation is perceived). 
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Plot inus begins his lectures on memory by asking whether memory 
pertains p r imar i l y to sense-perception or to intellection.^^ He concludes that the 
soul has t w o " i m a g e - m a k i n g " powers , corresponding to the d iv i s ion o f soul into 
h igher and lower parts. M e m o r y can s imi lar ly be d iv ided into t w o sorts o f 
funct ions. Plot inus is qui te clear that memory , i n the ordinary sense, pertains to 
what is tempora l and d iv is ib le . He a l lows that the highest part o f the soul may 
have a memory - l i ke re lat ionship to the intel lect from w h i c h i t proceeds, but this 
cannot be a re lat ionship marked by temporal discursiveness. Instead, th is w o u l d 
be a re lat ion o f potent ia l (soul) to actual ( inte l lect) , and no temporal in terval 
w o u l d come into play.^^ However , this is not the ordinary sense i n w h i c h Plot inus 
speaks o f memory . The nature o f memory is determined rather by the 
characterist ics o f the " i m a g e - m a k i n g " powers that are proper to the soul-body 
composi te. M e m o r y is therefore a proper func t ion o f the soul , i n its qua l i f ied , 
composi te d imens ion. 
The memory o f sense-perceptions and affect ions is consequently a mode l 
fo r the memory o f thoughts. Plot inus says that there can only be a th ink ing o f our 
thought w h e n i t is translated into a sort o f image, even a verbal image: 
Perhaps the recept ion into the image-making power w o u l d be o f the verbal 
expression w h i c h accompanies the act o f intel l igence. The intel lectual act 
is w i thou t parts and has not , so to speak, come out in to the open, but 
remains unobserved w i t h i n , but the verbal expression unfo lds its content 
and br ings i t out o f the mtel lectual act as i f i n a mi r ro r , and this is h o w 
there is apprehension and persistence and memory o f i t . Therefore, even 
though the soul is a lways moved to inte l l igent ac t iv i ty , i t is when i t comes 
to be i n the image-mak ing power that we apprehend it. 
• The chapters on memory include 4.3.25 through 4.4.14. 
Enn. 4.3.25. 
' Ibid 4.3.30. 
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Plot inus is d is t inguishing between pure intel lectual act iv i ty and what cou ld be 
described as self-conscious thought ; the former , something non- tempora l and 
fundamenta l ly inef fable, and the latter, the operat ion o f memory as i t makes 
thought possible for a s d f that is fundamenta l ly d iv ided. M e m o r y i n this picture 
mediates the transcendent (recept ive) and the immanent (product ive) i n th ink ing . 
August ine echoes this in his discussion o f the p roduc t ion o f an " in terna l w o r d " for 
thought i n trin.֊except that, for August ine , the transcendent m i n d is f u l l y d iv ine 
and not an aspect o f the descended soul . 
The mode l o f sense-perception is normat ive fo r the body-sou l composi te 
because, as w i t h Ar is to t le , thought requires the image-mak ing capacity o f 
phantasia. Th is pos i t ion, moreover, is mainta ined by August ine , fo r wh i l e he 
denies that phantasms must accompany the remembrance o f thoughts, he insists 
on the necessity o f "verbal images" in trirt.^^ 
For Plot inus, the t w o aspects o f thought are ideal ly not dist inct . When the 
soul that is descended is i n harmony w i t h the soul that is undescended, they are 
one. Plot inus does not speculate about whether memory w o u l d be necessary i n 
this р ісШге, except as expressing the relat ionship o f potent ia l i ty that w o u l d yet 
exist between soul and its part icular intel lect . There is no need fo r memory i n the 
pure ly in te l l ig ib le w o r l d , since " the intel lectual act " is t imeless {achronos pasa 
noesìs) as un i f y i ng what is diverse.^^ I t is evident that the stewardship o f body by 
the soul is what makes memory foundat ional fo r understanding as w e l l as for 
percept ion and af fect ion. 
3 5 Cf. also Ep. 7.1.2. Augustme wishes, for example, to show that memory can bring things to 
mind without making the mind subject to them, as in the case o f a powerful emotion; rather, they 
return to the mouth o f the one remembering like cud, but without any taste {conf. 10,14.21). 
Em. 4.4.1. 
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There is therefore a straggle for memory , whether i t should be attuned to 
higher or lower th ings. Plot inus describes th is i n terms o f a habit or d isposi t ion 
that can be fo rmed and awakened.^^ Fa i l ing th is , memory is a source o f 
distract ion. Plot inus seems to retreat from his stated pos i t ion on the " l oca t i on " o f 
sense-perception i n the soul w h e n he describes memory as something that 
selectively sifts th rough the mass o f bod i l y experiences, not permi t t ing what is 
" i r re levant " to enter in to the soul . W e can conclude here, however, that he is 
speaking o f the lower soul as a sort o f guardian fo r the higher soul. When the soul 
is turned to the contempla t ion o f h igher th ings, memory is not even aware, he 
says, o f sense-perceptions produced " i n the soul."^^ Though memory be necessary 
for sense-perception, i t can pe r f o rm th is func t ion mindlessly wh i l e s imultaneously 
being trained fo r the apprehension o f lo f t ie r real i t ies. T o be sure. Plot inus here 
seems to be descr ib ing contempla t ion as an extraordinary experience o f 
contemplat ion, one w h i c h is ideal and not normat ive , as Ar is to t le m igh t describe 
it. I n other texts, the myst ica l language o f ascent and un ion predominates. I n 
such a case, memory i n the ord inary sense ceases to be necessary for the operat ion 
o f the ւաո ճ . ՝ ՛ ^ 
I n the ac t iv i ty o f m i n d , Plot inus fur ther observes that the soul does not 
actually remember itself. The soul possesses i tse l f "secondar i ly " , i n the sense that 
i t becomes one w i t h the objects o f knowledge. I f the soul were to th ink o f i tself, i t 
w o u l d th ink something " e m p t y . " Instead, the s e i f i s " i n c l u d e d " i n its knowledge, 
whether potent ia l or actual, o f a l l th ings. Thus, when self-aware, the soul is at 
once two and one: i t loses i tse l f i n the discovery o f the th ing k n o w n , and f inds 
" / Ш 4.4.4; "diakeimai." 
38 Ibid. 4.4.8. 
3 9 Again, as Ar is to tk says in De anima 3.5 (430a23-24). 
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i tse l f as the k n o w i n g subject. Th is "mys t i ca l l y " Ar is to te l ian way o f speaking is 
impor tant to h igh l igh t because the sense o f se l f - re f lex iv i ty developed by 
August ine i n the tenth book o f trin. can be misrepresented as a species o f pure 
sel f - re lat ion, apart f r o m any grounding in a knowledge o f what is other; but 
August ine excludes this interpretat ion fa i r ly exp l ic i t l y . Some scholars consider 
this a more P lo t in ian reading o f August ine , and w e po in t out th is passage i n 
Plot inus in order to discourage such an іп Їефге їа ї іоп. 
Ennead IV. 6: On Sense-Perception and Memory 
This short text meri ts special attention for several reasons. I t re tums i n a 
very concise manner to questions o f sense-perception and the паШге o f memory , 
many o f w h i c h have been considered i n earlier texts. Moreover , i t is very 
po lemica l i n tone, engaging d i rect ly texts o f Ar is to t le and other students o f Plato. 
Th is is a negative, since Plot inus is a more careless reader֊especial ly o f 
Aristot le一when his object ive is po lemica l . A t t imes, he misconstrues Ar is to t le ' s 
arguments, and i n th is case, he refuses to read the treatise De memoria et 
reminiscentia as hav ing a l im i ted goal w i t h i n a m u c h larger epis temologica! 
project . Nevertheless, when w e take seriously P lo t inus ' o w n phi losophica l debt to 
Ar i s to t le , we can of ten see beyond a rhetor ical posture to p ro found points o f 
development a long the l ines o f Ar is to te l ian psychology. I t also becomes clear 
that, fo r Plot inus, Stoic mater ial ist epistemology is the greater enemy. 
I n the f i rst sect ion. Plot inus objects to the idea o f sense-perceptions as 
impressions or stamps upon the soul . F r o m this, i t w o u l d f o l l o w that memory 
cannot consist o f the recol lect ion o f impressions i n the soul , since there w o u l d be 
no need to b r ing to m i n d again what is already inde l ib ly present i n the soul . 
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Plot inus is mak ing a careful d is t inct ion. A s we have seen, he w i l l not a l l ow that 
anyth ing can be "s tamped" on the soul in the same manner that i t is stamped on a 
bod i l y organ. He wishes to avo id bo th the phys ica l i ty and the passivi ty imp l ied i n 
this way o f speaking. H is object ions t ry to prove th is point . 
Plot inus of fers four object ions. First , i f sense-perceptions were 
impressions made on the soul , there w o u l d be no need fo r the soul to " l ook 
outside i tsel f . " The soul w o u l d not need to p lay a role i n percept ion i n any active 
sense; the impressions w o u l d aiready be " t he re " w i t h i n the soul. Second, he raises 
a quest ion about the t ime elapsed because o f the distance between the perceiver 
and the object perceived. I t w o u l d be absurd to speak o f there be ing a distance 
between the perceiver and the th ing perceived i f i t were already impressed i n the 
soul , and l ikewise absurd to suggest that any t ime had elapsed."^^ T h i r d , he asks 
h o w the actual size o f a th ing cou ld be comprehended g iven that i t w o u l d be 
impossib le for the dimensions, e.g. o f a moun ta in range, to be reproduced w i t h m 
the soul o f one person. F ina l ly , he points out that, i f a l l w e perceive are the 
impressions stamped in the soul , then we w i l l not be perce iv ing the actual th ing at 
a l l . 
These object ions are more coherent as cr i t ic isms o f Stoic, софогеаІізЇ 
not ions o f sense-perception. Ar is to t le i n fact f i rst makes many o f these 
օեյ60էւօոտ.՛*^ The second and th i rd can be removed once w e accept P lot inus ' 
One problem with this objection proceeds from the fact that Plotinus says that sight, and 
likewise hearing, are ๒stantaneous, cf. 4.5.6-7. The reason for this is that he considers light to be 
immaterial; Armstrong, in a note (4.5.7, p. 308), points out that the іпсофогеа і nature o f light is an 
idea taken from Aristotle, which provided " just i f icat ion for his very free use o f the symbolic 
language o f light when speak๒g o f spiritual act ivi ty." I think it unjust to ultimately contrast this to 
Aristotle, for whom the physical description o f l ight and the mechanism o f sight was the model for 
intellectual i l lumination and abstraction. This way o f speak๒g also points to the patristic language 
o f spiritual senses, and the recurrence o f the image o f i l lumination for Augustine. 
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posi t ion on the nature o f sense-perception as a w o r k o f the soul as a composi te 
w i t h body, and not merely o f the body (cf. above). Concern ing the first ob jec t ion , 
see ท. 30 above. The f i rst and four th object ions o f fer a challenge both to the idea 
o f the act ive nature o f the soul , and to the importance fo r Plot inus o f the 
distinctness o f the ru l i ng pr inc ip le f r o m what is r u l e d / ^ 
I n the second chapter, Plot inus presents his o w n posi t ion. The soul , he 
says, is not a f fec ted, but rather comes to k n o w what is near i t֊presumably near 
to i t by v i r tue o f the presence o f the sense organs w h i c h "mediate between t w o 
6ճէէ6տ6Տ."՛՛^ A s w e have seen, sense-perception is a messenger, and soul is the 
master o f this messenger, not merely the possessor. Plot inus appeals to the 
example o f hear ing: 
The impression is i n the air, and is a sort o f art iculated stroke, l i ke a letter 
wr i t ten on the air by the maker o f the sound; but the power {dunamis) and 
substance (ousia) o f the soul does something l i ke reading the impressions 
wr i t ten o n the air when they come near and reach the pomt at w h i c h they 
can be Տ66Ո. ՛ ՛ ՛ ՛ 
What is vex ing about this explanat ion is the ambigu i ty o f the te rm "near . " 
Plot inus is emphat ic about the non- locat ion o f soul , and its universal presence to 
physical bodies. The language o f "nearness" subverts what cou ld be a more 
precise descr ipt ion o f h o w soul and the soul-body composite communicate. He is 
more clear when , after Ar i s to t le ' s example, he says that sense-perceptions are 
affect ions o f the body (especial ly taste and smel l ) , but that they are 
simultaneously acts o f knowledge (gnosis) d ist inct f r o m the affect ions when 
considered as perceptions and judgments (krisis). Ar is to t le says that i n sense-
42 For this reason, he says that the perceiver and the thing perceived remain physically distinct. 
43 Enn. 4.4.23. 
^ Ibid. 4.6.2.10-14. Note how the model o f sight dominates this description o f hearing, as 
Armstrong observes at ท. 1, p. 325. 
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percept ion, the perceiver and the th ing perceived remain d is t inct i n order for 
percept ion to be possible, but that in knowledge, the knower and the th ing k n o w n 
are identical. ' '^ 
S im i la r l y , P lotmus says that "sense-objects are observed f r o m outside, but 
the in te l l ig ib les i n reverse come out, one can say, f r o m w i t h i n . " Bo th Plot inus, 
and Ar is to t le before h i m , have a concept ion o f the " p l a c e " o f knowledge as an 
inter ior space. U n l i k e Ar is to t le , however, Plot inus depends more on the imagist ic 
impl icat ions o f th is in ter ior i ty for expla in ing h o w knowledge occurs. Th is much 
fo l l ows i n Augus t ine ; but , un l ike August ine, Plot inus is more caref i i l to avo id a 
s imple soul-body dua l ism and antagonism in the sense that the body , operat ional ly 
speaking, is real ly noth ing apart f r o m the presence o f an imat ing , ru l ing soul . 
I n the f i na l chapter. Plot inus retums to the dual nature o f memory . The 
soul , by means o f memory , remembers in te l l ig ib le th ings because it is ident ical 
w i t h them, even i f on ly potent ia l ly . I n the case o f sense-perception, the soul as 
act ive pr inc ip le per forms the necessary wo rk : i t br ings th ings before its "eyes " 
since " i ts power is i n t ravai l (odinouses) towards t h e m . " He of fers several 
object ions, paral le l to those l isted above, w h i c h ch ie f l y argue against a concept ion 
o f memory that presupposes a physical k i nd o f impress ion upon the soul . I f 
impressions were present i n the soul i n a physical sort o f way , memory w o u l d not 
be necessary at a l l , neither w o u l d forget t ing be possible, since the impressions 
themselves w o u l d be l y i ng "ready to հՅոժ."՛՛^ Instead, Plot inus clear ly locates 
memory in the soul , descr ib ing i t as habitus or a power {ischus), w h i c h needs to 
be exercised in order to be improved. I t can be t ra ined to be more attentive to the 
Aristotle, De anima 419a 12-14. 
' Em. 4.6.3. 
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apprehension o f in te l l ig ib le th ings, and less attentive to the images that i t br ings 
into the soul f r o m w i thou t . 
The negative re lat ion o f memory to embodied experience is conf i rmed by 
the understanding that Plot inus has o f matter as a k i nd o f becoming that is at heart 
nothingness.'*^ I n the hierarchical order o f creat ion, matter is a product o f the soul 
i n a manner analogous to the p roduc t ion o f soul out o f nous. P lo t inus ' de f in i t ion 
o f t ime is closely associated w i t h matter, since the descent o f soul in to the 
physical is a movement that actual ly gives rise to t i m e / ^ The experience o f 
d issolut ion, or d istract ion, granted to the soul- in-exi le is r igh t l y described as a 
ruthless series o f temporal d is junct ions: the soul is not real ly at home i n this place, 
i n this mode o f being w h i c h is not " b e i n g " at a l l . Th is is not , however , the final 
w o r d . The fa l l o f the soul becomes the r e ณ m o f the soul , i n that է Խ օ ս £ հ memory , 
the temporal is ordered i n such a way as to reveal some par t ic ipat ion in nous 
through soul. Bu t this is merely a moment ， and one w h i c h is hopefu l l y surpassed 
ent irely by the ind iv idua l s o u l / ^ 
To summarize, Plot inus sees memory as a power o f the intel lect ive soul 
w i t h two basic funct ions, one per ta in ing to phantasia, and therefore to the order ly 
retent ion o f sense and verbal images, and the other per ta in ing to act ive 
recol lect ion, the "b r i ng ing f o r t h " o f in te l l ig ib le things i n the m i n d . The latter 
concerns the forms, and is discursive, and therefore dist inct f r o m the myst ica l 
" '№/๔.2.5.4-5 
48 Ibid. 3.7.1; see also 1.5, in which Plotinus makes an argument that seems contrary to what we 
have said about memory, namely, that it can be trained in such a way as to increase the well-being 
o f a soul. 1.5 suggests that the passage o f t ime, by its very nature, can only reveal the soul mixed 
up in the evil o f temporal existence. Well-being simply is (for soul). These positions are 
reconciled by favouring the de-temporal izing ascent made by means o f memory as the proper role 
for memory. See R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (Duckworth: London, 1983), pp. 
157-170. 
'*^  See J: Trouil lard, La Procession Plotinieme (Presses Universitaires: Paris, 1955). The problem 
wi th readmg Plotinus selectively is clear throughout this discussion. ― 
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union and contemplat ion that is the f ina l rest o f the soul . The phi losopher must 
cul t ivate the паШга І power o f memory and t ra in i t to be consciously preoccupied 
w i t h the "ac tua l i za t ion" o f intel lect , o f ten described as par t ic ipat ion i n nous. 
Confus ion can arise because o f the dividedness o f m i n d տ its undescended aspect, 
i n w h i c h memory has no part, since the passage o f t ime is not noted. 
M e m o r y is therefore single, but w i t h t w o dist inct funct ions. The ideal 
perspective on the lower func t ion o f memory could be described as ben ign 
neglect. M e m o r y ought to serve the approach o f soul to m i n d i n l ikeness, but the 
l i fe o f the soul-body composi te frustrates tMs. M e m o r y is b o m o f the experience 
o f the embodied l i fe , and i n certain passages, Plot inus speaks m o v i n g l y o f the 
beauty o f the d i m phys ica l " re f lec t ions" o f the order o f nous. These cannot even 
be compared i n value to in te l l ig ib le Beauty, and thus memory func t ion ing i n an 
ideal manner, tums away f r o m the mater ia l to the in te l l ig ib le i n the hope o f the 
reuni f icat ion o f soul w i t h nous―and therefore in the hope o f its o w n ob l i v i on . 
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Conclusion to Part I 
These three ancient wr i ters are central representatives o f the mainst ream 
development o f Platonism. Plot inus is a f ru i t f u l interpreter o f bo th Plato and 
Ar is to t le , a benef ic iary o f their commentators, as w e l l as an or ig ina l source o f 
metaphysical and rel ig ious teaching i n his o w n r ight . Augus t ine 'ร speculative 
roots cannot be explained by this t radi t ion alone. First , we have not considered 
the inf luence o f Stoic mater ia l ism on both Plot inus and Augus t ine , for reasons 
indicated i n the in t roduct ion. Second, Augus t ine 'ร appropr ia t ion o f P latonism is 
mediated not s imply է Խ օ ս ց հ Cicero and doxographica l wr i t i ngs , but th rough a 
var iety o f other authors more contemporary, some o f whose wr i t i ngs are not w e l l 
k n o w n . The inf luence o f Рофһугу is h igh ly probable, but d i f f i cu l t to speak to 
w i t h certainty fo r lack o f or ig inal texts.*^^ O f the greatest impor tance, surely, are 
Chr is t ian authors such as Ambrose ; further speculations are inv i ted , but rarely 
conclusive: an inf luence o f Or igen through Jerome^ ^  Tertนl l ian^^, the actual 
wr i t i ngs (as opposed to the translations) o f Mar ius Victor inus^^, Cypr ian , Basi l o f 
Caesarea, and even Ph i lo o f A lexandr ia? Even i n the case, however , o f Ambrose , 
an atmosphere predominates that is altogether more exot ic than i n August ine. 
5 ° The fairly measured position o f J. O'Meara ( "Philosophy from Oracles " ш Augustine (Paris, 
1959) should be read alongside p. Hadot's critique in "Citations de Prophyre à propos d'une 
recente ouvrage", Re\՝ue des Études Augustmiermes 2 (1960)， pp. 204-244. 
5 ' A . Bastiaensen, "August in et ses prédécesseurs latins", ๒ Augustimana Traiecíma: 
Commmicatiom Présentées au Colloque International d՝Utrecht, J. den Boeft and J. van Oort， 
eds. (Études Augustmiennes: Paris, 1987), pp. 42-44; A . - M . La Bonnardière, "Jérôme, 
' informateur' d'Augustin au sujet d'Origene", Revue des Études Augustmiennes 20 (1974), pp. 42-
54. 
52 See the entry by Frédéric Chapot in Augustine Through the Ages: an Encyclopedia, pp. 822-824， 
5 3 p, Hadot, Marius Vicîorinus: Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres (Études Augustiniennes: 
Paris, 1971); N. Cipriani, "Agostino lettore dei commentari paolini di Mar io V i t tor ino" , 
Augustiniamm 38 (1998), ppT413-28; N. Cipriani, " L e fonti cristiane della dottrina trinitaria nei 
pr imi dialoghi di ร. Agost ino", Augmtiriiaหum 34 (1994), pp. 253-312. 
54 See N. Cipriani 's article, "Le opere di Ambrogio negli scritti di Agostino anteriori 
ííiVepiscopdX๙%֊Խ Scuola Cattoliea-\2SI6i\997)rppr-763^80G; G. Ш0ес, Saint Ambroise et la 
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Moreover , August ine does not wr i te as a ph i losopher֊al though this 
observation of ten proceeds f r o m an impover ished sense o f what phi losophy meant 
to the ancients. Our object ive i n these chapters is to look at phi losophical authors 
as part o f a "h is tory o f ideas", and not a series o f direct, t ransmitted inf luences, i n 
order to determine contexts fo r early speculat ion about the idea o f memory . The 
t radi t ion o f ref lect ion upon memory and sense-perception that we have described 
is largely taken for granted by August ine. I t is reasonable to mainta in that the 
manner in w h i c h memory is used i n conf. and trin. is w h o l l y or ig ina l . The early 
wr i t ings , w h i c h we shal l n o w proceed to consider, demonstrate that August ine has 
internal ized a r i ch anthropology f r o m a variety o f ph i losophica l and l i terary 
sources. The or ig ina l i ty o f the later wr i t i ngs does not depart f r o m the content o f 
the earlier, but rather develops their ant føopological presupposit ions i n new ways 
appropriate to the genre and audiences o f those texts, and w i t h a more mature 
appreciat ion o f the theological impl ica t ions o f these presupposit ions. Hence we 
shall argue not on ly that August ine inheri ts many elements o f this phi losophical 
t rad i t ion, but that he uses these elements for his o w n риф08Є8 i n a manner fa i r ly 
consistent throughout h is career. 
Plato is w e l l k n o w n for the teaching o f knowledge as recol lect ion. We 
have shown that, isolated, this teaching wishes to account for the m ind ' s 
relat ionship to the forms. We have also shown that, throughout his wr i t ings , the 
idea comes to be central to a concept ion o f dialect ic that includes the vagaries o f 
embodied l i fe . The value o f the body is admit ted in i t ia l l y on ly grudg ing ly : Plato 
does not w ish to say that its experience is o f more than instrumental usefulness. 
B y Philebus, the " m i x e d " l i fe o f v i r tue arguably has a place o f more value than i n 
philosophie (Études Augustiniennes: Paris, 1974); A. Pincherle, "Ambrogio e Agostino", 
Augusiinjanum ì4 ( 1974), pp. 385-407. 
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Republic. I n appropr ia t ing Gadamer 'ร observation about recol lect ion as dia lect ic, 
we are t rac ing a t w o f o l d shi f t . A recol lect ion that had on ly an inc idental re lat ion 
to discursive intel lectual operat ions, describing merely an a priori l i nk to the 
fo rms o f thought , becomes something demonstrable by a var iety o f modes o f 
argumentat ion. Secondly, memory takes on a more metaphor ical character as a 
pr inc ip le in tending to include both the mu l t ip l i c i t y o f sensible experience, and the 
s impl ic i ty o f knowledge i n the un i ty o f the perceiv ing subject. M e m o r y describes 
the ab i l i ty o f soul to mediate pr incip les o f measure and beauty. B y this reading, 
Plato is closest to Augus t ine 's o w n posi t ion. 
For our purposes i t is he lp fu l to assume, as most o f the Peripatetics and 
early Neoplatonists d id , a deep doctr inal harmony between Plato and Ar is to t le . 
W h e n Ar is to t le describes the active intel lect as " the l ight o f reason", does th is not 
b r ing to m i n d the i l l um ina t i on o f the intel lect by the Good? I t is on ly a 
d isc ip l inary unwi l l ingness by m o d e m scholars to see that the comple t ion o f De 
anima i n Ethica and Metaphysica 13 and 14 is mediated by the theology o f 
Metaphysica 12 that prevents this reading. Ar is to t le enlists memory as a clear 
partner o f the imaginat ion. I n do ing so, he l inks inte l lecmal operations to the 
fo rmat ion o f images, sensate and l inguist ic. Is there a transcendent concept ion o f 
memory in Ar is to t le? H i s epistemologica! real ism does not preclude th is , but he 
does not describe i t i n such terms, part ly i n reaction to Plato, and part ly because 
knowledge as pure, actual and in itself, does not include the passage o f t ime. Bu t 
th is is not h o w knowledge actual ly occurs g iven the condi t ions o f embodiment , 
and Ar is to t le is not as reluctant as Plato to find that the real i ty o f body is 
determinat ive. I t is indeed the case that Ar is to t le sees intel lect as separable i n 
pr inc ip le , but he does not take this to be normat ive any more than August ine takes 
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the v is ion at Ost ia to be normat ive o f the act o f worship.^^ T o beho ld the Good in 
a myst ica l ascent should be appropriately desired. The commun i t y at Cassiciacum 
as an instance o f the Chr ist ian c i ty is more than a compromise o f th is: as church, i t 
is intended to be a real izat ion o f al l that is contained i n that v is ion . Augus t ine 'ร 
v is ion is shared w i t h his mother: they ascend together, a l l the wh i l e loquens. Th is 
moment is a taste o f the peace o f death that soon comes upon Mon i ca . I t is also a 
reminder that the cont inui ty o f the commun i t y o f the church is not in temip ted by 
the death o f the body. 
H o w very d i f ferent this is f r o m Plo t inus ' gentle flight " o f the alone to the 
A l o n e . " Th is may s imply be a consequence o f the loss o f sel f i n the 
transcendence o f Intel lect, to w h i c h Chr is t ian personal ism can be contrasted.^* 
The theological anthropology o f Plot inus determines a l l else. A s w e have seen, he 
has a very sophisticated understanding o f h o w sense-perception occurs, but the 
manner in w h i c h the soul perceives impressions and af fect ions invo lves real 
d i f f i cu l t ies . Plot inus is certain that the soul is the act ive pr inc ip le at w o r k i n 
b r ing ing to the soul a l l o f its appropriate data. B u t for what end? The explanat ion 
is less clear than we wou ld l ike. Soul lacks the recept iv i ty o f the passive element, 
at best coming "near " to what i t perceives. M e m o r y has bo th a lower sense that 
pertains str ict ly to sense-perception, and a h igher sense per ta in ing to the retent ion 
o f the fo rms. He , more clearly than Plato, cal ls memory a " hab i t " that needs to be 
cul t ivated and developed so that the soul becomes less m i n d f u l o f the physical 
th ings that are be low, and more attentive to the in te l l ig ib le th ings above. Th is 
language is echoed power fu l l y by August ine i n conf. Reminiscent o f the t r i -
" Cow/9.10.23. 
For a critical contrast, see A . H . Armstrong, "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus", in 
Dionysius 1 (1977), pp. 49-68. 
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partite soul o f Or igen, memory as "hab i t " pertains only to soul in the lower sense, 
and does not perta in to m i n d w h i c h , for Plot inus, remains above. For August ine, a 
memory o f t l i is " p l ace " is necessary; but its achievement does not entai l the 
obl i terat ion o f the remember ing subject. August ine is very much at home in the 
language o f P lo t in ian anthropology. Nevertheless, he takes that antføopological 
t radi t ion i n a very d i f ferent d i rect ion. 
Where does this b r ing us w i t h August ine? I n conf., speculation at the 
anthropological level gives way to a cosmic re f lect ion upon the nature o f t ime and 
the imp l ica t ion o f creat ion ex nihilo. The state o f the mic rocosm compels 
ref lect ion upon the macrocosm. I n the early dialogues o f greatest signif icance 
w i t h respect to theological ant føopology, to be considered in the next section, 
there is no in t imat ion yet o f the fu l l s igni f icance that memory w i l l have. The 
question o f memory arises i n the context o f ref lect ions upon the relat ionship 
between the soul and the body: their in t imacy i n acts o f percept ion, their host i l i ty 
w i t h respect to sp i r iณal pur i ty . Th is p icture i n these texts is very complex. Wh i l e 
we venture no new theories about part icular texts o f either Plato or Plot inus that 
August ine may have read, w i t h i n the l im i ted mode l o f histor ical doctr inal 
inf luence indicated above, we are arguing that August ine inherits an impover ished 
picture o f the teachings o f Plato. He gratefu l ly receives the " l i be ra t ion" o f the 
theory o f forms, w i thou t much sense o f Plato 's o w n resolut ion to the p rob lem that 
they pose. W e see h i m i n these texts st ruggl ing w i t h soul-body dual ism, and w i t h 
the inf luence o f Chr is t ian w i s d o m f r o m other s o u r c e s ― a n d needless to say, his 
o w n part icular g e n i u s ― h e recognizes and seeks to overcome the anthropology 
that this onto logy impl ies. M e m o r y is central to this ef for t . 
77 
The early wr i t i ngs o f August ine are phi losophica l ly r i ch , and their 
іп їефге їа Ї іоп f raught w i t h d i f f i cu l t questions o f genre. They also bear ample 
evidence o f mature theologica l ref lect ion, and we mean to read them accordingly. 
I t is our in tent ion w i t h August ine , much more than w i t h the authors i n this part, to 
be as true as possible to the argument o f part icular texts. A n abstract approach 
( "what is Augus t ine 's pos i t ion on xT) is h igh ly useful , but we mean to approach 
memory in part icular, and psychology in general, w i t h a desire to understand w h y 
memory arises at a l l տ the part icular loci that i t does, and h o w these po in t ahead 
to its treatment i n conf. and trin. 
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P A R T I I : 
A U G U S T I N E ' ร E A R L Y W R I T I N G S 
C H A P T E R 4: 
T H E C A S S I C I A C U M D I A L O G U E S 
CONTRA ACADEMICOS, BEATA VITA, A N D DE ORDINE 
August ine never looks at memory w i t h the same sort o f detail as do the 
phi losophers considered i n the first part. L i k e them, however, he raises the 
question o f the status and role o f memory at crucia l moments o f inqu i ry into the 
nature o f w i s d o m , and the re lat ion o f sense-based knowledge to the same. The 
l imi ta t ions o f memory delineate the mode o f the m ind ' s apprehension o f t ru th , 
since they reveal the ground ing o f the k n o w i n g subject i n sensible experience. 
The s igni f icance o f memory is f u l l y acknowledged i n the earliest dialogues, but its 
careful examinat ion is cont inual ly deferred. For what does August ine wai t? A n 
answer begins to emerge——intimated i n ord. ， more developed i n mus. ： he wai ts for 
t ime, the music and pr inc ip le o f creat ion, as the exp l ic i t context for the spir i tual 
experience o f embodied l i f e , o f l i fe l i ved " w i t h i n the bounds o f memory . " I n 
these dialogues, our m i n i m a l goal is to ident i fy texts i n w h i c h memory is raised. 
We shall also lay out the general anthropological р ісШге w i t h i n wh i ch the 
importance o f memory is discussed. W i t h respect to these goals, this part is 
cont inuous w i t h the f i rst part o f the dissertat ion. 
The fundamenta l concern o f these dialogues is the nature o f w i sdom. I n 
the first book o f Acad, w i s d o m is def ined as the knowledge o f things human and 
d iv ine. ' Th is f h i i t f u l and provocat ive de f in i t ion w i l l stay w i t h August ine for some 
80 
t ime, insp i r ing the d is t inc t ion between scientia and sapientia f ound in ケШ. 2 
W i s d o m more than anyth ing else is the guarantor o f happiness; the possession o f 
happiness, as the f i rs t book of Acad also shows, is cont ingent on some sort o f 
possession o f t ru th . Th is idea is taken f r o m a mul t i tude o f ancient sources, in 
part icular, C icero . ' O f course, for August ine, the convergence o f w i s d o m , 
happiness and t ru th point to their ident i ty w i t h and i n the d iv ine . Th is 
convergence is not f u l l y developed unt i l the final chapters o f beata น. The 
quest ion o f t ru th and cert i tude i n Acad blossoms into a larger quest ion o f h o w one 
desires and obtains happiness i n beata น. ： the epistemologica! issue becomes a 
theologica l quest ion o f the mediat ion o f t ru th as more than intel lectual pr inc ip le . 
Ord takes up the same quest ion on a cosmologica! scale: here, w i s d o m consists i n 
the ab i l i ty to recognize t ru th as a universal , cosmologica! p r inc ip le : ordo. 
Med ia t i on is e f fec t ive ly discerned at the level o f the phys ica l creature, i n the 
ref lected l igh t o f the t r in i tar i an w o r k o f creation. 
O n the epistemologica! side, the in i t ia l quest ion i n Acad, about the sense in 
w h i c h t ru th can be "possessed" can be mis leading. These texts leave us i n a 
pos i t ion o f tension, a hopefu l acceptance o f an earthly state that is at best a 
possession but also a lack, a f i nd ing , and yet st i l l a seeking. The manner i n w h i c h 
the argument moves between knowledge o f t ru th and desire for happiness 
reinforces this dia lect ic, since, as August ine is fond o f saying, w e cannot love 
what we do not k n o w ; and yet, we cannot real ly k n o w what we do not first love. 
Thus L.F. Pizzolato wr i tes: 
՜ 13.1.1; 14.1.3: "disputâmes autem de sapientia, defmiermt eam dicentes: sapientia est rerum 
humanarum divinarumque scientia. Unde ego quoque in libro superiore utrarumque rerum 
cognitionem, id est divinarum atque humanarum, et sapientiam et scientiam dici posse non tăcui. ՝ 
3 Hortentius (Fr. 36, Mül le r ) ; Disputationes Tusculanae 5.10.28; De natura deorum 1.20.53; 
Seneca Beata и. 2.3; Plato, Euthydemus 278; see also Aristot le, Nicomachean Ethics 1094al ; 
1178b8. 
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L a conclusione del l ib ro I del Acad. sembra essere una buona premessa al 
discorso del bv: "po iché tu t t i desideriamo la fe l ic i tà sia che essa si possa 
ottenere solo con ľ acquisizione (inventa) del la ver i tà sia con la sola 
di l igente r icerca iquaesita) d i essa, no i , se vog l i amo essere fe l ice, 
dobbiamo subordinare ogn i altra aspirazioni e r icercare la veri tà. Come 
si vede, ad Agos t ino nel Acad preme dire che dal la tendenza al la fe l ic i tà 
discende la necessità de l la r icerco del vero. N e l bv invece, dove i l 
problema centrale è la natura del la fe l ic i tà , occorrerà stabi l i re anche in che 
senso i l conoscere rende possibi le la fe l ic i tà . Insomma, mentre nel Acad 
la fe l ic i tà è funzionale a stabi l i re la necessarietà del prob lema 
gnoseologico, nel bv i l p rob lemo gnoseologico è funzionale a quel lo 
eudenionologico. E se la tensione verso la fe l ic i tà è un postulato che 
fonda la necessità del la conoscenza (Acad), un discorso sulla fe l ic i tà 
{beata น.) postula un discorso gnoseologico.^* 
The development o f this dialect ic o f seeking and finding is j us t one i l lustrat ion o f 
the cont inui ty o f purpose between these early dialogues and August ine 'ร later 
wr i t ings , especially C0f7/ There is no need to resurrect d i f f i cu l t questions o f the 
h is tor ic i ty and w r i t i ng o f these texts. For our purposes, i t is suf f ic ient to say that 
the Cassiciacum dialogues are a you th fu l attempt on Augus t ine 's part to 
understand his fa i th in terms o f his phi losophica l evo lu t ion and early pedagogical 
methods.^ The reverse is not an adequate pos i t ion . The most ins ight fu l readings 
o f these texts approach them i n many ways as an inc ip ient attempt at what was 
u l t imate ly accompl ished i n the early parts o f conf (The ro le o f M o n i c a is o f 
especial importance in th is regard. For example, even as August ine , w i t h a 
4 " I I Beaio น. о Ia possibile felicità nel tempo", in Ĺ 'opera letteraria di Agostino tra Cassiciacum e 
Milano^ ed. Giovanni Reala et al. (Edizioni Augustinus: Palermo, 1987), p. 85. See also Α . Guzzo, 
"Agost ino dal Contra Académicos al De vera religion๔% in Studi e Ricerche dì Storia della 
Filosofìa 22 (Tur in, 1957), p. 2 1 . 
5 Beata น. is described by Pierre Courcelle as "les premières Confessions''; cf. "Les premières 
confessions de saint Augustm", Revue des Études Latines, 21/22 (1943/44), pp. 155-174. On the 
dialogues ๒ general, see J."J. O'Meara, "The historicity o f the early dialogues o f Saint Augustine", 
Vigiliae Chnstianae 5 (1951), pp. 150-178; G. Madec, "L 'h istor ic i té des Dialogues de 
Cassiciacum", Revue des Études Augustmiemes 32 (1986), pp. 207-231 ； p. Caiy, "What Licentius 
learned: a narrative reading o f the Cassiciacum Dialogues", Augustinián Studies 29:1 (1998)， pp. 
141-163. See all relevant articles in the collection edited by Giovanni Reale et al., in which 
Pizzolato observes (p. 33) that " I Dialogi {sic) sono da considerare sostanzialmente 'stor ic i ' e da 
studiare come un unico complesso. Né d'altra parte è possibile contraporre i l dialogo come genere 
alla veridicità storica, se è vero che i l dialogo aveva di per sé una riconosciuta funzione 
autobiografica." See chapters below for further references on the dialogues in general. 
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measure o f ar t i f ice, discovers t r in i ta r ian tropes oí modus i n beata и. 4.35， M o n i c a 
is standing impat ient ly by to announce that August ine has been speaking al l a long 
o f Chr is t ian doctr ine.) August ine is p rob ing the value o f his o w n early 
pedagogical assumptions: he both explo i ts and cr i t ica l ly uses his Stoic inf luences 
for his o w n purposes.^ He u l t imate ly defends their value, to the extent that they 
can b r ing L icent ius to the po in t o f ph i losophica l clari ty.^ That this quasi-Socratic 
method is abandoned i n subsequent wr i t ings can be largely attr ibuted to 
Augus t ine 'ร pastoral and apologet ic demands as a churchman. 
I n these dia logues, as w e l l as in de libero arbitrio 1 ， number is associated 
w i t h w i s d o m i n a var iety o f ways. Acad, uses number to introduce mathemat ical 
knowledge as a mode l o f inte l lectual certitude.^ August ine also argues that i t is 
the inf luence o f Pythagoras that takes Plato beyond Socratic ethics.^ The 
language o f measure {modus) i n beata и. carries the argument to its c l imax o f 
media t ion : w i s d o m as modus, the " m e a n " te rm between the extremes o f ful lness 
and want . The language o f ordo i n ord s imi lar ly points to measure and number 
as pr inc ip les embedded i n creat ion. I n these texts, f r o m the perspective o f the 
ph i losophica l Mstory detai led i n the first section, we can see August ine st ruggl ing 
w i t h the l im i ta t ions o f the dua l ism that he has inheri ted f r o m a part ia l picture o f 
the Platonic t rad i t ion . Plato had to challenge the ab i l i ty o f the theory o f the forms 
6 N. Cipriani convincingly argues for the influence o f Varro on ord 2, observing that "the 
anthropological framework o f the section o f De ordine on the artes is clearly anti-NeopIatonic." 
See the entry on Liberal Arts in Augustine Through the Ages: cm encyclopedia (Eerdmans: Grand 
Rapids, 1999) ed. A l lan Fitzgerald, pp. 492-493. 
A n d , as Gerard о ' D a l y points out, Augustine continued to use "skeptical arguments and method 
in his wri t ings: they are found, for example, in his anti-Manichaean polemic from 388 onwards," 
He attributes the Stoic influence largely to Cicero, except o f course for the idea that "the 
arguments o f the New Academy were a device o f Arces і laus to protect genuine Platonic doctrine, 
to which Academic skeptics contmued to subscribe esoterically. Cf. "The response to skepticism 
and the mechanisms o f cogni t ion", in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, eds. E. Stump and 
N. Kretzmann (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001), pp. 159-160. 
\23.9 
' 3 . 1 8 . 4 1 . 
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to exp la in the re lat ion between the in te l l ig ib le and the phys ica l , and a re f lec t ion 
on the nature o f number i n Philebus grants h i m insight in to the necessity o f 
onto log ica l media t ion. A t the moment where reason discovers that i t has a 
" k i n s h i p " w i t h number in ord (2.19.48), i t has an insight into the nature o f 
intel lectual ac t iv i ty that is a start l ing echo o f the connect ion made between 
memory and dialect ic i n Philebus. Know ledge is both an ascent and a descent, 
f igurat ive ly speaking; i t is a col lect ing and a dispersal, bu t i n both cases, an act o f 
seeking un i ty i n a l l th ings, whether by gather ing into one, or by comprehending 
what is mu l t ip le as who le . Plato transforms recol lect ion into dialect ic. August ine 
is not quite at that po in t , but i t is precisely at that moment i n the argument o f ord. 
that the quest ion o f memory is raised between August ine and L icent ius . W e w i l l 
show h o w August ine is brought to the quest ion o f the nature o f memory and its 
role i n sense-perception and knowledge. 
From truth to happiness 
The three books o f contra académicos f rame the other t w o dialogues 
chronolog ica l ly . Th is w o r k is purpor tedly about August ine 's attempt to convince 
those present, L icent ius i n part icular, o f the falsehood o f the skeptical c l a im that a 
man cannot "pe rce ive" Qyercipere) the t ru th , and therefore should not assent to 
anyth ing. The specif ic question that moves the argument o f the first book is 
whether a man can be happy i f he does not possess the էณth. L icent ius , standing 
fo r what is presumably the pos i t ion o f the Skeptics, argues that a man can be 
happy i f he is searching for the t ru th . ' ^ Tryget ius , closer to August ine 'ร pos i t ion, 
Acad 1.2.15. ""Quid hoc ipsum? inquam; existimatism beatos nos esse posse etiam non inventa 
veniate? —— Tunc Licentius: Possumus, inquit, si verum quaeramus. " The Latin text o f these three 
dialogues is taken from Volume 29 in Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (Tumhol t : Brepolร, 
1970). . _ 
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replies that i t is on ly i n the possession o f t ru th that a man is made happy. 
Tryget ius w i l l argue that a desire fo r the t ru th is d i f ferent f r o m possession, and 
therefore that a desire that springs f r o m a lack is basical ly admission o f a state o f 
error.* ' To this, L icent ius responds that w i t h o l d i n g assent w i l l preserve a man 
f r o m error, since even a man w h o has not attained the է ա է հ can l ive according to 
reason.'^ 
O n the th i rd day o f debate, August ine enters into the f ray, def in ing 
w i sdom for his fr iends as the knowledge o f th ings human and d iv ine . He defines 
human matters as what pertains to the v i r tues, and d iv ine matters as the "h idden 
God h i m s e l f to w h i c h intel lect " rare ly reaches, and sense never." '^ August ine 
adds to tMร : 
I don ' t cal l anyth ing ' know ledge ' where the person who professes it is 
sometimes mistaken. Know ledge doesn' t consist merely i n the matters 
that are apprehended. Instead, i t consists i n the fact that they are 
apprehended in such a way that nobody should be i n error about i t or 
vaci l late when pressed by any opponents. 
A measure o f cert i tude is required i n order fo r knowledge to be true. L icent ius 
w i l l reply by saying that happiness can result f r o m the act iv i ty o f the search for 
t ru th. On l y at death w i l l man possess true knowledge , and therefore "d i v ine j o y . " 
L icent ius ' language resonates w i t h Augus t ine 'ร : w i s d o m consists o f a dialect ic o f 
the presence and absence o f t ru th , or o f " the g o o d . " Th is idea is ftilly developed 
" 1.4.10. ''Mihi, ait Ше， пес secundum rationem vivere пес beatuร omnino quisquís errat videtur. 
Errat aułem omniร, qui semper quaerit пес invenìt. ，， 
12 1.4.12-1.5.14. 
ᄂ 1.8.22. 'Чат res divinae cum omnibus concedeทtibus melioreร augustioresque multo quam 
húmame sint, quo pacto eas ille adsequi poterat, qui quid esset ipse msciebat, nisi forte 
existimaทร sidera, quae cotìdie contemplamur, magnum quiddam esse in comparatione verissimi et 
secretissimi dei, quem raro fartasse intellecîus, sensus autem miim aiîingit? The translation o f 
c. acad is by Peter K ing (Hackett: Indianapolis, 1995). 
" 1.7.19. ''Primo, inquii, ego scienîiam non appello, in qua ille, qui earn profitetur, aliquando 
f a l l i t i i r . Scientia enim non solum conprehemis sed ita conprehemis rebus comtat, ut หeque in ea 
quisquam errare пес quibuslibet adversantibus inpulsus หนtare debeať\ 
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i n these dialogues, and i t recurs throughout his wr i t ings : hence conf, opens w i t h a 
recogni t ion that, wh i l e the soul is absent f r o m God , nevertheless G o d is present to 
the soul . W h o can seek after G o d who does not k n o w God already? Ye t h o w 
does the soul come to k n o w G o d except by seeking?*^ 
L icen t ius ' pos i t ion raises the question o f what exact ly constitutes 
knowledge. A t 2.3.9， August ine says that mathematical knowledge is a mode l o f 
cert i tude, and this mode l abides t l i roughout the dialogues. 
I n o w declare to both o f y o u : take care lest y o u th ink yourselves to k n o w 
anyth ing except on ly what y o u have learned in the manner i n w h i c h y o u 
k n o w that the sum o f one and t w o and three and four is ten. A g a i n , take 
care lest y o u th ink that i n ph i losophy y o u w i l l not k n o w the t ru th or that i t 
can ' t be i a i o w n i n this manner at a l l Bel ieve m e ֊ o r rather, bel ieve H i m , 
for He says Search and y ou shall find֊knowledge is not to be despaired 
o f and i t w i l l be clearer than those numbers are." 6 
There is an unresolved tension between this picture o f knowledge and the imp l i ed 
ine f fab i l i t y o f the divine^ to the extent that t ru th is located i n the d iv ine l i fe.*^ 
Beata и. and ord w i l l col lapse to the t w o parts o f the de f in i t i on o f w i s d o m 
prov ided in Acad The mode l o f cert i tude prov ided here cannot apply broadly to 
either the knowledge o f th ings human or d iv ine : human acts, their relevant vir tues 
and vices, cannot become a science i n the manner o f mathemat ics; nor can the 
d iv ine be apprehended after the manner o f a mathematical t ru th . A t th is po in t i n 
'5 Cofif 1.1.1. De Trinitate concludes wi th the same trope: " o Lord my God, my one hope, 
hearken to me, lest through weariness I be unwi l l ing to seek Thee, 'but that I may always ardently 
seek thy face.' Do thou give strength to seek, who hast made me find thee, and hast given the 
hope o f f i n d m g thee more and more." (15.28.51) Trans. พ .G .T . Shedd in Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers Series (Series 1, Vo l . 3) (Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 1988). 
16 ''Sed nunc ambobuร dico: cávete, ne quid vos nosse arbitremini, nisi quod ita didiceritis saltem, 
ut nostis шит duo tria quattuor simul collecta in summám fieri decem. Sed item cávete, ne vos in 
philosophia veritatem aut non cogmturos aut milo modo ita posse cogทosci arbitremini Nam 
mihi credite, vel potim illi credite, qui ait: quaerite et mvenientis, пес cogìiìtionem desperandam 
esse et manifestiorem futuram, quam sunt illi numeri" See also 3.11.25: " I think i t 's now 
sufficiently clear what falsehoods seem to be through sleep and madness, namely, those that 
pertain to the bodi ly senses. For that three times thiee is nine and the square o f rational numbers 
must be true, even i f the human race be snoring away." 
'•^  Cf. supra. 
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A cod August ine is urg ing his inter locutors toward a more complex understanding 
o f w i s d o m , one that w i l l be more f u l l y developed i n beata พ. IS 
The quest ion o f the precise nature o f w i s d o m is therefore del iberately not 
answered in Acad A t 3.5.12, August ine points out that the Academics do not 
want to say that the wise man knows no th ing : they do not deny t ru th , bu t on ly that 
i t has been found . ^ ^ A t the conclusion o f the text, August ine says that the 
Academics may have i n fact concealed their true teachings, t h i nk ing w i s d o m to be 
attainable, but not by the young, and certainly not by those w h o do not have an 
author i tat ive teacher?^ August ine may be teasing L icent ius here; more l i ke ly he 
is requ i r ing the reader to look beyond the surface o f the pedagogical method o f his 
o w n treatise. 
C lar i ty comes when the language o f the good (rather than the t ru th) as the 
th ing sought points us to beata น. as the next step i n the argument. "Possession" 
o f the good i n beaŕa น. is understood i n a broader manner, and i t w i l l develop the 
sense o f "cer t i tude" al luded to in Acad 
From modus to ordo 
՚ 8 This is intimated at 3.17.37: "Plato added the knowledge o f natural and divme matters, which he 
had dil igently acquired from those I've mentioned, to Socrates' ethics wi th its w i t and subtlety. 
He brought these components together under dialectic as their organizer and judge, smce dialectic 
either i sw isdom itself or that without which there can't be w isdom." ("/gZ/wi* Plato adiciens lepori 
รนbtililìtatique (sic) Socraticae, quam in moralibm habuit, naturalium divinarumque rerum 
peńtiam, quam ab eis quos memoravi dil і genter acceperat, subiuทgensgue quasi formatricem 
lilarum partium iudìcemque dialecíicam, quae aut ipsa esset aut sme qua onmino sapientia esse 
noท posset..''). 
'9 "Oe quo eos consulo, utrunใ negerti, id est utrum eis plăceai verităţi assentierใdum non esse. 
Numquam hoc dicent, sed eam non inveniri asseverabunt. Ergo et hic ex nonnulla parie socium me 
tenent, quod utrìsque non displicet at que adeo necessario placet comerใtiendum esse verităţi. Sed 
quis earn demonstraba? mquiunt. Ubi ego cum illis mrt curabo certare; satis mihi est, quod iam 
non est probabile nihil scire sapienteiท, ne rem absurdìssìmam dicere cogantur, aut nihil esse 
sapientiam aut sapientiam หescire sapientem. " 
3.20.43. Looking ahead to mag., we know this teacher to be Christ. 
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Beata น. argues that he w h o w i l l s what is good, and possesses i t , is 
happy. 2* The Skeptics cannot seek what they do not have a w i l l to find. L icent ius 
has more d i f f i cu l t y main ta in ing that they w i l l be happy even though they do not 
have what they desire.^^ The possession o f G o d , by de f in i t ion i n Chapter 1 1 , is 
happiness, and th is is fur ther expla ined as a f u l f i l l i n g o f God 's w i l l , an "a t ten t ion " 
to God, and a r igh t mode o f l i v i ng . The non-possession o f God is def ined as a 
defect, or a state o f unw isdom?^ August ine of fers a fu l ler picture o f the 
dif ference between these states by lay ing out a series o f opposites. 
i n iqu i t y {nequitia) f ruga l i ty (frugalitas) 
not be ing {non esse) be ing (esse) 
pover ty (paupertas) r iches (divitiae) 
want (egestas) fulness Qjlenitudo) 
Ci t ing Cicero 's author i ty i n Pro Deiotaro, August ine seizes upon f rugal i ty as the 
"mother o f a l l v i r tues . " Cicero understands f ruga l i ty to include "modera t ion and 
con t ro l " {modestia et temperantià)?^ August ine subsequently departs f r o m 
Cicero, col lapsing the d ichotomies and argu ing that f ruga l i ty is a mean, even a 
sort o f un i ty , that foreshadows the continentia o f conf. 
Modera t ion indeed is der ived from measure and temperance f r o m 
temperies. For where measure is and temper, there is neither too m u c h nor 
too l i t t le o f anyth ing. Pleni tude, therefore, fialness i tself, w h i c h we had 
placed opposite to want , we w o u l d use m u c h more f i t t i ng ly than 
abundance. For i n abundance is understood an ove r f l ow ing and, i n a 
manner, the outpour ing o f a th ing too r i ch . W h i c h , when i t comes fo r th 
beyond wha t is suf f ic ient , there too is measure wan t ing ; and the th ing 
w h i c h is too much lacks measure. . . ( therefore) both " too m u c h " and " too 
l i t t l e " are fo re ign to measure.^^ 
2 ' 2.10-11; translation by Francis Tourscher (Peter Reil ly Company: Philadelphia, 1937), w i th 
some changes. 
^^2.14. 
23 4.30. Cf. 4.29: "Egestas enim verbum est non habendi. " 
- M . 3 1 . 
25 4.32. ''Modestia utique dicta est a modo, et a temperie temperantia. Ubi autem modus est atque 
temperies, пес plus est quidquam пес minus. Ipsa est igitur plenitudo, quam egestati contrariam 
posueranพร, multo melius quam si abundantiaw poneremus. In abmdantia enim intelligitur 
affluentia, et quasi rei nimium exuberaทtis effusio: Quod cum evenit ultra quam satis esi etiam ibi 
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Modus ergo animi sapientia est. Measure, August ine concludes, is the w i s d o m o f 
the soul. The mean is n o w the goal o f the man seeking w i s d o m , and the language 
o f the vir tues (one part o f knowledge in Acad.) becomes an access to a knowledge 
o f the d iv ine (the other part o f knowledge m Acad.). Acad, points to th is 
conclusion in several places. For example, the long passage quoted above about 
mathemat ical knowledge as a model o f cert i tude contains, and is f o l l o w e d by , 
wordp lay upon the te rmino logy o f modus. 
Le t us n o w come to the matter at hand. Too late have I started to fear that 
this in t roduct ion exceeds its proper l im i t ! Th is is no smal l matter, since 
measure is surely d iv ine , but i t is easy to make a mistake w h e n i t beckons 
so agreeably. I ' l l be more cautious when I am wise. {Nunc adpropositum 
veniamus. Iam enim sero coepi metuere, ne hoc princípium modům 
excederei, et non est leve. Nam modus procul dubio divinus est, sed 
fefellerit, cum dulcìter ducit. Ero cautior, cum sapiens fuero. 
I n beata и. ， the goal o f the man seeking w i s d o m is no longer a superlat ive, but a 
mean, a measured midd le pos i t ion. This language certainly has a Stoic and 
Ar is to te l ian resonance^^: modus br ings happiness because i t tempers the desires. 
I t lends a stabi l i ty o f m i n d to the one seeking w i sdom. The ethical d imens ion o f 
this text, however , blossoms into a theological language i n later chapters. 
Happiness comes f r o m the "possession" o f G o d (habere Deum): this does not 
mean an inte l lectual mastery, a s ingle-minded goal , but rather a submission to a 
desideratur modus, et res quae nimia est modo eget.... A modo autem et plus et minus aliena 
รนทť' 
26 2.3.9. I am o f course suggesting a parallel here to the movement o f the argument in Plato's later 
Äialpgues, especially Philebus, 
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prov ident ia l order, a specif ic relat ionship w i t h the God w h o is in t imate ly present 
to the-soul 
Later chapters introduce the idea o f a summus modus. Th is pr inc ip le is 
dist inguished f r o m truth {Veritas), w h i c h l i tera l ly "comes to b e " th rough the 
summus modus, i n a movement o f descent f r o m and return to the summus modus. 
The image is clearly t r in i tar ian: 
Bu t t ruth, i n order that i t may be, is real ized th rough some supreme 
measure, f r o m w h i c h i t proceeds, and unto w h i c h , perfect , i t re tums. . . . 
(As) t ruth is fo rmed i n measure, so measure is k n o w n in t ru th : t ru th , 
therefore, never was w i thou t measure, and measure never was w i thou t 
t ruth. W h o is the Son o f God? I t has been said—the T ru th (cf. John 14:6). 
W h o is i t that has not Father, other than the Supreme Measure? 
Whosoever therefore comes to the Supreme Measure by the T ru th is 
happy. Th is is to have G o d in the soul , that is , to en joy God . For other 
things, though they are possessed by G o d , do not have God.^^ 
What is the relat ionship between modus i n general and this summus modus! A t 
the conclusion to beata น., August ine says to a si lenced L icent ius that modus is 
everywhere to be observed {sei-vandนร est) i f " o u r г е Ш т to G o d is i n our heart 
(cor) . "^ ' ' Th is suggests a pr iv i leged sort o f v i s ion for those w h o "at tend t o " God , 
one that clearly includes the experience o f the sensible w o r l d w i t h i n its scope. 
Th is v is ion is enabled by something present not on ly i n the m i n d , but i n the 
"hear t " : cor impl ies a midd le pos i t ion , anthropologica l ly speaking, inc lud ing 
intel lect and w i l l , m i n d and sense. August ine is speaking o f far more than an 
innate l ikeness between the m i n d and the d iv ine "reasons." I n ord., modus is 
28 Pizzolato writes (p. 90) that for Monica '^habere Deum non è un telos, ma casomai m'arche, 
dato che i l 'possesso' di Dio non è una conquista del l 'uomo, ma un dato originario e inelimmabile 
della sua natura." 
29 4.34. " Veritas autem ut sii, fit per aliquem summum modum, a quo procedit, et in quem se 
perfecta convertit.... Ut igitur Veritas modo gignitur, ita modus veritate cognoscitur. Neque igitur 
Veritas sine modo, neque modus sine veritate unquam fuit. Quis est Dei filius? Dictum est, 
Veritas. Quis est qui non habet Patrem, quis alius quam summus modus? Quisquís igitur ad 
summum modum per veritatem venerit, beatus est. Hoc est, animo Deum habere, id est, Deo frui. 
Cetera enim, quamvis a Deo habeantur, non habent Deum. " 
30 On cor, see E. de la Peza, "E l significado de 'cor ' en San Agust in" , Revue des Études 
Augustiniennes 7 (1961), pp. 339-368; see also trin. \5Л0Л9. verbum est quod in corde dicimus." 
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ordo, and as such, i t is the creative p r inc ip le that connects the sensible and the 
in te l l ig ib le , mak ing the one discernible through the other.^' Beata и. on ly begins 
to describe how this comes to pass by in t roducmg the language o f i l l um ina t ion . A 
d iv ine suggestion (admonirioX August ine says, "descends" and is b o m w i t h i n the 
soul , and by v i r tue o f this G o d is brought to remembrance^^: 
Т Ы ร brightness that unseen รนท pours fo r th into our inmost v is ion . 
Every th ing that we speak o f H i m is true, even when , our eyes being as yet 
weak or suddenly opened, we are unsteady, reluctant to be converted 
bo ld ly and to behold the entire t ru th. Th is again appears to be no th ing 
other than God , perfect, by reason o f no degeneration. 
(Hoc interioribus luminibus nostris iubar sol ille secretus infundit. Huius 
est verum omne quod loquimur, etiam quando àdhuc vel minus sanis, vel 
repente apertis ocuUSy audacter convertí, et totum intueri trepidamus: 
ทihilque aliud etiam hoc apparet esse quam Deum, nula degeneratìone 
impediente perfectum.ý^ 
This chapter l inks the power o f this inter ior l igh t w i t h the H o l y Spir i t , sett ing up a 
threefold process whereby the Spir i t places i n the heart both a desire ( ''sitiamus ") 
for t ru th and the means for seeking i t . The Son, or the " T r u t h " , is the object o f 
desire, and the th ing enjoyed once possessed. F ina l l y , un ion w i t h the Supreme 
Measure is accompl ished " t o o u g h " possession o f the t ru th. The text is descr ib ing 
a dynamic process that is t r in i tar ian and inter ior, and str ict ly ordered in stages. 
The happiness o f Acad.^ the "possession o f the t r u th " , is here described as the l i fe 
o f the Spir i t . I n an oracular outburst, M o n i c a describes this l i fe as the act iv i ty o f 
fa i th , hope and char i ty. The s p i r i t alone, the i l l umina t ive " f o n t " o f d i v in i t y , is not 
31 "Ne l De ord. ai fattori extrarazionali preferiti nelle altre due opere si sostituisce i l concetto di 
ordo, comprensivo dell 'azione provvidenziale esercitata da Dio sul mondo: in questo caso la v ir tù 
consiste nella capacità del l 'uomo di cogliere la nascosta presenza di questo ordo, mediante un 
concentrato ripiegamento su se stesso. La stessa contrapposizione espressiva, tipica delle altre due 
opere, viene assorbita: non si parla più di rapporto tra virtus e fortuna/tempestas, ma solo di ordo 
che la vir tù può cogliere." L.F. Pizzolato, " I l Beata li. о la possibile felicità nel tempo", in 
L Opere Letteraria di Agostino tra Cassiciacum e Milano, ed. G. Reale et al. (Edizioni 
Augustmus: Palermo, 1987), p. 39. 
3 2 Note the etymology o f the verb recordor. 
" 4 . 3 5 . 
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supposed to satisfy the one seeking w isdom, str ict ly speakmg. I t is not 
"abundance' ' that is required, but modus, the measured part. The Spir i t , i n 
d ia lect ical fashion, includes the extremes; i t is not, however , ident ical w i t h them. 
Indeed, according to the mode l o f ord. the "ex t remes" are ident i f ied w i t h vice.^"^ 
The modus, here standing fo r the person o f the Son, subsumes the extremes as a 
mean. The modus and the summus modus are not hereby col lapsed; on a pract ical 
leve l , August ine is s imp ly suggesting that par t ic ipat ion i n one is par t ic ipat ion i n 
the other. The Spi r i t and modus w o r k together to reach the soul where and as i t is , 
and ef fec t ive ly b r ing i t to order. The result is not sat is fact ion֊on the epistemic 
terms o f Acad.——but an activity o f contentment, or happiness. 
However , so long as w e seek, not ye t satisf ied by the fon t i tsel f , t o use that 
w o r d " fu lness" , let us acknowledge that we have not as yet reached our 
measure; and therefore, though God is our he lp , we are not yet wise and 
happy. Т Ы ร therefore is the fìlli sat isfy ing 01 souls, th is is the L i f e o f 
c o n t e n t m e n t ― t o k n o w p ious ly and perfect ly by w h o m y o u may be 
brought to the T ru th , w h i c h T ru th y o u may en joy , by w h i c h means y o u 
may be uni ted t o the Supreme Measure. W h i c h three th ings show fo r t h to 
those w h o understand One God and One Substance, shut t ing out the 
vanit ies o f va ry ing supersti t ion. (Sed tamen quamdìu quaerìmus, ทondum 
ipso fonte, atque, ut ilio verbo utar, plenitudine saturati, nondum ad 
nostrum modum nos pervenisse fateamur: et ideo, quamvis iam Deo 
adiuvante, nondum tamen sapientes ас beati sumus. Illa est igìtur plena 
satietas anìmorum, haec est beata vita, pie perfectegue congnoscere a quo 
inducaris in veritatem, qua ventate perfruarìs, per quid connectaris 
summo modo. Quae tria unum Deum ìntelligentibus นทamque 
รนbstantìam, exclusis vanitatibus varìae superstìtionis, ostenduntf^ 
Memory in De ordine 
De ordine speaks to the c la im at the conclusion οΐ beata и. that modus (or 
ordo) is everywhere to be observed, i f "ou r return to G o d is i n our heart . " The 
argument unfo lds at the cosmic level as a quest ion o f d iv ine governance, and at 




knowledge. A tension runs throughout the text as to the status o f the sensible, and 
this tension is resolved——although not w i t h finality——by the invocat ion o f memory 
and the artes liberales?^ 
I n this wo rk , L icent ius is made to defend the true pos i t ion, namely , that 
order is present in al l th ings, and that noth ing occurs as the result o f chance. 
Those w h o make this error are pre-occupied w i t h sense-perception, and more 
precisely w i t h their part icular percept ion o f th ings: to look at creat ion is l i ke 
v i ew ing a mosaic, August ine says, and w e must step back f r o m i t i n order to see 
the un i ty and beauty o f the whole.^^ Even i f the part icular causes o f an event are 
not discernible, a pattern o f causal i ty is nevertheless evident to the m ind . 
L icent ius arrives at this insight on his o w n , much to Augus t ine 's del ight , and he 
excla ims that "order encompasses a l l " , hav ing no opposite, since even error (and 
by imp l ica t ion , ev i l ) has some cause.^^ W h i l e August ine is careful to say that G o d 
is not responsible for ev i l , he does argue here that ev i l is a part o f the who le , even 
i f God despises it . 
A n d [God] greatly loves order, precisely because by i t H e loves not evi ls. 
B u t h o w can evi ls themselves be "no t i n order" , a l though God does not 
love them? N o w this i tse l f is the order o f evi ls : that they be not loved by 
G o d . . . . Th is very th ing H e loves: to love good th ings, and not to love ev i l 
things一and this I t s e l f IS a th ing o f magni f icent order and o f d iv ine 
arrangement. A n d because th is order ly arrangement maintains the 
harmony o f the universe by this very contrast [between good and ev i l ] , i t 
comes about that ev i l th ings [lesser goods] must need be. I n this way the 
3 6 See J. Doignon "Le Ord., son déroulement, ses thèmes", in L ， Opera Letteraria di Agostino tra 
Cassìciacum e Milano (Edizioni Augustinus: Palermo, 1987)， pp. 136-146 on the liberal arts in this 
text; also infra. 
37 Ord 1.1.2. Latin text is from Corpus Christia?iorunใ Series Latina V o l . 39 (Brepolร: Tumholt , 
1970); we are using the English translation, wi th some modifications, from the "Fathers o f the 
Church" series, rendered as Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil, trans. Robert p. Russell 
( C İ M A Publishing: New York, 1948). The role reversal o f Licentius at this point in the text may 
pertain to the recurring presence o f poetry throughout these texts, and the extent to which the 
liberal arts are affirmed in ord as a legitimate way to behold order in creation. 
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beauty o f a l l th ings is i n a manner conf igured, as it were, f r o m antitheses, 
that is , f r o m opposites: th is is pleasing to us even i n discourse.^^ 
The order that is present in creat ion is discerned at two levels, and here the 
abovement ioned tension is exposed. The percept ion o f the beauty and un i ty o f the 
who le is described as a k i nd o f se l f -knowledge, or a habit o f w i t hd raw ing f r o m the 
senses and the mu l t i p l i c i t y o f the sensible."**^ Un i t y is something perceived w i t h i n . 
L icent ius accordingly describes the happy l i fe as a conversion f r om the 
"uncleanness" o f the body to a l i fe o f virtue.'** The l iberal arts are marshal led to 
this cause: 
I f y o u have a care for order, I rep l ied, you must return to those verses. 
Inst ruct ion i n the l iberal arts, i f on ly moderate and concise, produces 
devotees more alert and steadfast and better equipped fo r embrac ing t ru th , 
L icent ius , so that they more ardent ly seek and more consistently pursue 
and i n the end more l ov ing l y c l i ng to that w h i c h is cal led the happy life."*^ 
Other men , August ine says, are content w i t h the "name o f the most h i gh God , and 
w i t h their sense facu l ty " , and they l i ve wretchedly. They l i ve , indeed, but they do 
not have the happy l i fe . However , immedia te ly f o l l ow ing this discussion, the 
39 1.7.18. "Et ordimm ideo multum dìligit, quia per eum mm diligit mala. At vero ipsa mala qui 
possunt กоท esse in ordine, cum deus illa non dilìgat? Nam iste ipse est mahrum ordo, ut non 
diligaหtur a deo..,. Hoc ipsum enim diligit, diligere bom et non diligere mala, quod est magni 
ordinis et divinae dispositioniร. Qui ordo at que dispositio quia universitatis congruentiam ipsa 
distinctione custodií, fit, ut mala etiam esse necesse sit. Ita quasi ex antithetis quodam modo, quod 
nobis etiam տ oratione iucundum est, ex contrariïs, omnium simul rerum pułchritudo figuratur. " 
Augustine w i l l not tend to use this way o f speaking o f evil in his later wri t ings, although many 
other Christian thinkers w i l l , eg. St. Thomas Aquinas Summa contra Gentiles 3.10-17. 
Ord 1.1.3-1.2.3. 
41 1.8.23. " A n d what else is the process o f conversion but to upl i f t oneself wholeheartedly by 
virtue and temperance from the excess o f vices?" 
42 1.8.24. "Si ordinem, inquam, curas, redemdum tibi est ad illos versus. Nam eruditio 
disciplinarum liberalium modesta sane atque succinta et alacrioreร et perseveraหfibres et 
comptioreร exhibeî amatoreร ampiecíeหdae ventati, ut et ardeทtius appetant et constantius 
imequantur et inhaereant postremo dulcius, quae vocatm Lìceทti, beata vita. ，' On the liberal arts, 
see the entry o f N. Cipriani ๒ Augustine Through the Ages: and eกcycopedia, ed. A l lan Fitzgerald 
(Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 2001 ); Carol Harrison, Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint 
Augustine (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992), pp. 24-26; L Hadot, Arts libéraux et philosophie dam 
la pensée antique (Paris, 1984); H.-I. Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (E. de 
Boccard: Paris, 1958). On the later Augustinian tradition, see R.D. Crouse, "Honorius 
Augustodunensis: thé Arts as via adpatrianr\ in Arts Libéraux et Philosophie au Moyen Age 
Œibrairie Philosophique J. V r in : Paris, 1969), pp. 532-539. 
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assembled depart for the baths, but are way la id by the sight o f a cockňghť^^ 
Beho ld ing this, August ine marvels at the many aspects i n w h i c h "govern ing 
reason" is manifest i n the sensible сгеаШге, its const i tut ion and its behaviour. 
Th i s is the proof , he says, that order is present at the lowest levels, and mani fest to 
the senses. Moreover , i n the conclud ing chapters o f the second book, August ine 
a f f i rms that the l iberal arts include astrology, music , geometry, a l l o f w h i c h 
concern the search for the under ly ing uni ty o f what is perceived through the 
senses.՚*՛* The l iberal arts reveal not on ly the ordo docendi but also the ordo 
naturae, or the ordo divinae providentiaeý^ A s such, the progress o f l ibera l 
educat ion is a k i n d o f awakening and r e m e m b e r i n g ― t h a t is, assuming that one is 
m i n d f u l o f the f o l l o w i n g . 
The sensible has an ambiguous status: i t m igh t be a way to discern the 
d iv ine order for those who are m ind f t i l o f God , and who have appl ied themselves 
to the l ibera l arts i n order to correct ordinary false impressions. A t the same t ime, 
the sensible is something to be scorned, and "conver ted" f r om. Th is tension 
remains a l ive throughout the second book o f ord., i n w h i c h the or ig ina l quest ion is 
re formulated as fo l l ows : how can that w h i c h is var iable, or mutable, be w i t h God? 
The quest ion here has an epistemologica! d imension: h o w we do ho ld together the 
sensible and changing w i t h the fixed truths perceived by the intel lect? L icent ius 
interrapts th is query by insist ing that memory is purely passive and looks on ly to 
the sensible. M e m o r y is not necessary for accurate sense-perception, he says, 
since percept ion is " immed ia te . " August ine replies, saying that memory is 
43 1.8.25-1.8.26. Compare this passage to Augustine's frustration w i th his own tendency to be 
distracted, e.g. in conf. 10.34.52. 
44 One can see how the conclusion o f ord points to the wr i tmg o f the treatises on the liberal arts; 
this project, o f course, was ultimately abandoned. 
՚՛^ 2.5.15. "Яаес et alia in hominum vita cogunt homines plerumque inpie credere nullo nos ordine 
divinae providentiae gubernari." 
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necessary for instruct ion, and for the preservat ion o f learning i n general: scient i f ic 
knowledge, and even contemplat ive w i s d o m , is subject to the discursiveness o f 
language. L icent ius insists that to k n o w G o d is to be w i t h God , and that sense has 
noth ing to do w i t h this."^^ August ine responds: 
" T h e n " , I said, " y o u are asserting not on ly that a wise man does not 
consist o f a body and a soul , but even that he does not consist o f an 
integral soul , fo r on ly a senseless person w o u l d say that the part by w h i c h 
he uses the senses does not perta in to the soul. I t is not the eyes and ears 
that perceive, but something or other that perceives through the eyesr'^ 
Licent ius further argues that the wise man does not require memory i n order to 
k n o w God , since he "has everyth ing in f ron t o f the inter ior eyes o f the mtel lect 
[and therefore] gazes fixedly and immovab l y on God , w i t h w h o m are the things 
that the intel lect can see and possesร."'^^ August ine says that this is close to his 
o w n pos i t ion, but he reiterates fo r L icent ius the importance o f memory for 
instruct ion, and the obl igat ions that a wise man has to his communi ty in the 
cu l t iva t ion o f his memory on their behalf . The content o f memory i n this case is 
vague, and may be inspired by Cicero 's idea o f the broadly educated teacher o f 
ci t izens. 
M o r e impor tant ly , he suggests that memory makes w i s d o m possible i n 
some manner, and that a wise man must store up some o f his " t reasure" over and 
above what is required fo r instruct ion. L icent ius however is not convinced, and 
he insists that the man w h o requires memory fo r knowledge is a servant, and not a 
master, and that the func t ion o f memory does not manifest any ratio at wo rk , but 
at best points to a higher intel lectual pr inc ip le . For L icent ius, memory is 
"^2.2.5. 
47 2.2.6. "Negas ergo, inquam, non solum ex corpore et anima sed etiam ex anima tota constare 
sapieหtem, si quìdem partem isiàm, qua utitur sensibนร, ammae esse negare dementis est Non 
enim ipsi acuii vel aures sed néscio quid aliud per óculos sentit. " 
՚՚շշ.า. 
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exclusively and essentially linked to body, and manifests a rational operation only 
accidentally. A t the conclusion o f Chapter 2， the matter is explicitly delayed for 
consideration in some other text, wi th Augustine in disagreement wi th Licentius. 
The question of the nature o f memory is appropriately raised in ord. in the 
context o f a comparison between sense-perception and understanding."^^ 
Augustine distances himself from a position that holds memory to be purely 
passive and merely receptive to what is taken in through the sense-organs. He 
sees the soul as that which senses, but that requires the body as a tool in this 
endeavour: it is an activity of the soul, not merely a passio corporis!"^ The mind 
perceives what is simple, and it can only make sense o f what is subject to time i f it 
can itself be extended in time while remaining unified. The role o f memory in 
understanding is not developed more ful ly until an. quant, and mus. Memory acts 
as a tool for the mind, gathering what is "scattered" into a comprehensible unity. 
The supposed divergence between the positions of Licentius and Augustine 
concerns the necessity o f experience as a teacher for the increase o f wisdom. 
Augustine only points here to the inadequacy of Licentius' position as pertaining 
to a poorly integrated picture of the unity o f soul and body. 
The second book o f ord. proposes an intermediate ftmction in which 
memory looks to both intellect and sense-perception at the level o f cor. The 
liberal arts are affirmed as necessary for human action and production, for the 
languages of instruction, and for providing pleasure (i.e. as derived from the 
contemplation o f the beauty of things).^* They map out a ladder o f ascent, as it 
49 As ๒ conf. 11, the larger context o f the question is the ontologicai issue o f the relation o f the 
changing to the unchanging. 
5° CLGn, litt., 3.5.7: ''sentire mn est corporis, sedanimae per corpนs'՝ 
2.12.35. 
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were, by which the mind is purged of false ideas, է Խ օ ս £ հ the sensible to the 
intelligible principles o f natural things. Through this ascent, the soul desires to 
possess truth and enjoy happmess, both o f which are the result o f a soul rightly 
ordered to God. Augustine is careful with his language: "delight of the sense is 
one thing; delight through the sense is something else. Graceful movement 
delights the sense, but the timely import o f the movement delights the mind alone 
through the sense.，，52 The soul that is rightly ordered can use the arts as a way to 
discern divine order in the sensible, and take joy in it. 
Augustine further emphasizes the importance o f not only dialectic, but o f 
rhetoric, since instruction must move the emotions and not only the intellect. This 
is appropriate, since not only truth but also beauty is the object o f the arts and 
sciences.^^ The acquisition of knowledge is therefore not an abstract, 
disembodied process. It is includes the whole person as the inquiring subject― 
sense and intel lect―and therefore the whole creation―sensible as well as 
intel l igible―as its object. Augustine's concern here to emphasize the unity of the 
human person is part o f a deliberate move to qualify the Platonic antfeopology 
implied in Acad, in consequence to the ontologicai picture in ord^'^ 
The conception of learning in ord. must be read alongside a passage 
describing the twofold function of knowledge, both as synthesis and analysis, an 
ascent and a descent, wi th unity (or "one") as the summit. The soul here has 
realized the kinship of reason and number, and "soliloquizes thus": 
52 2.11.34. ergo semus, aliud per sensum; mm sensum mulcet pulcher motus, per sensum 
autem animum solum pulchra in motu significa է io." This language is very close to mus., except 
that the anthropology sounds less dualistic in that the "del ight" ot the mind and the senses are 
explicit ly connected through a shared ordo. 
" 2.13.33,2.13.34, and 2.18.51. 
5 4 V . Pacioni, Ĺ 'unità teoretica del de ordine di ร. Agostino (Mi l len ium Romae: Rome, 1996), p. 
177. See also the image o f the soul as the captain o f a ship in ord 2.6.18.; also 2.11.31 (Pacioni, 
P-220). 
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"By some kind o f inner and hidden activity o f mine, I am able to analyze 
and synthesize the things that ought to be learned; and this faculty of mine 
is called reason." As a matter o f fact, what ought to be analyzed except 
what is reputed to have unity, but either has no unity whatever, or has less 
o f it than It is believed to have? And, likewise, why must sometMng be 
synthesized, unless in order that it become one, in so far as it is capable? 
Therefore, both in analyzing and in synthesizing, it is oneness that I seek, 
it is oneness that I love. But when I analyze, I seek a homogeneous unit; 
when I synthesize, I look for an integral unit. In the former case, foreign 
elements are avoided; in the latter, proper elements are conjoined to form 
something united and perfect. In order that a stone be a stone, all its parts 
and its entire nature have been consolidated into one. 5 5 
In every case, the object o f knowledge is order, or unity. There are deep 
resonances in this passages both wi th Plato's Philebus and with the distinction 
Aristotle makes in the parts o f abstraction: the composite as the thing perceived, 
the simple form as the thing known. There is also a profound harmony o f interior 
and exterior֊֊although this dichotomy is not stressed as much as in later writings. 
Through phi losophy―which, of course, has a higher place than the artes 
liberaleร^^֊and the artes themselves, the apprehension of the sensible is a means 
for the perception o f a unity and order that is entirely immanent. In declaring 
unity in its particular way, the sensible is not merely "variable." Thus there is a 
meeting o f the ordo that is within the soul and the proper object o f the intellect, 
and the ordo that is "everywhere to be observed" in the created world. It is clear 
from the passage quoted above, however, that there are not two ordines at all, but 
one ordo which is variously described in these dialogues as truth, ratio, measure. 
2.19.48. "Ego quodam meo motu interiore et occulto ea, quae discenda sunt, possum 
discernere vel caneciere et haec vis mea ratio vacatur. Quid autem discernendum est, nisi quod 
aut unum putatur et non est aut certe non tam unum est quam putatur? item cur quid conectendum 
est, nisi ut unum fiat, quantum potest? Ergo et in discernendo et in caneciendo unum volo et unum 
amo, sed cum discerno, purgatum, cum conecto, integrum volo. In illa parte vitantur aliena, in 
hac propria copulantur, ut unum aliquidperfectum fiat. Lapis ut esset lapis, omnes eius partes 
omnisque natura in mum solidata est. " 
56 2.18.47. By Cipr iani 's account {op. cit.), Augustme is foUowmg Varro 'ร organization o f the 
liberal arts, in which philosophy, by virtue o f its relation to physics, is subsumed by astronomy. 
This is not ultimately indicative o f Augustine's own understanding o f the nature and role o f 
philosophy. 
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mean, and finally, unity. Why memory arises in the context of this discussion is 
not made explicit. However, we have observed that the position of Licentius is 
based upon an overly dualistic anthropology. The consequence of this is a failure 
to appreciate the significance of memory for both sense-perception and thought. 
The idea o f the "integral soul" indicated by Augustine moves us to consider 
subsequent dialogues, with the intention of eliciting the role of memory in 
explaining the unity o f the human person. 
Conclusions 
Though the chronology of these early dialogues has been observed, it is 
not nevertheless an easy matter to conclude with the second and third books o f 
Acad. This text does not seem an adequate frame for beata и. and ord. By the 
middle o f third book, it is clear that the philosophical challenge posed by the 
Skeptics, and by the boy, Licentius, on their behalf, is not very substantial. 
Augustine concludes Acad, by telling his listeners that the Academics likely 
concealed their true teachings anyhow: perhaps they wanted to preserve wisdom 
from those too young to receive it. Perhaps their true teaching was Platonism!^^ 
However we define wisdom, Augustine says, in making it unattainable, the 
Skeptics make philosophy unattractive.^^ 
Acad 3.20.43. A jocular tone is sustained in Soliloquia 1.4.9 (trans. T.F. Gi l l igan): ''Reason: 
When you say this, are you not afraid o f the Academicians? Augustine: Not at al l . For they do not 
want the wise man to make a mistake; but I am not wise. Hence, I sti l l am not afraid to claim a 
knowledge o f those things which I know. But if, as I desire, 1 arrive at wisdom, I shall do what 
wisdom teaches me." 
' ' 3 .9 .19 . 
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Even Cicero does not escape Augustine's rebuke.59 In the end, Augustine 
allies himself wi th what he calls "Platonism." Though he affirms the reliability of 
the senses*^ ,^ he alludes to the middle Platonic teaching that the senses only give 
rise to opinion.^' He clearly promotes the two-world ontology o f Plato'ร early 
middle dialogues, finding the sensible to be an image o f the intelligible, and 
therefore "truthl ike" at best.62 He declares that Plato is "alive again" in Plotinus, 
and presumably Platonism'ร positing of an intellectual dimension, distinct from 
the sensible, has answered the dilemma of the Skeptics. 
The playful tone with which the dialogue concludes casts a curious 
shadow over the group o f these three texts. He does, however, end with an appeal 
to the authority of Christ. He points to the Incarnation as the solution to 
Platonism'ร inadequacy: 
Yet the most subtle chain o f reasoning would never call back to this 
intelligible world souls that have been blinded by the manifold shadows of 
error and rendered forgetful by the deepest filth from the body, had not 
God the Highest, moved by a certain compassion for the multitude, 
humbled and submitted the authority o f the Divine Intellect even to the 
human body itself.^^ 
The image o f the descent o f God into the sensible resonates wi th the two-world 
picture which Augustine embraces. In the context o f ord, the action of the 
Incarnation describes a marriage and reconciliation o f the софогеаі and the 
intelligible. Our souls, Augustine says, are "awakened not only by [Christ's] 
59 3.16.35. On Cicero and Platonism, see J. Doignon, "Problèmes textuels et modèles littéraires 
dans le livre I du 'Ord ， de saint August in" , in Revue des Études Augustiหiennes, 24 (1978), pp. 
77-78. 
3.11.25. 
6' 3.11.26. Augustine says that he w i l l discuss this matter " later", possibly meaning the conclusion 
๒3.17.37. 
62 3.17.37. Here is another example o f the playfial manner ๒ which Augustine is appropriating the 
language o f the Skeptics. 
63 3.19.42. Note that in the retractatioms Augustine does not distance himself from the language 
he uses throughout to describe the senses or the body; he only regrets that he did not distinguish 
between the senses o f the body, and the "spiritual senses" (cf. 1.3.2-1.3.3.)· 
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precepts, by also by [his] deeds", by his verbal and visual example.^'' A 
providential ordo is seen by those who are made fit not by the liberal arts, but by 
the example o f Christ's humil i ty. Beata น. as well concludes with a powerful 
trinitarian image o f the modus as the Son descending to the soul, so that it may 
bring the soul into union with the summus modus. These images, however, do not 
seem to enter into the argument o f the third book of Acad. The formula of 
(Platonism + the Incarnation) finds its most simplistic form here for Augustine. 
This may speak against an excessive concern for reading Acad, as a divided text. 
Ord. suggests an intermediate function for memory as necessary for the 
gathering o f what is multiple into what is unified (synthesis) and for the 
comprehension o f the composite as multiple and whole (analysis). This much is 
evident, even though the question o f the precise staณร of memory with respect to 
sense-perception and knowledge has clearly been deferred for later consideration. 
An. quant, provides some o f the theoretical basis for this. We do, however, agree 
with Pacioni that ord. is the dialogue that should guide the reading of the 
"Cassiciacum" group o f texts.^^ It alone provides a cosmologica! framework for 
the anthropological picture emerging wi th in them. 
'^Acad 3.19.42 
6 5 The enigmatic elements o f Acad. 3 become more transparent wi th scholarly work on 
Augustine s pedagogical motivations wi th respect to his Stoic authorities. 




THE " M I D D L E E A R L Y " DIALOGUES 
SOLILOQUIA, DE IMMORTALITÀ TE ANIMAE 
A N D DE ANIMAE QUANTITATE 
Soliloquia is a dialogue of transition. The first book gathers many 
elements from the Cassiciacum dialogues into a theologically rich consideration 
of how the soul approaches God, by knowledge and by likeness, т ы ร book 
concludes with questions about how the soul possesses attributes. These 
questions arise out o f Augustine's problematic but frui tñi l pre-occupation with a 
language o f spiritual " location": where is God? where is the soul? where is truth？ 
Everything, Augustine says, that exists must exist somewhere, and truth must 
therefore exist somewhere. ^  In the second book of sol., in de immortalitate 
animae and in de animae quantitate, Augustine attempts, wi th varying degrees o f 
success and elegance, to prove the immortality of the sou l / The eternity and 
specific " location" o f truth is the linchpin o f the argument for immortality. That 
truth is made to be an attribute of the soul would seem to be its flaw. Attention to 
' Sol. 1.15.29. Clearly this is a problematic language when speaking o f something immaterial and 
therefore by definit ion immutable. Augustine w i l l recognize this in mus. 6. 
2 It is now generally accepted that imm. an. is intended to complete รoL; this thesis is that o f 
Mart in Grabmann, in Die Grundgedanken des Ні Augustinus über Seele und Gott (J.p, Bachem 
Verlag: Köln, 1916), p. 68， ท. 5. Most scholarship on imm. an. argues that Augustine had Plotinus' 
Emead4.7 before his eyes; cf. Gérard Verbeke, "Spiritualité et Immortali té de l 'âme chez Saint 
August in" , in Augustinus Magister I (Études Augustiniennes: Paris, 1954); Richard Penaskovic, 
" /vn Analysis o f Saint Augustine's "De immortalitate ammaď'\ Augustmiaห Studies 11(1980), pp. 
167-76. John Mourant largely seconds Augustine'ร wish that this dialogue had never been 
published; he argues that it is "who l l y philosophical" (as contrasted wi th other early writ ings), 
"devoid o f all religious content", and generally undialectical. He speculates that, around the t ime 
o f his baptism, Augustine was anxious about the issue o f the resurrection o f the body, and might 
have thought that the immortal i ty o f the soul would guarantee a certainty o fbod i l y resurrection; cf. 
"Remarks on the De immortalitate anima๔\ Augustiman Studies 2 (1971), pp. 213-217; also, 
Augustine on Immortality, (Vi l lanova University Press: Vi l lanova, 1969). There is very litt le 
ІііегаШге on De animae quantitate as a whole, although mention is often made o f the seven "steps 
o f the soul" in СҺ.ЗЗ, 
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the ontologicai framework w i l l shed a congenial light on that aspect of the 
argument. 
These dialogues have a larger project by which Augustine is seeking to 
purge his own conception o f the soul o f materialistic language. The "two-world 
ontology" of the middle Platonic writings wi th which contra académicos 
concludes declares Augustine'ร confidence in a correspondence between intellect 
and truth, and sense-perception and falsehood (or mere opinion). However, by the 
end of an. quant., Augustine identifies idolatry, and not Manichaean materialism, 
as the error against which he (and the Church) speaks. Confronted with dualism 
as a spiritual problem, Augustine is mindful o f the limitations o f simple dualistic 
formulations.^ 
Explicit references to memory are rare in these texts. The question of 
recollection and how learning occurs is once again explicitly deferred; in an. 
quant. 20.34, he writes: 
I do not know o f one more important [question] on which our views are so 
diametrically opposed. For, while in your view the soul has brought no art 
with it, in mine, on the other hand, it has brought every art; for to learn is 
nothing else than to recall and remember. But, do you not see that this is 
not the right place to investigate that point?"* 
3 Goulven Madec renders the over-arching problematic in more theological terms as the 
"découverte du spiriณalisme", wi th reference to a passage in conf. 6.3.4 (trans. R.s . Pine-Coff in: 
" I learned that your spiritual chi ldren... do not understand the words God made man in his own 
image to mean that you are l imited by the shape o f a human body.. . and I could not form the 
vaguest idea, even wi th the help o f allegory, o f how there could be substance that was spiritual.") 
Cf. "Le spiritualisme augustinien à la lutniere du de immortalitate anima๔\ in L Opera Letteraria 
di Agostmo tra Cassiciacum e Milano ed. Giovarmi Reale et al. (Edizioni Augustinus: Palermo, 
1987),p. 180. 
4 "Et qua nescio utrum quiquam maius sit, quaestionem moves, พ qua nosirae sibimet opiniones 
adversaหtur, ш tibi anima nullam, mihi, contra, omnes artes secům atîulisse videatur; тс aliud 
quidquam esse id quod dicitur discere quam remirtisci et recordare Trans. John J. McMahon, in 
Vo l . 2 o f t h e W r i t i n g s of Saint Augustine (Fathers o f the Church: New York, 1947՝». 
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In sol. 2.19.33, Augustine asks how learning {disciplina) perpetually abides in the 
soul, even of the unlearned. Reason replies, saying that "this question requires 
another book, i f you want it discussed thoroughly."^ 
As to the function o f memory within an epistemologica! framework, we 
can infer certain details about its relation to sense-perception in these texts. We 
shall lay out exactly such a framework, noting especially the emerging importance 
of i l lumination; then, we shall note significant passages concerned with memory, 
in context. 
Creation as a hierarchy of excellence: illumination 
Considering these three works together allows us to see them as framed by 
the theological virtues o f sol 1, and the seven steps or acts o f the soul's power in 
the conclusion o f an. quant. Augustine is very clear that he has undertaken an 
explication o f the teaching o f the Church 6, and of true re l ig ion/ These texts 
describe knowledge in terms o f the vision o f the soul. The images used to 
describe the illuminative power o f God, and the steps required in order to attain a 
contemplation o f God, suggest a process o f ascent: the language is reminiscent o f 
the manner in which the liberal arts describe a program of learning in ord. Here, 
faith, hope and charity are actively necessary to the soul's search for God. 8 
Together, all XhľQt in specific ways heal and strengthen the impaired "naณral" 
vision o f the mind, and place in the soul the desire for its patria: this idea should 
5 ''Aliud ista quaestio volumen desiderat, si earn vis tractari dìligerìter'' Trans. Thomas F. 
Gil l igan (Cosmopolitan: New York , 1943). Again, this seems to be a reference to mag. 
^ An. quant. 33.76. 
7 Ibid. 36.80. The question remaining at the conclusion o f an. quant, is that o f the free w i l l , and 




be compared to the trinitarian influence described in beata и. (4.35) ； at the same 
time, these virtues describe a process of approach, or ascent, that ends wi th faith 
and hope abandoned―their purposes being fu l f i l led―and the l ife o f charity ful ly 
enjoyed.^ Thus the seven steps o f an. quant, describe an ascent which has the 
contemplation o f God, or Beauty, as its goal. A t the same time, however, 
Augustine urges that, in this life, we may experience some or all o f these "acts" at 
any particular moment֊֊thus bringing into question the picture o f spirimal 
progress as a step by step movement "up" a ladder o f virtues. 
It is appropriate then that Augustine so strongly describes the order o f 
reality in terms o f a hierarchy. The fimdamental question about the manner in 
which the soul possesses its attributes must be seen in this light. Augustine 
describes creation as a Ыегагсһу of excellence in which the higher transmits both 
power and specific attributes to the lower. O f course, for Augustine the soul is not 
the creative origin of the attributes o f body, but rather serves as the informing 
principle after a more Aristotelian fashion. This language nevertheless may reveal 
a powerful influence of specific texts of Plotinus at this point in Augustine's l ife. 
A сณcial passage is found in imm. an. ： 
Finally, united wi th the body (and this not in space, although the body 
occupies space) the soul is affected prior to the body by those highest and 
eternal principles, changeless and not contained in space, and not only 
prior, but also to a greater extent. For, the prior affect in the soul occurs to 
the extent that the soul is nearer to these principles, and, by the same 
token, the soul is more greatly affected in proportion to the superiority 
over the body. This nearness is not one in space, but in the order o f nature. 
In this order, then, it is understood that a form is given by the highest 
Being through the soul to the body―the form whereby the latter exists, in 
so faras it exists. Hence, the bodysubsists through the soul and exists by 
the very fact that it is animated.... 
''Sol. 1.7.14. 
՝" 15.24. '^Postremo, si quamvis locum occupanti corpori anima tamen non localiter iungitur, 
summis illis aeíernisque ratioทibus, quae mcommutabiliter manent, пес utique loco continentur, 
prior affìcitur anima quam co^us, пес prior tantum, sed etiam magisr Tanto enim prior quanto 
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The soul actually communicates form to the body, which form it receives from a 
higher principle: thus the Mgher moves the lower not only wi th respect to efficient 
causality一 which would include, but not be limited to, the cause o f movement or 
energy֊but also with respect to formal causality一the communication of 
essential attributes, and therefore the cause o f the particular being of a thing. The 
language is that of Aristotle, in a Plotinian context. This passage must be read 
alongside the final chapters o f an. quant., where Augustine describes the steps o f 
the soul in terms of an increase of greatness {vis). This increase results, not from 
a rejection of the body, but from a subjection o f body to the ontologicai 
superiority, and therefore moral authority, o f the soul. The desired goal of all 
creation, he explains in a subsequent chapter, is union with God, and this union is 
effected by a series of subordinations which are caused by God: body to soul, soul 
to God. " The lower is not decimated by the higher, but rather gathered in, as­
similated according to its essential principles. To use a language not strictly 
Augustinian, the exitus o f creation and the reditus o f salvation are aspects o f the 
same divine work. 
While illumination has a metaphorical dimension, it is intended to describe 
as literally as possible how the highest principle moves the soul. It is an 
explanation both ontologicai and epistemologica!, since the same light shines 
upon both the eyes of the soul (aspectus mentis) and the things perceived by the 
soul, at the same time. Just as the physical รนท fonctions by activating the vision 
propinquior; et eadem causa tanto etiam magis quanto etiam corpore meliar. Nee ista 
propinquitas loco, sed naturae ordine dicta est. Hoc autem ordine intelligitur a summa essentia 
speciem corpori per animam tribui, quae est in quantumcumque est. Per animam ergo corpus 
subsistit, et eo ipso est quo animatur..." Trans. Ludwig Schopp, in Vo l . 2 o f the Writings of Saint 
Augustine (Fathers o f the Church: New York, 1947). 
' ' An. quant. 36.80. 
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o f the eyes and i l l umina t ing the objects seen, the l ight o f the m i n d activates 
intel lectual funct ions wh i l e also i l l umina t ing its objects. A l t h o u g h the senses and 
their objects are clearly dist inct, th is is not the case w i t h the m i n d . W h i l e 
August ine fo l l ows a more Platonic tendency to re i fy in te l l ig ib le ideas i n 
themselves֊especial ly at the point at wh i ch they are ident i f ied w i t h the d iv ine 
mind——in these dialogues he insists on their locat ion (along w i t h the disciplina) 
" i n " the soul. 12 I l l um ina t ion is an idea intended to address this epis temologica! 
tension. A n early passage i n sol. mer i ts fu l l c i tat ion: 
I n fact, each one grasps that unique and most true good accord ing to his 
health and endurmice. There is a certain unspeakable and 
incomprehensible l igh t o f minds. Our common l ight may teach us, as far 
as is possible, h o w that l igh t operates. For there are some eyes so healthy 
and v igorous that they can fearlessly t u m toward the รนท as soon as they 
opened. For such as these l igh t i tse l f is health and it is not a teacher that 
they need but only perhaps some caution. I t is enough for t hem to bel ieve, 
to hope and to love! Others, however, are dazzled by the very lustre w h i c h 
they so ardently desire to behold and, not seeing i t , they g lad ly re turn to 
the darkness. To these, even though they now are such as m igh t rightly be 
cal led healthy, i t is dangerous to want to show what they are as yet 
incapable o f seeing. They are therefore f i rst to be trained and, fo r their 
o w n good, their love is to be restricted and nourished. First, they should 
be shown some things w h i c h do not shine w i t h their o w n l igh t but w h i c h 
may be seen only by means o f l ight , such as a garment or a wa l l or 
something o f that k i nd . Then they should be shown something w h i c h , 
though i t does not shine w i t h its o w n l ight , yet gl i t ters more fa i r l y by 
means o f that l ight, such as, go ld , si lver and the l ike, w h i c h yet are not so 
radiant as to hurt the eyes. Then perhaps this earthly fire should be 
careful ly shown them, then the stars, then the moon, then the brightness o f 
the davm and the splendor o f the wh i ten ing sky. I t is through these th ings 
that, each one according to his strength g row ing more prof ic ient , either 
through al l the steps or leaving out some o f them, sooner or later he w i l l 
behold the sun w i Á o u t flinching and w i t h immense del ight. Some such 
th ing is what the best teachers do for those who are most desirous o f 
w i s d o m but who , though indeed they see, do not see clear ly. For it is the 
duty o f good educat ion to arr ive at w i sdom by means o f a def in i te order; 
w i thou t order this is a matter o f chance hardly to be rel ied ս բ օ ո . ՛ ՝ ՛ 
'2 See ร. Gersh, Middle Platonem and Neoplatonism (University o f Notre Dame Press: Notre 
Dame, 1986), \o\. 1, pp. 403-413; A . Solignac, "Analyse et sources de la Question De Ideis", in 
Augustinus Magister і (Congrès International Augustinien: Paris, 1954), pp. 307-315. 
" 5c?/. 1.13.23. "Quippepro sua quisque sanitate ac firmitate comprehendit illudsingulare ас 
verissimum bonum. Lux esi quaědarň ineffabilis et incomprehemibilis mentium. ĹWC ista vulgaris 
nos doceat quantum potestrģuomodo se iilud habeat: Nam sunt nonnulìi oculi tam sani et vegetir 
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Augustine is distinguishing between a light o f the mind that is fundamentally 
"incomprehensible", and some sort o f "common" light: the latter is clearly 
something created, or at least reflected in the whole o f creation and available to 
human reason. It is intelligible while making all things intelligible. The former 
kind of light is harder to define, except that it is exemplary to the latter kind. 
Wisdom seems to be attainable by one of two paths, and Augustine later qualifies 
this in retr. 4.3, saying that Christ is the only way, and that tMร passage may not 
have the "right sound" to "pious ears." Augustme'ร anxiety here is 
understandable but can also, I think, be overlooked. A certain equivalency can be 
allowed between these ways since the one that is framed by the theological virtues 
is clearly superior here, and because o f how Augustine appreciates the speculative 
depth o f the faith represented by his mother as early as beata и. Throughout his 
career Augustine continues to parallel the viae o f the Cføistian philosopher with 
that of his faithful mother. What Augustine finds missing from this passage is the 
assurance that the ways to wisdom described here both occur in the context of the 
theological virtues. Such a reading is consistent with an. quant and imm. an., as 
well as the prayerful opening chapters of sol. 
qui se, mox ut aperti fuerim, in ipsum solem sine ulla trepidatione comeriam. His quodammodo 
ipsa lux sanitas est, nee doctore indigent, sed sola fartasse admonitione. His credere, sperare, 
amare satis est АШ vero ipso quem videre vehementer desiderant, fulgore ferimtur, et eo non 
viso saepe in tenebras cum delectatione redeunt. Quibus periculosum est, quamvis jam talibus ш 
sani recte dici possint, velle osteหdere quod àdhuc videre non valent. Ergo isti exercendi sunt 
prius, et eorum amor utiliter differendus atque nutriendm est Primo emm quaedam illis 
demomtranda sunt quae non per se lucent, sed per lucem viderì possint, ut vestis, aut paries, aut 
aliquid horum. Deinde quod non per se quidem, sed tamen per Шат lucem pulchrius effulgeat, ut 
aurum, argentum et similia, пес tamen ita radiatum ut óculos laedat. Tme fonasse terremis iste 
ignis modeste demomtrandus est, deinde sidera, deinde Ima, deinde aurórete fulgor, et albesceทtis 
coeli nitor ln quibus seu citius seu tardius, sive per totum ordinem, sive quibusdam contemptis, 
pro sua quisque valitudim assuescem, sine trepidatione et cum magna voluptate solem videbit. 
Tale aliquid sapientiae studiosissimis, пес acute, jam tamen videntìbus, magistri optimi facimt. 
Nam ordine quodam ad earn pervenire bome disciplinae officium est, sine ordim autem vix 
credibilis felicitatis" 
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At 1.13.23, Augustine distinguishes between those who need a teacher, 
and those who do not. Both require faith, although their faith may function in a 
different capacity with respect to w i s d o m . T h e progress towards wisdom that is 
described in detail reads like a more kataphatic version of conf 10.6.9. When 
Augustine seeks after God in the physical realm in that text, the whole creation 
cries back to him: "we are not God! " As in sol, the reflected beauty (species) o f 
the сгеаШге is what declares the handiwork, and therefore the presence, of the 
divine. Here, those who are weak in learning must be gradually imtiated, so that 
they may be strengthened and healed in the habits o f faith, hope and charity. The 
basic intellectual goal in this, as confirmed by an. quant. 33.76， is the valuation o f 
the spiriณal above the material. Augustine's concern in retract, with respect to 
this is consistent: it is a first principle o f Augustinian spirituality, not that the 
physical be rejected, but that it be seen as a means to a รрігішаї end, and therefore 
o f lesser value as compared to the spiritual.*^ We shall argue later that his desire 
in retract, to distinguish between the senses and the spirimal senses is part o f an 
effort to soften the language o f an apparently hostile soul-body dualism. 
We cannot agree entirely wi th Thonnard that the process described above 
is a mere propadeutic to the real exercise o f Christian philosophy, since the 'ΊαΙβ 
aliquiď reminds us that Augustine is describing, in physical terms appropriate to 
the physical language used to liken il lumination to the รนท, "something l ike" what 
a teacher does.*^ The point o f this passage is to aff irm that learning must reflect 
" Compare this description to that o f scientia as faith in trin. 12-14. It is never the case that some 
require faith and others do not (say, because they are innately spiritually wise); there are rather 
different degrees and character o f faith and erud i t ion―some are teachers, others are not. One 
could argue that Augustine comes to appreciate a simplicity o f faith more in later writ ings, except 
that this is generally what Monica represents in early writ ings. 
'^Cf. l . I ; 1.3; 4.2. 
I6 F.J. Thonnard, "La notion de la lumière en philosophie augustinienne". Recherches 
Augustiniennes l (1962), p. 127. 
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the ordo that is manifest in creation. Thus in 1.14.25, Augustine says that our 
affections must be re-ordered in such a way as to reflect a properly hierarchical 
conception o f the nature o f things. The sensuous ought not to be loved in itself, 
since it has no sapientia to offer as such. Rather, it has ambiguous value as 
inviting one to cupiditas, to the possibility of inordinate love. In this, we see the 
early development o f the distinction between "things to be used" and "things to be 
enjoyed" for their own sake, which w i l l undergird the argument o f de doctrina 
Christiana, as wel l as the distinction between sapientia and scientia in ԾԽ. 12-14. 
While i l lumination in sol. 1 traces a picture o f creation as wel l as the 
manner in which the human mind images the divine, the idea is left behind by a 
transition at the end of the first book. It may be that, turning to the question o f the 
soul's immortality, Augustine is aware of the limitations o f the imagistic language 
of i l lumination, and instead moves into a more philosophical mode o f 
argumentation. A t 15.27, Augustine asks that Reason assist him in seeking to 
discern the "l ight." '^ Reason replies, saying that he must first seek after truth, 
which in turn introduces the issue o f "locating" truth in the soul, which in turn i s 
the basis for the argument for the immortality of the soul. 
Reason: Do you say with certainty that you desire to know the soul and 
God? 
Augustine: That is my only desire. 
Reason: Nothing else? 
Augustine: Absolutely nothing. 
Reason: What? Do you not want to know Truth? 
Augustine: As i f I could know these except through its means! 
Reason: Therefore that is first to be known through which the other things 
can be known. 
" More specifically, the "nearness" o f the light in question: "Non sinarท omnino concludi hune 
libeUum, nisi mihi modicum quo iníeníus sim de vicinia lucis aperueris. " 
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Reason goes on to demonstrate that, even i f true things pass away, the attribute of 
truth which they possess need not pass away. '8 Later texts on il lumination permit 
us to see "truth" here not simply as an epistemologica! condition, but as a concept 
linked more deeply to illumination as a model for creation. "Tru th" is prior to 
particular true tMngs not only conceptually, but also causally, ontologically, as a 
condition for their being. Although the word "participation" does not occur in this 
text, il lumination and truth serve here to explain how something that transcends 
the soul can also be present in the same, even inscribed in its nature. Hence truth, 
once translated from the more limited, propositional sense of Acad, is clearly 
linked to the concept of light both as an intellectual influence, and as a divine 
attribute. We have seen how, in beata и. ， Augustine connects images o f light to 
the interior working of the Holy Spirit. In later writings, light and truth are both 
identified as spiritual r e a l i t i e s a n d the second person o f the Trinity is 
preeminently identified wi th Veritas}^ In conf. 7， at the moment o f Augustine's 
Platonic epiphany, he calls upon the light that transcends the sight of his mind as 
the immutable light that created him, and he calls this light Truth: 
I saw above that same eye o f my soul the immutable light higher than my 
mind... superior because it made me, and I was inferior because I was 
made by it. The person who knows the truth knows it, and he who knows 
it knows eternity' Love knows it. Etemal truth and trae love and beloved 
eternity: you are my God. 
(Vidi supra mentem теат lucern ìncommutabilem... superior quia ipsa 
fecit me, et ego inferior quia factus ab ea. Qui novit veritatem, novit, et 
qui novit earn, novit aeternitatem. Caritas novit earn, о aeterna Veritas et 
vera caritas et cara aeternitas! Tu es Deus meus.ý^ 
" 1.15.29. 
՚ 9 We w i l l return to this topic; for textual references, see R. Jolivet, Dieu soleil des esprits (Paris, 
1932), pp. 150-153 
2° F.J. Thonnard, "Caractères platoniciens de l 'ontologie augustinienne", in Augustinus Magister I 
(Études Augustiniennes: Paris, 1954), pp. 322-323. 
֊'Сои/7.10.16. 
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Both i n сій. and Gท. litt, the or ig ina l creat ion o f l ight is also associated w i t h the 
b i r th o f the angelic creature. Hence Thonnard , speaking o f the d is t inct ion 
between l ight as uncreated d iv ine attr ibute and l ight as spir i tual creature, r igh t ly 
notes that 
Saint Augus t i n ท ' ind ique pas toujours nettement cette d is t inct ion, mais el le 
est incontestable et nous la supposons établie. Nous avons en el le une 
par t ic ipat ion créée à la Vér i té d iv ine , selon la doctr ine de ľ e x e m p l a r i s m , 
theorie fondamentale du platonisme accuei l l ie et christianisée par saint 
Augus t i n ; et certes, c'est l 'exempla i re qu i réalise d 'abord et au sens propre 
la per fect ion, pu i squ ' i l est la source où toutes les autres puisent leur valeur 
et q u ' i l est la fo rme même, absolue et parfai te, sur la modèle de laquel le 
toutes les part ic ipat ions qu i portent le même n o m doivent être " façonnées" 
pour ainsi dire ou formées en leur essence. D u point de vue august imen, i l 
faut conclure que la lumière au sens propre est d 'abord "Dieu-Véri té". '^^ 
By this account, the confus ion ar is ing f r o m mul t ip le signif icat ions o f " t r u t h " and 
" l i g h t " is f r u i t f u l , since i t points to a doctr ine o f part ic ipat ion w h i c h accounts fo r 
both fo rmal and other k inds o f causal i ty. The arguments for the immor ta l i t y o f 
the soul in sol. 2 and imm. an. must be read i n this context, namely, o f an 
emerging theory o f par t ic ipat ion; otherwise, they seem weak indeed. Cr i t ics o f 
August ine 'ร arguments about the immor ta l i t y o f the soul tend to over look their 
context.^^ The likeness o f the soul to God , and therefore its nearness, is a premise 
o f the argument, and not a conclusion.^' ' T o say, therefore, that the t ru th or the 
disciplinae depend on the m i n d as attr ibutes depend on their subject, is not the 
who le picture. T ru th is associated w i t h the soul i n an inseparable manner, but not 
as though caused by the soul , but as caused by some Ыдһег pr inc ip le w i t h w h i c h 
the soul has a пашга ї к іпзШр. I l lv iminat ion is the image intended to expla in the 
'F .J. Thonnard (1962), pp. 130-131. 
2 3 Richard Penaskovic, " A n Analysis o f Saint Augustine's 'De immortalitate animae"\ in 
Augustinián Studies 11 (1980), p. 171. John Mourant approaches his position. 
" Cf. an. quant. 34.77: "Just as we must acknowledge that the human soul is not what God is, so it 
must be set down that nothing is nearer to God among all the thmgs He has created than the human 
soul." 
113 
causal re lat ion between t ru th and the soul, and therefore the l ikeness o f the human 
to the d iv ine . Because this likeness is natural and universal , August ine w i l l 
conclude that t ru th can never be separated f r o m the s o u l ― u n l e s s the soul 
del iberately t u m s away f r o m the t ru th by an act o f the wi l l . ^^ Th is is the 
"con t rad ic t i on " o f s in, the spir i tual d i lemma o f the " f r e e " creature. 
H a v i n g prov ided the context o f i l l umina t ion , we w i l l n o w turn to part icular 
texts that d raw out and develop the importance o f memory that was f i rst in t imated 
in ord. 2. 
Memory and the nature of the soul: texts 
Sol. 1.4.9 
August ine dist inguishes memory f r o m knowledge early i n sol. A t 1.6.13, 
he describes reason as the v is ion o f the soul: ''aspectus animae ratio est." 
August ine immedia te ly qual i f ies th is , saying that not a l l who behold something 
t ru ly see it (videre). The natural v is ion o f the soul is corrected and enabled by 
fa i th , hope and charity.՜^^ Wi thou t these vir tues, the m i n d sees, but i t does not 
understand; i t l istens, but i t does not hear. 
I f those th ings w h i c h Plato and Plot inus said about G o d are true, is i t 
enough for y o u to k n o w God as they knew H i m ? 
Augustine I f those things wh i ch they said are true, i t does not o f necessity 
f o l l o w that they knew them. For many people speak at length about th ings 
they do not k n o w , jus t as I myse l f said I desired to k n o w a l l those th ings 
for w h i c h I prayed. I w o u l d not desire them i f I already knew them. Was I 
not able nonetheless to speak o f them? Indeed, I spoke not o f those things 
w h i c h I grasped w i t h my intel lect, but o f the things w h i c h I had gathered 
from many sources and commi t ted to memory , the th ings w h i c h I bel ieved 
as much as I cou ld . But to know֊tha t is something e lse . ' 7 
I隱. an. 6.10-11;аи. quant. 36.80. 
2 6 Cf. supra. 
"Si ea quae de Deo dàerunt Plato et Plotinus vera sunt, satisne tibi est ita Deum scire, ut illi 
sciebant? A. Non continuo, si ea quae dL·eruní, vera sunt, et iam scisse illos ea necesse est. Nam 
multi copiose dicmt quae msciunt, ut ego ipse omnia quae oravi, me dixi scire сиреге, quod non 
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August ine is not saying that Plato was operat ing mere ly at the level o f pistis. The 
d is t inc t ion here between two k inds o f k n o w i n g is s igni f icant . M e m o r y is 
described i n this chapter as propaedeutic to knowledge. Posi t ive ly speaking, i t is 
intended to encompass a var iety o f sources o f data: fa i th , experience, author i ty, 
and so on. To the extent that the truthfulness o f the objects o f memory is 
accidental , i t w o u l d seem that w e have a species o f Platonic op in ion . August ine 
contrasts the " k n o w i n g " o f memory , as associated w i t h the l i fe o f the senses, w i t h 
the cert i tude and relat ive immediacy o f mathemat ical knowledge. T o know a l ine 
or a sphere, he says, is proper ly said o f the intel lect. Once pressed to give some 
account o f h o w knowledge is acquired, he cannot main ta in a s impl is t ic opposi t ion 
o f intel lect and sense. He grudg ing ly concludes that the senses are useful , even 
necessary, for the k inds o f knowledge that are encompassed by memory . He 
describes the knowledge o f mathemat ical forms as a process o f abstraction f r o m 
the sensible. 
Reason What about t h e s e ― h a v e y o u perceived [a sphere or a l ine] by the 
senses or the intel lect? 
Augustine I rather employed the senses i n this matter as I use a ship. For, 
when they had carr ied me to the place to w h i c h I was go ing and I had there 
dismissed them, and when I had been set d o w n , as i t were, on dry land and 
began to t u rn these th ings over i n m y thought , m y steps were for a long 
t ime unsteady.^^ 
A l t h o u g h the senses by habi tuat ion make the intel lect less sure, they are necessary 
fo r learning. M e m o r y is therefore suited to contain everyth ing that is learned by 
means o f the senses, whether by language, v isual images or other modes o f 
cuperem si jam scirem: mm igitur eo minus ilia dicere potui? Dai enim non quae intellectน 
comprehendi, sed quae mdecumque collecta memoriae mandavi et quibus accommodavi quaหtam 
potui fidem: scire autem aliud est. ՚ Sol. 1.4.9. 
28 "R. Quid haec, semibusne percipisti, an intel leetu? Α. Im sensus in hoc negotio quasi navim 
s腦 expertm: Nam cum ipsi me ad locum quo tendebam pervexennt, ubi eos dimisi, et jam velut 
in solo positus coepi cogitaìione ista volvere, diu mihi vestigia titubarmi. " Sol 1.4.9. 
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s ign i f ica t ion. A n d wh i l e August ine must admi t that the intel lect may i n some 
sense depend on , or "use" , the senses, he says clearly at 1.5.11 that mathematical 
knowledge and knowledge o f God are o f an ent irely d i f ferent order. Ye t he is not 
prepared to abandon this much-va lued trope o f comparison. 
Sol. 2.20.34-35 
The quest ion o f the ab i l i t y o f the w i l l to separate the soul f r o m God , is, as 
we have observed, deferred fo r lib. arb. as w e l l as conf. We have also observed 
h o w the language o f i l l um ina t ion i n sol. 1 serves as a basis for an argument about 
the re lat ionship between t ru th and the soul . I n the second book o f sol., August ine 
asks h o w the soul can part ic ipate in error; here, as in Acad. 3, August ine assumes 
that phys ica l data on ly gives rise to op in ion , and therefore admit o f falsehood. I 
take this to be a development that moves away f r o m the posi t ion described above 
i n B o o k I . I t is, moreover, a move that compromises the importance o f ver i f iab le 
sense-perception for the arguments against skept ic ism i n Acad 
August ine 's discussion o f fa lsehood seems flawed to the extent that i t 
depends o n the idea o f a deliberate act o f deceit. M u c h l ike Plot inus, he does not 
want to make sense-perception something merely physical and therefore passive, 
but un l ike Plot inus, he does not invoke an Ar is tote l ian sense o f j udgment in order 
to exp la in both the l imi ta t ions and compensatory techniques o f the imaginat ion i n 
the act o f sense-perception. Thus August ine says that " z i n c " is to be b lamed as a 
deceiver because i t looks l i ke si lver; i t is not in fact our faul t i f we are mistaken 
about its nature 
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Is there anyth ing that we t ru th fu l l y k n o w i n the rea lm o f the sensible? 
August ine asks whether we find veri table geometr ic fo rms i n bodies.^" I n a move 
that qual i f ies, i f not contradicts, ord. he replies i n the negat ive: bodies tend to 
imi tate geometr ic fo rms, and as imi ta t ing the t rue, they are d i f ferent , and therefore 
false.՝^' I t is appropriate then that at the conclus ion o f sol. 2 , August ine 
dist inguishes between the figura o f the intel lect and the figura ( in the sense o f 
phantasm) that is abstracted f r o m the sensible, "made by the inte l lect . " I n bo th 
cases, the intel lect is at wo rk , but in one it depends p r imar i l y on the experience o f 
the senses.^^ August ine explains the di f ference by d is t inguishing t w o k inds o f 
remember ing (recordatio). 
I n one case, when something has been forgot ten, i t can be brought again to 
remembrance w i t h the assistance o f others w h o suggest d iss imi lar th ings. A man 
w i l l real ize that these exampleร are not what he is seeking, and yet s t i l l he does 
not remember the th ing itself. I t is not qui te t rue, then, to say that he forgets, but 
he "cannot be deceived or mis led, and he knows suf f ic ient ly what he is seek ing." 
Th is is an " in te rmed ia te " type o f forgetfulness. I n the other case, August ine 
describes a k i n d o f forgetfulness that is "c loser and more l i ke to remembrance and 
reco l lec t ion o f the t r u th . " 
Such a type o f forgetfulness occurs when w e see someth ing, recognize fo r 
cer ta in that w e have seen i t at some t ime, and declare that w e k n o w i t . Bu t 
where or when or h o w or i n whose company i t came to our at tent ion we 
straggle to rev iew and remember. A s , fo r example, i f this were to happen 
to us i n the case o f a man, we ask h i m where i t was w e made his 
acquaintance. When he has reminded us o f i t , a l l at once the who le a f fa i r 
' 5๙.2 .18 .32 . 
3 1 "Quis enim mente tam caecuร est qui mn videat, istas quae in geometrica docentur, habitare in 
ipsa veritate, aul in his etiam veritatem; illas vero corporis figuras, sìquidem quasi ad istas 
tendere videntur, habere néscio quam imitationem veřitaíis, et ideo falsas esse? " 
3 2 Gerard О 'Daly argues that, under the influence o f Cicero, Augustine normally understands 
pHãntasia in a purely passive sense, wi th this passage as the exception; cf. Augustine's Philosophy 
of Mind (University o f California Press: Berkeley, 1987), p. 107. 
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floods back to our memory l i ke a l igh t and we no longer have d i f f i cu l t y i n 
remember ing . . . . Those who are w e l l t ra ined in the l iberal arts are l i ke 
this. They b r ing to l igh t i n the process o f learning knowledge that 
undoubtedly is bur ied in ob l i v i on w i t h i n t hem, and, i n a way , they disinter 
i t . Moreover , they are not content and they cannot contain themselves 
un t i l they behold i n a l l i ts breadth and ful lness the who le countenance o f 
T ru th whose splendor already g lows i n a certain measure in those eíñsp 
O f course, August ine then warns that the l iberal arts, compared w i t h the 
unchanging t ru th , are var iable. The splendor o f t ru th is avai lable i n a qual i f ied 
manner ("quidam'') th rough the arts. The m i n d , he says, must seek a posi t ion o f 
transcendence by turn ing i n upon itself, and l ook ing to that place f r o m whence i t 
judges between true and false, c i rc le and square. The imaginationes that are the 
product o f sense-perception are to be avoided, and even though we may abstract 
geometr ic f igures f r o m sensible th ings, these are not to be compared w i t h 
geometr ical pr inc ip les that cannot be imaged at a l l (such as the in f in i te d iv is ion o f 
a f in i te space). August ine is a good student o f Plato in observ ing this d ist inct ion. 
Th is passage concludes sol H o w has i t expla ined what i t intends to 
explain? August ine observes that recol lect ion is something l i ke a habit , or a state 
o f intel lectual f i tness. Certain th ings may seem to have been forgot ten, but the 
fact that they can be sought after i n a systematic way , even by a process o f 
e l im inat ion , proves that they have not i n fact been forgot ten. The possibi l i ty o f 
recol lect ion proves that knowledge exists i n some sense even where there is no 
f u l l and exhaustive apprehension. I f memory is at w o r k , then the w i l l is 
ftmctioning as un i t i ng subject and the th ing sought after. The idea o f memory as 
33 "Cw/ simile est quando videmus aliquid certoque recognoscinms id nos vidisse aliquando, atque 
nosse affirmamus; sed ubi, aut quando, aut quomodo, aut apud quem nobis in notitiam venerit, 
satagimus repetere atque recolere. Ut si de homme nobis contigení, etiam quaerimus ubi єит 
noverimus: quod cum ille commemoraveriu repente tota res memoriae quasi lumen infunditur, 
nihilque ampliuร, ut remmiscamur, laboratur.... Tales sunt qui bene disciplinis Uberalibus eruditi: 
siqmdem illas sine dubio ๒ se oblivione obrutas erumt discendo, et quodammodo refodiunt: пес 
tamen contenii รนหէ, пес se fenent donee totam faciem verìtatis, cuius quidam Խ illis artíbus 
splendor iam subrutilaí,_ latìssìme aţquepienissima irttueantųr. " Sol. 2,20.34-35. 
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an inexp l ic i t l i nk to a g round o f knowledge that is also an object o f knowledge, 
i l lustrates Augus t ine 'ร emerg ing sense that knowledge must inc lude other aspects 
o f the act iv i ty o f the intel lectual soul , and cannot be reduced to mere preposi t ional 
certainty.^' ' 
Rather than demonstrat ing the falsehood o f images based on sense-
percept ion, the conc lus ion o f sol. points to their usefulness i n recol lect ion, 
whether w e conceive o f reco l lect ion as a hor izontal process (i.e. the recol lect ion 
o f a face or other sensible th ing) or a vert ical process (i.e. the caref t i l , h ierarchical 
progress th rough the sensible to the ideal) . August ine says that minds trained i n 
the l iberal arts may have true th ings more readi ly at hand to their memory , since 
they are better t ra ined i n the mnemonic techniques that are a part o f rhetor ical 
inst ruct ion. Nevertheless one must remain suspicious and eager to transcend 
sensible images even when they are required. Even though August ine does not 
speak any longer th rough the language o f i l l umina t ion , the transcendence should 
be understood after a s imi la r mode l : sensible th ings, once k n o w n to be sensed by 
v i r tue o f the i l l um ina t i on o f some agent, are thereafter thought to be o f secondary 
importance compared to an inqu i ry in to the nature o f that agency. 
The problem offorgetting and the constancy of soul: imm. aa 3.3 
The quest ion that moves de immortalitat e animae is the sense in w h i c h the 
soul is said to change and to remain changeless. I f we possess reason, August ine 
argues, and i f reason does not exist w i thou t learning {disciplina), then it f o l l ows 
34 Brian Stock speaks o f this as an abiding "skepticism" (m Augustine the Reader (Belknap Press: 
Cambridge, 1996)) that runs throughout Augustine's thinking. This is a provocative way to 
describe what we prefer think o f as an attenipt to adopt classical wisdom Christianly, in which a 
Christ-l ike humi l i ty becomes a necessary epistemic condition for the apprehension o f truth; cf. 
Conclusion. ― 
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" that learning is i n the m i n d o f man."^^ Disciplina, i n some texts ident i f ied w i t h 
t ru th , is described as นnchanging.^^ Nevertheless, i t w o u l d seem that the m i n d is 
var iable since i t can forget. Reading this text after sol., the issue seems 
st ra ight forward. August ine takes the occasion o f the ob ject ion to explore the 
several ways i n w h i c h the m i n d or the soul can be said to change; this discussion 
с arries on է Խ օ ս ց հ an. quant. 
What emerges is a р ісШге o f the soul as something i n an intermediate 
pos i t ion between the variable and the absolutely unchanging, par t ic ipat ing in the 
one, part ic ipated by the other. August ine r igh t l y points out that what moves is not 
necessarily moved i n a passive sense: "constancy possesses some power 
(virtนร)"^^ The soul , wh i l e remain ing "constant" , moves the body i n t ime and, i n 
a certain sense, space. W h i l e August ine w i l l not a l l ow that the soul moves, 
str ict ly speaking, w i t h respect to space, i t does move w i t h respect to t ime. A s a 
result, the m i n d can contain what is p lura l i n a simultaneous, un i f i ed fashion. The 
m i n d can be extended in t ime, wh i le remain ing who le and the same i n itself.^^ I n 
a l im i ted manner i t is at once changeless (as act ive pr inc ip le) and changing (as 
receptive pr inc ip le ) . The acts o f the soul do not thereby demonstrate change in 
the sense o f d issolut ion or death, but rather as act iv i ty or power . 
Imm, an. 1.1. 
36 On Augustine's struggle w i th the identification o f truth and disciplina, see Phil l ip Cary, 
Augustine's /mention of the Inner Self (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000), pp. 100-104. It 
may be true that Augustine's pre-occupation wi th the language o f spiritual " locat ion" reveals an 
excessive influence o f Stoic materialism; we only disagree wi th Сагу in his insistance that 
Augustine is unable in the early works to distinguish easily between the mind and God. 
Appreciating the hierarchical picture o f creation that emerges from ord. and sol. is a corrective to 
this ітефгеТаїіоп. 
37 ļmm. an. 3.3. 
This"idēā recurs in Augustine, and has one origin in Aristotle's de anima when he speaks o f the 
unity o f the judging faculty; cf. 43Jb l 8. 
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Imm, an. thus reaf f i rms a hierarchical p icture o f creat ion and causality i n 
general. The power o f the soul , as w e l l as its substance, is received f r om a higher 
pr inc ip le ; i n tu rn , the soul moves and in fo rms what is lower than i t , the sensible i n 
general and the body i n particular.^^ The presence o f learning i n the m ind must 
be understood i n a s imi lar manner. T o say that the disciplinae abide in the m i n d 
does not mean that they have their o r ig in there. The m i n d possesses a knowledge 
o f the disciplinae as a func t ion o f par t ic ipat ion i n the i l l umina t ing l ight o f 
knowledge, i tse l f an emanat ion o f foundat ional t ru th . Even the more ordinary 
exercises o f rhetor ic and dialect ic themselves are works o f reason and therefore o f 
t ru th, even though one must d is t inguish between the pract ice and the pr inciples 
w h i c h they presuppose."^*^ 
The m i n d therefore changes w i t h respect to t ime, by means o f memory , 
un i f y ing the mu l t ip le data o f experience. T o the ob jec t ion that the m i n d forgets 
things, August ine repl ies that the m i n d actual ly possesses a great many things o f 
wh i ch i t is not aware. The m i n d is on ly aware o f what has actually entered its 
thinking.'*^ He strengthens this argument i n 14.23， where he points out that the 
m i n d , upon w a k i n g , is not a b lank; even wh i l e we sleep, " t rue reasons" abide i n 
the m ind . For the soul to change, then, w i t h respect to its qual i t ies, is not to 
introduce an essential change."*^ A n increase i n w i s d o m indicates an асШа І іга Ї іоп 
39 Cf. 15.24-16.25. The picture is almost Procline in its hierarchical clarity. Unl ike Plotinus, here 
the soul inhabits its proper place entirely; unlike Proclus, Augustine does not lend real formal 
causality to the influence o f soul over what is lesser. On the mediate communication o f substance, 
see Elements of Theology, Props. 174,195. 
4 0 See for example an important article by J. Roland E. Ramirez ("Augustine's Numbering 
Numbers", Augustinián Studies 21 (1990)， pp. 153-161) which explains the distinction, wi th 
respect to conf. 10.12, between numbering and numbered numbers. He describes it as an 
"inarticulated relation , in which numbering numbers are clearly transcendent and causal; the logic 
o f i l lumination compels us to see ทนmbered numbers as temporal instances o f something etemal 
"existing in something compatible w i th such an etemal existence." 
An. quant. 4.6. 
^^^/พ/พ, aw, 6.11. 
121 
o f an attr ibute proper to the soul : one m igh t become more God- l i ke , or i n the 
absence o f w i s d o m , more l i ke an animal , but the soul does not thereby cease to be 
what i t i s ^ 
A n . quant 5.8 
Th is observat ion answers the basic query o f an. quant T o the suggestion 
that the soul must increase along w i t h bod i l y magni tude, August ine replies by 
showing that the soul increases only metaphor ica l ly , as a func t i on o f g row th i n 
v i r tue, w i s d o m or excellence.՚*՛* The manner i n w h i c h imm. an. concludes, by 
return ing to the issue o f the " l o c a t i o n " o f the soul w h i c h int roduced the first book 
o f sol, po ints to the substance o f the argument o f an. quant. Th is w o r k poses six 
questions about the nature o f the soul. I n the first t w o chapters, August ine 
answers the first t w o questions: the soul 's o r ig in is God , and its nature is s imple 
and immor ta l . The remainder o f the text speaks to the th i rd quest ion concerning 
the "greatness" o f the soฟ.45 I n the th i rd chapter, August ine summar i ly explains 
that the soul is "g rea t " not w i t h respect to extent, but w i t h respect to power {vis)r^ 
An. quant is a development o f this idea, already put fo r th i n imm. an., and 
therefore a med i ta t ion on the immater ia l i ty o f the soul and i ts proper place w i t h i n 
the hierarchy o f creat ion. 
I n the fifth chapter (5.8)， August ine again appeals to memory in order to 
exp la in h o w the soul , i n a mediatory pos i t ion, can be s imple and yet gather in to 
43 Nevertheless, in an. quant. 20.34, Augustine reiterates that learn๒g implies no real acquisition, 
since it is simply the recollection o f what the soul possess eternally; again, Augustine says that this 
is not the place to develop this particular topic. Retr. (1.8) clarifies that recollection must be 
understood as a dialectical exercise, and not as implying the soul's pre-existence. 
4 4 ル7. quant. 16.28-18.32. 
45 The final three questions are only alluded to in the final chapter (36.80): the reason for the union 
o f sou land body, the effect o f this union and the effect o f the separation o f soul and body. 
46 An. quant. 3.4; "anquanium valeat nosse velis.'' 
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i tse l f the mu l t i p l i c i t y o f sense-perception and experience. B o d y l im i ts the soul 
on ly w i t h respect to present perception*^; at the same t ime, th is l im i ta t i on is 
overcome by memory , by the act iv i ty o f its o f f sp r ing , reco l lect ion and 
expectat ion. August ine f inds that no present percept ion is possible w i thou t the 
operat ion o f memory ; as о 'Daly wr i tes , " a l l menta l concentrat ion persists o f 
necessity over a t ime-span: to hear even the briefest sound memory is needed, for 
the beg inn ing o f a sound does not coinc ide tempora l ly w i t h its end, and cannot be 
perceived simultaneously in its 6 ո էՄ617 . " ՛ ՛ * Hence again, the idea that the soul can 
extend i n t ime, but not i n space, is the answer to Augus t ine 's concern about 
un i ty 严 
I n this text, memory shows h o w the soul can be associated w i t h body, and 
yet remain free f r o m the body to a l im i ted extent. Echo ing language later used i n 
conf. 10, August ine observes that the soul is great because, i n an immater ia l 
fashion, i t can contain "great, vast c i t ies."^" A g a i n , at 14.23 August ine says that 
the soul , wh i l e lack ing quant i ty, can conta in what is great by v i r tue o f the vis o f 
memory .^ ' August ine is speaking o f the combined w o r k o f imag inat ion and 
memory : F r o m experience in t ime, memory gathers and retains a var iety o f 
47 "Cum igitur anima tua hic sit ubi corpus, пес ultra spatium eius porrigatur, ut superior ratio 
demonstrabat...." 
48 "The response to skepticism and the mechanics o f cognit ion", in The Cambridge Companion to 
Augustine, eds. E. Stump and N. Kretzmann (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001), p. 
166. O 'Da ly finds this position, at least w i th regard to visual perception, unconvincing. 
49 Note how Plato, in Phaedrus, avoids the language o f temporal extension, preferrmg to identify 
the object o f memory as what is simple and universal; cf. supra. 
so Cf. 5.9. "Cwr ergo, cum tam parvo spatio sit anima quam corpus est eius, tam magme in ea 
possunt exprimi imagines, ut et urbes, et lalitudo terrarum, et quaeque alia ingentia apud se possit 
imaginan? Volo emm cogites paulo diligeทtìus, quanta et quam multa memoria nostra conţineai, 
quae utique anima continentur. Qui ergo fundus est, qui sinus, quae immensitas quae possit haec 
capere, cum et earn fantam quantum corpus est superior ratio docuisse videaturl" 
5' "Si aulem te movet, cur tanta coeli, terrae, marisque svätia memoria conţineai, cum sit ipse 
nullius quantiíatts; mira quaedam vis est, quam tarnen ex แร quae a nobis comperta sunt, quantum 
ineşţ ingenio tm luminiş, animadvertere potesľ 
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images w h i c h i n t u m f o r m complex wholes.^^ Though the creative process 
depends upon images, spatial l imi ta t ions are nearly i rrelevant. 
Reason is described as the sight o f the s o u l " , proceeding f r o m a fixed 
point ; memory explodes the s ingular i ty , and makes what one could describe as a 
straight l ine o f mental v i s ion fan out, as i t were, t rac ing a ftill c i rc le, a tota l 
perspective o f potent ia l percept ion. M e m o r y gives the m i n d ' s eye perfect 
peripheral v i s ion : present percept ion, w i t h a remembered sum o f experiences, and 
a sense o f expectat ion fo rmed by the sanie remembrances. Wh i l e encompassing 
in potency so m u c h , the m i n d nevertheless remains the fixed po in t o f j udgment . I t 
is tempt ing to describe th is pos i t ion as one o f transcendence, except that the 
abi l i ty o f m i n d to be ent i re ly immanent to what is sensibly before i t , wh i l e 
remain ing i n i tself, is more to the po in t . 
Memory and sense-perception in the ascent of the soul to God: an. quant 23.41 
August ine defines sense-perception as a bod i l y experience o f w h i c h the 
soul is aware d i rect ly .^՚՛ Th is is contrasted w i t h the indirect experience o f the 
soul一for example, g row th , w h i c h is a bod i l y experience, but not an act o f sense-
percept ion. August ine wishes to observe that man is not d iv ided i n the act o f 
percept ion: i t is not the eyes that see; they are merely instruments. I t is the man 
that sees, or more speci f ica l ly , the act o f seeing. H is account is w h o l l y 
52 On memory and imagination, see the correspondence between Augustine and Nebridius, 
especially Letters 6 and 7; see also T. Breyfogle, "Memory and Imagination in Augustine's 
Confessions", in Literary Imagination, Ancient and Modem: Essays in Honor of David Grene 
(University o f Chicago Press: Chicago, 1999), pp. 139-154. 
" 14.24. 
5 4 25.48. ortas se enim verum est, omniร sensus passio corporis est animam non latens.'' 
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Ar is to te l ian on this point.^^ The soul is receptive to the in fo rmat ion taken f r o m 
sensible signs; i n j udgmen t , the soul has an act ive knowledge o f the w o r l d 
" th rough the body."^^ 
Sense-perception, especially v is ion, is a process analogical to knowledge. 
Just as sight moves over th ings un t i l i t f inds that w h i c h i t desires to beho ld , so 
also does reason move over its proper objects, and w hen i t sees that upon w h i c h i t 
is focused, there is actual knowledge: i t is reason that beholds, and scientia that 
sees; reason that seeks, scientia that is found.^^ The compar ison between sight 
and knowledge marks a suggestive t ransi t ion in the text, at 33.66， to a descr ipt ion 
o f the seven steps or acts o f the soul . These are described i n a var iety o f d i f ferent 
ways, as the f o l l o w i n g table summarizes.^^ 
1. an imat ion 
2. sensation 
3. art 
4. v i r tue 
5. t ranqui l i ty 
6. approach 
7. contemplat ion 
o f the body 
through the body 
about the body 
toward i tse l f 
i n i tse l f 
toward G o d 
i n God 
beaut i fu l o f another 
beaut i fu l th rough another 
beaut i fu l about another 
beaut i fu l t oward a beaut i fu l 
beaut i fu l i n a beaut i fu l 
beaut i fu l t oward Beauty 
beaut i fu l i n Beauty 
5 5 On Aristotelian parallels, see O'Daly {ibid. p. 166) who writes that "sense perception is 
perception o f images o f objects, not o f objects themselves. These images are not софогеа і : 
Augustine describes them as a k ind o f 'spiritual matter' {an. et or. 4.17.25), but the analogy is 
confusing, for, like Aristot le, August๒e argues that perception is the abil i ty to receive fomis 
without matter. Moreover perception is the perception o f like by l ike. There is an aff in i ty between 
the percipient's reason and the image or form o f the object perceived, which is described by 
Augustine ๒ rational, numerical terms or in the language o f proportion and measure. It is this 
aff inity which makes perception possible in the first place, as wel l as guaranteeing its rel iabi l i ty." 
'^23.42. 
57 Augustine uses the term "Tatiocinatio'' to describe the discursive activity o f reason. 27.53. ՛՛Սէ 
ratio sit quidam mentis aspectus, ratiociหatio autem rationiร inquisitìo, idest, aspectus illim, per 
ea quae aspicìenda sunt, moth. Quare ista opus est ad quaerendum, ilia ad videndum. Itaque 
cum ille mentis aspectus, quem ratioหem vocamus, comectus in rem aliquam, videt Шат, scientia 
ทominatur: cum autem non videt mens, quamvis intendat aspectum; imcitia vel ignorantia 
dicitur:" 
58 This summary is found in 35.79, although it is incomplete without the development o f 33.70-76; 
As we pointed out init ial ly, Augustine maintains that the soul has the power to perform all o f these 
acts simultaneously, though it might pay attention only to several at one time. This makes it 
di f f icul t to read these steps as only describing a terminal ascent. 
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I n the first two steps, August ine speaks o f the soul as " i n " the mor ta l body main ly 
i n order to br ing un i ty thereto. B y an imat ing, i t gives and maintains ordo. I n 
sensation, the soul funct ions del iberately i n the physical w o r l d , even though i t 
may w i thd raw for a t ime so that both the soul and the senses may have their 
" v igou r restored."^^ The soul , however , is not natural ly at home i n the physical 
environment, and it is by habi t that is comes to feel i t se l f a part o f the same. This 
passive sense o f habi tuat ion August ine describes as memory . The th i rd step 
distinguishes a d i f ferent sense o f memory , not as " a l i nk w i t h the fami l i a r " , but as 
an active compi ler o f things such as the disciplinae, pract ical sk i l ls , and language: 
this is memory as " the power o f reason and thought."^*^ Augus t ine gives us a very 
clear d ist inct ion between t w o lower funct ions o f memory w h i c h w e w i l l see 
developed i n de musica. Religio enters the picture at th is po in t , as something 
f o rm ing and leading the memory as a pedagogue. F r o m the four th step on, 
August ine appeals to the necessity o f a sure fa i th as a process o f ascent wh i ch is 
clearly described i n terms o f the progressive va luat ion o f the spir i tual over the 
mater ia l . I n this process, the soul is made free and, speaking i n almost Stoic 
terms, undisturbed. On ly then can i t commence its approach to God . 
These steps mer i t more carefu l analysis, for th is is r i gh t l y one o f the most 
famous passages f r o m Augus t ine 'ร early works . W e w i l l on ly make several 
observations. August ine says clear ly that the purpose o f l ay ing out these steps as 
a conclusion to these texts (50/ . , imm. an. and an. quant.) has been to show the 
reader h o w much greater are unseen realit ies than th ings that are seen, and 
'33.71 
' 33.72： " . . . V í / M ratiocinandiet excogiţandi.'' 
126 
therefore h o w " w e l l w e are nour ished by the Church."^ ' Th is conf i rms our in i t ia l 
thesis about the fundamental concern mot iva t ing this group o f texts, as in t imated 
in the quotat ion f r o m conf. 6 . 6 2 August ine also expresses his desire that the reader 
w i l l have an increased hope i n the է€տսՄ€0էւօո o f mutable bodies^՝^, and therefore 
comfor t i n the Incarnat ion. August ine is clearly l i nk i ng the Incarnat ion to the 
correct ion o f false conceptions about the soul . This correct ive is ent irely 
pract ical , since bod i l y resurrect ion comes to pass t føough par t ic ipat ion i n the 
Incarnat ion. 
Throughout these texts, August ine has appealed to an ordered, h ierarchical 
picture o f bo th creat ion and the const i tu t ion o f man. I l l um ina t ion , i n the first 
book o f sol, conf i rms th is p ic ture, and adds a nascent explanat ion for h o w the 
m i n d is related to the highest l igh t and creative pr inc ip le . August ine has also 
argued that the soul and the body stand i n a veri table un ion , by v i r tue o f the 
subject ion o f the latter to the former : the soul act ively animates, orders and 
in forms, and the soul also uses the body as an instrument for the "passive ac t i v i t y " 
o f percept ion. Thus i t is toough an anthropological mode l that August ine 
understands h o w the physical must be uni ted w i t h the spir i tual . Since G o d "never 
abandons the sou l " , the phys ica l i tse l f is f i r m l y held under d iv ine providence by 
v i r tue o f its subordinat ion to a part icular տօսԼ^ ՛ * We say "par t icu la r " because 
there is no suggestion o f a cosmic wor ld -sou l i n these texts. W e s imply have an 
early instance o f Augus t ine 's admi t ted an toopocen t r i sm, j us t i f i ed th rough the 
" 33.76. 'Ти«с agnoscemus quam vera nobis credendo imperata sint, quamque optime ас 
saluberrime apud matrem Ecclesiam nutriti fuerimus." 
6 2 Cf. note З, supra. 
6 3 John A. Mourant notes this in his "Remarks on the De Immortalitate Animae", Augustinián 
Studies 2 (197il p. 216. 
" 36.80. It is interesting, in this regard, that at the conclusion o f this text, it is not philosophical 
materialism, but rather idolatry o f which the reader is warned. As Augustine w i l l make clear in 
conf., the philosophical errpr is the offspring o f the s๒ o f pride. 
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central i ty o f the Incarnat ion. I t is tempt ing to find in these texts a paral le l o f 
anthropological m ic rocosm and cosmic macrocosm, since even the rebel l ious act 
o f the free w i l l cannot disturb this fundamental , hierarchic orderl iness. 
M e m o r y as the ab i l i ty o f the soul to extend i n t ime makes i t possible for 
the soul to assimilate the mu l t ip l i c i t y o f what is subordinate to i t . Augus t ine , i n 
retract. ， expresses reservation about l i nk ing the language o f recol lect ion to the 
l iberal arts, prefer r ing a language o f dialectic and inst ruct ion. Bu t the discussion 
o f i l l um ina t ion as a l i nk between the m ind and God , and the inser t ion o f soul i n a 
mediatory place i n a hierarchical ly ordered cosmos, has opened the possib i l i ty f o r 
the development o f a theological and contemplat ive fbnc t ion fo r memory in later 
texts. 
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C H A P T E R 6: 
DE MAGISTRO A N D DE MUSICA 
These texts are both examples o f the k i n d o f exercitatio animi thought by 
August ine to be necessary fo r the pur i f i ca t ion o f the soul , namely the purgat ion o f 
excessively sense-based opin ions. De magistro effects th is w i t h respect to 
language, and de musica w i t h respect to numbers. A s such, they are appropriately 
paral leled. A l t hough thei r t rad i t ional dates o f compos i t ion also j us t i f y keeping 
them together, there are impor tant advances made f r o m one to the other. Mus. 
exposes most clearly o f any text yet w h y August ine makes memory the 
foundat ion o f his ant føopology. I t also of fers gl impses o f the d i rect ion i n w h i c h 
this thesis w i l l continue after this chapter, namely , t oward the incarnat ional 
rationale for an ant toopology founded on memory . 
Mag. is o f more interest to us for what i t is not than for what i t is. I t opens 
up the concepณal space fo r memory to become the foundat ion o f knowledge as a 
dialect ical mode o f presence. I t does not however g ive us a " theory o f memory . " 
Mm. begins this, but u l t imate ly points the reader to conf. I t nevertheless declares 
for the first t ime that memory has a central ro le in the m i n d ' s knowledge o f God : 
but this new role is barely developed. These are texts w i t h very specif ic goals, 
and we shall lay out their arguments——with far more at tent ion to that o f mus. 
De magistro 
B y his o w n account, August ine maintains that mag. presents neither a 
theory o f s igni f icat ion nor a theory o f language. A t the conclus ion, he claims that 
he w i l l discuss elsewhere the "usefulness o f w o r d s " ; th is text is rather about what 
129 
words are not, or cannot do. ' I take the "other p lace" to be doct. ehr., where w e 
see his concern about language become a matter o f the іп Іефге Іа Ї іоп o f Scripture.^ 
Gou lven Madec 'ร warn ing remains apt for al l readers oîmag} 
I l faut toutefois se garder de t rop prêter à Augus t in , sous peine d'être déçu. 
I l n 'a pas développe, pour e l le-même, une theorie des signes ou du 
langage. . . . I t y a b ien des elements de sémantique, concernant le 
"meta langage" (rapports du mot et du signe, énoncé, etc.) et la 
"pragmat ique ' (buts d u langage. . . ) . M a i s i l faut observer que n i les uns n i 
les autres ne concernent directement la pratique normale du langage, 
réserve fai te de la quest ion in i t ia le . . . . O n ne devrait donc pas supposer 
que la cr i t ique du langage, menée dans le De magistro, soit toute la 
doctr ine d 'Augus t i n sur le langage. S ' i l fa i t v io lence au langage (cf. 8.24)， 
c'est pour faire comprendre que ses condit ions de possibi l i té ne sont pas 
d 'ordre l inguist ique ou métal inguist ique, mais d 'ordre métaphysique ： le 
procès l inguist ique authentique imp l ique l 'act iv i té des esprits. 
Nevertheless, phi losophica l commentators such as Christopher K i r w a n , inspired 
by Wi t tgenste in 'ร b r i e f reference to August ine i n his Philosophical Investigations, 
speak w i t h great re l ish o f h o w August ine 'ร " theory o f language" s imp ly doesn' t 
w o r k . 4 Other interpreters see the l im i ted funct ion that August ine does a l l ow 
language to have, but are not sensit ive to what Madec describes as the 
' 14.46. "Sed de tota uîHHate verborum, quae si bene consideretur non parva est, alias, si Deus 
siverit, requiremus" The Latin text is available in the Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, Vo l . 
29, ed. К. Daur (1970); we are using the English translation o f Peter K ing (Hackett: Indianapolis, 
1995), wi th reference to the translations by G. Madec (Desclée de Brouwer: Paris, 1976) and 
Adele Canini (Mursia: Mi lano, 1993). 
2 On the relationship between these two texts, and for ftuther bibliography, see the article by Mark 
Jordan, "Words and Word: Incarnation and signification in Augustine s De doctrina Christiana'' տ 
Augustinián Studies (Vo l . 11, 1980)， pp. 175-196. We w i l l consider the connection between 
memory and bibl ical іп їефгеш іоп in the chapters on c o n / 
3 Notes Complémentaires 4， in the first series, Vo l . 6， o f the Bibliothèque Augustmienne. 
4 "Wittgenstein wrote: "When we say: 'Every word տ a language signifies something' we have so 
far said nothing whatever, unless we have explained exactly what distinction [i.e.contrast wi th 
non-significance] we wish to make." I wish to conclude that Augustine, who does say this, has not 
said nothing whatever, but on the contrary has explained what he means, i f not exactly, at least 
painstakingly and sufficiently: sufficiently for us in our time, who are standing on his and so many 
others' tall shoulders, to be able to see that he is wrong, though not for the reason presented by 
Wittgenstein in Philosophical investigations ľ Christopher k i rwan , "Augustine's Philosophy o f 
Language" ๒ the Cambridge Companion to Augustine] eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001), pp. 186-204. See also K i rwan, 
Augustine (Routledge: London and New York, 1989), pp. 50-55; M-F. Bumyeat, "Wit tgenste๒ 
and Augustine'ร De Magistró՝\ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vo l . 61 (1987), 
pp.T֊24; P: Bearsly, "Augustine and Wittgenstein on language", Philosophy 58 (1983), pp. 229-
236. 
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"metaphysica l cond i t ions" that must obtain i n order for language to func t ion . We 
are lef t w i t h August ine as the "empi r i c is t l ingu is t " , even a Humean!^ Jackson and 
others have shown that the idea o f words as species o f signs, and the d is t inc t ion 
between a th ing and a verbum, signum, vocabulum or nomen is not in fact o r ig ina l , 
but has ancient sources, bo th pMlosophica l and rhetor ical .^ Nevertheless the fact 
that August ine , l i ke Boethius in his commentary on Ar is to t le 'ร de ìnterpretatione, 
finds that the relat ionship between signs and things is largely c o n v e n t i o n a l , leads 
semiot icists such as Eco and Deely to f i nd i n August ine a s ign i f icat ion theory that 
is nove l , "expressiv is t " and entirely modem. 
Th is var iety o f scholarly interests has l i t t le bearing on our project . Th is 
text , very m u c h l ike mus., is a perfect example o f Augus t ine 'ร early sense o f the 
pedagogical importance o f exercitatio animi. I n de anima et eius origine 
Augus tme admits that he has l i t t le idea o f h o w and whence the soul comes to act 
on the body. The only th ing o f w h i c h he is certain is that the soul is greater than 
the bodyS, and parallel to th is, that the intelligible is of greater value than the 
sensible. The m in ima l purpose o f the exercitatio i n th is context is to remind 
onesel f o f th is. Thus at 8 .21 , August ine asks w h y he and Adeodatus are ta l k ing 
about signs and not things i f they are seeking the happy l i fe . August ine repl ies, 
saying that we must 
exercise the m ind ' s strength and sharpness, w i t h w h i c h we ' re able not on ly 
to wi thstand but also to love the heat and l igh t o f that reg ion where the 
happy l i fe is {sed exercendi vires et mentis äciem, quitus regionis illius, 
5 As one example, see Herman J. Cloeren, "St. Augustine's De Magistro: a transcendental 
investigation", in Augustinián Studies 16 (1984), pp. 21-27. 
6 B.D. Jackson, Semantics and Hermeneutics in Saint Augustine 'ร De Doctrina Christiana, 
Dissertation (Yale University, 1967), p. 65 fif. This dissertation includes a useful translation of de 
dialectica. See also the excellent article by R.A. Markus, "St. Augustine on signs", m Phronesis 2 
(1957), pp. 60-83. 
' Cf. ๔ОС/Г cAr. 2.25.38. 
* 4.5.6. 
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ubi beata vita est, colorem ас luce m non modo susţinere, verum et amare 
possimus). 
W e must understand the signs, the physical shadows, o f th ings before we are f i t to 
behold the truths w h i c h they s ign i fy . On l y when the exercitatio is complete do we 
see it for what i t is: a preparation abandoned by one w h o t ru ly understands, and 
never real ly necessary for the fa i thf t i l .^ 
U l t imate ly , mag. proposes the same p rob lem as Plato 's Meno: h o w can 
one attempt to learn something unless one already has some sort o f anterior 
knowledge, such that what is learned can be a f f i rmed to be true? Plato'ร answer 
to this p rob lem, as we have seen, is the so-cal led theory o f recol lect ion. 
August ine largely embraces this theory, but w i thou t the unorthodox element o f 
pre -ex is tence―an element w h i c h , w e have suggested, was regarded as inessential 
by Plato Mmsel f . These t w o texts therefore open up the conceptual space for a 
not ion o f memory that is not necessarily l inked to sense-perception. Th is in turn 
raises questions about the status and nature o f lower k inds o f knowledge, and the 
uni ty o f man as soul and body. 
The f irst and longest part o f the text is concerned w i t h signs, ch ief ly 
spoken words, that s ign i fy other signs, and signs that s ign i fy things. Scholars 
have discussed the part icular d iv is ions that m igh t be imposed on the argument o f 
' Cf. mus. 6.17.59. "But i f any read this talk o f ours committed to wr i t ing, they must know these 
things have been written by persons much weaker than those who, having fol lowed the authority 
o f the two Testaments, by believing, hoping, and loving, venerate and worship the consubstanţial 
and unchangeable Trmity o f the one highest God from whom, through whom and տ whom are all 
things. For they are puri f ied, not by flashing human reasoning, but by the effective and burning 
fire o f charity." Trans. R.c. Taliaferro (Fathers o f the Church: New York, 1947). ^Sermonem 
autem hune nostrum mandatum ι it է er іร Sì qui legeni, sciant multo mfirmìorìbm haec esse scripta, 
quam sunt i l l i , qui uniuร summi Dei consubíaทtialem et incommuiabìlem trimtatem, ex quo omnia, 
per quem omnia, in quo omnia, duorum testamentorum auctoritatem secuti venerantur et colmi 
earn credendo, sperando, dilìgendo. Hi enim non scmtillantibus humanis ratiocmationibus sed 
validíssimo et_ flggranüşşjmo CÆi^tisjgnepurgantนุrj.l) — ， - , . 
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mag. A t 4.7, August ine lays out the order o f discussion about the nature o f 
signs. 
i . 4.7"8.21signs that can be explained or "exh ib i t ed " by other signs 
a. signs that are "se l f -exh ib i t i ng " (10.29-10 32) 
b. signs that " p o i n t " to things (10.33-13.40)** 
The first part ( i . ) argues that words are a species o f signs; words can s ign i fy other 
words , such as " p r o n o u n . " Even words that proper ly s ign i fy things have a 
func t ion as s ign i f y ing some other w o r d . Th is means that every w o r d by its 
s igni f icat ive func t ion can act as mnemonic tag. '^ The possib i l i ty o f c i rcu lar i ty o f 
s ign i f icat ion is not regarded as problemat ic by August ine. The argument is 
certainly incomplete at the level o f language, o f words , i n re lat ion to themselves. 
M u c h as the physical is mora l l y ambiguous, either ensnaring the beholder, or else 
d i rect ing the gaze o f the soul beyond itself; so also is the reader expected to see 
the argument about s i g n s ― w h e r e every verbum is a n a m e ― a s incomplete.*^ 
Indeed, sensible o f the d i f f i cu l t ies o f his project, August ine remarks at 5.14 that to 
discuss words w i t h words is "as entangled as in ter lock ing on๙ s f ingers and 
rubb ing them together, where hard ly anyone but the person do ing i t can 
d ist inguish the f ingers that i tch f r o m the fingers scratching the itch."^"^ I t is 
appropriate then that this first sect ion ends w i t h a summary and inter lude (7.19-
'0 See G. Madec, "Analyse du De magistro", in Revue des Études Augustmennes 21 (1975)， pp. 
63-71; F. Crosson, "The structure o f the De magistrď', ๒ Revue des Etudes Augustimemes 35 
(1989), pp. 120-127; F.-J. Thonnard, Bibliothèque Augusîimenm Vo l . 6 (2՞^ ed， 1952), р, 15, p. 
103. The Hackett edition adopts Crosson'ร divisions. 
" Whether ii.b. technically ends at 13.40, or continues to the end o f the dialogue is the point o f 
disagreement between Crosson and Madec. Crosson'ร basic point, that it is an inadequate 
summary to simply say that "Christ is the only teacher o f man", does not in my opinion stand or 
fall on this. 
ւ շ 8.21. Consider the association o f words involved ๒ a game such as "charades." 
'^5.15. 
' ' ' 'พaw verbis de verbis agere tam implìcatum est, quam digitos digitis imerere et confricare; ubi 
vįx dįgnoscitur, nisi ab eo į РАО qujJd agiL qui digiti pruneņt,,et qui amilientur prurientibus'" 
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8.21), w h i c h includes an assurance o f the larger object ive o f a discussion o f 
signs.'^ Note also that, in i t ia l ly August ine and Adeodatus take signs to mean 
spoken words , but they are n o w taken to include a var iety o f gestures, images and 
actions. 
A t 9.26, August ine shows Adeodatus that i t is better to have knowledge o f 
a t h m g than a knowledge o f its s ign, since signs exist on account o f the things 
w h i c h they s ign i fy : this is a pr io r i ty both log ica l and temporal in the order o f 
be ing. I t may be that, i n the order o f learning, a name can be learned w i thou t its 
s ign i f ica t ion being known . I n such a case, however , August ine w o u l d not say that 
there is a veri table knowledge o f that sign. Bu t can there be knowledge o f a th ing 
w i t hou t a knowledge o f its corresponding sign? S ign i f ica t ion is necessary to 
communica t ion , and therefore no th ing is taught w i thou t s i g n s . A d e o d a t u s 
conv inc ing ly argues that behold ing a man wa l k i ng for a short t ime does not confer 
an adequate knowledge o f everyth ing one needs to k n o w about w a l k i n g , such that 
one cou ld actual ly do i t . '^ I n response to th is , August ine of fers examples o f 
things that are "se l f -exh ib i t i ng " , such as nature and G o d , but these are on ly 
evident as things to those w h o are attentive (cerทentibus), or par t icu lar ly 
inte l l igent . I th ink August ine a l lows some d i f f i cu l t y to remain i n th is d iv is ion 
( i i .a.) . I n other contexts, August ine w o u l d say that nature is at best an image or a 
sign i n w h i c h a d iv ine order can discerned: what he is descr ib ing here as things 
are clear ly signs i n a broad sense. They may teach something in a pre- l inguist ic 
manner, however. August ine 'ร po in t , then, is a very specif ic one (10.34) : signs, 
" Cf. supra. 
10.31. "Confectum est igitur et nihil sine signis doceri, et cognitionem ipsam signis quibus 
cognoscimus, chariorem nobis esse oportere: quamvis non omnia quae sigทiftcantur possint signis 
SWS esse pot юга." 
" THēexample is flawed, since he does not distinguish between having a scientific or a practical 
knowledge. — ク - ― 一 
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understood as words or names, do not act ively confer upon the m i n d the meaning 
wh i ch they s ign i fy . A s ign is on ly mean ing fu l when the th ing s igni f ied is in some 
sense already k n o w n . W e learn not by hearing a w o r d , but by look ing at a th ing . 
Here, the apparent carelessness i n us ing the term " know ledge " (cognitio) 
is addressed. A s August ine concludes w i t h a monologue concerning the final 
d iv is ion ( i i .b . ) , he speaks o f be l ie f (credere) as useft i l and even necessary to 
knowledge. I n th is text, be l ie f seems to have the character o f Platonic op in ion : i t 
is epistemologica! in s c o p e a n d is ambiguous i n that i t may have an object that 
is false or true. Nevertheless, i t is a necessary step i n the process o f coming to 
k n o w something. I t is precisely th is observat ion that motivates a tu rn " w i t h i n " i n 
the argument. I f be l ie f is necessary, or else usefu l , then there must be teachers, or 
an auctoritas, that is absolutely certain. Every rat ional soul consults the t ru th that 
"dwe l l s w i t h i n " i t , both by natural necessity, and as a g i f t opened to each 
"accord ing to their capacity."*^ T o say that the soul perceives what is made 
manifest to i t by the t ru th w i t h i n does not mean that knowledge is immediate, 
s imple and exhaustive: i t may be a knowledge that is he ld by images, shadows and 
t ru th fu l opin ions. I t may be a dia lect ical re la t ion o f something perceived, yet not 
fu l l y possessed. 
՚ 8 Despite the quotation from Isaiah at 11.37. Cf. ''Quod ergo intelligo, id etiam credo: at non 
omne quod credo, etiam intelligo. Omne autem quod intelligo, scio: non опте quod credo, scio. 
Nec ideo nescio quam sit utile credere etiam multa quae néscio; cui utilităţi hane quoque adiuทgo 
de tribus pueris historiam: guare pier ague rerum cum scire non possim, quanta tamen utilitate 
credantur, scio'' 
19 11.38. "Đe umversis autem quae intelligimus non loqueทtem qui personat foris, sed intus ipsi 
menti praesideníem comulimus veritatem, verbis fartasse ut consulamus admoniti. Ule autem qui 
consulìtur, docet, qui in interiore hornine habitare dietus est Christus, idest wcommutabilis Dei 
Virtus atque sempiterna Sapieหtia: quam quidem omniร rationalis anima consulii; sed tantum 
cuique panditur, quantum capere propter propriam, sive malam sive bomm voluหtatem potest. Et 
si quando fai li tur, non fit vitio consuUae veritatis, ut negue huius, quae foris est, lucis Vitium est, 
quoä corporei~õcülі sāepe falluหtur: quam lucern de rebus vis ibi ι і bus consuli fatemur, ut eas nobis 
quantum cernere vaļemus,_ostendatr _ __ ___ 
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This w o u l d not be knowledge in the follest sense. I t does however seem to 
be knowledge in the most ord inary sense. August ine compares understanding and 
sense-perception. Just as the senses receive s t imul i i n an immediate fashion, so 
also does the m i n d receive truths w i t h an "und iv ided eye" , i l l um ined by the inner 
էաէ հ ՛ ^ ^―a l t hough this picture o f knowledge as receptive w i l l be str ict ly qua l i f ied 
in mus. W h e n August ine teaches Adeodatus truths, the words coming f r o m his 
mou th are i r relevant to the extent that the t w o o f them stand ind iv idua l l y i n the 
same inte l lectual re la t ion to the t ru th that i l luminates the m i n d . " E v e n before I 
spoke, he cou ld exp la in these very matters were he quest ioned", August ine says o f 
Adeodatus. 
Nevertheless, i t is the weakness o f our discernment that makes bo th 
language and be l ie f epis temological ly necessary. Mag. concludes w i t h these t w o 
observat ions: Language is necessary, and i n part icular, accepted convent ional 
meanings, so that commun ica t ion can occur. Wh i l e words may not communicate 
their " h i d d e n " s ign i f ica t ion, they can direct the m i n d ' s at tent ion to something.^* 
B y dia lect ical quest ioning, a teacher removes the obstruct ions that stand i n the 
way o f the m i n d ' s eye. The act iv i ty o f the human teacher is therefore largely 
negative. The posi t ive d imension o f teaching is a fiinction o f the m i n d ' ร re lat ion 
to the t ru th w h i c h i l l umines \X?^ Be l i e f is also necessary because o f the 
"weakness o f our d iscernment" , and therefore our need for human teachers. 
12.40. "Cพ/พ vero de m agitur quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu atque rottone, ea 
quìdem loquimur quae praeseìใtia contuemur in illa interiore luce veritatis, gua ipse qui dicitur 
homo interior, illustratur et fruiturľ 
շ ւ 10.43; 10.35. 
22 12.40. ''Nam quod saepe contìngìt, ut iníerrogatus aliquid neget, atque ad idfateหdum allis 
interrogationibus urgeatur,ßt hoc imbecillitate cementis, qui dere tota Ulam lucern comulere non 
potest: quod partibus faciat, admomtur, cum de iisdem istis partibus ìnterrogaìur, quitus Ша 
summa constat, q uant Шат cernere non valebat. Quo si verbis perducitur ems qui interrogat, 
non tamen doceniibus verbis, sed eo modo mquirentibus, quo modo est ille a quo quaeritur, infus 
discere idoneusT . ——- . _ 
136 
Those who cannot discern something w i t h their m i n d are l i ke those described at 
the beginn ing o f ord. w h o see th ings i n part since they fa i l to see the ratio o f the 
larger picture. They may nevertheless bel ieve words that they hear, even i f they 
do not understand w i t h their m ind?^ Th is idea is developed posi t ive ly i n de 
utilitate credendi; here, August ine is very grudg ing , since the student m igh t be 
deceived by false teachers. The on ly t ru ly rel iable teacher is the t ru th itself, the 
magister interior. 
The epistemology of mus. 
I n mag. the on ly exp l ic i t func t ion accorded to memory is the retent ion o f 
images o f things sensed in the past. A s i m a g e s ― a n d not the things t h e m s e l v e s ― 
they are in a sense false. A r e the images i n themselves false (as per Plato) , or is i t 
the case that, the th ing perceived being absent, the l i ke l ihood o f false judgment is 
that much greater? Th rough j udgmen t we see the images for wha t they are, as 
"cer ta in attestations o f th ings sensed prev ious ly . " Ou r m i n d can therefore 
consider them, and take them as t ru th f i i l i n the l im i ted manner in w h i c h anyth ing 
can be t ru th f i i l that is based on sense-perception."^"^ I n a m i n i m a l fashion, mag. 
acknowledges the necessity o f memory for inst ruct ion, both on the part o f the one 
g i v i ng and the one receiv ing. A s we have seen in de ordine (2.2.7), August ine 
says that memory is necessary so that an instructor may gather and retain in an 
order ly manner the learning that constitutes w i s d o m , so that he can communicate 
13.41. 
2 4 12.39. "Cww vero mn de üs quae coram sentimus, sedde his quae aliquando sėmimus 
quaeritur; non iam res ipsas, sed imagines ab แร impressas memoriaeque mandatas loquimur: 
quae omnino quomodo vera dicamus, cum falsa intueamur, ignoro; nisi quia non ms ea videre ас 
sentire, sed vidisse ас sensisse narramus. Ita illas imagines m memoriae penetralìbus rerum ante 
semarum quaedam documenta gestamus, quae animo contemplantes boria comcierìtia non 
mentimur cum IpquimurJl 一— _ _ 
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to his student w i t h knowledge ready at hand. The quest ioning o f the student is a 
mode o f dialect ic s imi la r to the marr iage o f recol lect ion and dialectic that we have 
argued is one o f the f ru i ts o f the later dialogues o f Plato. I n the apparently 
paradoxical sentence quoted above, August ine demonstrates the necessity o f 
language: " E v e n before I spoke, (Adeodatus) cou ld expla in these very matters 
were he questionedľ^^ O n a more fundainental level , memory is the foundat ion 
for language i n that the convent ional nature o f a variety o f signs and p r e j u d i c e s ― 
not on ly names, but gestures, manners, m o v e m e n t s ― i s taken for granted as a 
cond i t ion for commun ica t ion?^ 
M e m o r y however seems to have no real part i n knowledge, since the 
percept ion o f the t ru th is in ter ior and a func t ion o f the i l l um ina t ion o f the m i n d by 
the t ru th that indwel ls i t . I t is therefore, much l ike sensation, an instantaneous 
a c t ? ' Even i n the context o f inst ruct ion, August ine maintains this pos i t ion at the 
conclusion o f mag. 
[รณdents learn] by l ook ing upon the inner T ru th , accordmg to thei r 
abi l i t ies. That IS therefore the po in t at w h i c h they learn. W h e n they 
inward ly discover that t ruths have been stated, they o f fer their p r a i s e s ― 
not k n o w i n g that they are pra is ing them not as teachers but as persons w h o 
have been taught, i f thei r teachers also k n o w what they are saying. M e n 
are mistaken i n ca l l ing persons ' teachers' w h o are not , w h i c h they do 
general ly because there is no delay between the t ime o f speaking and the 
t ime o f k n o w i n g ; and since they are quick to learn internal ly after the 
p rompt ing o f the lecturer, they suppose that they have learned external ly 
from the one w h o p rompted them. 
25 Dialectic is not optional. But is this the case for those who possess a simple but true faith? Are 
the faithful exempt from Augustine's Platonic suspicion o f judgment based on images? This 
question points to the abiding importance o f the role o f the Church in Augustme'ร eyes, and o f the 
role o f the bishop as teacher and guardian o f the flock. 
26 And therefore a condition for community; one can read 14.45 as a criticism o f Augustine's early 
educational experience: "A f te r al l , who is so foolishly curious as to send his son to school to learn 
what the teacher thinks?" Yet even Augustine had to submit to the instruction and other public 
demands resulting from his admission to the Catholic Church. 
27 12.40; cf. supra. This language is famil iar from Aristotle. 
֊֊44.45. "...Apudsemetipsos considerant, interiorem scilicet Шат veritatempro viribus 
intuentes. Tunc ergo discunt: et cum vera dicta esse infus imenermt, laudani, nescientes non se 
doctoresๆ?õtiWlaudäre^äWäõctösTsi tāmeh^t illi quõd lóqïluntür sčiūht: Falluntur autem 
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I n this case the w o r d and the th ing s igni f ied by the w o r d occur i n the m i n d 
v i r tua l l y s imul taneously. The result is that the student mis takenly draws a false 
inference about a causal relat ionship between the s ign and the t ru th s ign i f ied. I n 
fact, the t ru th comes to f ru i t i on in the minds o f bo th student and teacher 
s imul taneously, or at least i n the same manner. There are some pract ical 
d i f f i cu l t ies w i t h th is example; August ine 'ร po in t nevertheless stands: knowledge 
is universal in character, and its existence i n the m i n d is not a result o f the fo rma l 
causality o f language. Is i t then an accidental result? Augus t ine certainly a l lows 
more than th is . 
The six books o f De musica develop this p ic ture, wh i l e adding to i t 
s ign i f icant ly as far as our understanding o f the role o f memory is concerned. A s 
w i t h mag., th is w o r k is a self-conscious exercitatio, the goal o f w h i c h is the 
movement o f the m i n d ' s eye beyond the sensible to the in te l l ig ib le . I n this case, 
August ine is m o v i n g from sensible to in te l l ig ib le number ; hence at the end o f the 
f i f t h book, he concludes: " le t this be the end o f the discussion, so we may next 
come w i t h as m u c h w i s d o m as w e can f r o m these sensible traces o f music , a l l 
deal ing w i t h that part o f i t i n the numbers o f the t imes to the real places where i t is 
free o f a l l body."^^ I n the s ix th book, the t ransi t ion is more dramatic. A t 1.1， he 
describes apologet ical ly the first f i ve books as a " ch i l d i sh de lay " and a " t r i v i a l i t y " 
homines, Ш eos qui non sunt maģistros vocent, quia plerumque inter tempus locutionis et tempus 
cogmtłonis, nulla mora mterponitur; et quoniam post admoriitionem sermocinantis cito intus 
discurtt, foris se ab eo qui admoหนit, didìcisse arbiíranturľ 
29 Transi. R. С. Taliaferro (Fathers o f the Church: New York, 1947); Lat in text is from Migne, 
Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latim 32; see also the volume in the Oeuvres de Saint 
Augustin series, which reproduces Migne wi th few corrections. 5,13.28. ''Sed iam si nihil håbes 
quod contradicas, finis sit huius dispuiatioms, ut deinceps quod ad hane partem nmsicae attinet 
quae in numeris temporum est, ab his vesíigiis eius sensibiiibus, ad ipsa cubilia, ubi ab omni 
C0Kļļ0Ķe_alijsna est,յļшЩayքlemusյagaçitatęyęmqmuşľ. — — — - ___ 
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even though i t is a "necessary way fa r i ng . " H e urges his readers to tu rn away f r o m 
the senses, and tu rn to the G o d w h o instructs the m i n d i n a s imple and direct 
manner. 
For w e thought this [du t i fu l labour] on ly ought to be undertaken so 
adolescents, or men o f any age w h o m G o d has endowed w i t h a good 
natural capacity, m igh t w i t h reason gu id ing be to rn away, not qu ick ly but 
gradual ly, f r o m the f lesh ly senses and letters i t is d i f f i cu l t for them not to 
st ick to , and adhere w i t h the love o f unchangeable t ru th to one God and 
Master o f a l l th ings w h o w i t h no mean te rm whatsoever directs human 
minds.^*^ 
This language speaks to M a r r o u ' ร hypothesis that the first chapter is an 
in t roduct ion added later fo r the sake o f those w h o w o u l d read the s ix th book as an 
independent treatise, a tendency that w o u l d become the n o r m i n the medieval 
period.^ ^ For those w h o find this book d i f f i cu l t , Augus t ine is not recommending 
that they tu rn back and struggle their way toough five books on meter and verse. 
Rather, as is urged at the conclus ion o f mag,, they should seek to be nourished in 
the "precepts o f r e l i g i on . " 
Whereas mag. is ch ie f ly concerned w i t h language as a species o f signs, 
mus. is concerned w i t h "sound ing r h y t h m " as a species o f numer ic sign. I t is 
therefore natural that memory should be discussed i n more detai l here, since 
rhy thm, for example, i n the hear ing o f the verse Deus creator omnium, concerns 
the judgment o f number expressed i n t ime. Augus t ine begins by asking " w h e r e " 
abid ing number is located, but he ref ines th is quest ion to become one about the 
3° "Quam nostrom nugacitatem apud benivolos homines facile fortassis exciiset qfficiosus labor, 
quem non ob aliud siłspiciendum putavimus, nisi ut adolescentes vel cuiuslibeî aetatis homines, 
quos bono ingenio donavit Deus, поп praepropere sed quibusdam gradibus a sensibus carniร 
atque a carnalibนร litteriร, quibus eos non haerere difficile est, duce ratione avellerentur atque uni 
Deo et Domino rerum omnium qui humanis mentibuร nulla natura interposita praesidet, 
incommutabilis veritatis amore adhaerescerent!" 
3' Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Bibliothèque des Écoles d'Athènes et de Rome: 
Paris, 1939), pp. 580-583, Jacobsson considers contemporary scholarship and comes out in favour 
o f Marrou's thesis; he concurs that separation o f Book 6 from the rest o f the work was permitted 
byAugustine!, although occasioned by reader demand. (See also Letter 101 to Memoriuร, in which 
Augustine criticizes the liberal arts for teachmg only " fables" and deceits.) ： 
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superior i ty o f d i f ferent facult ies or operat ions, and therefore o f d i f ferent k inds o f 
number.^^ I n 4.5， August ine gives an in i t ia l order ing o f these k inds o f number. 
32 Here fol lows a synopsis o f the argument o f the text. 
1.1 Introduction 
2.2 Where is rhythm/number? 
a. memory o f hearer 
b. act o f the one reciting 
c. ears o f the hearer 
d. sound heard 
4.5 Add to these a faculty o f judgment, superior to all 
4.6-5.14 Question o f superiority o f imagination to memory (b. to a.) raises 
question o f the passivity o f sense-perception, and manner in which soul 
is involved 
6.16 Return to question o f number: which is the greatest? 
7.17 Any o f these five kinds o f number etemal? No. 
8.20 Judgment both orders lower number according to its own, and pre-supposes the number o f 
reason 
8.21-22 Judgment depends on memory for the former 
9.23-24 In the latter, we have reason adding truth (Veritas) to the delightful 
9.26 Reason sees ordo or aequalitas in the sensible 
11.29 For this to happen, soul must be rightly ordered re. bodi ly: " r ight 
af fect ion" 
(''Delecłatio quippe quasi pondus est animae. Delectatio ergo ordinat 
ammam.^^ 
11.31 Af f i rmat ion o f hierarchical causality in general: soul produces beauty in the physical 
precisely because it is connected to the numbers that are higher. Memory enables this. 
11.32 Memory A. Memory re. sensible: dist๒guish phantasiai and phantasmata; negative 
dimension o f latter. Mutabi l i ty associated w i th mortality, and therefore sin. Proper delight can 
resist habit o f flesh. 
12.34 Memory B. Memory re. spiritual, or etemal. Order, aequalitas, sought after in the sensible 
because it is already known: memory grounds the soul in the truth, which is in neither place nor 
time. This "knowledge is in the soul, and from God. 
13.37-end. What does it mean to have r ight ly ordered desire? To have an "act ive" relation o f soul 
to body? To have a positive valuation o f the spiritual over the physical? It is l ike contemplation, a 
habit, or a state o f be๒g 
13,40 Not imitation o f God, but a submission to his ordo\ humil i ty, versus emptiness o f 
pride 
14.46 It is not the sensible that demeans the soul, but inordinate love o f the sensible; the 
sensible has a beauty o f its ovm, but must be "esteemed l ight ly" and "used w e l l " (cf. 
doctr. chr.). The soul must " rema๒ wi th in the bounds o f memory" (value o f the health o f 
the body, and love o f neighbour) 
15.50-16.51 Describes a system o f sanctification or "v iv i f ica t ion" 
Prudence: to know one's station 
Temperance 
Fortitude and Justice 
(These virtues abide after death, they describe the relationship between 
the soul and God, and also (cf. 13.46) the manner in which a memory o f 
bodily l i fe abides eternally) 
17.56 Conclusion: number is the prmciple o f creation, since number begins wi th one, and can 
therefore include both unity and mult ip l ic i ty. Time is therefore closely akin to number, and 
therefore to creation; creation is l ike a song (De creator omnium). Angels are an example o f the 
numeric mediation o f oneness and mult ipl ic i ty. 
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a. j udgmen t 
b. memory 
c. imaginat ion, or what gives rise to the act o f rec i t ing 
d. ears, or sense organ 
e. sound 
A discussion at 4.6 questions whether memory is real ly superior to the 
imaginat ion, since surely what is product ive is greater than what is mere ly passive 
and receptive. When numbers pass away f r o m the memory , i t is because they 
have been destroyed by forget t ing. When they pass away f r o m the imaginat ion , 
however, they do so by a паШгаІ "cessat ion" w h i c h is the result o f the discursive 
operat ion o f imaginat ive funct ions. I t is no failxire o f the imag inat ion that images 
cease to exist i n i t , whereas it is the specif ic task o f memory to reta in them. 
B y this account, the Discipulus suggests that the sounding numbers (e.) 
should then be superior to both the sense organ and the imag ina t ion (d . and c.) 
since they cause the latter. This seems to defy the fundamenta l rale o f the 
superior i ty o f the in te l l ig ib le over the sensible. T o th is , the Magister repl ies that i t 
should not be surpr is ing i f the soul " su f fe rs " the body: 
[The body ] has a beauty o f its o w n , and i n this way i t sets its d ign i ty o f f to 
fa i r advantage i n the eyes o f the soul . A n d neither its w o u n d nor its 
disease has deserved to be w i thout the honour o f some ornament. A n d the 
highest W i s d o m o f God designed to assume this w o u n d , by means o f a 
wonde r fu l and inef fable sacrament, w h e n He took upon h imse l f man 
w i thou t s in, but not w i thout the cond i t ion o f s in. For He was w i l l i n g to be 
humanly b o m , to suffer, and to die. None o f these th ings was 
accompl ished by our mer i t , but by th is most excel lent goodness, i n order 
that we migh t rather look to the pr ide w e most deserv ingly fe l l in to those 
th ings by , than to the humi l ia t ions He undeserv ingly s u f f e r e d . . . " 
3 3 4.7. " . . .quod tamen habet sui generis pulchrituďmem et eo ipso dignitatem animae satis 
commendai, cuius пес plaga et morbus sine honore alicuiuร decoris meruit esse. Quam piagam 
summa Dei Sapientia mirabili et ineffabili sacramento dignata est adsumere, cum hominem sine 
peccalo, non sine peccatoris condicione, suscepit. Nam et nasci humaniter et pati et mori voluit, 
nihil horum merilo sed excelleníissima bonitate, ut nos magis cavaremm superbiam, qua 
digmssime in ista cecidimus, quam contumelias, quas indigทտ excepit...." The Latin text o f Book 
6 ıs from the edition by Mart in Jacobsson (Almquist and Wiksel l ๒temational: Stockholm, 2002). 
When noted, we w i l l use his translation as wel l . Both English translations suffer from different 
flaws: -Taliaferro's is very awkward and at times grammatically false; Jacobsson'ร can be 
philosophically insensitive. He translates numerus as " rhy thm" wi th good reason, although we 
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The Incarnat ion, as ordered to the restorat ion o f the mor ta l body, is a blessing 
upon the physical . Though the soul may be natural ly superior to the body, i t does 
not f o l l o w that every th ing that occurs i n the soul (e.g. false dreams) is greater than 
what occurs i n the body.^' ' E i ther way , both agree that the true is better than the 
false. To both the soul and the body there is an appropriate k i nd o f number, an 
appropriate order, and therefore per fect ion. Th is language o f what is "p roper " 
marks a shi f t for August ine , f r o m consider ing the sensible as what is associated 
w i t h falsehood s imp ly : the numbers associated w i t h the corporeal are a per fect ion 
to the same, and the numbers proper to the soul are l i kewise a perfect ion to the 
soul. W i s d o m {sapientia) however is not to be found i n the corporeal as such. 
The idea o f an order, i f not a per fect ion, proper to the physical rea lm is an 
idea fami l iar f r o m ord.^^ L i kew ise fami l ia r is the invers ion o f the order o f 
argument proposed above. A t 5.8， August ine says that we cannot on ly move f r o m 
sounding numbers to the numbers by w h i c h they are j udged . The numbers o f 
"d i v ine w i s d o m " are received d i rect ly f r o m G o d , and by the mediat ion o f the 
human soul , they are impressed o n the body. August ine must show h o w the 
numbers received by inte l lect enable the knowledge o f the numbers received 
through the senses. Appropr ia te ly , the body must be shown to be a too l for the 
soul , as something used i n an act ive, causal manner. 
context. As an example, at 4.7, Jacobsson renders ''mirarepotius, quodfacere aliquid in anima 
corpus potest" as "you should rather be astonished by the fact that the body is able to create 
anything at all in the soul." Later he translates "facere" more appropriately as "produce." 
Taliferro uses the more ambiguous, and therefore safer, "make. 
3 4 4.7; cf. also mag. 9.26. 
3 5 See also mus. 9.28， where he says that софогеаі things can only imitate true equality. A n 
observer can be deceived about whether certain things are truly equal in their measurements; he 
nevertheless allows that, insofar as they imitate, they are "beautiful in their k ind and order." 
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A t this po in t , w e have August ine 'ร most detai led account o f the re lat ion 
between the soul and external s t imu l i , and i t is one part ly fami l i a r f r o m Plot inus. 
Feel ing, August ine says, is the result o f the soul "pay ing a t ten t ion" to the 
interact ion o f th ing and body ; i f the interact ion is easy, there is pleasure; i f i t 
d i f f i cu l t , there is pain?^ I n both cases, there are t w o dist inct movements : the 
s t imulat ion o f the sense organ, and the awareness, or "observa t ion" , by the soul . 
Thus the soul, str ict ly speaking, is not af fected; i t "pays a t tent ion. " A th i rd 
element here enters i n , so that the soul can d is tmguish not s imp ly between 
pleasure and pam, but between what is good and what is ha rmfu l i n the f u l l mora l 
sense. There must, he says, be a mediat ing sense w h i c h is subject to both body 
and soul , " an instrument o f the body directed by the soul for its order ing so the 
soul may be more prepared to act on the passions o f the body w i t h attent ion o f 
j o i n i n g l ike th ings to l i ke and o f repel l ing what is ha rm f t i l . " ^ ' B y this " b o d i l y " 
instrament, the soul has an agent, as i t were, in each o f the senses, much as 
j udgmen t may func t ion i n sense-perception for Aristot le.^^ 
The soul attends to the body out o f concern for the surv iva l o f the person. 
Cer ta in ly , i t is less " w i t h i t s e l f when i t does so; this is the natural state o f af fa i rs , 
and a proper harmony, a bod i l y attention that is not a "d i s t rac t ion" , w i l l have to 
wa i t un t i l the resurrect ion o f the body. Th is harmony, again, is conceived i n terms 
o f a proper subordinat ion o f soul to God, and i n th is, o f body to soul.^^ Though 
^"5.9 
37 "Sed iste sensus, qui, edam dum nihil sentimm, inest lamen, instrumentum est corporis, quod ea 
temperatione agitur ab anima, ut in eo sit adpassiones corporis cum atteทtione agendas paratior, 
similia similibus ut adimgat repellaíque quod noxium est. 
38 I.e. through the "calculative imagination"; de anima 434a5. 
5.13-14. This language is famil iar from Origen, for example, the de principas, in which he 
4Íescribes the tripartite person (spirit, soul and body) as ๒ a state o f disharmony, represented in the 
struggle between the mind and the " f lesh." The resurrection o f the body involves the 
subordination o f spirit to God,๚õOltõ spiřit; and W õ n V w i t f i the perhaps imique(an3certain ly 
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the natural state is one fraught w i t h expected d i f f i cu l t y , there is hope because " w e 
have a memory o f the good . " The soul that is not yet "ex t ingu ished by s i n " , that 
can st i l l look to its o w n care, is said to be yet dwe l l i ng " i n memory.""*** 
Motus igitur animae servans inpetum suum et ทondum extinctus in 
memoria esse diciłur, et cum in aliud intenditur animus, quasi non inest 
animo pristino motus, et revera minor f i t , nisi, antequam intercidati 
quadam similium vicinitate renovetur. 
Preceding this passage by several sentences, memory , speci f ica l ly its tumultนoses 
recordatioทes, is b lamed as that w h i c h permi ts "carnal occupat ions" to d isณrb the 
soul. A k ind o f memory that is not s imp ly l i nked to percept ion i n a passive 
manner is suggested, and w i l l be developed much later i n the text. 
A t 6.16， August ine returns to the quest ion o f w h i c h numbers are superior, 
those that pertain to c., d.， or e. Here we are introduced to te rmino logy by w h i c h 
we can dist inguish between the k i nd o f number and the facult ies or operat ion to 
w h i c h they pertain. Cur iously , the l ist o f five facult ies is presented again as 
corresponding to the k inds o f number, but i n this instance memory suffers a 
demot ion. 
a. judgment 
b. imaginat ion 





i i i . occursores 
i v . recordabiles 
V . sonantes 
foreign to Augustine) result o f the dissolution o f the term "soul" , so that Origen is left wi th man as 
spirit and transformed body. I mention this in part because the phrase from Romans 7:24 ("Who 
shall deliver me from the body o f this death?") is key both for Origen'ร argument, as wel l as for 
Augustine here in 5.13, 
The sense of "extinguished" here is not clearly o f substantial destruction as ๒ the "second 
death" o f СШ. 13.2.3, but rather the " f i rs t" , the spiritual distance from God. 
4 ' 5.14; Jacobsson'ร translation is fairly literal, " A n d so when the motion o f the soul preserves its 
impulse and is not yet extinguished, it is said to be in the memory, and when the mmd directs its 
attention to something else, as i f the previous motion were not present to it, that motion does ๒ 
fact become smaller, unless it is renewed by the vicinity o f something similar before it ceases to 
exist?' In the context o f this paragraph, the something similar" is the master {dominus) o f the 
soul,„or at the veiy least^what is "ulterior" toJhe spul, g i v๒g rise to its calm. 
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The placement o f memory in this l is t is l i ke l y due to the fact that, up to now , 
August ine speaks o f memory as passive, mediat ing percept ion and the mutab i l i t y 
o f sensible phenomena. He is certain that one cannot perceive the briefest 
st imulus w i thou t memory since there is a lways a certam passage o f t ime, however 
smal l , jus t as the eyes, i n order to behold something three-dimensional, must see 
the various sides o f an object."*^ 
The rank ing o f these numbers is less impor tant since, as August ine 
observes, none o f them are "eternal."՚*^ The judgmen t o f man reflects the 
temporal nature o f that w h i c h i t judges. I t is therefore l im i ted in appropriate 
ways: since a man must sleep, he cannot l isten to a rhy thm that is extended over 
the per iod o f a month . M e m o r y is necessary for any judgment as ho ld ing together 
a beginning and an end, and therefore actual ly const i tut ing a r hy thm as a who le . 
August ine describes this, l i ke in о ฬ . , as a recept ion o f a higher ordo, w h i c h in 
turn is conferred on what is lower. M e m o r y is thus or iented i n a two fo l d manner, 
mediat ing the Mgher to the lower , the inner to the outer. Hence, the j ud i c i a l 
numbers br ing a superior order to the lower k inds o f number through the memory . 
M e m o r y i n tu rn assists the j udgmen t in comprehending the seemingly boundless 
"d ive rs i t y " {varietas) o f what occurs i n t ime. Even the lower (reactive) numbers 
also manifest the ratio o f the memor ia l numbers. 
Bu t are there numbers that transcend the l imi ta t ions o f the physical? 
August ine appeals to reason as that w h i c h "adds t ru th to de l ight . " I t is reason that 
4 2 8.21 . ''''Quamlibet enim brevis syllaba cum et incipiat et desinai, aho tempore mitium eim et 
alio finis sonat. Tenditur ergo et ipsa quantนlocumque temporis intervallo et ab initio suo per 
medium suum tendit adfinem. Ita ratio invenit tam localia quam temporaìia spatia infmitam 
divisionem recipére, et idcirco mílius syllabae cum initio finis auditur. Խ audienda ¡taque vel 
brevissima syllaba nisi memoria nos audiuvet, ut eo momento temporis, quo iam non initìum sed 
finis syllabae sonat, maneat ille motus in animo, quifactus est, cum initium ipsum somit, nihil nos 
audisse possumus dicereľ 
' ' 7 .17-19 . _ . _— — — ― —  
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enables the judgment to appraise not s imply what is de l igh t fu l , but what is r igh t ly 
or w rong l y delightful.'*'* Reason can abstract the in te l l ig ib le f r o m the sensible, and 
can therefore discern an ordo o f a higher паШге in the sensible, here cal led 
aequalitas. Wha t is i t that we love when we del ight i n sensible harmony? I t is 
equal i ty , order or ratio. Sensible things in themselves can on ly imi tate this 
equal i ty , a l though this im i ta t ion is the result o f veri table par t ic ipat ion. A s such, 
they manifest a beauty o f their o w n ֊ t h o u g h certainly a lesser order o f beauty 
than that o f in te l l ig ib le equal i ty . 
A n d what is worse than error and inequal i ty? A n d so w e are advised to 
ณ m away f r o m the enjoyment o f thmgs imi ta t ing equal i ty . For we cannot 
perceive whether they perfect ly fill out their t ime , a l though we can 
perhaps perceive they do not perfect ly do so. A n d yet in so far as they 
imi tate w e cannot deny they are beaut i fo l i n their k i n d and order.՚՛^ 
W h e n reason enters in to the argument, the picture is made complete and blossoms 
to grant us a larger perspective upon what August ine is after: a v i s ion o f creat ion 
as an ordered hierarchy o f goods, the lower appropriately subject to the higher. 
Th is theme, in i t ia l l y art iculated in ord., becomes the central theme o f mus. 6. W e 
shall quote Chapter 11.29 i n f u l l . 
Let us not , then, be envious o f things in fer ior to ourselves, and let us, our 
L o r d and G o d he lp ing , order ourselves between those be low us and those 
above us, so we are not t roubled by lower, and take del ight on ly i n higher 
things. For del ight is a k i nd o f weight in the soul . De l igh t therefore orders 
the soul . 'For where your treasure IS , there w i l l you r heart be also. ' 
Where del ight , there the treasure; where the heart, there happmess or 
misery. Bu t what are the higher things, i f not those where the highest 
unchmigeable undisturbed and etemal equal i ty resides? Where there is no 
t ime, because there is no change, and from where t imes are made and 
ordered and changed, im i ta t ing eternity as they do w h e n the tu rn o f the 
heavens comes back to the same state, and the heavenly bodies to the same 
place, and in days and months and years and centuries and other 
" 9.23. Reason at 9.24 ստսփտ the name o f " judgment" or " judicial numbers." 
4 5 10.28 (trans. Taliaferro). ''Quo errore et inaequalitate quid turpius? Ex quo admonemur ab his 
avertere gaudium, quae imitantur aequalitatem; et utrum inpleant, non comprehendere possumus, 
//niwo, quod non impleant, fartasse comprehendimus; et tamen, іท quantum imitantur, pulchra esse 
in genere suo et in ordine suo negare nonpossumus." ― _ 
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revolut ions o f the stars obey the laws o f equal i ty, un i ty and order. So 
terrestrial things are subject to celestial, and their t ime c i rcui ts j o i n 
together i n harnionious succession for a poem o f the universe. 6 
A s i n ord., August ine observes that the harmony and un i ty o f the created order 
may not be obvious, but that this is due to a l im i ta t ion o f perspective. The soul , 
speci f ical ly its delectatio, must nevertheless attempt to be r igh t l y ordered to what 
is above and be low it, as receptive to the ordo o f what is h igher, and as format ive 
o f the beauty and aequalitate o f what is lower . Th is a f f i rma t ion o f the act ive, 
mediatory pos i t ion o f soul ushers i n the most detai led discussion o f memory i n 
mus. 
There are two fundamental k inds or aspects o f memory : that w h i c h 
pertains to the sensible and changing, and that w h i c h pertains to the in te l l ig ib le 
and eternal. Augustme speaks here i n unprecedented detai l o f the latter. That i t is 
memory o f w h i c h August ine speaks is notable, for i t is an acknowledgement o f 
the fact that what is supra-temporal must be received by the m i n d in a temporal 
manner. The lower sense o f memory develops i n a cracia l manner here as we l l . 
August ine distinguishes between a posi t ive and a negat ive operat ion o f 
memory . He dif ferentiates between phantasiai and phantasmatar^ The former 
has what O ' D a l y describes as a "pass ive" nature; this should be qua l i f ied to 
inc lude an act ive theory o f sensation as we have described i t . The term is accurate 
46 'Wo/7 ergo wvideamus mferioribus quam ms sumus, nosque ipsos inter Ша, quae infra nos sunt, 
et Ша, quae supra nos sunt, ita Deo et Domino nostro opitulante ordmemus, ut mferioribus non 
offendamur, solis autem superioribนร delecîemur. Delectatìo quippe quasi pondus est animae. 
Delectatio ergo ordinat animam. 'Ubi enim erit thesaurus tuus, ibi erit et cor tuum '， ubi 
delectado, İDI ıhesaurm, ubi autem cor, ibį beatitudo aut miseria. Quae vero superiora sunt nisi 
illa, in quitus summa, inconcussa, ìrìcommutabilis, aeterna manet acquali tas, ubi nullum est 
tempus, quia mutabìlitas nulla est, et unde tempora fabricantur et ordmantur et modificantur 
aetermtatem imitantia, dum caeli conversió ad idem redit et caelestia corpora ad idem revocat, 
diebusque et mensibus et amis ас ԽտԾւտ ceterisque sidenim orbibus legibus aequalitatis et 
unitatis et ordinationis obtemperai? Ita caelestibus terrena รนbìecta orbes temporum suorum 
numerosa successione quasi carmìni universitas adsociantľ 
4 7 1 Լ32,_ ร^e цега rel 64 т рҺаШтаШ as falsehoods. 
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insofar as i t s ignif ies memory as conta in ing s imply the images that i t has received 
through bod i l y experience. B y contrast, phantasmata have an inherent falseness, 
since they are the result o f a 'c reat ive ' combinat ion o f images intended to replace 
actual, exper ient ia l knowledge. These are the product o f what we migh t ca l l 
' fan tas iz ing ' , for example, t r y i ng to b r ing to m i n d the image o f a face o f a person 
that one has either never seen or not seen for a long t ime, though one may have 
heard reports or seen reproduced images. Rather than b laming error upon what is 
based on the senses s imp ly , he attr ibutes i t instead to phantasmata, w h i c h are 
products o f the combinat ion o f sense images. I t is those who l ive by phantasmata 
as the final t ru th w h o l ive " the l i fe o f օ բ ւ ա օ ո . " ՛ ՛ ^ August ine a f f i rms that the 
sensible th ings upon w h i c h memory (as i t contains phaหtąsiai) is based have a 
beauty and order o f their o w n , despite their fleeting nature. August ine blames this 
upon human mor ta l i ty , and therefore sin, i n a fami l ia r but of ten mis leading trope. 
Bu t i f rhythms o f this k i n d , w h i c h are produced in the soul that is 
dedicated to th ings софогеа і , have a beauty o f their o w n , a l though i t is not 
in a permanent way that they activate i t , why should the d iv ine prov idence 
look askance at th is beauty, w h i c h is fo rmed out o f the mor ta l i ty that we 
received as punishment? Th is mor ta l i t y we have deserved through G o ď s 
most jus t law, but he d id not abandon us i n i t i n such a way that w e w o u l d 
not be capable o f return ing and being cal led back from the pleasure o f the 
camal senses by his mercy that stretches out his հսոճ. ՛ *^ 
4 8 11.32. "However, to consider also phantasmata to be knowledge is ๒deed the worst k ind o f 
error, although there is some reason in both cases to say that we 1 ๓ 0 พ , that is to say, that we have 
perceived certain things and imagine others. Finally, that I have had a father and a grandfather I 
can truthfi i l ly say; but I would be fool to say that they are what my mind keeps տ aphantasia or 
Phantasma. But many fo l low their phantasmata so impetuously, that there is no other ground for 
all their false opinions." Ç'Sed vero etiam phantasmata habere pro cogmtis รนmmuร error est, 
quamquam sit in utroque genere, quod nos mn absurde scire dīcamus, id est, sensisse nos talia vel 
imaginary nos talia Patrem denique me habuisse et auum non temere possum dicere; ipsos autem 
esse, quos animus meus in phantasia vel phantasmata tenet, dementissime dixereim. Sequmtur 
autem non min phantasmata sua tam praecipites, ut nulla sit alia materies omnium falsarum 
opinioทนmľ) 
4 9 11.33. ''Cur autem, si huiuscemodi numeri, qui fimt in anima rebus temporalibus dedita, 
habent sui generis pulchriiudmem, quamvis earn trameundo actitent, invideat huic pulchritudim 
divim Providentia, quae de nostra poenali mortalitate formatur? Quam iustissima Dei lege 
merumus, in qua tamen ms поп ita deseruit, ut non valeamus recurrere et a camalium semuum 
deleçtatiom misericordia e jus manum pomgęnte revocan ľ 
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I t is precisely the Incarnat ion that embodies this " m e r c i f u l outs t retch ing" : i t is not 
on ly the inter ior Magister who calls out to the m i n d , but the incarnate Chr ist who 
reaches out to heal the who le person.^^ For man 'ร part, this appears as the 
t ransformat ion o f the active " theo ry " o f sensation into the active habi tuat ion o f 
body , or the " f l e s h " , put in subject ion to the soul . The senses are no longer 
b lamed fo r their intr insic falsehood, but for being an occasion for the habit o f the 
flesh, for " c a m a l a f fec t ion " concupiscentia. Th is habit , says August ine, can be 
broken by ra is ing the m i n d to "sp i r i tua l th ings" , more precisely, by tak ing del ight 
i n the numbers o f reason insofar as they i n f o rm lower , bod i ly th ings. De l igh t is 
no t s imply der ived f r o m зр іг іша ї pr inciples i n themselves, but f r o m these 
pr inc ip les insofar as they en l iven and act ively i n f o rm . The relat ion o f phantasiai 
is necessary, since by memory and imaginat ion the j ud i c i a l numbers are mediated 
and actual ly g ive rise to the number o f lower th ings. F r o m the opposite 
perspect ive, memory and imaginat ion are necessary so that man can retain the 
images o f bod i l y experience such that their inherent ratio may become manifest . 
U p o n this basis, August ine w i l l later argue for the cont inu i ty o f memory i n the l i fe 
o f the resurrect ion. 
There is another funct ion to memory , however , since it takes i n not on ly 
" c a m a l mo t i ons " but also sp inณal . August ine is not descr ibing another k i n d o f 
memory , as Plot inus m igh t deem necessary. Th is is a development o f the idea 
that the j u d i c i a l numbers, in order to t ru ly enable judgment , must be grounded in 
reason. The equal i ty that is sought i n the sensible, he says, cou ld on ly be desired 
were i t already k n o w n "somewhere. " Here at last August ine makes a l iberat ing 
5 ° By contrast wi th mag., there are in this text several extended meditations on the mortality o f the 
body as the result o f sin, and the felicitous effects o f the Incarnation, chiefly the resurrection o f the 
body; cf. supra, as wel l as 11.33; cf. 14.45 on the love o f one's neighbour. 
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c lar i f icat ion: "bu t this ' somewhere ' is not situated i n local or temporal spaces, 
since the first swel l and the others pass away."^ ' Th i s marks a move beyond the 
l imi ta t ions o f the language o f " l o c a t i o n " that t roubled imm. an. T ru th , or true 
spir i tual pr incip les, have no physical locat ion; they are dist inguished by the 
immutable mode in w h i c h they possess the attr ibutes o f truthfulness. To 
remember something l i ke this is not therefore l ike remember ing a sounding 
rhy thm, the syllables o f w h i c h cou ld be uttered for d i f ferent durations on di f ferent 
occasions. Rather i t is l ike remember ing the pr inc ip les by w h i c h we judge the 
dist inct ive equal i ty and rat io that consti tute a pleasing and correct rhy thm. 
August ine compares this to remember ing a t ru th such as " t w o and two make 
four"^^: i t is t ru th about w h i c h , i f knowledge is ve r i l y present, there can be no 
uncertainty. A n d this k i n d o f t ru th , August ine concludes, is m the soul , though 
from God . 
August ine asks a necessary and final quest ion. I f unchangeable spir i tual 
t ru th resides i n the soul , h o w can a man tu rn away f r o m i t such that he seems to 
forget it? This question introduces an impor tant qua l i f i ca t ion o f the picture o f the 
immutable soul found i n the earliest dialogues. 
So what remains is fo r us to look fo r what is in fer ior [to etemal equal i ty ] . 
Bu t is the soul not the first th ing y o u come to th ink of, w h i c h certainly 
admits that equal i ty to be unchangeable but realizes that i t is i tse l f changed 
by the very fact that i t is sometimes intent upon this unchangeable 
equal i ty, at other t imes upon something else, and, by f o l l o w u i g di f ferent 
things in this way , activates a var iety o f t imes, w h i c h does not exist i n the 
eternal and unchangeable t h i n g s ? " 
12.34. "Hoc autem alicubi non in spatiis locorum et temporum, nam et illa fument et illa 
praeterunt." 
" 12.35. 
53 13.37. ''Restat ergo, ut quaeramus, quid sit inferius. Sed nonne tibi prius ipsa anima occurit, 
quae certe aequalitatem illam incommutabilem esse confitetur, se autem agnoscìt mutar і eo ipso, 
quod alias hane alias aliud intuetur, et hoc modo aliud atque aliud sequens varietatem temporis 
operator, quae in aeternis et incommutabilibus nulla esiT Compare this wi th the concern to 
maintain the unchanging nature and natural immortal i ty o f the soul in imm. an. 
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The use o f the verb operatur raises many interesting questions. A m i n i m a l 
іп Їефге Іа Ї іоп finds that the soul , being mul t ip le i n its possible objects, can behold 
wha t is eternal, but on ly in a tempora l , fleeting manner. As such, i t cannot adhere 
to the eternal {aeternis inhaerere) i n a s imple and permanent way. W e have seen 
i n prev ious texts the benef i t o f memory , in that i t gathers i n what is mu l t ip le 
{varietas) over t ime so that i t may be comprehensible to the m ind ' ร eye as a 
considered un i ty . Mus. raises the question o f whether m i n d can transcend the 
discursive mode o f k n o w i n g del ineated by memory . I f the m i n d depends i n a 
necessary manner on memory for knowledge, what sort o f apprehension o f t ru th 
does i t attain? August ine says that t ru th makes an impr in t on the m i n d even wh i l e 
remain ing dist inct from the mind——since ident ical w i t h God——and accordingly the 
soul is changeable depending on whether i t is or iented to the eternal or the 
var iable. I t is indeed a d iv ided , even tragic, state for soul to occupy, and it is 
Augus t ine 'ร ins ight that this is the pr ice o f a certain f reedom o f the w i l l . 
The soul becomes l ike the good that i t desires through a return, a 
restorat ion to i tself. A s w e have seen, August ine is more careful here than before 
to emphasize that th ings beneath the soul have an appropriate beauty. L i kew ise , 
norma l funct ions that presuppose the l i fe o f the body are not on ly necessary but 
good: attending to the heal th o f the body, g i v ing necessary approval or 
d isapproval to s t imu l i , and most impor tant ly , engaging in act iv i t ies that promote 
the love o f one's neighbour. August ine describes al l these as "be ing w i t h i n the 
bounds o f memory."^"* These are done r igh t ly , however, on ly by the soul that 
looks to the etemal , c l i ng ing to i t as its source and end. Wh i l e the l i fe o f the body 
5 4 14.45， in which he is clearly contrasting memory as pertains to phantasiai, to memory as serving 
phantasmata. 
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is proper ly described in terms o f ac t iv i ty ; th is " c l i n g i n g " o f the soul to God is 
described as a state o f be ing, a f o r m o f habi tuat ion: an act iv i ty , to be sure, but one 
attuned to a core o f sti l lness. I t is not a " s t r i v i n g " , nor an im i ta t ion , but rather 
submission. I n language that is again fami l ia r f r o m ord., the soul 's peace comes 
f r o m the recogn i t ion o f its place in a larger, prov ident ia l order. August ine speaks 
here o f th is submission as a programme o f sanct i f icat ion charted by the cu l t i va t ion 
o f certain v ir tues. These virtues do not describe an ascent i n the sense o f the 
"seven steps" oían, quant., but rather an educat ion and fo rmat ion that is ongo ing 
whether i n the earthly l i fe or the blessed. 
Pradence is the foundat ional v i r tue: i t is that whereby the soul knows its 
"proper station."^^ The other virtues are essential ly evocations o f prudence, al l 
hav ing the same goal o f the soul 's be ing ordered to God . B y temperance, the soul 
conquers the habi t o f l ov ing the beauty o f in fer ior th ings. B y for t i tude, the soul is 
no longer af ra id o f death and the concomitant loss o f wo r l d l y th ings. B y jus t ice , 
the soul is made subject to God , and dominant over lesser th ings, a l though co­
equal w i t h "pure souls." The soul that sees G o d w i l l be made " l i k e h i m " ; at that 
t ime , a l l phantasmata w i l l be erased, but these v i r tues, and the struggle against the 
habi t o f the flesh w i t h w h i c h they are i nvo l ved , w i l l abide. What does this mean? 
I f memory abides, does sin abide? Rather, the process o f g row th , educat ion, 
increasmg love, is cont inuous. A fixed and unchanging relat ionship is established 
between the soul and God , i n พ Ы с һ delectatio is exercised and increased, since 
G o d cont inues to d raw the soul to h imse l f by "sweetness." Th is is par t ic ipat ion 
and j o y i n God , c i rcumscr ibed by the humi l i t y o f "p rudence. " A s par t ic ipat ion, 
the soul seeking the etemal shares in the attr ibutes o f t ru th and peace. 
15.50; cf.also 13.37 f(ҘТprudentia. Temperance is also described at 50.51 as caritas. 
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Conclusion to Part и 
August ine concludes mm. by return ing to number as a "pr inc ip le o f 
c reat ion" , and therefore a pr inc ip le o f order and prov ident ia l care. Number 
"begins f r o m one" and, much as fo r Plato, i t describes a way i n w h i c h the m i n d 
can comprehend the passage f r o m oneness to mu l t i p l i c i t y w i t h i n t ime. I n a less 
abstract f o r m , t ime does much the same th ing i n creat ion: i t charts the emergence 
o f being f r o m noth ing on a cosmic scale, and therefore the mediat ion o f the spatial 
and non-spat ial . ' T o exp la in creat ion is to exp la in t ime, and August ine 's first 
systematic attempt begins where we shall tu rn next, the final books o f conf. 
Certainly this is not a predominant theme, either i n the Cassiciacum or the Roman 
dialogues; but we have observed the recurr ing presence o f number as an attempt 
on August ine 's part to enter in to the p rob lem o f un i ty and o rder֊more obl iquely 
in Acad., less ob l ique ly i n ord.―specifically mot ivated by an appreciat ion o f the 
Chr is t ian understanding o f creat ion. 
August ine assumes the onto log ica l super ior i ty o f in te l l ig ib le real i ty and 
the corresponding spir i tual value that stems f r o m this. A general ly Platonic 
conv ic t ion is thereby t ransformed, by seeing the relat ionship between physical and 
in te l l ig ib le i n terms o f submiss ion and hum i l i t y , into a d is t inct ive ly August in ian 
trope. The dist inct elements o f this are not new: hum i l i t y is not a Chr ist ian 
novel ty . Ye t here i t is at the center o f every th ing, onto logical and 
epistemologica!. Conce iv ing th is humi l i t y i n the terms o f the doctr ine o f the 
Incarnat ion i n tu rn demands a renewed va luat ion o f the phys ica l : the mic rocosm 
reveals the macrocosm. The movement from spir i tual condi t ion to cosmic real i ty 
again points to the argument o f conf. 10-12. Mus. points the reader to conf. 
՝ Cf. 17.56. 
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because the a n t o o p o l o g y that has been d rawn out f r o m imm. an., sol. and an. 
quant, is inserted into the cosmolog ica! context o f ord. and g iven greater detai l . 
Un i t y on the anthropologica l level is our concern w i t h respect to memory . 
M e m o r y is potent ia l ly a d iv is ive factor g iven that i t l inks the soul inextr icably to 
its bod i l y l i fe . P lo t inus ' so lu t ion is, on the one hand, to save m i n d f r o m memory 
altogether, and on the other hand to lend memory a therapeutic func t ion , a hope 
for r e fo rm fo r a fa l len soul . For August ine, fu l l y appreciat ing the un i ty o f soul 
and body , and more impor tan t ly , appreciat ing the theological impl icat ions and 
spir i tual hope o f the Incarnat ion, th is is not an adequate solut ion. He must accept 
a natural mutab i l i t y proper to the soul 's very essence, marked by the extent to 
w h i c h the soul tends to become more or less " l i k e " God . He st i l l w i l l ma in ta in a 
certain "natura l immor ta l i t y " , but he w i l l c learly d ist inguish this i n trin. f r o m the 
immor ta l i t y o f blessedness. M e m o r y w i l l be central i n the establishment o f a 
relat ionship between the soul and the God upon w h i c h the l i fe o f the soul depends. 
I t w i l l therefore be a relat ionship du ly hindered by a t ime-bound mode o f 
knowledge , a restless, inescapable d iscurs iv i ty . Accept ing that the soul l ives i n a 
sort o f constant d issolut ion, and yet i n the hope o f the promise o f the Incarnat ion, 
marks the next stage i n the argument about the place o f memory in Augus t ine 's 
wr i t i ngs . 
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P A R T I I I : 
CONFESSIONES A N D DE TRINITATE 
C H A P T E R ? : 
I N T R O D U C T I O N : CONFESSIONES 10 
The tenth book o f conf. is famous fo r i ts extended treatment o f memory , 
and any scholar w ish ing to understand Augus t ine 'ร singular interest i n memory 
w i l l normal ly beg in and end w i t h a reading o f its first half.^ We shall attempt to 
be more соп ЇехШа І , asking not on l y about the nature o f memory , but rather h o w i t 
funct ions i n the argument o f the tenth book , and h o w a pre-occupat ion w i t h the 
temporal condi t ions o f embod iment move the t ransi t ion into the final books: t ime 
as a creaturely by-product o f creat ion ex nihilo, and the attempt to discern a new 
perspective on tempora l i ty bo th t feough the іп Їефге Їа Ї Іоп o f Scripture as the m i n d 
o f the Church and the foundat ion o f the commun i t y o f the Church in the "heaven 
o f heavens." W e w i l l not neglect the argument o f the tenth book, but include b r i e f 
remarks i n th is t ransi t ional chapter. Our pos i t ion is that the argument o f corīf 
insofar as i t concerns memory , is not complete w i t h the tenth book. Hence a more 
detailed discussion in the t w o subsequent chapters w i l l examine the eleventh and 
twe l f t h books. 
August ine marks the tenth book o f conf. as a po in t o f t ransi t ion i n a var iety 
o f ways. The n in th book closes w i t h the death o f his mother Mon ica , fo r w h o m 
1 G.J.P. O'Daly, "Augustine on the measurement o f t ime: some comparisons wi th Aristotelian and 
Stoic texts", in H.J. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus, edş., Neoplatonism and Early Christian 
Thought (London: Var iorum, 1981), pp. 171-179; "T ime as distentio and St. Augustine's exegesis 
o f Philippians 3:12-14", in Re\me des Etudes Augustiniennes 23 (1977), pp. 265-271. G. 
Soehnigen, "Der Aufbau der Augustinischen Gedächtnislehre (Confessions х, с.6-27)" in Aurelim 
Augustinus, Die Festschrift der GörreS'Gesellschaft zum 1500 (Todestage des heiligen 
Augustinus: Kö ln , 1930), pp. 63-100; к. Winkler, " L a théorie augustinienne de la mémoire à son 
point de départ" in Augustinus Magister 1, pp. 511-519; M. Moreau, "Mémoire et durée". Revue 
des Études Augustimeหหes 1 (1955), pp. 239-250; L. Cil leruelo, " L a memoria Dei según san 
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he n o w sheds a "d i f fe ren t sort o f tears."^ August ine realizes that, wh i l e M o n i c a 
has been fo r h i m a mode l o f saint ly v i r tue her who le l i fe long, he nevertheless 
cannot k n o w the "secret s ins" that may have been commi t ted i n the depths o f her 
heart. Before the impar t ia l i t y o f d iv ine jus t ice, August ine can on ly pray fo r mercy 
and forgiveness. The tenth book is a new attempt at the confession o f Augus t ine 'ร 
soul i n l igh t o f this stark t ru th . The first nine books are i n an obv ious sense 
"h i s to r i ca l . " August ine speaks n o w not o f what he has been, but o f what he is . 3 
What precisely is new here? August ine suggests one w a y i n w h i c h to exp la in the 
matter: the " f i r s t " confession is o f the exterior l i fe , and the " n e w " con fess ion֊ 
more severe, more d i s c e r n i n g ― i s o f the inter ior l i fe . W h i l e th is analysis contains 
an element o f t ru th , i t is not adequate. Acknow ledg ing the rhetor ical ar t i f ice o f 
the earliest accounts o f h is you th , one cannot c la im that August ine has neglected 
to examine the problems o f w i l l and desire when consider ing his in fant i le greed, 
his adolescent lust or his mature convers ion. What troubles August ine n o w is the 
fact that he has an ІПШІІІОП of the righteousness of the divine, and yet, despite 
being bapt ized and ñ iUy a member o f the Church, he finds h imse l f i n the same 
pos i t ion s t i l l . August ine bel ieves as he d id i n his early wr i t i ngs that the soul has a 
certain natural k insh ip w i t h the t ru th . Bu t he f inds that, i n carefu l ly examin ing his 
soul , i t is a house d iv ided : he is, he says, a question to h imsel f . The flesh is at wa r 
w i t h the spir i t , and " w h i c h side has the v ic tory [he yet ] knows ո օ է . " ՛ ՛ 
2 9.13.34. "Aliud lacrimarum genus.՝՝ We are us๒g Chadwick's translation, w i th occasional 
modifications (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992); the Latin text is found ๒ the Corpus 
Christianorum Series Latina Vo l . 27, which reproduces in a revised form (by Luc Verhei]en) the 
text o f M. Skutella (Teubner: Leipzig, 1934), which is found ๒ volumes 13-14 o f the Bibliothèque 
Augustinienne (Desclée de Brouwer: Paris, 1962) wi th the admirable French translation and notes 




The fact that he speaks n o w o f "wha t he i s " tel ls us that he is lay ing before 
his readers the abid ing condi t ion o f the embodied soul . He is also b r ing ing into 
quest ion the very possib i l i ty o f coherent narrat ive, o f f r u i t f u l confession, since 
what he tel ls o f is already past. He is a creature o f memory and expectat ion, 
d i v ided and spread out l ike a psa lm wr i t t en on a page, contained as some sort o f 
who le , i n no one obvious place. I t is therefore a p rob lem o f un i t y , or order, 
fami l ia r f r o m ord. as we l l as mus. August ine speaks i n m u c h more detai l here 
about memory : memory is not s imp ly the way տ w h i c h the soul retains and 
mean ing fu l l y assimilates present percept ion and past experiences. M e m o r y is the 
embodied soul 's mode o f approaching God . There is no possib i l i ty o f s imple 
apprehension i n the soul 's present cond i t ion , since the t ime-bound mode o f 
knowledge is in f in i te ly d i f ferent f r o m the s imple and un i f ied : though G o d , as 
maker, is int imately present to the soul , the soul is a lways " l a t e " to grace, a lways 
one step "beh ind . " The soul 's approach to G o d is complex and t ru ly dialect ical . 
For August ine , what is k n o w n is at once remembered and loved , or w i l l ed . The 
memory is that w h i c h br ings the desired object before the m i n d ' s eye i n its 
appropriate manner, mak ing what is absent, present; the w i l l unites the man w i t h 
the th ing that i t desires, but lacks. The Platonic p rob lem o f knowledge that 
introduces the argument o f mag. is expanded to become the de f in ing m o t i f o f 
Augus t ine 's psychology and spi r i tua l i ty . Fai th as un i t i ng the soul w i t h its object 
is not on ly epistemological ly necessary, as August ine shows i n util. cred. ， but is 
also sp i r iณal ly imperat ive i f the soul is to f u l f i l l its natura l ly intended end. 
August ine 's argument begins w i t h the assurance that he has some sort o f 
memory o f God. The discussion o f memory in the tenth book furthers this same 
quest ion that has pre-occupied August ine at least since sol, the quest ion o f the 
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mode o f presence o f the soul to God , and therefore o f God to the soul . ""Nihil 
longe est Deo"; " no th ing is far f r o m G o d " , M o n i c a cries as she dies. Once again, 
August ine seeks to prove the t ru th o f h is mother ' ร fa i th f i j l w i sdom. 
The tenth book is not therefore about memory s imply . I t takes up anew 
the quest ion w i t h w h i c h conf. opened: "grant me L o r d to k n o w and understand."^ 
B y fa i th , August ine r igh t l y seeks after and r igh t ly asks where God is to be found 
(2.2), w h o God is (4.4) and what God is (5.5) . Scripture tel ls August ine that G o d 
is per fect ly good, powe r f u l , merc i f u l and jus t ; h idden yet in t imate ly present; 
immutab le yet changing a l l th ings; perfect i n the act ion o f love, and yet perfect i n 
rest.^ Bu t i n these words o f S c r i p t o e , August ine says, "wha t have I said, m y G o d , 
my l i fe , m y sweetness? Wha t has anyone achieved i n words when he speaks 
about y o u ? " The words s ign i fy l i t t le to August ine , for he sees that his soul is an 
un f i t dwe l l i ng for God , a place o f disorder. I n mag., August ine a f f i rms that a 
knowledge o f th ings is to be m u c h preferred over a knowledge o f signs. I n conf., 
to k n o w the th ing i tse l f is to be assimi lated to i t , to become l ike i t , whereas a 
knowledge o f words , however true the words m igh t themselves be, w i t hou t a 
concomitant t ransformat ion o f the self, is no knowledge at a l l . August ine wants to 
be actual ly changed by the d iv ine presence, to we lcome his creator i n his heart, 
and so he cries out at the conclus ion o f the n in th book: "cleanse me f r o m m y 
secret faul ts."^ He does not k n o w h imsel f , and the spir i tual mysteriousness o f the 
self; l i nk i ng this mysteriousness to sin is a ha l lmark o f Augus t iman in ter ior i ty . 
Hence, the quest ion o f the knowledge o f G o d is subsumed by the quest ion o f 
' 1.1.1. 
' 10.4.4. 
'Cf . 1.5.6. 
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becoming God- l i ke , and i f this omniscient God should act as a j udge , " t ak ing note 
o f in iqui t ies, L o r d , w h o shall stand?" 
The tenth book continues th is argument: " m a y I k n o w y o u , w h o k n o w me. 
M a y I k n o w as I also am known . Power o f m y soul , enter into i t and fit i t fo r 
yoursel f , so that y o u may have and ho ld i t w i thou t spot or b lemish. Th is is m y 
hope and that is w h y I speak." 8 August ine wants to be l i ke G o d , by approach to 
G o d ; when he comes to see the dark places o f his sou l , the t ru th , he says, w i l l 
shine out , and he w i l l choose the t ru th , re ject ing wha t is dark and d isorder ly , and 
thereby he w i l l do the t ru th. I n this sense, he is d iscover ing no new th ing about 
h imse l f (2.2) . H e knows the weaknesses o f his soul , especial ly as they pertain to 
the habits o f the flesh. N o longer recount ing an h is tor ica l narrat ive, and therefore 
freed f r o m the gu i l t associated w i t h past deeds, he t u m s w i t h i n to his memory to 
attempt to locate the t ru th w i t h i n his person, as abstracted from part icular 
h istor ical events. 
There is another d imension to the t ransi t ion f r o m the n in th to the tenth 
books that is essential to understanding the final books altogether. The first n ine 
books, August ine says, are about the past sins that he has commi t ted , and they 
have been wr i t ten fo r the Church so that the mora l l y weak may be encouraged by 
August ine 's hope that he can become l ike God , that he can k n o w as he is k n o w n ; 
they have also been wr i t ten so that the fa i th fu l may rejoice in Augus t ine 'ร smal l 
v ic tor ies, and g ive thanks to God w h o is their or ig in .^ What i n th is respect is 
unf in ished, and w h y does he feel an ob l igat ion to h is commun i t y to exp la in what 
he " n o w is"? Is th is pastoral ly wise? A n d i f the th ings he is seeking, by his o w n 




attempt to unearth them in a pub l ic context? Th is exercise attests to August ine 'ร 
conv ic t ion about the universal nature o f t ru th , and the manner i n w h i c h t ru th and 
the soul are inextr icably l i nked : th is is most f u l l y seen i n this book (20.29) i n the 
classical argument about the manner i n w h i c h a l l men desire to be happy, whether 
r ight ly or not.*^ Despite the pr ivate and inter ior character o f this confession, 
August ine expects that any w h o read it w i l l l i kewise rightly lament what he finds 
to be ev i l , and rightly rejoice in what he finds i n h imse l f that is good. He expects 
there to be a genuine positive commona l i t y o f experience w i t h this confession that 
cou ld not have existed w i t h the first nine books. 
I n the second book o f conf, August ine addresses his audience, 
admonishing them, lest they th ink themselves free from the s in fu l impulses 
described by August ine i n that book. H is po in t is that the w o r k o f his l iberat ion is 
one o f grace, both as heal ing and prevent ing. 
What shall I render to the L o r d , w h o recalls these things to my memory , 
wh i le my soul feels no fear f r o m the recol lect ion. I w i l l love you , L o r d , 
and I w i l l g ive thanks and confession to your name because y o u have 
forg iven me such great evi ls and m y nefar ious deeds. I attr ibute to your 
grace and mercy that y o u have mel ted m y sins away l ike ice. I also 
attr ibute to your grace whatever ev i l acts I have not done. . . . N o one w h o 
considers his f ra i l ty w o u l d dare to attr ibute to h is o w n strength his chastity 
and innocence, so that he has less cause to love you֊as i f he had less 
need o f your mercy by พ Ы с һ y o u fo rg ive the sins o f those converted to 
On Augustine's ''eudémonism๔' see p. 568 o f Solignac'ร Notes Complémentaires： "La volonté 
de vie heureuse, intimement liée à la volonté de vérité, joue donc un rôle prépondérant dans la 
pensée augustinienne. On doit y voir comme le ressort du dynamisme de l'esprit dans la 
connaissance et l 'action, Vintentio fondamentale de l'âme humaine vers sa fin; intentio qui repose 
d'ailleurs sur une notio impressa beatitatis (lib. arb. 2.9.26), c'est-à-dire sur une norme a priori de 
l'idée de bonheur, antérieure à toute expérience. Et comme Dieu seul est à la mesure de ce voeu 
radical de ľ âme humaine, comme il est la seule fin i l luminatrice et béatifiante de l 'homme, la 
volonté de bonheur et de vérité fait entendre à tout homme l'appel incessant vers la recherche et la 
découverte de Dieu." Cf. conf. 1.1.1 where the junct ion o f the true and the good is located in the 
con "Our heart is restless unti l it rests in you . " 
1' 2.7.15. ''Quidretribuam domino, quod recolit haec memoria mea et anima mea noก metuit 
inde? Diligam te, domine, ei gratias agam et confìteor nomini tuo, quoniam tanta dimisisti mihi 
mala et nejaría opera mea. Gratiae tuae deputo et misericordiae tuae, quod peccata mea tanquam 
glaciem soluisti Gratiae tuae deputo et quaecunque non feci mala.... Quis est hominum, qui 
suam cogitam mfìrmitatem audet viribus suis tribuere castitatem atque mnocentiam suam, ut 
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Augustme describes the thef t o f pears that he undertook w i t h ผ ร fr iends as "a 
no th ing . " I t was a desire for power w h i c h i n the end produced noth ing o f 
substance, on ly the i l l us ion both o f power and even more ter r ib ly , the i l lus ion o f 
friendship. He w o u l d not have stolen were i t not for the i l lus ion o f fe l lowsh ip 
prov ided by his f r iends: " therefore m y love i n the act was to be associated w i t h 
the gang i n whose company I d i d i t . " ' ^ 
B y contrast, i n the tenth book , he is w r i t i ng speci f ical ly fo r the animus 
fraternus, the Chr is t ian brother, w h o w i l l recognize not on ly his o w n weakness, 
but the essential fact that God alone is wor thy o f praise and love. A s his ch i ld ish 
gang moved h i m to " n o t h i n g " , n o w the commun i ty o f lovers o f G o d moves h i m to 
the act o f praise and love. He is s t i l l s ick, st i l l spi r i tual ly an infant , but i n the 
strength o f the commun i t y o f the Church , he subjects h imse l f to God ' s 
prov ident ia l order and care.'^ 
I t is not then s imp ly an epistemologica! observat ion that August ine , i n 
confessing the deeds o f his you th , can recal l things to his memory w i thou t fear or 
distress. Th is psychologica l peace is the result o f his hope being ent i rely in God . 
H is conv ic t ion that G o d not on ly rescued h i m i n his you th , but even n o w w i l l not 
a l l ow h i m to come to ha rm, buoys h i m and enables confession to move fo rward . 
The universal i ty o f God ' s mercy is greater than the \miversal i ty o f s in. Th is is the 
minm amet te, quasi minus ei necessaria fuerit misericordia tua, qua donas peccata conversis ad 
teT 
'^2.8.16. 
՚ 3 10.4.6. Hence the emphasis throughout this book is on God's w i l l , God's command. "For my 
part, I carry out your command by actions and words; but I discharge it under the protection o f 
your wings. It would be a far too perilous responsibility unless under your wings my soul were 
submissive to you. M y weakness is known to you. I am a child. But my Father ever lives and my 
protector is suiŔficient to guard me." ("Et ego id ago factis ๙ dictis, id ago sub alis tuis, mmiร cum 
ingenti periculo, nisi quia sub alis tuis tibi subdita est anima mea et wflrmiías mea tibi nota est. 
Parvuluş ąum, sed vivit semper pater meus ęt idoneuรุ est mihi tutor nieuร.") 
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hope shared speci f ical ly by those readers w h o c la im membership i n the Church. 
A s such, this confession can both presuppose and u l t imate ly nour ish a commun i t y 
o f Chr is t ian char i ty , a civitas Dei that can t ru ly sympathize w i t h and be lead by 
August ine 'ร example. The social memory o f the Church is not here ordered 
toward past deeds, but to the active recol lect ion o f a merc i f u l and steadfast God. 
It looks fo rward i n expectation o f an eschatological ly real ized hope. Mos t f u l l y , i t 
is ordered to the present, to the progressive real izat ion o f t ru th " i n the inner parts." 
Th is Church is not (as w i t h the Donatists) a commun i t y o f the perfect, but rather 
o f those who , i n fear and t rembl ing for the sin in w h i c h they share, praise G o d as 
the peace and perfect ion o f their souls. I t is a confession m o v e d by hope (5 .7) , 
cont inual ly emphasiz ing God 's fai thfulness, per fect ion and mercy. 
Chapters 6.8 toough 26.37 begin the search for t ru th i n and th rough the 
memory in earnest. August ine recapitulates the mo t i va t i ng quest ion, "wha t do I 
love when I love m y G o d ? " as ^^quomodo ergo te quaero domine?^''', " h o w shall I 
seek y o u " , by what means? We have observed i n l ook ing at Augus t ine 's earl ier 
works that memory is an appropriate avenue because i t is an anthropologica l 
pointer to the meet ing place o f soul and body, and to the onto log ica l bo imdary 
between the sensible and the in te l l ig ib le. He cou ld equal ly speak o f the 
imaginat ion, as he does i n mus., but the signi f icance o f t ime-consciousness 
becomes clear at the c l imact ic central chapter, 27.38. Th rough his memory , 
August ine contains, whether actual ly or potent ia l ly , the who le creat ion, inc lud ing 
the mysteriousness o f his o w n self. The sel f can then become an object for 
inqu i ry , and i n tu rn , the depths o f d iv ine relatedness to the self. 
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There is clearly a pattern o f ascent i n this argument, but i t is not one that 
leaves the wo r l d o f sensible experience behind. Th is m i n i m a l conclusion is 
defended in our examinat ion o f the twe l f t h book. I n the tenth book, August ine 
calls into question the success o f an ascensional t rope at the abovementioned 
central chapter. He begins his search in the physical w o r l d , and these creatures 
respond to his " t hough t " w i t h their manifest beauty, w h i c h beauty points the 
enquirer to their maker: " H e is not he re ! " He rises above the facul ty o f sense-
percept ion to that o f memory . Through the m e m o r y , again, the sensible wo r l d 
exists for the m i n d through the sense impressions (imagines) that are taken in 
through the senses and stored in the memory (thesauri innumerabilium 
imagiหนทใ), w h i c h is also described as the " s tomach" (venter) o f the m i n d . 
Recol lect ion is the act iv i ty o f del iberately b r ing ing fo r th images before the m i n d ' ร 
eye, and i t is one that the soul can improve by practice and habit (8.12). Is 
something t ru ly k n o w n i f the imago is what is known? Some scholars cr i t ic ize 
this l ine o f inqu i ry as be ing տօՍբտւտէւօ.*՛* However , they are w rong , and we have 
shown that the central c la im that memory is a lways invo lved in acts o f judgment 
is Ar is to te l ian, and a commonplace to an August ine reasonably steeped in 
classical epistemology. 
August ine "pauses" w i t h the memory , expressing wonder at the seemingly 
in f in i te capacity o f memory to contain images. A s w e have seen before, memory 
is described as a power o f the soul w h i c h " l ooks d o w n " or outwards to the 
՚ 4 Gareth Matthews makes two slight errors, first, in questioning August๒e through the lens o f 
Descartes, and second, in thinking mag. to be a sufficient source for understanding how memory 
enables knowledge; cf. "Augustine on speaking from memory", in Augustine: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. R.A. Markus (Doubleday-Anchor: New York , 1972), esp. pp. 168-169. 
Augustine is defended by Markus in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval 
Philosophy (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1970), U I Chapter 24. See also the valuable 
article by BruēēBubācz, "Augustine's account o f factual memory" \χΓΑนิgmtiman Studies Võ i : 6 
(1975), pp. 181-192. 一 ՜. 
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sensible, and " u p " or inwards to the in te l l ig ib le. August ine is pleased to f i n d that, 
by the memory , he can contain any variety o f sensible images, bel iefs and 
judgments , expectations and hopes, i n a manner i n w h i c h the w i l l and the memory 
are in harmony (8.14). There is a confidence and contro l here. The power (vis) o f 
the memory , w h i c h is a power o f the m ind , cannot be comprehended: but i t is a 
false d i l emma (8.15) , i n w h i c h August ine observes that what is not actual, and 
therefore a " f a l se " in f in i te , cannot be actually comprehended by the m i n d . The 
m i n d can contain wha t seems to be a potent ial ly in f in i te number o f discrete 
memor ies, but i t is l im i ted w i t h respect to the discursive passage o f t ime. 
The l iberal arts are contained i n the memory , though not taken i n th rough 
the senses.'^ The same clearly applies to numbers and mathemat ical principleร.^^ 
Th i rd l y , he observes that the memory contains perturbatioms animi, af fect ions o f 
the soul , w i thou t actual ly suf fer ing them: he can remember that a certain event 
caused h i m great sadness, but he w i l l not necessarily be subject to that same 
sadness. A f t e r l ay ing out the three things contained i n the memory , sensible 
images, th ings themselves, and affect ions or norioms, he observes that, though he 
fe l t he cou ld not conta in the vis o f memory at 8.15, the memory can contain any 
，5 These are an example o f the res ipsae contamed in the memory; the argument is a familiar 
account o f recollection. The liberal arts are: 
1. not learned through the senses, 
2. neither (therefore) learned from another, 
3. therefore they are in the heart (cor), though not in the memory, before they are learned; 
4. however, i f they can be acknowledged as true, their principles must have existed in some "secret 
recesses" o f the memory; 
5. therefore, to learn these is simply to "gather" {cofitmebit) what is scattered {dispersio). 
'6 See the article by J. Roland E. Ramirez, "Augustine's Number๒g Numbers", in Augustinián 
Studies 21 (1990), pp. 153-161. We have already mentioned this article,in the context o f the 
argument o f imm. an. 3.3 (see also mus. 6.6.16 աւժ ord 2.14.41), in which Ramirez observes that 
the "numbering numbers" have a causal relationship to the sensible "numbered numbers" and in 
no way depend on the latter; nevertheless, he argues that these are an instance o f "a temporal 
discoveiy o f something eternal existing in something compatible wi th such an etemal existence" 
(p.. 159), . , ՜ . . . ՝— , , 
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number o f relations o f s ign i f icat ion, relat ions o f sign and th ing , w i t h the result that 
the memory can see i tse l f as conta in ing a series o f fa i r ly ordered chains o f 
s ign i f ica t ion through w h i c h the m i n d can navigate at w i l l . M e m o r y , as Solignac 
observes, is contextual , and August ine now marvels at the fact that what appears 
to be u n k n o w n can be brought again before the m i n d ' s eye in a more or less 
order ly fashion. '^ 
17.26 marks a signi f icant t ransi t ion i n the argument. W h i l e he marvels at 
the memory , he observes that even animals share this facul ty i n some measure. 
H e knows that, i n order to seek after God , he must therefore rise above and 
beyond (tramibo) this facul ty. Bu t he cannot make this move : fo r even i f G o d 
dwel ls above his m i n d , how cou ld he seek h i m were he not present to his 
remember ing? "Quomodo ergo te, domine?"' H o w shal l I seek y o u , L o r d , he asks 
at 20.29. W h e n men seek after God , he says, i t is the beata vita after w h i c h they 
seek. I f this is God, then h o w d id this idea come into the memory? August ine 
states clearly that he does not k n o w , but is on ly certain that a l l men desire th is 
happiness.*^ He asks then whether this desire abides in the memory l i ke a sense-
image, l i ke a scient i f ic pr inc ip le or l i ke an af fect ion. He concludes that i t is after 
the manner o f an af fect ion or perturbatio animi. I t is something i n the memory 
17 Clearly Augustine is talking o f memory in terms o f deliberate acts o f recollection. As is 
manifest at 16.24, the mind only knows itself in the context o f such discreet acts: " I know that I 
remember X . " Memory is not for Augustine a general tendency to self-consciousness that gives 
rise to a simple, transcendent subjectivity. This reading is lent to Augustine by those who see ๒ 
h im a Neoplatonic proto-Hegelian, cf. E. Booth, " H e g e ľ s Conception o f Self-Knowledge Seen in 
Conjunction wi th Augustine's", in Augustiniána 30, Fasc.3-4 (1980), pp. 221-250; "St. 
Augustine's notifia รพ related to Aristotle and the Early neo-Platonists", ๒ Augustiniana 27 
(1977), pp. 70-132 & 364-401. An antidote to this reading is the scholarship o f R.D. Wil l iams (eg. 
"The Paradoxes o f Self-knowledge in the De Trinitate'', Collectanea Augustiniana Augustine: 
Presbyter Factus Sum, J.T. Lienhard et al. (eds.) (New York, !993), pp. 121-134) and Lewis 
Ayres (eg. "The Discipline o f Self-knowledge in Augustine's De trinitate Book X " , in The 
Passionate Intellect ， ed. Lewis Ayres (New Brunswick and London, 1993); in this essay, Ayres 
indicts Charles Taylor as another proponent o f this mis-reading o f Augustine.). 
IS Augustine says that the opening phrase o f the Hortemius is 'Omnes beali esse v o / ш / . " Cf. Tuse. 
D։sp. 5A 02S; conf. 4.12.18; 6.10.17; beata и. 4.32; 4.34, as participation in God. See also 
Solignac in footnote 8, above. 
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such that i t can be loved, even though it be not possessed: i t is l ike the co in lost by 
the woman , w h i c h is lost, but not ent i re ly lost, or else she cou ld not seek after i t . 
I t is in the memory , he concludes, as the memory o f j o y (gaudium) that he has 
experienced, however part ia l and fleeting. A l l men seek this j o y and indeed 
experience i t , i n var ious and confused ways. I f the object that gives del ight , 
however, is not also what is true (23.33) , misery then fo l lows. To love what is 
both most j o y f u l and most true, namely God , is the most certain happiness: 
^'amant beatam vitam, quod non est aliud quam de ventate gaudium'' Since the 
good o f the intel lect and the good o f the w i l l are u l t imate ly one in God , what g ives 
j o y must be made subject to the t ru th : these alas are usual ly separated by man, f o r 
w h o m it is o f greater importance to be r ight than true (23.34): thus, says 
August ine, do men hate the t ru th w h e n i t condemns them. The classical argument 
for the universal desire for happiness of fers ins ight concerning the relat ionship 
between God and the soul , but i t is inadequate unless i t is made to include God as 
t ru th personi f ied as at its end. T feough the af fect ions, he leams o f j o y , but these 
alone do not teach h i m o f God. 
I t is thus by exp lo r ing the necessary ident i ty o f the good and the true, the 
proper objects o f the w i l l and the intel lect respect ively, that August ine comes to 
accept the myster ious mode o f d iv ine presence. God inef fab ly transcends the 
soul, and yet, because he makes h imse l f kno wable (24.35) he is present i n the 
memory ; he is not present however as something understood exhaust ively, nor 
possessed who l l y . The mode o f h is being present and the mode o f our knowledge 
are entirely d i f fe ren t֊and yet he can on ly speak to the soul in a mode proper to i t . 
Th is ref lect ion a l lows August ine to see G o d in a d i f ferent manner ent i rely: " ๙ 
ทนsquam locus, et recedimus et accedimus, et nusquam locus.,., Simulque 
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respondes omnibus diversa consulentibus. " I n his despair, August ine cou ld not 
find G o d i n any place, and where, i f not in his o w n soul? I n j o y , he realizes that i f 
God is i n no place, he is able to be i n every place (26.37). The t ru th therefore 
speaks to every man w h o calls upon it , though they may not understand or even 
l ike what they hear; the t ru th is one, and yet becomes many. The happy man does 
not seek to have his o w n desires conf i rmed by the t ru th , but rather to hear the t ru th 
and obey i t . Submission o f the w i l l becomes August ine 'ร prayer, and the t ru th 
gathers many to i tse l f i n th is submission. 
Thus տ the end, the memory does indeed contain God i n some part icular 
manner, but i t is more proper to say that God contains the memory , and i n do ing 
so fills i t , i l l umines i t , and speaks to i t in part icular i n s t a n c e s . T h e end po in t o f 
the quest for G o d i n the soul is the awareness o f d iv ine agency. " H o w shall I seek 
y o u ? " August ine asks at the opening paragraphs o f this book: i t is not s imp ly by 
the memory , but by the i l l um ina t ing and enl ivening presence o f G o d in the soul. 
A t 40.65, w h e n August ine summarizes the path he has taken, he says that he 
learned that the vis o f the soul was a marve l , but that i t was not G o d ; G o d in a 
d i f ferent way is the power o f the soul : he is the lux permanens, by w h i c h he 
" invest igated a l l these matters to discover whether they existed, what they were, 
and what value should be attached to them. " A n d though a l l o f these things g ive 
August ine great j o y , the on ly place i n w h i c h he is safe is the d iv ine l igh t i tself: 
" there my dispersed aspirations are gathered together, and f r o m y o u no part o f me 
w i l l depart."^° 
՚ 9 "There w i l l always be, given the means o f grace, a temporal dislocation or anachronism between 
human recollection o f God, and God's recollection o f humanity." J. Wetzel, Augustine and the 
Limits of Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 195. 
շ 0 "'Ñeque in his omnibus, quae percurro consulens te, inverno tutum locum animae meae nisi in te, 
quo colligqntur sparsa mea пес a te quicquam reçedat ex me." 
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What is good and what is t rue are one i n God , and this gives Augustme a 
sense o f great hope: hope that, even i f h is intel lect and his w i l l or af fect ions do not 
func t ion entirely in harmony, God w i l l lead h i m to this place. The second ha l f o f 
the tenth book bears out this analysis, as August ine examines the command that 
he receives to be continent. Cont inence is a command to l i ve according to the 
t ru th perceived by the m ind , above the m i n d : un i ty i n act, by w h i c h we understand 
an order ing o f the affect ions, so that what has been scattered abroad into a 
mu l t i p l i c i t y may be gathered i n again into one. 2 i A f t e r the pattern o f 1 John 2:16, 
August ine passes through the successively graver temptat ions that assault h i m : 
concupiscentia carniร, concupiscentia oculorum, ambitio saeculi. The pattern o f 
ascent mir rors that o f the treatment o f memory , and yet i t perverts i t as August ine 
describes a descent into greater darkness as the j o y desired by the soul and the 
t ru th are progressively separated un t i l the one complete ly obscures the other, and 
August ine has replaced the t ru th w i t h his self, an ido l and a falsehood. M e m o r y is 
o f cont inu ing but ambiguous signi f icance here. I n the first ha l f o f the book, i t 
expresses the fact that God is at once present and absent: not precisely a paradox, 
but an enigma suggesting the radical d i f ference between the s o u ľ s knowledge and 
the d iv ine knowledge and presence. Here, memory preserves against August ine 's 
w i l l certain habits f r o m his former l i f e , images and experiences that he w o u l d 
rather forget. A t the same t ime, i t is by means o f the memory that he has a 
" know ledge o f h is good conscience" (30.41). I n the language o f mus., August ine 
desires to purge h imse l f o f phantasmata and yet benef i t f r o m the remembered 
phantasia o f blessed joy——to l ive w i t h i n the "bounds o f m e m o r y . " August ine 
2 ' 28.39. For an analysis o f these magnificent central chapters, truly the center o f the whole o f 
conf. see Solignac, pp. 569-572 and the third volume o f J.J, O'Donnel l 's commentary, Augustme 'ร 
Confessions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
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wants his delectatìo to be ordered by a higher pr inc ip le. Though his memory is a 
v i ta l l i nk to the t ru th , nevertheless th is is not adequate to heal the w i l l , w h i c h is 
prone to "exceed reason" i n favour o f voluptas. Reason fai ls as he loses the 
ab i l i ty to examine h imse l f al together; his pr ide destroys the very commun i t y that 
he seeks to bu i l d up as a re l ig ious leader; and the burden o f his self, o f his s in, 
mars the v i s ion o f d iv ine Beauty granted to h i m at 27.38. 
Hope is granted in the f o r m o f the verax mediator. There is no inadequacy 
about d iv ine i l l um ina t ion . August ine clear ly has the text o f Romans 7 before his 
m ind ' s eye. The flesh and its voluptas seem intractably at war w i t h the spir i t , and 
there is no help w i t h i n August ine for the resolut ion o f this d i lemma. I n the early 
dialogues, August ine f requent ly describes the peace o f the blessed l i fe as the 
product o f t ru th be ing b o m i n the soul , w i s d o m as the ordo animi, or a 
par t ic ipat ion i n the Beauty that makes a l l things beautiful.^^ Here the order or 
un i ty o f the soul is described as a w o r k o f iustitia, just ice or righteousness. Th is is 
not a no t ion fo re ign to the early wr i t i ngs , but as i n mus., i t is power fu l l y 
connected w i t h the humi l i t y and self-denial w h i c h makes the incarnat ion o f G o d 
among m e n possible. Th is d iv ine condescension and empty ing a l lows August ine 
to see a way to the overcoming o f his personal d i lemma, and therefore a way to 
remain i n the w o r l d , and i n the commun i t y o f the Church. The confound ing 
humi l i a t i on o f the d iv ine acts as a "med i ca t i on " to counteract the pr ide by w h i c h 
August ine can deny t ru th by an act o f h is w i l l . H i s intel lect is moved ; even more, 
i n the death o f this mediator, Augus t ine 's w i l l is healed by part ic ipat ion i n the 
same: the chance to die to his self, and l ive to God֊֊to pass through the broken 
humani ty and embrace the d iv ine un i ty . Chr ist thus offers an external, v is ib le 
՝ Beata u. 435; ord ]9,5\. 
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exemplar o f h o w this can be accompl ished, as w e l l as a pract ical via for its 
accomplishment.^^ B y fa i th , and w i t h hope, the heal ing w o r k o f love can begin. 
A t the conclus ion o f B o o k 1 1 , August ine wr i tes : 
See how my l i fe is a d is tent ion (distract ion) i n several direct ions. ' Y o u r 
r ight hand upheld m e ' i n m y L o r d , the Son of man who is mediator 
between you the One and us the many, w h o l i ve i n a mu l t ip l i c i t y o f 
distractions by many th ings; so '1 m igh t apprehend h i m in w h o m I also am 
apprehended' , and leav ing beh ind the o l d days I m igh t be gathered to 
f o l l o w the One, ' fo rge t t ing the past ' and m o v i n g not toward those future 
th ings w h i c h are transi tory but to ' the th ings w h i c h are before ' me, not 
stretched out in distract ion but extended i n r e a c h , not by being pu l led apart 
b u t b y 0ՕՈ06ՈէքՅէ1ՕՈ?՛* 
Has the mediator t ru ly o f fe red a so lu t ion to Augus t ine 's d i f f icu l t ies? The last 
üiree books o f conf. are a med i ta t ion on med ia t ion i n a var iety o f ways. We w i l l 
consider them i n this l igh t , speci f ica l ly w i t h an eye to ways i n w h i c h he continues 
to use tropes o f memory and t ime-anx ie ty as a way o f expressing spir i tual distance 
and distract ion. We w i l l show h o w this distance is overcome by a restorat ion, and 
not a destruct ion, o f the memory . 
These last tføee books are o f ten considered an enigmat ic appendix to the 
confession o f Augus t ine 'ร convers ion. W e w i l l del iberately avoid o f fe r ing grand 
schemes for answer ing questions about thei r place i n the larger who le of conf., 
instead focussing on the theological mot iva t ions fo r the discussion o f t ime and 
eternity i n the eleventh book , and the restorat ion o f the memory o f the Church in a 
2 3 R.D. Crouse writes: "[Because] the truth is manifested in the wor ld in deed, it can become the 
object o f love; and faith ๒ that truth becomes the starting point o f reason's restoration." "In multa 
defluximus: Confessions X， 29-43, and St. Augustme'ร theory o f personality", in Neoplatonism 
and Early Christian Thought, ed. н . Blumenthal and R. Α. Markus (London: Variorum, 1981), p. 
183. 
2 4 29.39 (italics mine): ". . .ecce distentio est vita mea, et me suscepit dextera tua in domino meo, 
mediatore filio hominis inter te unum et nos muitos, in multis per multa, ut per eum adprehendam, 
in quo et adprehensus sum, et a veteribus diebus collìgar sequens unum, praeterita oblitus, non in 
eã quae futura et tramitura sunt, sed extentus, non secundum distentioทem, sed secundum 
iníentionem." 
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hermeneutic o f S c r i p t o e i n the twe l f th . A cont inui ty o f purpose w i t h the tenth 
book is taken for granted. W e shall o f fer Grouse's suggestions, w h i c h are based 
on f i nd ing the recurr ing pattern o f exteriora-ìntenora-superìora throughout conf. 
Once again the pattern is complete, not n o w in terms o f the exteriora o f 
b iographical event [Bкร . 1-9], but i n a considerat ion o f the interiora o f the 
soul [the "psycho logy " o f B k . l O ] . Ye t the soul is not its o w n pr inc ip le and 
end; its mo t i on is a s t r iv ing ab ìnferìorìbus towards the superiora o f that 
etemal t ru th w h i c h i l luminates i t , and the final ttaee books o f the 
Confessions are accordingly devoted to a medi ta t ion upon the eternal 
W o r d as the p r i nc ip i um o f creat ion, W h o is the i l l umina tor o f the soul , and 
also speaks to the bod i l y senses in the words o f s c r i p t o e , that men should 
bel ieve in Him.^^ 
Grouse observes that the c l imax o f the argument o f the tenth book is the v is ion o f 
d iv ine i l l um ina t i on as d iv ine agency. The three final books consider the d iv ine 
mode o f being֊֊eternity, s imp l ic i t y , transcendence一but also inc lude the 
psychology o f the tenth book i n that they seek to show h o w G o d gathers creat ion 
to h imse l f i n a u n i f y i n g conversió. We w i l l d raw out the incamat iona l center o f 
th is , the manner i n w h i c h the soul seeks to part icipate i n the d iv ine attempt to 
overcome the di f ference between the eternal and the temporal . I n the early wo rks , 
August ine consistently sees memory as a power o f the soul that suggests the un i ty 
o f the who le person, body and soul . Part ic ipat ion in God , seen as a restorat ion o f 
memory , or as a " h o l y " forget t ing, cannot s imply be an ascent away f r o m the 
w o r l d o f ordinary experience. Exteriora are no longer mere exteriora i n l igh t o f 
the descent and death o f God . B y this g i f t , August ine sees that a l l th ings must be 
preserved and gathered into one, comprehended i n the mediator, " the Son o f man 
w h o is mediator between y o u the One and us the many, w h o l i ve i n a mu l t i p l i c i t y 
25 Cf. conf. 11.8.10; ''Recurrens in te шит: the pattern o f St. Augustine's Confessions'', Studia 
Patristica Vo l . 14 (1976), p. 391. Admittedly this is one example o f such a "grand scheme", one 
whiçh however has the virtue o f dependmg upon Augustinian categories. 
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o f distract ions by many th ings. " August ine demands no less than to k n o w as a l l 
th ings are k n o w n i n and through this mediator. 
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C H A P T E R S : 
CONFESSIONES 11 ： T H E " P R O B L E M " OF T E M P O R A L I T Y 
Scholars have general ly argued that, i n tu rn ing to the opening verses o f 
Scripture as he does at 11.3.5, conf. hereafter takes on a new cosmic and 
hermeneutic purpose. W e want to qua l i f y th is reading, i n that the hermeneutic 
d imension serves a larger agenda o f spir i tual progress. The cont inu i ty o f th is 
book w i t h the tenth is obv ious. I n the final chapter (43.70) o f the tenth book, 
August ine describes h o w he was fo rb idden to flee into the solitude o f the desert to 
do battle w i t h his sins. H e asks instead that he be permi t ted to l ive i n the f reedom 
he has in Chr ist by "med i ta t ing on his l aw . " H e turns therefore to Scripture as his 
hope wh i le at the same t ime a f f i rm ing Chr ist as the verax mediator, the one i n 
w h o m "are h id a l l the treasures o f w i s d o m and know ledge . " These t w o are not 
conf i ised, but f r o m the perspective o f spir i tual ,/0готаГ/о, a t u m to one is a tu rn to 
the other. ' 
The eleventh book is cont inuous w i t h th is goal . He wr i tes: 
Bu t when shall I be capable o f p roc la im ing by ' the tongue o f m y pen ' a l l 
your exhortat ions and al l your terrors and consolations and direct ives, by 
w h i c h y o u brought me to preach your w o r d and dispense your sacrament 
to your people? A n d i f I have the capacity to p roc la im էԽտ i n an ordered 
narrat ive, yet the drops o f t ime are too precious to me. For a long t ime 
past I have been burn ing to meditate i n your l a w and confess to 5^น what I 
k n o w o f i t and what l ies beyond m y powers . . . . I am reluctant to expend 
on any other subject those hours w h i c h I find free o f the necessities for 
restor ing the body, o f intel lectual w o r k , and o f the service w h i c h w e owe 
to people or that w h i c h w e render to them under no ob l iga t ion? 
' A t 2.4， Moses attests to Christ ("qui sedet ad dexter am tuam et te interpellai pro nobis, in quo 
sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditiľ) precisely in his wr i t ing o f Genesis. It is 
Christ, Augustine says, that he is seeking in these books. 
' 11.2.2. ''''Quando autem sufficio lingua calami enuntiare monia hortamenta tua et omnes terrores 
tuos et consolationes et gubernationes, quibus me perduxisti praedicare verbum et sacramentum 
tuum dispensare populo tuo? Et Sì sufficio haec enuntiare ex ordine, caro mihi valent síillae 
temporum. Et olim inardesco meditan in lege tua et in ea libi conßteri scientiam et inperitiam 
meamr:.. Et nolö-in aliud horae diffluant, quäš imenio liberas a necessítatibus reficiendi corporis 
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T w o things should be noted here. First , the ar t fu l anxiety about t ime , bo th the t ime 
remain ing to h i m for his w o r k , and the t ime already wasted, announces the true 
purpose o f th is book. Second, what August ine is speaking o f here is a meditaţia 
that is done fo r its o w n sake. A s the subsequent paragraph a f f i rms , th is desire is 
in harmony w i t h his sense o f ob l igat ion to the Church : to meditate upon Scripture 
as an act iv i ty done fo r its o w n sake is not a self ish endeavour, indeed, i t subsumes 
any publ ic-pr ivate d icho tomy. A n d yet, he laments that he is d rawn away f r o m 
this task by the distract ions o f his bod i ly needs and ord inary duties. W h i l e 
August ine sees before h i m what God requires o f h i m and w i l l grant h i m , there is 
nevertheless immedia te ly a conf l i c t that is the result o f the ord inary condi t ions o f 
embodiment . 
These opening chapters are not therefore s imply a preamble to 3.5: " m a y I 
hear and understand h o w i n the beginn ing y o u made the heaven and ear th . " 
August ine immedia te ly interpolates Genesis and the opening verses o f John, 
f i ndmg i n God ' s creative act the W o r d at wo rk , media t ing , dispersing, un i f y i ng . 
I n th is , August ine is st i l l ch ie f ly concerned w i t h the quest ion o f h o w the tempora l 
can be un i f ied w i t h the etemal . I n the first verses o f Scripture he finds that th is is 
a d iv ine wo rk , an act o f grace, and that i t is a w o r k begun even i n the first moment 
o f creation. W h y ? Or better (cf. 5.7., "quomodo"), how? Because G o d does not 
jus t b r ing the creature into be ing ex nihilo; he does th is th rough the W o r d , in 
princípium. Creat ing, August ine observes, is a speaking on the part o f the div ine.^ 
Th is t ightens the paral le l between Christ and Scripture, and cont inues precisely 
the questions posed i n the tenth book: h o w is Chr ist an ef fect ive mediator? Wha t 




does i t mean to dwe l l i n h i m , to part ic ipate i n h im? H o w , by the W o r d , can the 
temporal condi t ions and d i f f i cu l t ies o f bod i l y l i fe be brought in to un i ty w i t h and 
ver i l y be overcome by the peace o f eterni ty? 
I n its cont inui ty w i t h B o o k 10, this book is arguably not at a l l concerned 
w i t h cosmic questions o f h o w creat ion happens, and what role t ime plays i n this. 
B o o k 11 concludes by observing that th is d iv ine speaking, as a creative act iv i ty , 
suggests something discursive and spread throughout t ime. Nevertheless i t is 
inef fab ly unl ike human speaking. H o w then does 11 pos i t ive ly advance the 
argximent o f conf.l 
B y considering creation speci f ical ly as in princípium, August ine lays out 
the mode o f d iv ine eternity {aeterna ratio), or the d iv ine perspective on a 
temporal way o f speaking about creat ion (1) . Second, he introduces certain cr i t ics 
o f the idea that God 's act ion cou ld have a beg inn ing " i n " t ime (2) . Th i r d , he talks 
at some length about the human perspective on t ime , w h i c h concludes w i t h a 
rebuttal o f the cr i t ics o f creation (3) . F ina l l y , he concludes that memory is the key 
to mak ing any sense o f 3, w M l e p rov id ing an ins ight in to the p rob lem o f the great 
d i f ference between human and d iv ine perspectives in t ime (the contrast between 1 
and 3) . Abou t memory , then, there is both a posi t ive and a negat ive conclusion. 
August ine is ch ief ly contrast ing d iv ine and human k n o w i n g , and posing a 
quest ion: can meditaţia be an alternat ive to the distentio that describes the 
distract ion o f bod i l y l i fe? Is i t real ly possible fo r mor ta l man to have a sapiential 
This is w h y August ine is ta l k ing about t ime. F o l l o w i n g о 'Da ly , we speak 
against a vast body o f scholarship w h i c h takes the "de f i n i t i ona l " approach, i.e. 
w h i c h looks at this book as an attempt on Augus t ine 'ร part to understand the 
nature o f t ime i n creation. Such an approach assumes that a carefu l analysis w i l l 
177 
give rise to a picture o f Augus t ine 's " theory o f t i m e . " Amongs t such readings, 
op in ion is o f course var ied: is t ime object ive or subject ive, and so o n . 4 Though 
typ ica l ly a more phi losophica l debate, its false categories of ten seep into 
theological research, and most scholars conclude that August ine has a " t h e o r y " o f 
t ime, in w h i c h t ime is def ined as largely psycholog ica l , i n the sense o f be ing 
"sub ject ive . " One must di f ferent iate between a basical ly physical theory o f h o w 
t ime migh t fiinction, and a concern w i t h the spir i tual experience o f t ime, i n order 
to appreciate the greater s igni f icance i n the end o f the latter for August ine. 
4 J.F. Callaghan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1948); also, "Basi l o f Caesarea: a new source for St. Augustine s theory o f t ime", in 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958), pp. 437-454; R. Gil let, "Temps et exemplarisme 
chez saint August in", in Augustinus Magister շ , pp. 933-941 ； Jules Chaix-Ruy, Saint A นgustm: 
Temps et Histoire (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1956); J. Guitton, Le Temps ei L'Éternité Chez 
Flotin et Saint Augustin (Paris: AuDier, 1933); พ . Gundersdorf von Jess, "Augustine: a consistent 
and unitary theory o f t ime", in The New^ Scholasticism 46 (1972), pp. 337-351; H. Hausheer, "St. 
Augustine's conception o f t ime" , in The Philosophical Review 46 (1937X pp. 547-577; R. Jordan, 
"T ime and contingency in St. Augustine", in Markus (1972), pp. 255-279, reprinted from Review 
of Metaphysics 8 (1954), pp. 394-417; H .M. Lacey, "Empir ic ism and Augustine'ร probi ems about 
t ime", in Markus (1972), pp. 280-308, reprinted from Review of Metaphysics 22 (1968), pp. 219-
245; R.A. Markus, "Mar ius Victorīnus and Augustine", in A . H . Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge 
History of Later Greek arid Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967), pp. 327-419; J. McEvoy, "St. Augustine's account o f t ime and Wittgenstein's crit icisms", 
in Review of Metaphysics 37 (1984), pp. 547-577; E.p. M e i j e m g , Augustin über Schöpfung, 
Ewigkeit und Zeit: Das elfte Buch der Bekenntnisse (Br i l l : Leiden, 1979); J.L. Morrison, 
"Augustine'ร two theories o f t ime", in The New Scholasticism 45 (1971), pp. 600-610; R. Sorabji, 
Time, Creation and the Continuum (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); C.W.K. Mundle, 
"Augustine's pervasive error concerning t ime", ๒ Philosophy A\ (1966), pp. 165-168; R.J. 
O'Connell , "The Riddle o f Augustine'ร Confessions: a Plotinian key", in International 
Philosophical Quarterly (1964), pp. 327-352; D.L. Ross, "T ime, the heaven o f heavens, and 
memory տ August ๒e's Confessions'', in Augustinian Studies 22 (1991), pp. 】91-205; G.J.P. 
O'Daly, "Augustme on the measurement o f t ime: some comparisons wi th Aristotelian and Stoic 
texts'^ in H.J. Blumenthal and R.A. Markus, eds., Neoplatonism and Early Christian TԽนght 
(London: Variorum, 1981), pp. 171-179; Augustine 'ร Philosophy of л / / ๗ (Berkeley: University o f 
California Press, 1987); "T ime as distentio and St. Augustine s exegesis o f Philippians 3:12-14 , 
in Revue des Etudes Augustmiennes 23 (1977), pp. 265-271; R.J. Teske, "The world-soul and time 
in St. Augustine", in Augustiman Studies 14 (1983)， pp. 75-92; see also an unpublished M.A. 
dissertation by Phil ip CorKum, Et Mirum si Non Ipsius Animi: On Augustme, Confessions, Book XI 
(Halifax, Dalhousie University, 1994)， in which a great deal o f classic scholarship is exhaustively 
engaged. In most cases, the titles o f these articles and monographs tell o f their approach and 
userulness. We tend to be sympathetic wi th the French scholars, o f course including Solignac and 
Le Blond, as wel l as O'Daiy , who is the only one to note that the chief historical originality and 
therefore significance o f the eleventh book lies in Augustine's insistence "on the indispensable 
ftinction o f memory in all t ime calculation." We move beyond O'Daly only in a difference o f 
method; we seek to ask questions about memory and time measurement in a manner that intends 
chiefly to il luminate the argument o f Book 11. 
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Augus t ine 'ร argument is f ramed by appeals to Chr ist , the W o r d t feough 
and i n w h o m the enquiry is made. A t 22.28, Chadwick suggests that August ine 
does th is ma in ly to " foresta l l c r i t i cs" who w i l l see his pro ject as p r imar i l y 
ph i losophica l , i.e. Neoplaton ic , i n character.^ The appeal has a more subtle and 
relevant intent. W e have already observed the in i t ia l і п ЇефоІа І іоп o f Chr ist and 
Scripture. I n the prayer at 2.4, images o f creation and salvat ion are m ing led i n the 
person o f Christ. O f course, salvat ion for August ine invo lves Chr is t ' s un ion w i t h 
human i ty , w i t h the physical and psychical , wh i le creat ion does not.^ Bu t the 
abi l i ty o f the d iv ine to， as i t were, contradict itself, to enter in to the human and 
br ing i t into un ion w i t h i tself, is precisely the promise o f the argument here. 
August ine sees th is un ion as something intended and already being accompl ished 
in the uniquely t r in i tar ian mode o f creation described i n Scr ipณre. 
I make m y prayer through our L o r d Jesus Chr is t you r Son, ' the man o f 
your right hand, the Son o f man w h o m y o u have strengthened' to be 
mediator between yourse l f and us. B y h i m y o u sought us when we were 
not seeking you . Bu t you sought us that we should seek y o u , your W o r d 
by w h o m y o u made al l things inc lud ing mysel f , your on ly Son by w h o m 
y o u have cal led to adopt ion the people who bel ieve, m y s e l f among them. I 
make m y prayer to you through h i m 'who sits at you r r ight hand and 
intercedes to y o u for us. ' ' I n h i m are h idden a l l the treasures o f w i s d o m 
and knowledge. ' For those treasures I search i n you r books. Moses wrote 
o f h i m (John 5:46). He h imse l f said th is; th is is the declarat ion o f the 
T r u t h / 
5 Chadwick, p. 236. 
6 Contrast for example the Neoplatonic Augustinian Eriugena: in his Periphyseon, he does not 
collapse Incarnation and creation, but this шіефгеїіуе possibility always looms Im-ge given the 
continuity o f the movement o f divine exitus-reditus. 
7 Obsecro per dominum nostrum lesum Christum filium tuum, virum dexterae tuae,filium 
hominis, quem confìrmasti tibi mediatorem Шит et nostrum, per quem nos quaesisti mn 
quaereníes te, quaesisti autem, ut quaereremus te, verbum tuum, per guodfecisti omnia, in quibus 
et me, unicum tuum, per quem vacasti in adoptionem populum credentium in quo et me: per eum te 
obsecro, qui sedet ad dexteram tuam et te interpellai pro nobis, іท quo sunt omnes thesauri 
sapieหüae et scientiae absconditi Ipsos quaero in libris tuis. Moyses de ilio scripsit: hoc ipse ait, 
hoc Veritas aitľ The idea o f the treasures o f wisdom being hidden in Christ echoes a passage at 
2.3 where Augustine describes the pages o f Scripture as "secret recesses", deliberately intended to 
be di f f icul t and obscure so that they may be dark forests in which "deer recover their strength... 
and restore themselves by walk ing and feeding, by resting and ruminat ing." This image o f Christ 
the Word as ftill o f unfathomed depths is essential to the transition to the twelf th book in which we 
consider hoพ ฺ Scripture unifies. 
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August ine seeks to l isten to the d iv ine W o r d i n ЗсгірШге, yet is unsure about the 
nature o f the d iv ine mode o f speaking. For this reason, August ine seeks insight 
in to the d iv ine perspective on t ime or the creature i n general.* A s at conf. 10.6.8, 
creat ion cries out {clamant) to the m i n d o f the one perce iv ing that i t is, first, other 
than God, and second, that in be ing made {factum), i t is changing {mutari)? God 
creates by speaking, that is, by speaking his W o r d . The d i f f i cu l t y is apparent. 
The W o r d that God speaks is e temal , and is spoken "ever las t ing ly " (dicitur 
sempiterne). ՝^ O f necessity, the W o r d is i nvo lved i n a beginn ing in t ime, since the 
creature is mutable and as such is dependent on the unchanging for its being and 
coming- in to-be ing. For August ine , onto log ica l dependency is a basic 
metaphysical tenet, taken for granted throughout his early wr i t ings . Th is 
h ighl ights the d i f f i cu l t y i n ta lk about creat ion: i f God creates i n speaking 
everlast ingly, he does not speak as humans do, w i t h memory conta in ing and 
expect ing what has passed away and what is yet to come. Every th ing is made "a t 
once" in this mode o f speakmg. A n d yet the language introduces concepts o f 
ałter i ty in the d iv ine, as w e l l as succession. So h o w does the etemal cause the 
temporal? H o w can there be a " w h e n " i n the etemal th ink ing (aeterna ratio), and 
a beginning in its action? 
August ine appealร to revelat ion. The verbum is also the beginn ing , i.e. 
the beginning o f t ime; we k n o w th is , he says, because the W o r d i tse l f says i t , " i n 
8 This book is commonly divided into two parts, chapters 1 through 13, and 14 through 31 . The 
problem wi th this artificial division lies ๒ the fact that a great deal o f energy is thereafter 
expended in an attempt to reconcile the two "parts." I f we seem to repeat these divisions, their 
artif iciality must be conceded. We do this for the sake o f convenience, but in the end assume the 




the flesh", i n Scr ip tu re . " Th rough the " f l e s h " o f Scriptore, the " T r u t h " i tse l f 
teaches, speaking to the ears o f men so that they may be granted sapientia, by 
being brought to the very aeterna Veritas. Compare this to mag. ： i f one is being 
taught t ru th fu l l y , the changeable can be something through w h i c h one is lead back 
to the unchangeable t ru th. Clear ly this refers to the words o f Scripture. However , 
i t also refers to the words , the speech, o f the creature in its coming- to-be. 
Creat ion is a speaking to the creature. That i t is a w o r k o f the T r in i t y does not 
mean that i t is a mere necessary by-product o f a necessary internal re lat ion. I t is a 
ca l l ing , and then a recal l ing. A t 9 .11 , revelat ion in general is described as 
"s t r i k i ng at the heart" , as something that enflâmes August ine because i t is at once 
so "un l i ke h i m " and yet so ak in . A s at 10.27.38, where G o d v io len t l y breaks 
th rough Augus t ine 'ร deafness, and overcomes his blindness w i t h the d iv ine l ight , 
here sapientia is described as a g i f t g iven f r o m above: creation and w i s d o m are 
inext r icably l inked i n the d iv ine purpose in Christ. He concludes therefore that 
the d iv ine mode o f creat ing, o f speaking, is true because revealed as such, but that 
i t can on ly be understood as mi racu lous: "miro modo diceทร et miro modo 
faciensŕ^ 
This is on ly a temporary conclus ion. The next stage in the argument 
comes f r o m the cr i t ics o f the idea o f a princípium: these may be Manichees, or 
var ious representatives o f Platonic teachings. Either way , these cr i t ics make the 
mistake o f j u d g i n g the d i f f i cu l t y in speaking about creation by the mode l o f 
" 11.8.10. ^''Quando debuisse incipere vel desinere in aeterna ratione cognoscitur, ubi пес incipit 
aliquid пес desinit. Ipsum est verbum tuum, quod et princípium est, quia et loquitur nobis. Sic in 
evangelio per cameni ait, et hoc imonuit fons auribus homimm, ut crederetur et infus 




human reasoning and the l imi tat ions o f human language.' ' ' August ine is c lear ly 
also concerned w i t h the d i f f i cu l t y o f speaking o f a d iv ine sapieทtia being granted 
to a mutable creature. I n br ief , the cr i t ics assume that G o d is subject to the 
l inguis t ic categories o f t ime much as the creature is: " the i r heart flickers hi therto 
between not ions o f things past and to օ օ տ շ . " ՛ ՛ ՛ Thus they ask questions such as 
" w h a t was God do ing before creat ion?" To these August ine repl ies, saying that 
before creat ion there was no before, since there was no t ime before creat ion. 
Before G o d made, he d id not make anyth ing. '^ God 's " today " , says Augus t ine , is 
eterni ty; there is no succession i n his speaking; his t ime "does not pass" but rather 
"s tands" (staทt).՝^ 
The answer, at 14.17, is that t ime is a creature. T i m e , as August ine says 
later i n th is book, is such an obvious and int imate aspect o f everyday l i fe , and yet 
its passage marks a very mysterious t ru th about creatureliness. Wha t is t ime? The 
rhetorical quest ion is at last posed: quid est enim tempus? Th is suggests that we 
have f ina l l y come upon the mot ivat ing issue o f the text, but this is clearly not a 
complete movement i n the argument. August ine dist inguishes between t ime and 
the measurement o f t ime, but the remainder o f the book on ly considers var ious 
problems about the latter. The crit ics o f the Cathol ic pos i t ion are not able to 
imagine a way to th ink about t ime measurement i n a non-creaturely way , and the 
remainder o f the book considers whether and h o w August ine m igh t through the 
՚ 3 O'Donnel l suggests, comparing this passage to Gท. adv. Man., that the obvious critics are 
Manichees; Solignac adds Neoplatonists to these (cf. pp. 581-582); Chadwick (p. 227) argues that 
Augustine IS speaking against unsophisticated Catholics. 




physical creature come to some understanding, some sapientia, w i t h respect to the 
d iv ine perspective (the aeterna ratio) o f tempora l succession. 
Nevertheless, at 14.17 w e come as close as ever to a " d e f i n i t i o n " o f t ime i n 
this book. 
Take the t w o tenses, past and future. H o w can they ' be ' when the past is 
not n o w present and the future is not yet present? Ye t i f the present were 
always present, i t w o u l d not pass into the past: i t w o u l d not be t ime but 
eternity. I f then, i n order to be t ime at a l l , the present is so made that i t 
passes into the past, h o w can we say that this present also ' i s '? The cause 
o f its being is that i t w i l l cease to be. So indeed we cannot t ru ly say that 
t ime exists except i n the sense that i t tends towards non-existence.'^ 
The being o f t ime is precisely that i t tendit non esse. However , this is a 
descr ipt ion, not a de f in i t ion . ՝^ I t is the experience o f the one w h o is al ive to the 
passage o f t ime, to the fleeting character o f the present. August ine is clear that 
there is an "ob jec t i ve " real i ty to t ime ; but there seems to be discord between its 
existence and our experience. For the former , on ly the present exists; for the 
latter, the present is meaningless, except as the remembered past.'^ 
Subsequent chapters appear to be concerned w i t h the "sub jec t ive" 
experience o f t ime. W h i l e acknowledg ing that there can be a scient i f ic 
measurement o f t ime, one 's state o f m i n d lends very d i f ferent characteristics to 
the passage o f t ime. A per iod o f t ime may seem to pass more s low ly or more 
qu ick ly i n a var iety o f circumstances. Measurement then does not o f fer a 
suf f ic ient explanat ion fo r the experience o f the passage o f t ime. The solut ion o f 
memory is a l luded to at 17.22: th ings that are past and future i n some sense do not 
'7 " D M O ergo ilia tempora, præteritum et futurum, quomodo sunt, quando et præteritum iam mn 
est et futurum nondum est? Praesens autem si semper esset praesens пес in praeteritum transirei, 
non iam esset tempus, sed aeternitas. Si ergo praesens, ut tempus sit, ideo fit, quia in praeteritum 
transit, quomodo 'et hoc esse dicimus, cui causa, ut sit, ilia est, quia non erit, ut scilicet non vera 
dīcamus tempus esse, nisi quia tendit non esse!" 
" o :Da ļy (1981), p. 173. 
" On the fleeting present, see O'Daly (1981), p. 172. 
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exist since they are not present, and yet they are knowable , by recol lect ion and 
expectat ion based on "s igns or causes" o f what is to come . 2 0 August ine concludes 
that, because there is a k i nd o f knowledge, there is a presence, even o f what is 
str ict ly speaking not "present . " Intel lectual presence is not restr icted by physical 
presence. Thus when grammarians speak o f three tenses, past, present and future, 
they speak loosely ("nee proprie dicitur") o f what are in fact three modes o f 
presence " i n the s o u l " ("in animď). 
The cont inu i ty p rov ided by memory is essential for knowledge, and yet i t 
also paints a mis leading picture. Grammarians speak as though the three major 
tenses are states o f equal rea l i ty ; by this August ine alludes to the misconcept ion o f 
those w h o cr i t ic ize the idea o f a princípium. For creatures, a certain appearance 
o f cont inu i ty , or extension, is necessary i n order for t ime to be measured, and this 
extension is clearly a func t ion o f memory . A n analogy emerges between d iv ine 
and human k n o w m g , but i t begins immediate ly to fa i l , because fo r God there no 
past or fu ture, neither is there an "extended present" as there is f o r man. The ' 
extension o f the present preserves what is f r o m becoming what- is-not in a 
discursive perspective. Here August ine ventures his most mis leading rhetor ical 
quest ion. Is t ime this very extension? "F/ i /eo igitur quandam esse distentiomm. 
Sed video? An videre mihi videor?" The use o f the verb videre distances the 
speaker, delays a commi tment : " I see that t ime is some sort o f stretching; do I see 
this? Or does i t seem to me that I see th is?"^ ' Wh i l e he can observe the 
^"11.18.24. 
՜ ՛ As a definit ion, this idea is rejected by the biblical example provided in chapter 23.30, when 
God makes the sun stand stil l unti l a battle runs its course. What does the mot ion o f phy sical 
bodies which mark the passage o f t ime have to do wi th our experience o f time? Nothing, 
according to O'Daly (1981), p. 175. "Whatever the precise relation o f the unit dies maybe to solar 
movement, the equation o f t ime w i th movement by the Aoพо doctm fails to distinguish between 
time qua measurable duration or change and time qua time unit." 
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movement o f the bodies w h i c h mark the passage o f t ime, August ine cannot seem 
to iden t i f y wha t he means by t ime itself: " I measure what I do not k n o w " , he 
says.^^ 
A t 26.33, he is very careful to c la r i fy his pos i t ion : indeed, to the 
perce iv ing subject, t ime seems l ike a stretcMng out , a mak ing-contmuous o f the 
present moment and therefore o f the perce iv ing m i n d itself. Bu t wha t this m igh t 
mean, August ine says, is sometMng marvelous to h i m : "inde mihi visum est nihil 
esse aliud tempus quam dìstentionem: sed cuius rei, néscio, et mirum, si non 
ipsìus animi'' To say that the measurement o f t ime , or even the existent ial 
apprehension o f the passage o f t ime, is a func t ion o f the m i n d is hard ly radical or 
h is tor ica l ly nove l . What is remarkable about th is observation? August ine has 
c lar i f ied the sense in w h i c h past and filture do not actual ly exist, and he reminds 
h imse l f again at 27.34 that the present i t se l f "does not s tand" , but is fleeting and 
w i t hou t real extension. I t is therefore a w o r k o f memory to perceive and " f i x " i n 
the m i n d a th ing : '^sed aliquid in memoria mea metior, quod infixum manet,'' 
What is k n o w n and real ly present to the m i n d is what is past. M e m o r y provides a 
stable ground for the m ind ' ร knowledge o f creat ion, since i t mediates what needs 
to be ready at hand to the m ind . Someth ing is comprehensible because i t has been 
comprehended. L o o k i n g back to the mode l o f dialect ic i n ord, the trope o f 
synthesis here predominates.'^^ M e m o r y a l lows the m i n d to judge by un i f y i ng , 
since i t can contain a dist inct beginn ing and end 24 
'M 1.26.33. 
23 【n this sense alone is time measured in the mind; cf. 27.36: "in te, anime meus, tempora mea 
metiorľ This is not "subjectivist"; i f anything, it demonstrates that knowledge for Augustine is 
not idealist and abstract. This also speaks against Chadwick's comparison o f Augustine and 
Plotinus (p. 242) to the effect that t ime simply "doesn't exist outside the soul." Rather, 
August in๙ร intentions here are exposed as chiefly epistemologica! and spir іณal, 
2 4 1 1.28.37. Thus a period o f time seems to be long because it now seems to be long, though it be 
entirely expired. 
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August ine tel ls h imse l f that t ime is either the present measurement o f a 
past th ing , or else he is not actual ly measur ing t ime at a l l . Bo th o f these seem 
true: we have observed h o w he dist inguishes between t ime as such and its 
measurement. Bu t he is speaking o f the latter as more than a psychological event. 
M e m o r y makes the experience o f the discursive in te l l ig ib le ; temporal experience, 
otherwise, is a flux, an undi f ferent iated mess. O n the other hand, memory gives 
rise to a falsehood necessary for scientia. I t lends the present a sense o f 
permanence that i t does not i n fact possess, and there is a cost for this necessary 
misapprehension, bo th spir i tual and inte l lectual . August ine sees that memory 
cannot o f fe r h i m the sapieหtia that he seeks, the meditaţia so l ike the peace o f 
d iv ine w i sdom. I t grants on ly a l im i ted stabi l i ty , i n w h i c h the present is 
constantly s l ipp ing away. "See h o w m y l i fe is a distract ion {distentio) i n several 
d i rec t ions ! " A t th is essential moment , August ine appealร again to the Mediator , 
by w h o m he w o u l d (a) come to k n o w , or approach, the God " w h o is One" ; (b) be 
h imse l f gathered in to un i ty , preserved f r o m the " o l d th ings" i n a ho ly " f o rge t t i ng " ; 
and (c) be no longer distracted, but instead "extended through t i m e " as one w h o is 
"a t ten t ive" ("secundum attentionem") to what is "before."^^ 
Several th ings are go ing on i n this chapter. August ine expresses his desire 
to ๒10พ G o d as a w o r k o f grace, by w h i c h he is gathered into the un i ty o f Chr is t 
( ш quo et adprehenรนร sum), the W o r d th rough w h o m the creation o f many th ings 
(multa) is ef fected i n a un i f ied and simple manner. The mysterious juncture o f the 
W o r d i n creat ion, the '"mirus" o f the princípium, is the hope and the means o f the 
2 5 1 1.29.39. "Sed quoniam melior est misericordia tua super vitas, ecce distentio est vita mea, et 
me suscepit dextera tua in domino meo, mediatore f i l i o hominis inter te mum et nos muitos, m 
multis per multa, ut per eum adprehendam, in quo et adprehensus sum, et a veteribus diebus 
colligar sequem unum, praeterita oblitus, non in ea quae futura et transìtura sunt, sed in ea quae 
ante sunt non distentus, sed extentus, non secundum dìstentionem, sed secundum mtentionem 
sequor ad palmam súperme vocationis, ubi audiam vocem laudis et contempler delectationem 
tuam пес venientem пес preatereunteiท." 
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d iv ine gather ing- in to-uni ty . Th is gathering is described as a translat ion f r o m the 
o l d to the new, indeed as a t ransformat ion f r o m memory as a mode o f be ing that 
holds together the f ragmentat ion o f temporal existence into memory as a 
perspective that is st i l l d iscursive, but somehow who le , cont inuous and focused. 
Clear ly Augus t ine wants to find in the not ion o f " f o rge t t i ng " a transcendence that 
images the aeterna ratio֊the d iv ine perspective on t ime described i n the earlier 
chapters o f the book. A t ransformat ion o f memory is thus at the heart o f the idea 
o f spi r i tual attentiveness as a way to be in time yet not subject to time, and as such 
memory takes on a r i ch ly metaphor ical d imension. The " b e f o r e " to w h i c h 
August ine refers m igh t be the "onto log ica i before" to w h i c h the cr i t ics pose the 
i l l -conce ived quest ion: "wha t was God do ing before he created?" A s such, this 
w o u l d be a non- tempora l p r io r i t y that August ine is seeking, a p r io r i t y o f causal i ty: 
the aeterna ratio i tse l f i n act. There is also a d imens ion o f final causal i ty, or 
eschatology proper ly speaking: " fo rget t ing the past and m o v i n g not towards those 
future th ings w h i c h are transi tory but to the ' th ings w h i c h are before m e ' . . . . So I 
'pursue the pr ize o f the h igh ca l l i ng ' where I 'may hear the voice o f praise' and 
'contemplate your de l i gh t ' . " Hav ing acknowledged this real i ty , he then retreats: 
Bu t n o w m y years pass i n groans and y o u , L o r d , are m y consolat ion. Y o u 
are m y etemal Father, but I am scattered in t imes whose order I do not 
understand. The s torm o f incoherent events tear to pieces my thoughts, the 
inmost entrai ls o f m y soul , un t i l that day when , pu r i f i ed and mo l ten by the 
fire o f your love, I flow together and merge into you.^^ 
M e m o r y cannot prov ide a way to overcome the condi t ions o f the tempora l : i t is 
anthropolog ica l fact, and spi r i tual d i lemma. B y memory , the temporal becomes 
in te l l ig ib le , and possibly the foundat ion for a scientia. Bu t i t also signif ies what is 
2 6 11.29.39. ' พ И П С vero ami mei in gemitibus, et tu solacium meum, domine, pater meus aeternus 
es; at ego in tempora dissilui, quorum ordinem néscio, et íumultuosis varietatibus dilaทiantur 
cogitatïones meae, intima viscera anirnae meae, donee in te confluam purgatus et liquidus igne 
amoriร tui." 
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fo r August ine the tragedy o f the tempora l : the sense o f loss, the f rustrat ion o f 
distance, the dramatic unl ikeness o f the human and d iv ine perspectives o f 
creat ion. Th is is the negative conclus ion to this book, as con f i rmed i n the final 
chapter (31.41) , i n w h i c h August ine describes the manner i n w h i c h he remembers 
and recites a psalm. W h e n he does th is , he knows the who le psa lm i n his 
memory , even though his reci tat ion passes th rough each verse successively. Does 
G o d k n o w t ime i n this manner? N o ; G o d knows i n a better and more myster ious 
manner, " be fo re " a l l t imes: '"longe mirabilius, longeque secretius." The 
compar ison fa i ls ; there can be no scientia o f the eternal. W e un i f y by memory , 
but w e experience this uni ty i n a l im i ted manner as a "s t retch ing ou t " : we are 
therefore distracted, exper iencing the uncertainty o f a var iety o f af fect ions 
{perturbationes animi), m i n d inconstant i n the desire to attend to what is. 
M e m o r y is necessary, but i t declares the m i n d ' s inab i l i t y to understand 
{adprehendere) h o w G o d could create sine varietate notitiae. A n d so August ine 
concludes by pray ing that God w i l l "heal h is eyes" and remove the "consequences 
o f h is s i n . " 
Is this largely negative conc lus ion unexpected? Have we advanced 
beyond the conclusion o f the tenth book , i n w h i c h Chr is t was o f fe red as a promise 
o f med ia t ion , a means o f spir i tual un ion and personal integrat ion? Th is book also 
concludes w i t h the promise o f mediation——a necessary humi l i t y , the a f f i rmat ion 
that G o d dwe l ls i n the l o w l y : " y o u l i f t up those w h o are cast d o w n , and those 
w h o m y o u ra ise. . . cannot fa l l d o w n . " The di f ference between d iv ine and human 
w i t h w h i c h the book concludes c lear ly has a propaedeutic d imens ion. The cr i t ics 
o f the Cathol ic understanding o f creat ion fa i l i n precisely in that they judge the 
act ion o f the d ivme by the categories o f human k n o w i n g . August ine is clearly 
188 
wr i t i ng fo r the Church , and his cr i t ics need the preparat ion o f hum i l i t y even more 
dramat ical ly than August ine h imsel f . B u t is the promised reward only 
eschatological? W i l l Augus t ine "stand and f i n d stabi l i ty and so l id i t y " i n the t ru th 
and i n his o w n person on ly at the end o f his days?^^ When w i l l t ru th , un i ty , order, 
be made incarnate i n his o w n soul and body? 
There is however a ver i table analogy between memory as the experience 
of disteทtio, and the d iv ine eterni ty. T h o u g h i t seems contrary to Augus t ine 'ร 
purposes, i t is essential to the a r g u m e n t 2 8 Nevertheless, August ine leaves the 
reader w i t h the humb l i ng impression o f the unl ikeness o f the human and the 
d iv ine. Is the argument concern ing memory merely negative, as о 'Da ly argues? 
The twe l f t h book begins to show h o w G o d gathers what is many into one. The 
hope for th is is found in the eleventh book not on ly i n the necessary preparat ion o f 
humi l i t y , but i n the fact that G o d creates in princípium, i n his W o r d ֊ t h r o u g h 
w h i c h W o r d , in person and i n Scr ipture, he seeks to br ing man back to h i m again. 
A resolut ion to the spir i tual p rob lem posed by memory is avai lable, and i t is far 
f r o m abstract. I t is summed up i n the W o r d as scripture, i n its abi l i ty to f o r m the 
anima t h rough meditaţia, and i n i ts sacramental presence to the commun i t y o f the 
Church. Because o f th is , distentio need not be s imply a ruthless distract ion, but 
rather can become an "a t ten t i on " (intentio). Th is must be achieved precisely 
through the meditatio that Augus t ine expresses his desire for , both at the 
conclusion o f the tenth book, and at the opening o f the eleventh book. A real , 
albeit l im i ted , un ion o f the temporal and eternal is thus promised through an 
11.30.40. ''Et stabo atque solidabor in te, in forma mea, veritate tua." Note how human " f o r m " 
and divine ' 4 ա է հ " are parallel in this construction; their identification is what is promised by 
God's "stabi l i ty." 
Cf. Sorabji (1983), p. 30, who identifies an apparent confusion o f рифозе at the conclusion to 
this book. 
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understanding o f the mechanism o f memory . The t w e l f t h book looks to the 
renovat ion o f memory as intentio as a way to engage the via o f the incarnate 
mediator. 
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C H A P T E R 9: 
CONFESSIONES 12 and 13: T I M E , M A T T E R , 
A N D A SCIENTIA O F s c ผ P T U R E 
The final two books o f conf. are r i ch and themat ica l ly complex. Our 
intent ion is to consider on ly those facets w h i c h contr ibute to the argument that 
these books do indeed prov ide a coherent answer to the promise o f mediat ion 
of fered at the conclusion o f the tenth book. These books are not d i rect ly about 
memory as are the tenth and eleventh. However , w e have argued that the 
discussion o f eternity and tempora l i ty i n the eleventh book extends to the cosmic 
level the way i n w h i c h memory describes the l ikeness and unl ikeness o f the 
creature to God : the ab i l i ty o f the j u d g i n g m i n d to conta in what is passing in t ime 
before the m ind ' s eye as a memory o f what is past; and the almost tragic sense i n 
w h i c h the tMng desired by the m i n d has, i n i tself , already passed into non-being. 
August ine of fers i n the eleventh book the poss ib i l i ty o f an analogy between 
human and d iv ine know ing , but concludes w i t h a sharp reminder o f radical 
d i f ference. The question concern ing memory thus becomes: h o w can man, who is 
discursive i n his way o f k n o w i n g , be brought into un i ty w i t h the d iv ine in its 
s impl ic i ty? O f course, this is not exc lus ive ly a quest ion concerning memory , nor 
do we mean to reduce it to the same. 
A number o f scholars, O 'Donne l l among them, find i n the f ina l three 
books o f conf. a t r in i tar ian pattern by w h i c h each book corresponds i n some way 
w i t h each person o f the T r in i t y i n tu rn . These schemes are he lp fu l , but of ten do 
not expla in as much as they hope to. I n an obv ious sense, the f ina l book certainly 
br ings out the dist inct ive role o f the H o l y Spir i t i n the act o f creat ion. W e want to 
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show that a certain internal log ic mot ivates the progressive revelat ion o f the 
dist inct persons o f the T r i n i t y , and that the conclus ion to the argument o f conf. is 
not the H o l y Spir i t as such, but rather the v is ion o f God , the T r in i t y ent ire, as 
something that is perfect ly one, and yet by nature able to embrace "d i s t i nc t i on . " I t 
is this promise that is g l impsed on ly inchoately i n the verax mediator o f the 
conclusion o f the tenth book. 
These books are also, o f course, about Scripture. Some readers find the 
extended hermeneutic discussion i n the t w e l f t h book to be an ar t fu l but awkward 
impos i t ion on the central discussion o f formless matter and the caelum caeli. The 
two рифозев, however , come together. August ine is put t ing his o w n hermeneut ic 
into act ion, and thereby o f fe r ing i t as a mode l for what the confessional meditaţia 
o f the Cføis t ian commun i t y m igh t look l i ke . We are of fered a picture o f the 
Church i n w h i c h men o n earth are const i tuted, albeit i n a l im i ted manner, in a 
membership i n the caelum caeli, the c i ty o f God. The t r in i tar ian w o r k o f formatio 
in creat ion is seen to paral le l the w o r k o f reformatio o f souls in the l i fe o f the 
Church. I n August ine 's o w n meditaţia, w e see the "d is t rac t ion" o f memory 
become the "a t ten t ion " o f sure a f fec t ion , and his o w n m i n d , once a narrat ive o f 
recol lected past events, translated hopefu l l y into the " i n ten t iona l " memory o f the 
Church. 
The desire for un ion w i t h the Father is thus no longer s imply a matter o f 
anthropology or epistemology. Augus t ine 'ร hermeneutic attempts to overcome a 
convent ional barr ier between the pr ivate and the publ ic . Un i t y is n o w a matter o f 
ecclesiology. The embrac ing o f a new paradigm is the cond i t ion for the v i s ion o f 
the T r i n i t y in the th i r teenth book. 
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W e w i l l proceed in four short sections intended to b r ing out the movement 
o f resolut ion in the argument. A g a i n , this is not an exhaust ive, sc ient i f ic 
commentary o f these texts: this w o u l d be impossib le i n such a short space. ^  These 
sections w i l l consider August ine 'ร discussion o f formless matter, the heaven o f 
heavens, the metaphor ical d imension o f Scr ipture, and f ina l l y the T r i n i t y as i t 
br ings to comp le t ion the w o r k o f conversion and un ion w i t h God . 
I. บทlikeness: formless matter 
The cont inu i ty o f content between the eleventh and twe l f t h books is the 
cont inu i ty between the concepts o f t ime and matter. Th is is best summed up by 
Sol ignac (p. 600) : 
Bref , pour Augus t in , la mat ière֊tout comme le temps dont l 'être est 
tendance à ne pas être (11.14.17)֊֊est une réalité paradoxale, nous d i r ions 
au jou rd 'hu i dialectique', n i négat ion pure, n i réalite déf in ie , mais négativité 
dynamique. En tant que négativité, el le d i t absence totale de fo rme, 
in fo rmi té absolue; en tant que négat iv i té dynamique^ el le est le pr inc ipe de 
la mutab i l i té , la mutabi l i té même et la capacité de recevoir les formes. Ces 
deux aspects apparaissent c lairement dans les deux formules que suggère 
Augus t in : en tant que négat iv i té, el le est nihil\ en tant que dynamique, el le 
cst aliquid; en tant que dynamique, el le est; en tant que négat iv i té, el le 
ท 'estpas. C'est ce que Plot in expr imai t en une autre fo rmu la t ion : "e l le est 
déjà selon qu 'e l le est à venir , mais son être est seulement cet à-venir 
a imoncé" {Enn, 2.5.5). 
' On the last two books o f conf., there is a variety o f literature, mostly thematic. O f a more textual 
nature, see F. Cayré'ร article, "Le l ivre X I I I des Confessions , in Revue des Études Augustimennes 
2 (1956), pp. 143-161; A. Solignac, In Principio (Études Augustiniennes: Paris, 1973), especially 
"Exégèse et métaphysique Genèse I， 1-3 chez saint Augustin , pp. 153-171; L. Pera, La creazione 
simultanea e virtuale secondo ร. Agostino (Biblioteca Augustiniana: Florence, 1934); G. Haendler, 
"Der Schöpftingsgedanke in den Konfessionen Augustins , in Beiträge zur Theologie in 
Geschichte und Gegenwart ( พ . Piecie Universität: Rostock, 1976), pp. 33-41 ; E. Katayanagi, 
'"Conversió in creation๔\ in Studies Խ Medieval Thought 25 (】983)， pp. 59-79; c . Boyer, 
"Éternité et création dans les trois derniers livres des Confessions'', m Giornale di Metafìsica 9 
(1954), pp. 441-448. The best monograph on the themes o f these books is that o f Marie-Arme 
Vannier, Creatio, conversió, formatio, chez ร. Augustin (Editions Universitaires: Fribourg, 1991); 
by her own account, she is deeply influenced by the work o f G. Madec (especially relevant here is 
La Patrie et la Ko/e (Desclée de Brouwer: Paris, 1989)). 
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The importance o f creat ion ex nihiio fo r August ine cannot be overstated.^ O n the 
side o f the creator, i t emphasizes G o d ' ร gracioนsness i n h is w o r k : that he is bound 
by no necessity, but rather is moved by an abundance o f goodness. Omnipotence 
is demonstrated in the fact that noth ing is required fo r the w o r k o f creat ion outside 
o f the d iv ine nature. O n the side o f the creature, there is a radical sense o f 
dependency on the e f f ic ient and fo rma l causal i ty o f God . Th is much can be taken 
for granted as Cathol ic o r thodoxy on the topic o f creat ion for August ine 's 
audience. 
August ine defends the idea o f a formless matter out o f w h i c h things are 
made for several reasons. A t the very least, he th inks i t is s c r i p t o a l . Wh i l e he 
clearly means to make sense o f h is ph i losophica l heri tage, there is no manifest 
anxiety about fo rc ing Neopla ton ic ideas into a Chr is t ian f ramework : his w o r k here 
is not or ig inal i n its basics, nor do we find h i m compromis ing his or thodoxy for 
the sake o f concessions, say, to Plotinus.^ T o be sure, formless matter is created 
by God. I f August ine clear ly maintains that God is the o r ig in o f the who le 
creat ion, why introduce seemingly needless dist inct ions? For our o w n l im i ted 
purposes, the signi f icance o f formless matter, comparable to the p r imord ia l 
"chaos" o f Timaeuร, l ies i n the fact that a fundamenta l negat iv i ty underpins every 
creaturely wo rk . Th is is the negat iv i ty , the non-be ing, that August ine experiences 
as an embodied creature w i t h i n t ime i n the eleventh book. The negat iv i ty o f 
2 The literature on this subject is vast; see the bibliography in Vannier. On creation ex mhilo 
specifically, see H.A. Wolfson, "The mean๒g o f ex nihiio in the Church fathers, Arabic and 
Hebrew philosophy and s. Thomas", in Medieval Studies in Honour of J.D.M. Ford (Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, 1948), pp. 355-370; G. May, Schöpfung aus dem Nichts (Die 
Entstehung der Lehre von der creano ex mhilo) ( พ . de Gruyter: Berl in, 1978); G. Pel land, Cinq 
études d'Augustin sur le début de la Genèse (Bel larmin: Montreal, 1972); พ . Α . Christian, 
"Augustme on the creation o f the wor ld " , in The Harvard Theological Review 46 (1953), pp. 1-25. 
3 On matter in general, see the wri t ings o f Kevin Comgan (1996) and A .H . Armstrong, especially 
theiatter in "Spiritual or mtell igible matter in Plotinus and ร. Augustine", in Augustmus Magister 
1 (1954), pp. 277-283. 
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t ime 's passage therefore expresses the otherness, or unl ikeness, o f the creature i n 
terms o f a language that is more "spa t ia l " than tempora l : formless matter is 
described as " fa r o f f f r o m God , because i t is " u n l i k e " God."^ I t introduces a 
further aspect to the sense o f radical dependency o f the creature upon the Creator, 
because apart f r o m fo rma l causal i ty (associated most o f ten w i t h the W o r d ) , the 
creature is essentially next - to-noth ing. The creature is const i tuted by a 
combinat ion o f an act ive and a passive element, bo th o f w h i c h are traced to d iv ine 
causality. 
Augus t ine 'ร informitas is d i f ferent f r o m Ar is to t le 's hypokeimenon, but 
does sound remarkably l i ke his understanding o f matter as potency, i.e. as 
sometMng that does not exist i n real i ty , but on ly as an intel lectual pr inc ip le . A n d 
August ine does mean to exp la in i t as a pr inc ip le for thought mere ly : there is no 
passage o f t ime between the creat ion o f formless matter and the i n fo rm ing o f 
matter by the w o r k o f the T r in i t y . They are i n effect dist inct on l y i n pr inc ip le . 
There can be no substance in nature w i thout f o r m . A l t h o u g h described as 
"mat te r " , formless matter is non-physical as such 5 , not sensible and therefore not 
real ly knowable^; i t is a pr inc ip le o f "distance f r o m G o d " compared to the absence 
o f sound or l ight^, and yet not ent i re ly noth ing, because i t is "someth ing between 
f o r m and n o t h i n g " ("Żฑfôr formam et ուհւԲ)Ւ 
The key image is the "d is tance" or unlikeness, w h i c h subsequently 
underl ies a l l creat ion even though i t is in fo rmed by the W o r d as the pr inc ip le o f 







fixed place on this scale, whether closer to "noth ingness" at its base, or closer to 
G o d at its summi t ^ To be closer to God is to be more l i ke h i m in nature; but 
every th ing, even the heaven o f heavens, that f i rs t , purely inte l lectual creature, 
admits o f some measure o f the informitas w h i c h is the ab id ing "var iableness" o f 
what is other than God. 
On ly later does August ine say that formless matter should not be discussed 
apart f r o m the exp l ic i t creative roles o f the persons o f the T r i n i t y . W h y then 
begin an account o f creation in this way here? Because the account o f creat ion 
o f fered here is not merely a metaphor for the soul 's j ou rney f r o m the darkness o f 
sin to the l igh t o f heavenly presence; i t is actual ly the story o f the convers ion o f 
the soul as a coming- in to-be ing, a real izat ion o f i ts паШге, o f its intended species. 
The soul begins in a place o f unl ikeness, and comes to a reg ion o f l ight . I t is not 
the case that the soul occupies a fluid place on the scale o f be ing. Rather, i t has 
not yet attained the fu l f i l lmen t o f its intended f o r m . 
П. Likeness: the heaven of heavens 
The caelum caeli is described as a "cer ta in intel lectual creature" {'^aliqua 
creatura wtellectualis՝՝), and the created w i s d o m o f God Csapientiďy, i t is not 
co-etemal w i t h God, but partakes o f eterni ty by a par t ic ipat ion by contemplat ion. 
I t possesses the var iabi l i ty o f every other creature, yet at the same t ime , by 
" i n h e r i n g " i n God , i t rises above the mutab i l i t y o f t ime, indeed, rising above its 
o w n nature: "particeps tamen aeternitatis tuae, valde mutabilitatem suam prae 
dulcedine felicissimae contemplationis tuae cohibet, et sine ullo lapsu, ex quo 
՚ 12.7.7. 
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facta est, inhaerendo tibi, excedit отпет volubilem vìcissitนdinem temporum "^^ 
Th is heaven is created i n t ime, but also in a special way before t ime since, f r o m 
the first moment o f its existence, i t "c leaves" to God in an act o f adorat ion. 
I t is by grace then that the heaven o f heavens enjoys its stabi l i ty ; i t is not 
something possessed by nature. A fundamental var iab i l i ty remains. The "chaos" 
too was created before t ime, but i t is considered to be extra-temporal by v i r tue o f 
an absence o f " f i gu re or order." Once the special stams o f the heaven o f heavens 
is introduced in the twe l f t h book (10.10) , August ine prays for the g i f t o f 
i l l umina t ion : the t i m i n g o f th is prayer is del iberate. The heaven o f heavens seems 
to promise exactly what August ine is seeking, namely , a state o f contemplat ion 
whereby the natural condi t ions o f knowledge are at once fu l f i l l ed and overcome. 
B u t h o w is this possible? He does not yet see a way , and so he describes h imse l f 
as to rn between darkness and l ight . I n the f o r m and beauty o f mater ial th ings, he 
has come to see the hand o f a d iv ine creator, and " remember H i m " ; even mutable, 
mater ial things can ho ld together the negat iv i ty o f creaณrely existence w i t h the 
beauty o f f o rm. A t t imes, August ine has b lamed intel lectual errors about the 
nature o f mater ial th ings for ho ld ing h i m back f r o m G o d : i t is clear that 
intel lectual errors are condi t ional upon the pr ior issue o f the disorder o f the w i l l . 
August ine sees h imse l f as standing a lways at the b r ink o f a p i t o f darkness into 
w h i c h he w o u l d descend by reason o f the def ic ient causality o f his errant w i l l . " 
He is the "cause" o f the d i f f i cu l t y o f his o w n spir i tual state. 
12.9.9. This passage suggests that, although Augustine does not go into any detail here about 
the fall o f the angels and the founding o f the two "cit ies", he has nevertheless worked through this 
matter in his own mmd. Note also that, in addition to the term "inhaerendo" Augustine favours 
the term '"cohaerendo" to describe how the creature "c l ings" to God. 
" Again, it is in ciu., 12.1.1, ff., that Augustine describes in greater detail the idea o f sinft j l choice 
as a form o f deficient causality. 
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H o w then, he asks, can the heaven o f heavens accept its natural 
distinctness f r o m God and yet peaceful ly enjoy such an in t imacy? Chapters 11.11 
through 13.16 consider this matter, and conclude w i t h a t ransi t ion to a defense o f 
August ine 's hermeneut ic o f Scripture. August ine is also here arguing fo r the 
scr iptural basis and congrui ty o f the idea o f a heaven o f heavens as a f i rst сгеаШге, 
though its creat ion is not exp l ic i t l y ment ioned in the f i rst verses o f Genesis. 
The essential po in t is that the heaven o f heavens, or the creatures w h i c h 
inhabi t this dwe l l i ng , do not lose their natural "mu tab i l i t y " , but w i t h their who le 
heart, their who le a f fect ion ( "m affectu էօէօ՝՝՝), are filled w i t h God . G o d alone is 
immor ta l , and therefore has an immor ta l and immutab le w i l l . Th is is not the case 
for the heaven o f heavens: its w i l l is " f i x e d " by grace, not by nature, and by th is 
same grace i t "keeps i t s e l f , or " i s conta ined" tener). Thus, " hav ing neither 
anyth ing in the future to expect, nor convey ing anyth ing i t remembers into the 
past, i t is neither altered by any change, nor distracted by any t imes. " ' ^ The 
heaven o f heavens does not share the d iv ine perspective on t ime, i.e. eterni ty i n 
the fu l lest sense o f possessing an immutable w i l l . Rather i t possesses a satisfied 
will, because its w i l l is f i l l ed w i t h the God who is everywhere present and at w o r k . 
I n this scenario, memory is not destroyed, but rest f i i l ly focused on what is 
"present" to i t . The natural var iab i l i ty o f discursive knowledge remains, but its 
negat iv i ty is purged o f the possibi l i ty o f distract ion, anxiety and a sensed 
incompleteness. Th is is what August ine desires i n his meditaţia, and what he d id 
not yet see as a possib i l i ty i n the eleventh book: a w i l l at peace. August ine wants 
to share in the attributes o f the caelum caeli: he wants to e f fec t ive ly rise above the 
l imi ta t ions o f his nature by being f i xed พ affectu. Mus t the v is i ta t ion o f God 's 
՚ 2 12.11.12. ' พ o « hábem futurum quod expectei пес in praeteritum traiciem quod memmerit, 
nulla vice variatur пес in tempora ulla distenditur." 
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domus awai t the l i fe that is entirely free o f the negative aspects o f embodied l i fe? 
The on ly way fo r August ine to hope that his meditatio m igh t b r ing a measure o f 
peace to h is w i l l is by submission o f h is se l f to the l i fe o f G o d that is already at 
w o r k i n h i m . He has said as much before, but there is a new and pract ical 
d imens ion that w i l l serve the real izat ion o f th is project : the commun i t y o f the 
Church . 
I l l , Scripture as a metaphor of the Church 
I n these books, August ine presents what he sees as a novel parad igm o f 
t ru th. I n th is, he submits an epistemic scheme to the fu l l y theological concept ion 
o f Veritas fami l ia r f r o m the tenth book o f conf. W e tu rn to a contemporary 
Augus t in ian as an example and quasi-e lucidat ion o f this paradigm. Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, w r i t i ng in Wahrheit นnd Methode, describes a manner i n w h i c h t ruth 
can be seen as fundamental ly communa l , w i thou t being histor ic ist or relat iv ist ic i n 
nature. F rom a rich wel lspr ing o f ancient Stoic and m o d e m German sources, 
m ixed w i t h V i c o and an authentical ly August in ian concept ion o f memory , 
Gadamer challenges Hegel 's project as one that mtends a "comple te mastery o f 
substance."*"* Gadamer is ma in ly concerned w i t h the epistemologica! 
consequences o f such a project. I n l ook ing fo r a " n e w " , post-Enl ightenment 
picture o f rat ional i ty , Gadamer abstracts the fundamental ly h istor ical nature o f 
consciousness f r o m Hegel , and attempts to marry i t w i t h the "sensus communis'" 
13 First published in 1960; trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (Continuum: New 
York, 1995), 
'4 That is, the project o f tracing the necessary, progressivist and historical emergence o f the Idea, 
and conveniently f ind๒g its Гілаї fhaition in the writ ings o f Hegel himself; cf. Truth and Method, 
p. 15. Note that on p. 16, Gadamer writes: " I t is t ime to rescue the phenomenon o f memory from 
bēinģrēgārdēd merely as a psychological faculty and to see it as an essential element o f the finite 
historical being o f man." 
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o f V i co . ' ^ B y this account, knowledge is possible on ly by v i r tue o f the shared 
"p re jud ice" ( in the e tymolog ica l l y str ict sense), the shared language, o f a g i ven 
commun i ty . Rat ional i ty presupposes a t rad i t ion, or a culture (Bildung); i t is i n this 
idea o f h istor ical cul ture that Gadamer locates a basic openness to what is "o the r " 
and more t ru ly universal . 
I t embraces a sense o f p ropor t ion and distance i n relat ion to itself, and 
hence consists i n r is ing above i tse l f to universal i ty. To distance onesel f 
f r o m onesel f and f r o m one's pr ivate pmposes means to look at these i n the 
way that others see them. This universal i ty is by no means the universal i ty 
o f the concept or understanding. Th is is not a case o f a part icular be ing 
determined by a universa l ; noth ing is p roved conclusively. The universal 
v iewpo in ts to w h i c h the cul t ivated man (gebildet) keeps h imse l f open are 
not a fixed appl icable yardst ick, but are present to h i m only as the 
v iewpo in ts o f possible others. 1 
Instead o f the umversa l i ty o f the "concept " , Gadamer is po in t ing to the concrete 
universal i ty o f the group, the commun i ty . Thus he defines judgment as a 
submission o f many perspectives to one. Th is is very much akin to August ine; he 
is i n fact o f fe r ing an account o f rat ional i ty that is very classical, i n wh i ch rhetor ic 
takes on a who le new importance as a means by พ Ы с һ the whole man is ordered 
to what is t ru th fu l . The mode l is phronesis: a k i nd o f w i sdom that "presupposes a 
d i rect ion o f the w i l l , mora l be ing 
Cul ture , or historia, must accompl ish a great deal for Gadamer. For 
August ine, i t is the double l aw o f love o f G o d and love o f neighbour that moves 
the heart to submi t to the t ru th. However , this law is on ly real ized concretely i n 
the histor ical and physical real i ty o f the Church. A t the conclusion o f the tenth 
book, August ine sees i n the Incarnat ion the total demand o f self-denial , o f self-
" p . 19. 
' ^ . 1 7 . ' 
17 P. 22. Gadamer also discusses the importance o f an " intu i t ional" dimension o f knowledge, one 
which again presupposes a classical anthropology o f the whole person; he describes this (after the 
18* century theologian, Oetinger) as a knowledge " o f the heart. This resonates wi th Augustir ie'ร 
use oí cor throughout the later books o f coņf. 
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empty ing . I n the Church , he has the concrete means by w h i c h this can come to 
pass. Otherwise, fa i th i n the incarnate Christ remains over ly abstract. Th is is 
what the chapters on b ib l i ca l hermeneutics in the twe l f t h book seek to 
demonstrate. 
Pract ical ly speaking, these chapters are not therefore about t ru th , but about 
un i ty as a means to the t ruth. August ine urges readers to remain open to a var iety 
o f possible іпїефгеЇаЇІ0П8 o f Genesis; at the same t ime, he defends the internal 
coherence o f his o w n interpretat ion. N o doubt he is convic ted o f its accuracy. 
However , he w i l l not ho l d i t at the expense o f the un i ty and ed i f ica t ion o f the 
fa i th fu l . Hence i t is important that he exp l ic i t ly c lar i f ies that he is w r i t i ng for the 
Church alone at th is po in t . He feels no need to defend either the " t ru th o f th ings 
or the t ru th o f s igns." The discussion is rather about the model o f commun i t y 
suggested by the hermeneut ic method. To ask, therefore, whether one or another 
interpretat ion o f a part icu lar text is ''the r ight in terpretat ion" is to ask precisely the 
w r o n g quest ion?^ Wha t is scripture for, August ine asks? I t is for the edi f icat ion 
o f the fa i th fu l , speci f ica l ly the increase o f the double love o f God and neighbour ' 
The reading o f scripture is an exercise in understanding not the m i n d o f the 
Conf. 12.16.23. 
' 9 23.32, where Augustine says that the faithft i l , knowing scripture to be a true revelation, can 
assume a reliable relation between signs and things, namely, between the divine works and Moses' 
expression o f the same. Augustine also says (24.33) that Moses himself could not possibly express 
adequately in language the fiill significance o f the things he seeks to represent. Augustine cannot 
see into the mind o f Moses, but he does not need to; having confidence that he expresses a " t rue" 
thing wel l ("ар/๙'), Augustine can say confidently that he has access to the truths o f scripture. 
Language is a necessary but limited tool; the words are not identical wi th the Word, for "out o f the 
narrowness o f language, the truth o f Scripture overflows and f i l ls everyone who seeks with t ruth." 
(27.37. " Խ narratio dispematoris tui sermocinaturis pluribuร profutura parvo sermoms modulo 
scatetfluenta liquidae veritatis...,՝"). See also 13.29.44: " O man, what my scripture says, I say. 
Yet scripture speaks ๒ time-conditioned language, and time does not touch my Word， existing 
wi th me ๒ an equal eternity." ("(9 homo, nempe quod scriptura mea dicit, ego dico. Et tamen illa 




mediate wr i te r (say, Moses) , but the m i n d o f God. I t is therefore an exercitatio m 
the submission o f the m i n d o f the reader to the t ru th revealed i n scripture. There 
can be many truths found in a part o f scripture, so long as these are an expression 
o f the heart 's submission to the d iv ine w i l l . Thus the sense o f " m u l t i p l i c i t y " is not 
relat iv ist ic, because the scope o f possible readings is l im i ted by the agreed 
or thodoxy o f the commun i t y o f readers. Nevertheless the epistemic staณร o f t ruth 
is ent i rely subordinate to the commun i t y as its end, precisely because i t is a 
commun i t y const iณted i n submission one to another in the act of submission to 
ի՚սէհ. The double l aw o f love has a single end. 
This reading echoes the discussion in conf. 10.23.33 about the love o f t ru th 
shared by a l l . Th is love, August ine finds, does not b r ing j o y because what men 
take to be the t ru th is o f ten not the t ru th . 
Bu t w h y is i t that ' t ru th engenders hatred'? W h y does your man who 
preaches what is true become to them an enemy when they love the happy 
l i fe w h i c h is s imp ly j o y grounded i n t ruth? Thie answer must be this: their 
love for t ru th takes the f o r m that they love something else and want this 
object o f their love to be the t ru th ; and because they do not w ish to be 
deceived, they do not w i s h to be persuaded that they are mistaken. A n d so 
they hate the t ru th fo r the sake o f the object w h i c h they love instead o f the 
t ruth. They love t ru th for the l igh t i t sheds, but hate i t when i t shows them 
up as being w r o n g ? ' 
August ine echoes this at 12.25.34, when he says that the p roud love an 
іп Їефге Іа ї іоп o f a scr iptural text because i t is theirs, and not because it is true. 
The added element o f the commun i t y , the other, structures the rebuke that the 
proud receive, for they are no longer " i n c o m m u n i o n " w h o love their o w n " t r u t h " 
s imply because it is theirs. The oneness o f t ru th is ref lected i n the uni ty o f the 
՜ ՛ 10.23.34. "Смг autem Veritas parit odium, et mimicus eis factus est homo tuus verum 
praedicans, cum ametur beata vita, quae non est nisi gaudium de ventate? Nisi quia sic amatur 
Veritas, ut, quicumque aliud amant, hoc quod amant velini esse veritatem, et quia falli ทalleni, 
mtìmt convinci, quodfalsi sint. ¡taque propteream rem oderunt veritatem, quam proveritate 
amant. Amaní earn lucentem, oderunt earn redarguentem." 
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commun i t y : ''quoniam in commune omnium est amatoris veritatis."^~ The t ru th is 
avai lable to a l l f reely i n scr ipture, but under the condi t ion that i t is received 
speci f ical ly not as privátam. The " p r i v a c y " o f ownership is refi ised i n favour o f 
being owned by the t ru th . 
Th is is h o w the t ru th , ident i f ied always i n the end w i t h Chr ist the W o r d , 
can conta in many i n its s imp l i c i t y : by the sel f -empty ing o f the sel f fo r the other. 
I t is th is se l f -empty ing (humilitas), we have observed, that August ine recognizes 
as the essential meaning o f the Incarnat ion. August ine has seen this o f fered as 
example; here i t is a deeply pract ical via. O n the hermeneutical leve l , August ine 
concludes that he must a lways i n pr inc ip le be open to a better interpretat ion than 
his o w n , and he prays to receive i t i n the proper manner, as a g i f t , rather than a 
possession?^ 
One suspects that the hermeneut ic diversi ty imagined by August ine is 
largely one o f va ry ing "dep ths " o f penetrat ion into the mysteries o f the text o f 
revelat ion. August ine , echoing Or igen and a long patrist ic t rad i t ion, insists that 
scripture del iberately speaks to var iously sk i l led readers at appropriate levels; thus 
he must accept and encourage sha l low or " c a m a l " readings o f complex texts, so 
long as they are undertaken i n fa i th , i.e. i n the context o f the agreed or thodoxy o f 
the community.^ ' ' August ine , however , is not so much concerned to d iv ide the 
faithful in to groups o f the ini t iate and unin i t ia te; more important is the image o f 
scripture as a dark forest w i t h depths innumerable, into w h i c h al l must j ou rney , 
" 12.25.34. 
23 12.32.43. Gadamer echoes this in his demand that one remain open to the scope o f possible 
іп іефгеїа і іопз by the "other"; cf. supra. 
՜" 12.27.37. One can see in this book that, whi le Augustine's reflections on creation clearly 
respond to Manichean positions concerning emanation and materialistic dualism, his thoughts 
ãboürthe nature o f Christian community are a correction o f the forms o f false community that he 
regularly encountered as a young man, as a teacher and academic. 
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but in to w h i c h a l l w i l l not journey to the same extent. Scr ipture must be fo r the 
Church not on l y a rel iable resource o f spir i tual r iches, but a depthless one that can 
feed the depthless hunger o f the l ov ing soul on its via ad pair iam. 
I n conc lus ion, i n this v i s i on o f the Church as a "hermeneut ic b o d y " that is 
un i f ied in its submission to the one t ruth, August ine sees the best instant iat ion o f 
the heaven o f heavens on earth that he can hope for. For this reason he cou ld not 
flee into the desert: here, i n the messy " m u l t i p l i c i t y " o f the communa l l i fe o f the 
Church , is the very hope o f un i ty , and therefore peace. 
IV. The Trinity: likeness and unHkeness abide in community 
F r o m the twe l f t h chapter (13.12.13) to the end o f the th i r teenth book , 
August ine engages i n an exercise i n al legor ical interpretat ion that is a lmost 
rapturous i n tone, and t ru ly an extended example o f h o w scripture is used to 
іп їефге ї scr ipture i n al legory. I n do ing th is , I th ink that August ine is 
demonstrat ing a part icular depth o f engagement w i t h the text: the al legor ical 
approach, far f r o m b e ๒ g arbi t rary, demonstrates the r i ch meaningft i lness o f the 
text o f revelat ion. The " l i t e r a l " meaning is not le f t beh ind; the text becomes a too l 
տ the te l l ing o f a story about the l i fe o f the soul as the l i fe o f the Church.^^ I t 
w o u l d be contrary to August ine 'ร stated purposes to focus on the "correctness" o f 
the details o f h is o w n interpretat ion, e.g. w h y does the creat ion o f the heavenly 
bodies represent the fa i th fu l and their luminous works?^^ August ine expresses an 
2 Jean Pépin describes how the necessary mysteriousness o f Scripture reflects the transcendence 
o f its object; in the demand for spiritual or allegorical reading, human reason is humbled, and a 
sense o f obviousness o f meaning gives way to the need for an exercitatio that is more spiritually 
and intellectually profitable; cr. "Saint Augustin et la fonction protreptique de l 'al légorie", in 
Recherches Augustiniennes 1 (1958), pp. 243-286. See also L .M. Poland, "Augustine, Al legory 
and Conversion", ๒ Journal of Literature and Theology 2.1 (1988), pp. 37-48. 
26 Cf. 13.18.22. 
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almost ch i ld l i ke exci tement at the ab i l i t y o f words to express mul t ip le meanings 
(24.36), and by compar ison, at h o w the al legor ical method invi tes a variety o f 
readings o f a text. He is thus demonstrat ing not the t ru th or elegance o f his 
part icular reading, but rather his conun i tment to the ab i l i ty o f scripture to 
encompass a var iety o f readings.^^ The hermeneut ical is a metaphor for the 
onto log ica l , i n the th i r teenth as in the t w e l f t h book. I n the mu l t ip l i c i t y and 
diversi ty o f creat ion, August ine understands the meaning o f the d iv ine 'Ъопе 
valde." The who le w o r k , once complete, o f fers a beauty greater than any o f its 
parts. The un i f ied who le praises G o d and declares his w o r k , even i n the rise and 
decay o f i ts part icular тетЬсгв.^^* G o d is endlessly "a t w o r k " in creat ion, f o rm ing 
and un i f y i ng ; by the temporal g i f ts o f his prov idence, the hope o f uni ty is 
proferred and real ized. 
The summi t o f the " s i x days" w o r k o f creat ion is o f course the creat ion o f 
man in God ' s image. Th is conf i rms the extent to w h i c h August ine is reading the 
text o f scripture through the lens o f his o w n p e r s o n a l ― b u t n o w also universal , 
since it is the story o f the Church֊exper ience o f convers ion. The image o f the 
T r in i t y in man expresses August ine 's sure conv ic t ion that the w o r k o f renewal is 
even now ongoing fo r those creatures for w h o m , un l ike the heaven o f heavens, the 
experience o f creat ion and convers ion is tempora l ly dist inct. 
August ine has spoken o f the confer r ing o f f o r m as the essential w o r k o f 
the W o r d i n creation.^^ Th is p icture is clearly no longer adequate. A s O 'Donne l l 
observes, i t is not easy to d is t inguish between the d iv ine works o f the persons o f 
13.24.36. 
13.36.33. 
2 9 See uera rel. 36.66 forrna omnium"), as wel l as div. qu. 23; at several places, Augustine speaks 
explicit ly o f the threefold causality o f the Tr in i ty reflected in creation, usually as the cause o f 
being, the cause o f determination (i.e. being this or that), and the cause o f remaining or "cohering" 
as this or that; cf. div. qu. 18 and ep. 11.3. 
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the T r i n i t y , the formatio o f the W o r d , and the conversió o f the Spirit.^*^ Cer ta in ly , 
the t w e l f t h book shows that creat ion " ш principiď^ is the special w o r k o f the 
W o r d . The w o r k o f the Spir i t is progressively revealed in the medi ta t ion on 
creat ion; at 13.5.6, Augus t ine speaks again o f creat ion f r o m the formless chaos, 
and says that " n o w " he sees that God the Father was the maker, the Son, he i n 
w h o m al l was made, and the Spir i t , the one who "moved over the face o f the 
waters."^ ' August ine asks w h y Scripture delays speaking o f the Sp i r i t . 3 2 The 
Spir i t introduces a new language into the discourse about creat ion: act iv i ty as a 
k i n d o f non-physica l mo t i on . There w o u l d be noth ing to move " o v e r " were there 
not something already present. He is careñi l to point out that the Spir i t does not 
move i n the sense o f " софогеа і space", but he also does not exclude this 
d imens ion. The Spi r i t is a place, but also not a place: as a place, i t is a " g i f t o f 
rest."^^ The te rm ''superferebatur" describes the act ion o f d iv ine immutab i l i t y 
over and i n what is mutable. The d iv ine uni ty uni f ies what is mu l t i p le , and 
thereby introduces the mutable сгеаШге to the immutab le l i fe o f the T r in i t y . 
A t last, Augus t ine has a system o f language to describe creat ion i n a 
manner that overcomes the otherness o f the creature and the d iv ine : the immutab le 
pr inc ip le that moves. The creative act iv i ty o f the Spir i t is a d iv ine g i v i ng o f se l f 
that nevertheless does not v io late the un i ty o f the godhead. This ins ight leads 
August ine to a filli appreciat ion o f the revealed T r in i t y i n creat ion, w h i c h is i t se l f 
described as both a un i ty and a commun i t y . 
30 O'Donnel l (1992), Vo l . I l l , p. 347. For this reason, I have resisted saying that Book 12 is 
"about" the Word, and Book 13 about the Holy Spirit, even though there is measure o f truth in this 
analysis. 
3' "Et tenebam patrem in dei nomine, qui fecit haec, et filium in principii nomine, in quo fecit haec, 
et trinitatem credens deum meum, sicut credebam, quaerebam in eloquiis Sanctis eius, et ecce 
spiritus tuus superferebatur super aquas." 
J 3,6,7. On the progressive revelation o f the Spirit, see Sermo 52, as well as ciu. 11.24. 
" 13.9.10. 
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I n [being, k n o w i n g and w i l l i n g ] therefore, let Ы т w h o is capable o f so 
do ing contemplate h o w inseparable i n l i fe they are; one l i f e , one m i n d , and 
one essence, yet u l t imate ly there is distinction, fo r they are inseparable, 
yet dist inct. The fact is certain to anyone by introspect ion. Le t h i m 
consider h imse l f and ref lect and te l l me what is there. W h e n , however , 
th rough his invest igat ion o f these three, he has found something out and 
has made his report on that, he should not suppose that he discovered the 
immutab le that transcends t hem֊tha t w h i c h immutab l y is, immutab ly 
knows , and immutab ly w i l l s . I t baf f les thought to inqui re whether these 
three funct ions are the ground w h i c h constitutes the d iv ine T r in i t y , or 
whether the three components are present i n each person, so that each 
person has a l l three, or whether both these alternatives are true, i n the 
sense that, i n ways beyond finite understanding, the ultimate Being exists 
in both simplicity and multiplicity, the persons being defined by relation to 
each other, yet infinite in themselves? 
August ine is c lear ly aware o f the l imi ta t ions o f the method o f at tempt ing to 
comprehend the d iv ine mode o f being th rough its image i n the creature. However 
the creat ion o f man as imago Dei authorizes this language, and enables August ine 
to conceive i n an or thodox manner h o w the d iv ine can inc lude a fundamental 
pr inc ip le o f re lat ional i ty . 
The Spir i t alone is not the agent o f un i f i ca t ion , but the who le T r in i t y 
w o r k i n g i n a manner i n w h i c h its roles are very d i f f i cu l t to separate. Certain 
dist inct ions can be made, and August ine does d ist inguish between the creat ion o f 
man i n G o d ' ร image, and the formatio w h i c h is the result o f the w o r k o f 
convers ion. For the creatures that inhabi t the heaven o f heavens, there is no 
mean ing fu l d is t inct ion. For man , f reedom is a more complex g i f t : the capax Dei 
w h i c h man is granted reveals the purposes o f salvat ion inscr ibed i n creat ion, but 
13.11.12 (italics mine). " / A 7 his igitur tribus [esse, nosse, velle] quam sii inseparabilis vita, et 
una vita et una mem et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis dîstinctio et tarnen distincţia, 
videat qui potest. Certe coram se est; adtendat m se et videai et dicat mihi. Sed cum mvenení in 
his aliquH et daerit, non iam se putet invemsse Ulud, quod supra ista est incommutabile, quod est 
incommutab il iter et scit incommutabiliter et vult incomm utabil iter: et utrum propter tria haec et 
ibi trinitas, an in singulis haec tria, ut terna smgulorum sint, ari utrumque miris modis simpliciter 
et multipliciter infinito in se sibi fine...г By highlighting this passage as a key text, we are noting 
the presence in conf. o f the ftjU conception o f man as made in the image o f the trinitarian God; 
moreover, by this, we just i fy the leap we w i l l presently make in this essay to the later books o f 
trin. 
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alone it does not guarantee its o w n ftilfiUment. Hence i t is appropriate that 
August ine discusses the w o r k o f the Church i n the th i r teenth book: the importance 
o f works o f fa i th , wo rks o f mercy , the witness and sacrif ice o f the saints, and the 
l i fe o f the sacraments; the importance o f scripture as an author i ty "s t re tched" over 
al l a l ike i n order to humble the p roud ; and the ro le o f the judgment o f the fa i th fu l 
that serves them i n d iscerning as a commun i t y wha t is good and what is ev i l . A l l 
o f these are means by w h i c h the Spi r i t uses wha t is "ex te rna l " in order to nurture 
the inter ior process o f convers ion. I n these, Augus tme sees the T r im ty at wo rk , 
b r ing ing the who le man , and the who le Church , in to a more perfect un ion w i t h i t . 
Conclusions 
Coņf. opens w i t h the universal ly restless heart: inquietum est cor nostrum, 
donee requiescat in te (1.1.1.) ; i t concludes w i t h the promise o f the etemal rest o f 
the Sabbath: sabbato vitae aeternae requiescamus in te (13.36.51). A l t hough 
creat ion and convers ion are dist inct moments fo r the embodied creature, the 
negat iv i ty o f sin cannot mar the fundamental un i t y o f purpose l i nk ing them.^^ We 
have argued that the decisive moment i n Augus t ine 'ร conversion is the v is ion o f 
the incarnate mediator , echoed again at the conc lus ion o f the tenth book. The 
verax mediator, i n the flesh, manifests what the T r in i t y as a who le acts out: the 
myster ious manner i n w h i c h what is per fect ly un i f i ed and at peace can encompass 
and enter into re lat ion w i t h what is mu l t ip le or "o ther . " 
Were this an analysis o f the final books o f conf., th is picture wou ld be 
seriously inadequate. Le t us conclude by re turn ing to memory and the specif ic 
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t ra i l o f images and themes that w e have t r ied to explo i t i n order to flesh out its 
larger s igni f icance i n this text. 
1. The chr is to logica l perspective forms the character o f the larger 
invest igat ion. Augus t ine 'ร memory-based anthropology compels h i m to compare 
his o w n "absence" f r o m God w i t h God 's presence as test i f ied by the mediator. I n 
the person o f the mediator , he sees a promise o f the un ion o f human and d iv ine , 
and a pract ical via by w h i c h he m igh t respond to the grace o f the Incarnat ion w i t h 
an approach to the d iv ine l igh t by a f fect ion and adorat ion. The th i r teenth book 
concludes w i t h man as made i n the image o f the T r in i t y . Th is image reveals a 
g iven capax Dei by w h i c h w e are introduced to a new v is ion o f human personal i ty 
as something асШаІІу const i tuted in an encounter w i t h and re lat ion to another.^^ 
2. Acco rd ing l y , the discussion o f creat ion i n conf. is mot iva ted by 
օ ո էԽօր օ1օ§1031 concerns. W e have suggested reasons for the recurr ing at tent ion 
to hermeneut ical issues, but w e have also argued that these serve the pr imary 
anthropological project on bo th a l i teral level (the author i ty o f scripture as a 
source o f un i t y ) and a metaphor ical level (the ab i l i ty o f scripture to inv i te mu l t i p le 
readings as an example o f the ab i l i t y o f the Church to conta in a mu l t i p l i c i t y o f the 
fa i th f i i l i n a un i f ied c o m m i m i t y ) . I n l ook ing first at t ime, and subsequently at the 
idea o f formless matter and the heaven o f heavens, August ine has sought to find 
man 'ร place i n an established order, and (hopefu l ly ) to find thereby a k i nd o f rest 
in that order. 
^* In this, the intimนm and summum are found to coincide; cf. Vannier, pp. 135-137. In this we 
have a textual bridge to trin. 
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3. The discussion o f memory is extended by the discussion o f t ime in the 
eleventh book. There are clear passages that we have noted that attest to the fact 
that, ant feopologica l ly speaking, the p rob lem o f "d is tance" f r o m G o d is st i l l being 
considered in terms o f temporal d is junct ion. Th is language fades f r o m 
prominence after the eleventh book; i t is not supplanted, but supplemented, by a 
language o f space or spir i tual "p lace . " August ine u l t imate ly sees the resolut ion o f 
the " p r o b l e m " posed by memory in the tenth book i n t w o dist inct but related 
ideas. First , the abi l i ty o f God as t r iune to entertain " d i s t i n c t i o n " and yet remain 
un i f i ed , and thereby to contain and comprehend the mu l t i p l i c i t y and 
discursiveness that qual i f ies temporal existence ( i n the aeterna ratio). A s we have 
observed, a language that embraceร a "con t rad ic t i on " such as th is is authorized by 
the declarat ion that man is made i n God ' s image: th is opens a who le new avenue 
o f theological ref lect ion on personal i ty (cf. supra). 
Second, the fact that the t r iune G o d forms and uni f ies by a sel f-contained 
and uni lateral act. August ine realizes that i t is an ent i re ly generous w o r k o f grace; 
th is is a re l ie f to his sense o f anxiety. August ine does not have to overcome the 
condi t ions o f his k n o w i n g and be ing. A l l he must do is submit h imse l f to the 
Spir i t that works i n h i m , en f laming his heart in affectu, i n im i ta t i on o f the humi l i t y 
o f ՇԽւտէ.^^ Peace is not merely an end for w h i c h he hopes; i t is more than 
eschatological. I n the act o f creat ion, the Spir i t is already at w o r k i n formatio and 
illuminât io ^ impar t ing the rest o f the Sabbath upon the disorder o f the p r ima l 
chaos, both i n the cosmos, and i n the depths o f Augus t ine 's soul . 
Յ 7 A t 13.9.10, Augustine returns to the language o f pondus as a tendency to retüm to one's proper 
place, to "ascend to the patria. 
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Mar ie -Anne Vann ier argues that intentio is another w o r d for conversió?^ 
We conclude by echoing th is re f lect ion. I n the eleventh book, August ine prays 
that the distentio o f the l i fe o f memory migh t be translated into the intentio o f 
meditaţia or contemplaţia. I n the peace- impart ing w o r k o f the Spir i t , August ine 
sees a way in w h i c h he can rest i n the "e tema l present."^^ There w i l l a lways be a 
tension in bod i l y existence; but th is tension can be f ru i t f u l l y translated into the 
w o r k o f fo rmat ion , i n the ord inary l i fe o f the Church , and more speci f ical ly by 
g rowth i n the exercitatio o f meditaţia: th is , August ine suggests, is the s igni f icance 
o f the in junc t ion to "be f r u i t f u l and mult ip ly.""*" A greater stabi l i ty can be 
progressively attained i n the present, and the distract ion o f discursiveness can be 
translated into the s imple act o f adorat ion. 
3 8 Vannier, p. 138. 
3 9 On the Spirit and the rest o f Sabbath, see also Gn. litt. 4.8.16. 
4 0 13.24.36; Augustine comes to this іпіефгеїаїіоп wi th the aid o f Rom. 12:2: "be ye transformed 
by the renewmgof your mind. " 
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C H A P T E R 10: 
DE TRINITATE 
Turn ing finally to trin. requires us to acknowledge that the center o f th is 
dissertat ion l ies in the analysis o f conf. 11 and 12. I n th is , w e have placed a l l o f 
August ine 's ref lect ions upon memory as a locus for the un i ty o f body and soul 
thus far i n the context o f a theology o f creation. Hence the psycholog ica l focus 
shifts f r o m epistemology to the soul 's spir i tual experience o f a sensed tension 
present i n creat ion itself, a radical al ter i ty between creature and creator. The 
temporal and e temal , we have seen, are uni ted in Chr ist , as W o r d in creat ion and 
saviour i n reconci l ia t ion. Hence the un i ty o f body and soul i n man must be seen 
th rough the lens o f the incarnat ion o f the W o r d , i n i ts f u l l eschatological meaning. 
Trin. has its o w n specif ic goal , at tempt ing to discern ref lect ions o f the 
creator i n the created, to the extent o f f i nd ing a theo log ica l method i n the idea o f 
man as imago Dei. The Incarnat ion again arises as the central p r inc ip le th rough 
w h i c h the T r in i t y can be k n o w n and enjoyed. B y a d i f ferent route, conf. and trin. 
arr ive at a s imi lar end: a harmony and un i f ica t ion o f the temporal and etemal i n 
Chr ist , w i t h the result o f spir i tual peace for the soul that part icipates i n the same. 
The part o f trin. that is most d i rect ly concerned w i t h memory is the 
eleventh book. In this relat ively neglected book, August ine makes an e f fo r t to 
discern a trace o f the image o f God i n man in his " i nne r " psycholog ica l operations 
insofar as they pertain to the percept ion o f sensible phenomena. Here, as i n the 
tenth book, August ine continues to use and ref ine the t r in i ty o f memory , inte l lect 
and w i l l , hav ing basical ly rejected i n the same book the idea o f an imago Dei 
based on a parad igm o f pure sel f -knowledge. The opening chapters o f the t w e l f t h 
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book cal l into question Augus t ine 'ร o w n assumptions about the locat ion o f the 
boundary between the inner and the outer. August ine is not mere ly seeking to 
ident i fy the psychological " p l ace " o f the image o f G o d i n man. The question 
becomes: to what are the powers o f the soul ordered? Wha t is their object and 
end? Th is question coincides w i t h a s igni f icant development i n the argument i n 
w h i c h the Incarnat ion is brought to the fore as the key to understanding h o w man 
is consti tuted in God 's image. The t r in i ta r ian mode l alone is over ly abstract; the 
incamat ional model makes the t r in i ta r ian mode l in te l l ig ib le as an object o f 
contemplat ion, wh i le p rov id ing a pract ical via fo r the integrat ion o f man into the 
l i fe o f the communi ty o f the T r i m t y . 
The thir teenth book thus con f i rms that every th ing, that is , al l o f Chr ist ian 
w i s d o m , is contained i n the Incarnat ion. A s part o f the argument, i t enables the 
success o f the exercitatio intended by the later books o f էոռ ' Wha t this means in 
1 On the sense o f the term exercitatio, see Lewis Ayres, "The Christological context o f 
Augustine's De trinitate X I I I : toward relocating Books V1 I I "XV" , in Augustinián Studies 29:1 
(1998), pp. 111-139. As he points out, the specific term ''exercitatio'' isused rarely by Augustine 
in the sense o f an exercitatio animi; it occurs twice in the latter part o f trin., at 9.12.17 and 
13.20.26. Ayres rightly wams us from taking exercitatio to mean something purely mental and 
abstract. Augustine does not use this term precisely, but we f ind a similar sense o f spiritual 
"discipl ine" or intellectual exercise in earlier works, for example, mag. and mus. A t mag. 8.21, in 
the context o f an extended discussion o f kinds o f signs, Augustine says to Adeodatus: "However, 
wi th so many detours, i t 's di f f icult to say at this point where you and I are t r y ๒ g to get to! Maybe 
you think we're playing around and divert ing the m ๒ d from serious matters by some little puzzles 
that seem childish (quasi quibmdam puer и і bus  quaestìunculis, arbitraris), or that we're pursuing 
some result that is only small or modest֊֊or, i f you suspect that this discussion might issue in 
some important result, you want to know straight away what it is (or at least to hear me say what it 
is!). Wel l , I 'd like you to believe that I haven't set to work on mere trivialit ies in this 
conversation. Though we do perhaps play around {quamvis fartasse ludamus), this should itself 
not be regarded as childish. Nor are we thinkmg about small or modest goods. Yet i f I were to say 
that there is a happy and everlasting l i fe, and I want us to be led there under the guidance o f God 
(namely Truth h imsel f ) by stages that are suitable to our weak steps, I 'm afraid I might seem 
laughable for having set out on such a long journey by considering signs rather than the things 
themselves that are signif ied." This passage should be compared to the sense տ which Books 9-14 
o f trin. are clearly some sort o f preparation, in which the image o f the creator is sought in the 
created things as a preparation for beholding the thing itseif that is imaged. Consider also the 
opening o f the sixth book o f mus., somewhat more apologetic and impatient in tone: "Long 
enough, I think, and also quite childishly Q?ueriliter) have we dwelt through f ive books in the 
traces o f the rhythms that belong to the durations o f times. Perhaps our dut i ful labour (qfficiosus 
labor) may excuse these our trifles among benevolent persons, a labour we considered worth 
undertaking for no other reason than to tear away young persons or men o f any age whom God has 
endowed wi th a good mind, not wi th excessive haste but somewhat gradually and under the 
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the end is that the attempt to 5ифа58 memory , the variable condi t ions o f the 
"ou ter " , need not be รนccessñil. The Incarnat ion is a pr inc ip le o f un i f i ca t ion o f 
the temporal and etemal , and not merely a means to surpass one i n favour o f the 
other. T o whatever extent we migh t compare the final books oí conf w i t h those 
o f Ծա., their un i ty o f purpose l ies i n the emergence o f the central ro le o f the 
Incarnat ion, ep is temologica l ly , sp i r iณal ly and argumentaţ i ve ly . 
What is go ing on i n these books i n general? We shall depend on 
Augus tme 'ร o w n explanat ions, w h i c h recur tooughout the text, i n part because o f 
the unusual and rushed manner i n w h i c h trin. was publ ished. M o s t scholars by 
now agree that a t radi t ional and f i r m d iv i s ion o f the text in to t w o parts is 
unhelpñi l .^ The text i tse l f encourages no such d iv is ion , even though August ine 
speaks o f a " n e w approach" to the same subject matter at several points. 
August ine recapitulates the argument o f the who le w o r k early in the f i f teenth 
book. 3 A summary, based upon this recapi tu lat ion, fo l lows. 
guidance o f reason, from the camal senses (a sensibus carnis) and carnal literature." The reason 
given for the " labours" o f the first five books o f mus., is the same as that given in trin, namely, the 
pur i fy ing o f the mind's eye from "carnal conceptions." It is arguable whether Augustine the 
bishop abandons the liberal arts as useful educational tools; doctK chr, suggests otìierwise. 
Nevertheless the basic structure o f learning remains: for the "Christian philosopher", a disciplined 
pedagogy must be undertaken, under the guidance o f truth. True propositions cannot simply be 
poured into the ready ทา๒d; Ayres echoes Hadot ๒ saying that these "exercises" have a spiritual, 
practical dimension; we are arguing the stronger position that they are entirely ordered to this end, 
namely, the nurtur๒g o f practical wisdom and its virtues. 
2 Whether the "f irst part" consists in Books 1-7 or Books 1-8. On the structure o f the argument o f 
trm., see Ayres (1998); J. Gavadini, "The Structure and Intention o f Augustme'ร De trinitat๔\ 
Augustiman Studies 23 (1992), pp. 103-123; R.D. Grouse, "St. Augustine's De Trinitate: 
Philosophical Method", Studia Patristica 16/2, ed. E. Livingstone (Akadamie Verlag: Ber l in, 
1985), pp. 501-510; Donald Daniels, "The Argument oíŮxQDe Trinitate and St. Augustine's 
Theoi7 o f Signs", Augustinián Studies 8 (1977), pp. 33-54; Edmund H i l l , "St Augustine's De 
Trinitate: the doctrinal significance o f its structure Revue des Études Augustimennes 19 (1973)， 
pp. 277-286. 
3 A t 15.3.4-5. The translation we are using is that o f Edmund Hi l l (New City Press: New York, 
1991). We wi l l use the traditional paragraph and chapter numerations, even though H i l l does not 
reproduce these in his translation. 
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Boob 1-4. These concern the uni ty and equal i ty o f the T r i n i t y , as 
demonstrated f r o m scripture. August ine shows that the Son is not less because he 
is "sent " ; the T r in i t y works in an inseparable manner. 
Book 5. Some things are said o f God w i t h respect to substance, and other 
th ings w i t h respect to the relat ion between the persons o f the T r in i t y . 
Boob 6-7. Because o f the uni ty o f the T r i n i t y , special attr ibutes such as 
" w i s d o m " are not reserved for one person alone. 
Book 8. Th is is clearly a book o f t ransi t ion. August ine says he is s tudy ing 
the "same th ings" but in a "deeper manner." There is no inadequacy w i t h the first 
seven books, insofar as they defend the coherence o f or thodoxy on the basis o f 
รсг іршге. The inadequacy is rather i n the soul o f man w h o seeks to understand. 
The un i ty and equal i ty o f the T r in i t y are a func t ion o f God 's unchangeabi l i ty and 
in te l l i g ib i l i t y ( in the sense o f being supremely non-corporeal ) ; these attr ibutes are 
perceived only in a " f lee t ing and par t ia l " manner because the eye o f the m i n d is 
habi tual ly fo rmed by a " c a m a l " mode o f percept ion. August ine wishes to 
ef fect ive ly counter this tendency: hence the d imens ion o f purgat ion or exercitatio 
that frames the rest o f the work . What must occur is a " conve rs ion " o f the m i n d 
to that by w h i c h i t is made so that i t can become a "good m i n d " , and l ikewise o f 
the w i l l so that i t may become a " g o o d w i l l . " The method is thus more re lat ional 
than analogical . Scripture is studied because i t nurtures the increase o f the v i r tues, 
ch ie f ly love (4 .6) ; love then is the basis for the method o f proceeding (and the first 
th ing in wh i ch August ine ident i f ies a t r in i tar ian " l i f e " Ç'quaedam vita", 9.13)) 
because i t is inherent ly relat ional, j o m m g together t w o th ings by means o f its o w n 
power. 
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Boob 9-10. August ine seeks the image o f G o d i n the m ind o f man. The 
t r in i ty o f m i n d , knowledge and love is ՏԱՓՅՏՏ6<1 for that o f memory , 
understanding and w i l l . August ine c la ims that the latter of fers greater c lar i ty and 
"p rec is ion" ; i t w i l l be one o f our tasks to exp la in w h y this t r in i ty is u l t imate ly 
բէ6ք6Մ6 (1 to that o f m i n d i n general. A t the conclus ion o f the tenth book, 
August ine says that the m i n d that remembers, understands and loves i tse l f is not 
i n the same act able to d is t inguish i tse l f c lear ly f r o m what is "o ther " than itself, 
i.e. what is corporeal, and hence a fur ther e f fo r t o f intel lectual exercitatio is 
required. 
Book 11. A k ind o f t r in i ty is sought i n the operat ion o f the senses, i n 
part icular, o f sight. Th is is clearly inadequate for August ine , since this w o u l d 
pertain to the "outer m a n . " M e m o r y is discussed i n some detai l here, and we w i l l 
therefore examine this book closely. 
Boob 12-14. August ine sees these books as const i tut ing an argumentat ive 
un i ty . He distinguishes between knowledge (scientia) and w i s d o m (sapientia) as 
per ta in ing, respectively, to temporal matters and etemal matters. He wishes to 
seek the image o f God in what is superior i n the паШге o f man , namely, the m i n d 
in its highest operations. I n these books, he moves f r o m a t r in i tar ian to an 
incamat ional mode l . I n re-appropr iat ing the basic theme o f the earlier books, 
namely, the uni ty o f God , August ine is showing h o w the Incarnat ion and the 
Tr in i t y are inseparable myster ies, the one a pract ical as w e l l as speculative access 
to the other. 
The f i f teenth and f ina l book of fers a remarkable conclus ion. I n a sense, 
the previous fourteen books have been a preparat ion for i t : August ine declares i n 
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the f i f teenth book that we are ready at last to approach and behold the mystery o f 
the T r in i t y in itself. N o t surpr is ing ly , the fu l f i l lment o f th is expectat ion is not 
qui te so s imple. August ine must therefore expla in h o w these mysteries are k n o w n 
in th is l i fe and approached as a matter o f gradual spir i tual progress. Hence th is 
book br ings to f ru i t i on the themes introduced i n the eighth book. 
I n order to main ta in our focus on the signif icance o f memory and t ime-
consciousness i n the context o f the larger argument, we shall pursue three 
part icular goals. 
1. W e shall closely examine the eleventh book on the "ou te r " operat ions 
o f the soul , and conclude by ref lect ing on w h y August ine prefers to w o r k w i t h the 
image- t r in i ty o f memory , understanding and w i l l instead o f one that is based more 
abstractly i n " m i n d . " 
2. W e shall explore the dua l ism o f scientia and sapientia especial ly as 
expressed in terms o f the etemal vs. the temporal . Th is w i l l t ransfora i the 
anthropological approach based upon the imago Dei into an incarnat ional one, 
loosely paral le l to what w e find i n the final books o f conf. Fa i th is structural ly 
and themat ica l ly the key element o f these books. I t is the subject matter o f B o o k 
13. August ine cont inual ly h igh l ights the importance o f this book, bo th i n i tself , 
and as tak ing up the subject matter o f B o o k 4. Fai th is important i n part because i t 
grounds the act iv i ty o f the seeking soul i n a theology o f Chr is t 'ร body. 
3. F ina l l y , we shal l conclude by look ing br ie f ly at the f ina l book as a 
resolut ion to the " d i l e m m a " o f scientia: the H o l y Spir i t , as the personi f icat ion o f 
love , makes possible the par t ic ipat ion o f man i n the l i fe o f the resurrected Chr ist . 
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I t is our hope that these three points w i l l gather together the mu l t ip le 
purposes mot i va t ing this dissertation. Our in tent ion is to avoid a detai led perusal 
o f the argument o f trin. ： this w o u l d suggest an over ly ambi t ious scope, as w e l l as 
g ive the false impression that what w e are o f fe r ing here is " an і п Їефге Їа Ї іоп" o f 
the who le text , i n a l l its richness and complex i ty . N o r do w e w i s h to suggest that 
the concept o f memory , as i t grounds the t r in i tar ian image o f G o d i n man , can 
exp la in more o f the overal l argument than i t real ly can. 
W e w i sh rather to leave the reader w i t h an anthropological р ісШге that is 
deeply consistent throughout August ine 's career (up to the point o f էոռ). 
However , this should not detract f r o m genuine developments i n theologica l 
anthropology, much o f wh ich however can be explained by the d i f ferent goals o f 
d i f ferent texts and genres used at d i f ferent stages i n August ine 'ร professional l i fe . 
Thus , memory is no longer s imply a key in an argument about the un i ty o f man 's 
nature, but rather becomes a signi f icant element o f a spir i tual theodicy o f 
par t ic ipat ion in the body o f Christ , and therefore i n the l i fe o f the t r iune God . Our 
ending po in t is therefore inevi tably d i f ferent f r o m where we began, w i t h early 
ph i losophica l musings on the uni ty o f soul and body: the Incarnat ion as the mode l 
o f the un i ty o f man in h imse l f and o f man w i t h God . Acco rd ing to the manner in 
w h i c h humani ty is taken up into the l i fe o f the T r in i t y through Chr is t , knowledge 
o f God cannot consist in a direct intel lectual apprehension, purged o f a l l aspects 
o f the l i f e o f the body. I t is rather a part ic ipatory un ion that is the result o f each 
th ing finding its proper place i n the prov ident ia l order. For man , i n the words o f 
mus., this means to l ive 'Svi th in the bounds o f m e m o r y " ; the goal is an epistemic 
hum i l i t y , an acceptance o f the fact that there cannot be an adequate apprehension 
o f the d iv ine i n and tíirough the creature. Instead, there must be an order ing o f 
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man'ร af fect ions, to the end o f ensur ing constant spir i tual progress, through the 
vir tues, to an eschatological , contemplat ive v i s ion o f the countenance o f God. 
The inadequacy of the trinity of self-L·owledge 
August ine looks to the image o f God i n man w i t h a desire to examine 
"more deeply" the attributes o f equal i ty and un i ty that characterize the Tr in i t y . 
W e indicated above that the f ina l book recapitulates and completes many o f the 
themes int roduced i n the eighth book. The e ighth book talks o f love as a " k i n d o f 
l i f e " that jo ins together the soul and its օեյ6շէ.՛՛ The n in th book opens w i t h the 
question o f whether the H o l y Spir i t is proper ly cal led юүе.5 G iven the " n e w " 
approach o f these books, August ine does not proceed by ta lk ing direct ly o f the 
H o l y Spir i t , but rather o f the role that the w i l l or love plays in the soul. He is 
seeking some re f lec t ion o f the relat ionship between the Spir i t , the Son and the 
Father i n the soul. August ine considers the image, the sign, and not the th ing 
itself, as a more " b e f i t t i n g " object fo r the state o f our weak, enfeebled mind.^ The 
matter o f the H o l y Spir i t is exp l ic i t l y postponed unt i l the f i f teenth book. 
The m i n d knows i tse l f th rough itself, that is, i n the act o f knowledge. 
Love j o i n s the m i n d together w i t h i t se l f as object, thus o f fe r ing a gl impse o f a 
t r in i tar i an mot i f . I n this case, m i n d , knowledge and love (mens, notitia, amor) are 
fiinctionally inseparable and predicated re lat ive ly. Th is рісШге however is 
mis leading in g i v i ng the appearance o f stabi l i ty. The m ind is fundamental ly 
changeable in n a t u r e / The stabi l i ty i n w h i c h m i n d shares has its o r ig in elsewhere, 
"8.10.14. 
' 9 . 1 . 1 . 
'9.2.2. 
7 9.6.9. The mind is changeable in at least two ways: first, as created, it has come to be when it 
previously did not exist and, second, it possesses its attributes in greater and lesser degrees. Thus 
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" a b o v e " the m i n d , in the l ight o f the eternal reasons w h i c h enable r ight judgment .^ 
Th is is the first discussion o f the concept o f an inner verbum, or inner speaking 
(dictio). The po in t o f this idea is to inextr icably l ink concept- format ion w i t h a 
pr inc ip le that is superior to the soul , namely, the inf luence o f the eternal reasons ^ 
True concept ions, August ine says, are like a w o r d begotten internal ly in the m i n d . 
Love then j o i ns the m i n d to the w o r d o f t ruth (the true concept) that arises i n the 
m i n d . The changeable nature o f the m ind abides, because this knowledge is 
var iable: i t comes to be when i t has not previously existed as a w o r d o f the m i n d . 
Moreover , a concept ion can be w rong , or i l l - fo rmed. The m i n d is therefore on ly 
j o i n e d perfect ly to the w o r d o f knowledge when i t is " k n o w n and loved i n re lat ion 
to G o d " w h o is the t ru th. T o be in error is cupiditas}^ August ine says that 
cupìdìtas occurs w h e n the m i n d is forget fu l o f the dependence i t has upon what is 
higher and w h i c h enables right j udgmen t *^ The eternal reasons, then, are not 
ident i f ied w i t h God , even though they are inevi tably associated w i t h God as 
the mind does not cease to be a mind, although it may cease to be a good mind. The important 
qualif ication to this is the sense in which, through habituation, somethmg can become almost 
" l i ke " nature, Augustine speaks this way, for example, about the change o f the corruptible body in 
the resurrection, which is made fit for heaven "not by a loss o f its natural substance, but by a 
change in its qual i ty" (c/w. 13.23). 
8 Cf. 9.6.10; ''...aliis omnino regulis supra meutern nostrani mcommนtabiłiter mamntìbm, vel 
approbare apud หosmeüpsos, vel improbare coทvmcimur, cum recte aliquid approbamuร aut 
ітргоЬаттГ  6 .11; 'Utaque de istis secundum Шат (ipsa forma irtcorìcussae ас stabilis ventate) 
judicamus ， et Шат cermmuร rationalis mentis intuitu'' 
9 On intellectual mediation, see Rowan Wil l iams, "Sapientia and the Tr ini ty: reflections on the De 
trmi(atď\ in Melanges T.J. Van Bavel, B. Bruning et al., eds. (Leuven University Press: Leuven, 
1990), pp. 317-332. Note that August๒e never uses any terminology such as "mental wo rd " 
{verbum mentis); "word o f knowledge" {verbum mtitiae) would be closer to the text. (Cf. 
15.11.20, ''verbum hominis... quando eadem scientia intus dicitur"; 15.10.19, ''verbum... quod ad 
milam pertinet linguanf'\ 15.10.18, 'Чосийопеร cordis'',) In either case, the discussion is not 
focused on the nature o f this word, but rather on what conditions must obtain in order for a word to 
be a word: the word must be united to the knowing mens by charity and not cupiditas. For this 
reason, at 15.11.20， Augustine says that true conceptions w i l l give rise to good works: "sedetiam 
hie cum verum verbum est, tunc est mitium boni operisľ 
10 9.10.8. The discussion at 15.10.17-11.20 does not add significantly to this picture. 
'1 Cf. Lewis Ayres, "The discipline o f self-knowledge in Augustine's De trinitate Book x，，， in The 
Passionate Intellect, Lewis Ayres, ed. (Transaction: Brunswick, 1995), p. 271 ; I. Bochet, Saint 
Augustin ei le désir de Dieu (Études Augustiniennes: Paris, 1982), esp. pp. 36-44. 
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person i fy ing t ru th ; their epistemologica! role is imprecise here. O f greater 
s igni f icance is the idea that the soul reflects God , or demonstrates better 
func t iona l in tegr i ty , when i t displays a constant epistemic humi l i t y . Knowledge is 
not reduced to the theological pr inc ip le o f char i ty , nevertheless August ine does 
not want to cal l i t knowledge except when it is moved by char i ty as opposed to 
cupiditas. 
The m i n d that seeks to k n o w itself, or its knowledge, does not become 
ident ical w i t h the forms or " reasons" that enable judgment . I f knowledge occurs 
i n an ideal manner, the m i n d is ident ical w i t h its knowledge, understood as the 
w o r d or f o r m begotten by the m i n d , in the m i n d . Ident i ty therefore presupposes 
the presence o f the "eternal reasons" to the m i n d , but on ly th rough the mediat ion 
o f m i n d ' s p roduc t i v i t y / ^ The process o f se l f -knowledge is discursive and 
d ia lect ica l : no ident i ty can be assumed; rather, a greater l ikeness is sought after. 
The m i n d is made more stable by increased and deliberate con fo rmi ty to the 
reasons w h i c h i l luminate its operations. I t never ceases to be changeable, but o f 
course this changeabi l i ty is the reason for hope as the m i n d seeks con fo rmi ty w i t h 
the etemal reasons. August ine is not descr ib ing an epistemologica! analysis o f 
concept fo rmat ion ; rather he is prescr ib ing an intel lectual way o f l i fe , a habit o f 
recol lect ion or mindfulness that shapes the character o f the intel lectual soul. 
The n in th book conf i rms this reading by conc lud ing w i t h a discussion 
( w h i c h carries into the tenth book) o f the appetitus inveniendi, or the desire o f the 
12 Here, Augustine allows the use o f rationes for the forms even though previously (cf. div. quaest. 
83) he preferred formae or idei. This may be because o f the materialistic associations o f the 
rationes seminales, 
՚ 3 The theory o f forms here is, o f course, not purely Platonic. Augustme is not saying that the 
forms subsist ๒ or by the ทาind, as Cicero suggests {de oratore 7)7 though they clearly have serve 
to enable cognition. This idea IS Aristotelian, originally. The abiding transcendence o f the forms 
locates Augustine more wi th Plotinus and Рофһугу on this topic, than wi th Ciceronian Stoicism 
(cf. Gersh(1986), Vo l . Upp . 132-154). 
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m i n d to k n o w that w h i c h i t does not yet understand. Th is sense o f " w i l l " precedes 
knowledge and gives rise to i t , but i t is dist inct f r o m the sort o f " l o v e " that 
August ine has i n m i n d w h i c h is a product o f knowledge, and a pr inc ip le w h i c h 
uni f ies the m i n d w i t h its knowledge. These are related, and August ine calls one 
the o f fspr ing o f the other. The i r distinctness conf i rms for August ine that he has 
not yet found a way to conceive o f the m i n d i n a perfect ly stable state o f 
contemplat ion. The appetitus invemendi suggests a state o f lack, and this br ings 
August ine back to an o ld , Platonic quest ion: h o w can the m i n d seek, or desire, 
what i t does not already in some sense know? The dialect ical and discursive 
character o f knowledge br ings us again to the quest ion o f recol lect ion. I f the m i n d 
seeks to become l i ke that w h i c h i t knows , does this not suggest that m i n d already 
stands in some sort o f re lat ionship w i t h that w h i c h i t seeks? A s i n the parable o f 
the w o m a n w h o has lost a co in , i n conf. 10.18.27, i f the i l l uminat ing reasons can 
be sought by the m i n d , does th is not suggest that they are never absent f r o m the 
mind? 
I n the tenth book, Augus t ine investigates this question as a matter o f self-
knowledge. He concludes that the m i n d knows i tse l f i n the act o f k n o w i n g 
"someth ing " ; that is , i t knows i tse l f adequately as " i n act." Wh i l e the m i n d seeks 
to k n o w itself, he says, i t " k n o w s i tse l f as seeking and not knowing." ' " * For 
August ine, this is enough. The desire to k n o w (appetitus invemendi), or the w i l l 
i n general, must be comprehensive o f both possession and lack, poverty and 
plenty. 
What then is the po in t o f speaking o f sel f -knowledge? The imperat ive to 
" k n o w t h y s e l f is fo r August ine not so much a l i teral expectation as an 
10.3.5. 'Wov/Y enim se quaerentem atque nescientem, dum se quaerit ut noveriti 
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announcement o f the value o f m i n d as superior to софогеаі th ings and the images 
fo rmed f r o m them. I t is an essential funct ion o f the m i n d to j udge and assess what 
comes i n t taough the senses; nevertheless m i n d remains " f r e e " o f the senses in 
this very j u d g i n g element, as we have seen i n Augus t ine 'ร earl ier wr i t ings . Hab i t 
tel ls us that sensible th ings are most easily perceived and understood, since they 
are most fami l ia r ; on the contrary, says August ine (echoing Ar is to t le ) , i t is rather 
the case that knowledge i tse l f is the most knowable t h i ng o f a l l . ' ^ Bu t , as he 
f ound i n the n in th book, m i n d knows i tsel f i n the act o f k n o w i n g something: i t is 
not immedia te ly and abstractly present to itself. Images are a lways present i n the 
memory , and m i n d therefore cannot th ink i tse l f w i thou t images. '^ I t is fo r this 
reason that the m i n d becomes confused, and cannot d is t ingu ish between i tse l f and 
wha t is corporeal or based upon софогеаі images. Th is confus ion is what 
mot ivates the w r i t i n g o f subsequent books, i n part icular 11-14, since an 
exercitatio is deemed necessary for the correct ion o f th is misapprehension, and fo r 
the habi tual re format ion o f the soul 's inณi t ion to r igh t l y " v a l u e " th ings spir i tual 
over th ings софогеаі. 
The final t w o chapters o f the tenth book announce a decisive t ransi t ion to 
and preference for the t r in i tar ian image o f memory , inte l lect and w i l l over that o f 
m i n d , knowledge and love. There are t w o reasons for th is. A t 11.17, August ine 
discusses three aspects o f the process o f learning: what is learned, h o w greatly or 
h o w w e l l i t is learned, and to what end it is learned. '^ These three t h i n g s ― a b i l i t y 
{ingenium), knowledge {doctrina) and use {usus)֊are al igned w i t h memory and 
՚ 5 10.7.10. 
'6 10.7.10. This includes verbal images, as well as pre-verbal ''verbď (cf. supra). 
'7 Ayres discusses the Ciceronian roots o f this passage, cf. pp. 289-290. H i l l translates these as 
"disposit ion, learning and practice." 
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intel lect and w i l l : ab i l i ty and knowledge are the prov ince o f a l l three, but นรนร is 
i n a special way associated w i t h the w i l l . 
The th i rd however is to be found i n the use the w i l l n o w makes o f what the 
memory and understanding ho ld , whether i t refers them to somethmg else 
or whether i t takes del ight i n them as ends i n themselves. T o use 
something is to put i t at the w i l l ' s d isposal ; to enjoy i t is to use it w i t h an 
actual, not merely ant ic ipated j o y . Hence everyone w h o enjoys, uses; for 
he puts something at the disposal o f the w i l l for the purposes ot 
enjoyment. Bu t not everyone who uses, enjoys, not i f he wants what he 
puts at the disposal o f the w i l l fo r the sake o f something else and not for its 
own.*^ 
The w i l l determines the speci f ic or ientat ion o f the soul by characterizing the 
qual i ty o f its af fect ions: is the soul ordered to se l f or to G o d i n i ts loves? Th is is 
manifest i n the manner o f the s o u ľ s re lat ion to th ings other than itself, and not 
merely i n the mode and extent o f i ts se l f -knowledge. The soul does not easily 
d is t inguish between i tse l f and wha t is other, August ine has said. Rather than 
beg in w i t h an abstract concept ion o f the se l f as object, August ine instead begins 
w i t h the soul- in-relat ion, the soul as brought to f ru i t i on i n its proper end. The 
epistemologica! order, i n w h i c h the intel lect should constantly be in remembrance 
o f the higher pr inciples that enable its operat ions, is an order o f " va lua t i on " as 
wel l .^^ 
Here in lies the second reason for the preference for a t r in i t y that is based 
upon memory . The order ing o f th ings according to their va lue, or intended end, 
18 10.11.17. 'Чат vero usus tertìus in volúntate est, pertractante illa quae in memoria et 
intelligentia contineฑtur, sive ad aliquid ea referat, sive eorum fine delectată conquiescat. üti 
enim, est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis: fruì est autem, uti cum gaudio, non adhuc 
spei, sed iam rel Proinde omniร quifruitur, uíitur; assumit enim aliquid in facultatem voluntatis, 
cum fine delectationìs: non autem omniร qui นtitur, frułtur; si id quod ili facultatem voluntatis 
assumit, non propter Ulud ipsum, sed propter aliud appetivitľ 
'9 The term "va lue" is inadequate; this idea is best expressed ๒ the language o f the theological 
virtues, as we w i l l see Augustine doing in Book 15. Some readers o f Augustine accuse him o f 
making every act o f the intellectual soul directly dependent on grace, andtherefore philosophically 
meaningless! It would be di f f icul t to draw such an іШефгеЇаІіоп from trin.\ at issue here is the 
idea o f memory as a habit o f remembrance―remembrance o f causality (whether we take this as 
eff icient causality, or causality in the less determ๒ate sense o f i l luminat ion)֊with the intended 
end o fhumi l i t y . The soul that is humble acts w i th the greatest balance and integration o f the tr i -
personal powers o f the soul, and thus best reflects the triune God. 
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presupposes memory as a psycholog ica l foundat ion, l i nk ing the soul to a var iety 
o f objects and loves, bo th those past and those ant ic ipated, those possessed and 
those yet absent. M e m o r y def ines the soul as a th ing that stands рефеїиа11у in 
relation——and therefore perpetual ly fit fo r progress?" Hence in the eleventh book 
August ine insists that w e must be exercised i n a discussion o f the things that are 
added to our awareness " i n t ime . " ^ ' M e m o r y is both a negative and a posi t ive: i t 
explains h o w one can be distracted by a mul t i tude o f cares, and confused about 
their w o r t h , but i t is also of fers in t imat ions about h o w there can be a constant l i n k 
to a u n i f y i n g " g r o u n d " even in the mids t o f such condi t ions. August ine says that 
we proceed to the eleventh book out o f a concern that we migh t not d ist inguish 
adequately between memory and the understanding: the m i n d that act ively seeks 
to k n o w i tse l f is not apparently able to d is t inguish between its act iv i ty and its 
object, between what i t possesses and does not yet possess. Clar i ty on this matter 
is best obtained by examin ing m i n d i n act, " i n t ime . " 
Book 11: memory and body 
M e m o r y is discussed here i n the greatest detai l as something associated 
w i t h the presence and retent ion o f sense-images i n the soul : this func t ion o f 
memory w e have seen amply described i n earlier wr i t ings , especially sol. ， an. 
quant., mus. and o f course conf. 10. August ine describes memory as that w h i c h 
enables j udgmen t , and therefore as the psychologica l foundat ion fo r knowledge. 
M e m o r y lends un i ty to the data o f what is mutable and "becoming . " I t is also 
representative o f the extent to w h i c h the intel lectual soul is bound by a discursive 
mode o f k n o w i n g , since i t demonstrates the dependence o f m i n d on the body as a 
՜ Cf. 10.11.18. "Quod vero memoria dicituľ, ad aliquid relative dicitur." 
2' 10.12.19. 
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t oo l for filling the " s tomach" o f the m e m o r y ― a v i v i d image f r o m conf. 10֊֊given 
that the soul requires instruct ion in order for the forms o f mathemat ical values and 
speculat ive ideas to be d rawn mean ing fu l l y f r o m the memory . 
A t the conclus ion o f the eleventh book o f trin., August ine in fo rms the 
reader that he has not yet begun to consider the " inner m a n . " August ine has said 
that he is seeking the image o f God i n that part o f man that is "mos t nob le " , 
namely , the m i n d . However , this book is concerned w i t h m i n d , i n that sense-
percept ion, imaginat ion and recol lect ion a l l depend on the j u d g i n g facul ty o f the 
inte l lectual soul . Wha t is lack ing i n the considerat ion o f m i n d as i t is related to 
what stands "ou ts ide " the body is a d i f fe rent ia t ion o f the proper objects o f the 
intel lect. A t what po in t do w e have m i n d i n re la t ion to an object that shares i n its 
attr ibutes o f immater ia l i ty , immor ta l i t y and s imp l i c i t y? Can m i n d rise above the 
fundamenta l condi t ions o f its know ing? I n a certa in sense, i t cannot; w e have 
seen this already i n conf. I n seeking after the " i nner m a n " , August ine wants to 
observe the m i n d i n its extraordinary re lat ion to what stands " a b o v e " the m i n d . 
There he expects to find the imago Dei. The " i n te r i o r " is merely a stepping-stone 
to the "super io r . " 
The exercise o f look ing for traces o f a t r in i tar ian image i n acts o f sense-
percept ion is requi red by the fact that these are "mo re fami l i a r . " August ine begins 
by defending the un i ty o f man : i f the bod i ly is also "ca l led m a n " , then the external 
real i ty must ref lect the internal order ing pr inc ip les o f the soul?^ A t 11.5.8, 
Augus t ine says that the highest part o f man receives the d iv ine impr in t d i rect ly , 
w i thou t any in tervening "na ture" or mediator. The bod i l y i n tu rn ref lects the 
11.1.1. 
226 
div ine ordo, but as mediated by soul as an order ing pr inc ip le that is i tse l f subject 
to the higher. 
There is also a pedagogical mo t i va t ion at w o r k : since the sensible is more 
fami l ia r , i t more easily attracts interest by habi tua l ly f o rm ing the way i n w h i c h 
man th inks. " W e have to adapt ourselves to th is i l lness" , August ine says in the 
pro logue, precisely i n the hope o f cur ing it . The pedagogical exercise intends to 
give rise to a d isc ip l ined fo rmat ion o f the w i l l . Throughout this book, August ine 
reminds the reader that the w i l l is free to attach i tse l f to a var iety o f objects. I t has 
a proper funct ion i n the sensible rea lm, and this book seeks to demonstrate that i t 
can f u l f i l l this func t ion and yet not be constrained by i t . A t 8.5 August ine 
ment ions the example o f someone w h o takes a w a l k , whose m ind subsequently 
"wanders " to subjects other than the act o f w a l k i n g i n a part icular envi ronment. 
I n l ike manner, he says, " the w i l l averts the conscious attent ion f r o m what is in the 
memory s imply by not t h ink ing about i t . " M e m o r y , as fo rmed by sensible 
experience, is determinat ive, and yet the m i n d can learn to cul t ivate a รณdied 
detachment w i t h respect to the sensible. 
August ine finds in the bod i l y l i f e o f the rat ional soul t w o paral le l t r in i t ies 
that spr ing, respectively, from the sight o f the eyes and the sight o f the m i n d . The 
analogy between sense and understanding is fami l ia r . I n the act o f sight, 
August ine distinguishes between the th ing seen, the v i s ion that is act ivated by the 
sensation o f the th ing , and the w i l l or "consc ious in ten t ion " that directs the 
capacity o f sight to one th ing or another.^^ Augus t ine 's account o f h o w v is ion 
occurs is here, more than elsewhere, s t r i k ing ly Ar is to te l ian . August ine 
dist inguishes between the pr io r i t y o f the object seen (as the cause o f seeing) and 
11.2.2. 
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the p r io r i t y o f the facul ty o f v is ion (wh i ch is on ly potent ia l un t i l actual ized as the 
" i n f o rmed sense w h i c h w e cal l s igh t " {^'sensus inf ormatus")). August ine observes 
the unl ikeness o f the three elements, for on the side o f the one seeing, there is the 
facul ty o f v i s ion , and the conscious w i l l to see; on the side o f the th ing seen, there 
is object as such. The unl ikeness is not obv ious, for the " f o r m o f the body we 
see" and the f o r m produced i n the sense facul ty (the image) cannot be 
dist inguished except " b y reason." L i k e Ar is to t le and Plot inus before h i m , 
August ine compares the fo rmat ion o f sense-images to the impression made by a 
seal i n wax . The f o r m o f each is dist inguished only at a later moment in t ime , 
when the seal is separated f r o m the wax . The senses, August ine suggests, are 
more l i ke water than wax , i n that the image is no longer mani fest ly present once 
the object is removed; yet i t does not f o l l o w f r o m this that no impression was 
made. Clear ly v is ib le images are impressed in a somewhat more sophist icated 
manner than the example indicates since, as Ar is to t le observes, i f the object seen 
actual ly touches the eye, v i s ion no longer occurs. 
The operat ive t r in i t y o f sight spans the boundary between sensible and 
in te l l ig ib le : the th ing seen is external to the body; v i s ion pertains to the body, but 
also to the soul " w i t h respect to the b o d y " ; the w i l l to see belongs " o n l y to the 
տօսԼ" ՛^ ՛* Augus t ine notes that these three are d i f ferent , and yet express a un i ty i n 
the extent to w h i c h the first t w o are dist inguished only w i t h d i f f i cu l t y . M e m o r y 
funct ions i n a passive sense to retain the images that are impressed as a seal leaves 
its f o r m in wax . M e m o r y i n this case is an operat ion o f the soul speci f ica l ly 
ordered to the body. There is also a func t ion o f the memory that is act ive wh i l e 
11.2.5. 
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st i l l be ing ordered to body, exempl i f ied i n the paral le l t r in i t y o f conscious thought 
about th ings sensed. 
Th is image y o u get when the consciousness th inks about the look o f some 
body it has seen, does in fact consist bo th o f the body ' s l ikeness he ld i n the 
memory and that w h i c h is fo rmed f r o m i t i n the conscious attent ion as y o u 
actual ly recal l something; and yet i n appearance there is on l y one single 
image, and i t takes a judgment o f reason to discover t w o th ings here . ľ . 
The coincidence o f the t w o images, namely the one he ld i n the memory 
and the one o f f -pr in ted f r o m i t to f o r m the at tent ion in the act o f recal l , 
makes them appear as one because they are so exact ly alike.^^ 
A g a i n , this passage introduces a d is t inc t ion s imi la r to that found i n Ar i s to t le ' ร De 
memoria et remimscentia, between a referent ial and a non-referent ia l image that 
exists for thought . August ine maintains that the image that is actual ly being 
considered (the non-referent ial image) ceases to exist when the m i n d tums to 
something else; the (referent ial) image that is he ld i n the passive memory abides. 
M e m o r y i n i ts dual func t ion guarantees bo th permanence and epistemic flexibility. 
Th is lends to knowledge the i l lus ion o f an in f in i te сарса: hence August ine 
laments i n conf. 10 that he cannot possibly conta in i n discursive ref lect ion the 
in f in i te potency o f his m e m o r y . 2 6 Bu t th is vis is i n fact on ly potent ia l , and 
corresponds i n acmal i ty to a finite number o f objects, and therefore a finite 
number o f referent ia l images. 
The conscious attention cannot look at every th ing contained i n the 
memory at one glance, and so t r in i t ies o f thoughts f o l l o w one another in 
succession, and one gets this innumerab ly numerous t r in i t y . I t is not 
however an in f in i te one i f i t does not exceed the number o f th ings stowed 
away in the memory . A f te r a l l , f r o m the moment a person begins to sense 
bodies w i t h any o f his bod i ly senses, they add up to a def in i te and 
determinate number, though an innumerable one, even i f y o u add the 
11.3.6. "S/c iliaբԽոէստւօ, cum animus cogitai speciem visi corporis, cum comtet ex corporis 
similitudine quant memoria tenet, et ex ea quae inde formatur in acie recordantis animi; tamen sic 
una et singularis apparet, ut duo quaedam esse non inveniantur nisi iudicante ratione.... Sed 
utriusque coทiunctio, id est, eius quam memoria tenet, et eim quae inde exprimitur ut formetur 
acies recordantis, quia simillimae sunt, veluti unam facit apparere." 
26 Conf. 10.8.15. ''Magna ista vis memoria.... Et vis est haec animi mei atque ad теат naturam 
pertinet, пес ego ipse capio Шит, quod sum. Ergo animus ad habendum se ip s um angustus est." 
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things he has forgot ten. I t is not on ly in f in i te numbers that we cal l 
innumerable, but also f in i te ones that exceed our capacity to count.^^ 
What seems an in f in i te is i n fact a f in i te mu l t i p l i c i t y . I t is reason w i t h respect to 
non-referential images that br ings order and meaning to this mu l t ip l i c i t y o f 
impressions. B y in t roduc ing these dist inct ions, August ine , l ike Plot inus before 
h i m , succeeds i n descr ib ing sense-perception as something that is not merely 
passive. External objects act on the senses on ly insofar as the senses are 
themselves rendered act ive. Th ings sensed are stored up i n the memory i n a 
passive, sometimes unconscious, manner, but they exist fo r the m i n d only as 
act ively recol lected. Th is of fers a more detai led account o f what is suggested in 
early wr i t ings such as o r ๔ , namely, that soul is a media t ing pr inc ip le that orders 
the sensible by means o f memory even i n the case o f present percept ion. The 
example of fered here o f psychic causation is that o f dreams: August ine marvels at 
the abi l i ty o f soul to af fect and move the body th rough the act ive imaginat ion. 
For August ine, this example is a negat ive, but i t points to the posi t ive relat ionship 
that ought to exist between imaginat ion and body, i n w h i c h each aspect o f the soul 
is subordinated to its higher principle.^^ 
Even as memory is the means fo r media t ing order to the sensible, i t serves 
as a l im i t , or modus, upon the vis o f the intel lectual soul . 
Thus i t happens that everyone who th inks about bod i ly th ings, whether he 
makes them up h imse l f or hears or reads someone else descr ib ing past 
events or forecast ing Шшге ones, has to have recourse to his memory and 
there b r ing to l igh t the l im i ts and measure o f a l l the forms w h i c h he looks 
27 Trin. 11.7.12. "Sed quomam non potest ocies artimi simul omma quae memoria temt, uno 
aspectu contueri, alternării vicissim cedendo ас succedendo trmitates cogitatioหนnt, atque ita fit 
ista imumerabiliter numerosissima trinitas: пес tamen infinita, si numerus in memoria 
reconditarum rerum non excedatur. Ex quo enim coepit unusquisque sentire corpora quolibet 
corporis sensu, etiam si posset adimgere quorum oblitus est, certus ac determinatus profecía 
numerus foret, ąuamvis innumerabiliร. Dìcimus enim mnumerabilia, non solum infinita, sed etiam 
quae ita finita sunt, ut facultatem mmerantis excédant.'" 
28 Our analysis o f the text that fol lows bears out this юїефгеЇаІ іоп; admittedly, given the reality o f 
sin for Augustine, the issue is more complex. We shall return to this question in the conclusion. 
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at i n his thoughts. I t is s imply impossible for anyone to th ink about a 
colour or shape he has never seen, a sound he has never heard, a flavour he 
has never tasted, a smel l he has never smel led, or a feel o f a body he has 
never fel t . Bu t the reason w h y no one can th ink about any thmg bod i l y 
unless he has sensed it is that no one remembers anyth ing bod i l y unless he 
has sensed it . So the l im i ts o f th ink ing are set by the memory jus t as the 
l im i ts o f sensing are set by bodies.^^ 
Bu t here o f course August ine is speaking only o f the "s ight o f the m i n d " w i t h 
respect to sensible tWngs. What o f non-sensible things? The epis temologica! 
analysis in subsequent books is not pursued w i t h this k i nd o f detai l . Augus t ine 
has prev iously expla ined, at 8.6.9, that the m i n d knows " jus t i ce " i n the part icu lar 
instance o f a j u s t man ; just ice is the attr ibute o f a soul , and i t is seen th rough 
certain signs manifested i n bod i l y actions, even l inguist ic signs. The m i n d 
recognizes " jus t i ce " , however, not because i t has learned something th rough these 
signs that i t d id not previously k n o w : hence the ambigu i ty between the order o f 
knowledge and the order o f learning fami l ia r f r o m mag. The m i n d rather 
recognizes " t h r o u g h " physical signs because it knows the same th rough the f o r m 
o f " j us t i ce " that is present to the m ind . I n the order o f learn ing, the sensible 
serves the b r ing ing to l igh t o f knowledge. The reasons already present to the 
m i n d are du ly credited i n B o o k 14 as the cause o f knowledge o f in te l l ig ib le 
objects. Bu t there is no act ive understanding o f what constitutes jus t ice before the 
acquaintance o f a j u s t man is made.^^ 
11.8.14. "Λα f i t ut omniร qui corporalia cogitât, sive ipse aliquid confiหgat, sive audiat, aut 
legat vel praeteriîa mrrantem, vel futura praenmtiarìtem, ad memoriam suam recurrat, et ibi 
reperiai modum atque memuram omnium formarum quas cogitam intuetur. Nam negue colorem 
диет หนหquam vidit, ñeque figuram corporis, пес sonum quem пищиат audivit, пес saporem 
quem пищиат gusíavit, пес odorem quem пищиат oĮfecit, пес üllam conîrectationem corporis 
quam ทนหquam sensit, potest quisquam omnino cogitare. At sipropterea nemo aliguid corporale 
cogitai nisi quod sensit, quia nemo memiหit corporale aliquid nisi quod sensit, Sîcut in corporibus 
serìtieหdi, sic іห memoria est cogitaหdi modus'' 
^*Orēlsē äň unjust person, upon which basis the concept of ajust person mightbe negatively 
imagined. 
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The important po in t there, as here, is not u l t imate ly a quest ion o f h o w a 
f o r m m igh t be abstracted f r o m a part icular th ing or instance; rather, the issue o f 
s igni f icance is the pedagogical emphasis upon w i l l or love. The fo rms , as higher 
pr inc ip les present to the m ind but not ident ical to the m i n d , should be "c leaved t o " 
and loved to the end o f becoming as much l ike them as possible. Here, August ine 
observes that i t is the w i l l that j o i ns the m i n d to sensible th ings by means o f act ive 
recol lect ion. Thus the "d i r ec t i on " o f the m i n d ' s gaze reveals the object o f i ts love. 
The "exerc ise" o f this book intends to show the reader that the w i l l does indeed 
encompass and rule the l i fe o f the body, and that th rough memory i n its active 
capacity, m ind can subordinate the l i fe o f the body to its true ordo. The end o f 
this is not , as we shall see more clearly be low, a re ject ion o f the l i fe o f the body, 
but rather a proper submission, a peaceful modus. The result o f this is a รณdied 
disinterest in the things that pertain to the body, as contrasted w i t h a pre­
occupat ion in these tMngs falsely conceived as ends in themselves. 
Just as i t is the w i l l wh i ch fastens sense to body, so i t is the w i l l w h i c h 
fastens memory to sense and the th ink ing attent ion to memory . A n d what 
fastens them together and assembles them also unfastens and separates 
them, namely the w i l l again.... M e m o r y is averted f r o m sensation by the 
w i l l when , intent on something else, i t does not a l l ow it to fix i tse l f on 
what is present to i t . The way the w i l l averts the conscious attent ion f r o m 
what is in the memory is s imply by not t h ink ing about i t .^ ' 
BooL· 12-14: an incarnational model of unity 
These books introduce a cruc ia l development i n Augus t ine 's method. 
Consider conf. 10, in wh i ch August ine passes in ascendmg stages th rough the 
3 ' 11.8.15. " Voluntas porro sicut adimgit sens 訓 corpori, sic memoriam sens ui, sic cogitantis 
äciem memoriae. Quae aułem conciliat ista atque coňiungit, ipsa etiam disiungit ac separat, id 
est, voluntas.... Memoriam vero a sensu voluntas avertit, cum พ aliud intenta หоห ei sinit 
wHäeFere prâësëhtia. Iam porro ab eó quod in memoria est, animi aciem velie avertere, nihil est 
aliud quam non inde cogitare." 
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various operations o f soul : sense-perception, memory , the affectiones, speculative 
knowledge, and f ina l l y , to what stands " a b o v e " the soul. A reader o f Ծտ. 11 
m igh t expect the argument i n subsequent books to f o l l o w a s imi lar pattern; 
indeed, the t w e l f t h book begins by saying that we have finished consider ing the 
soul w i t h respect to exteriora, things perceived and understood through the senses, 
and that be ing exercised i n these matters, we may now proceed to interiora. The 
d is t inct ion between these " rea lms" becomes less meaningfu l as far as the overa l l 
argument is concerned. August ine here considers the soul i n general as engaged 
i n part iculars k inds o f acts, and therefore as related to d i f ferent sorts o f objects 
w i t h d i f ferent qual i t ies o f af fect ions. What is important for our study is the 
acknowledgement that the rea lm o f the temporal cannot, i n th is endeavour, be 
surpassed: i n this l im i ted sense, Gavadin i is ent i re ly correct in saying that the task 
o f these books, conceived negat ively as an "ascent" , is doomed to failure.^^ W e 
w i l l develop this observat ion be low. 
The rea lm o f the temporal natura l ly includes the sensible, but it must n o w 
be more broadly conceived. W e therefore have a new d ichotomy w i t h w h i c h to 
w o r k , summarized i n these books by a var iety o f terms: 
temporal —— scientia —— actio —— exsecutìo —— appetitus rationalis 
eternal 一 sapientia 一 mtellectum ― consilium 一 ratio 
32 John Gavadini, "The structure and intention o f Augustine's De trinitate'' in Augustinian Studies 
23 (1992), pp. 103-123. 1 only disagree wi th Cavadmi to the extent that he finds a deliberate anti-
Neoplatonic polemic in this argument. I am not suggesting that the inner/outer distinction is 
rejected, but that it loses significant explanatory power in these books. A t 10.13, Augustine 
identifies the " inner" as being the place where reüsorí begins', its realm is less easily Circumscribed, 
less frankly dualistic. — — ——— ― 
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W i s d o m consists i n the contemplat ion o f etemal tMngs, most f u l l y experienced i n 
the soul 's etemal presence to God. I t is the m ind ' ร re lat ion to what is un l ike the 
m i n d : the object o f w i s d o m is what is unchanging, and hence the m i n d at best can 
attain a fleeting " t ransi tory thought about a non-transi tory th ing."^^ Books 12-14 
are concerned more w i t h def in ing scientia, w i t h understanding h o w man can be at 
once ordered intel lectual ly to contemplat ion, yet g iven over to the management o f 
temporal af fa irs. The d is t inct ion between scientia and sapientia is therefore 
in t roduced i n order to expla in how the soul is changeable and yet possessed o f a 
certain stabi l i ty , because o f and despite its embodied l i fe . 
Tempora l af fa i rs are a proper subject matter for the m ind . A s w e have 
seen, i n bo th present percept ion and տ the act ive aspect o f memory ("act ive 
reco l lec t ion" ) , the m i n d is f u l l y invo lved in a j u d g i n g capacity. Scientia takes up 
this pract ical d imens ion f r o m the perspective o f m i n d i n itself: wh i l e expressing 
the changeable nature o f m i n d , scientia must also manifest the order o f h igher 
pr inc ip les֊hence the recurr ing use o f the term modus. I f sapientia finds the 
m i n d in un ion w i t h the eternal reasons, scientia is the demonstrat ion in actu o f the 
m ind ' ร attent ion to these same pr inciples. These are not t w o parts, nor t w o 
facult ies, o f the m i n d ; they are rather two d i f ferent k inds o f act iv i t ies: the m i n d as 
i t looks to what is "h igher " , and the m i n d as i t looks to what is " l o w e r . " W h e n 
consider ing the m i n d " i n act" , August ine sees the soul as a w o r k in progress. The 
soul g rows, increasing i n w i sdom, է Խ օ ս ց հ the exercise o f pract ical w i s d o m . The 
ideal state o f the m i n d reveals a harmonious marr iage o f scientia and sapientia: 
the m i n d w h o l l y and perfect ly in remembrance o f higher pr inc ip les to w h i c h i t is 
12.14.23. 
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"տսեյօւո6(1"^՛՛, and communica t ing this mindfu lness in its embodied, temporal l i fe . 
Hence the pract ical d imension o f .these books: to b r ing the reader to see a way in 
w h i c h this marriage can be enabled, and the al ienat ing effects o f the fa l len l i fe 
overcome. 
O n the theme o f marr iage, August ine famously compares the d is t inct ion 
between scientia and sapientia to Paulme theor iz ing upon the d is t inc t ion between 
man and woman . They are equal i n that they are ident ical i n their essential nature; 
but they are unequal i n that they are g iven to dist inct sorts o f tasks.^^ B o t h are 
necessary and both are good, but they are associated w i t h d i f ferent mediate ends. 
Th is book is he lp fu l l y read alongside not on ly ciu. 11-13 on the fa l l o f man, but 
also doctr. chr. and its d is t inct ion between things that are to be enjoyed as ends i n 
themselves, and things that are to be employed or ordered to final goods. 
August ine explains at doctr. chr. 1.3-5 that God the T r in i t y is the th ing that is to 
be enjoyed: this is the blessedness o f par t ic ipat ion m the d iv ine l i fe . Every th ing 
other than G o d ― n a m e l y , the who le c r e a t i o n ― i s a means to this end. E Մ 0 Γ , or 
s in, occurs when things other than G o d are confusedly taken to be things wor thy 
o f u l t imate enjoyment: in this case, they become idols rather than d iv ine 
instruments. Scientia i n trin. sees the created order as something good, but whose 
goodness lies i n its being ordered to w i sdom. The created order is not devalued as 
a mere too l , but rather finds its value as an ordo amoriร, a " w a y o f the af fect ions" , 
humb ly geรณring to its creator.՝^^ 
12.15.24; "subiuncta: 
3 5 12.5.5-13.21. Augustine defends the essential equality o f woman and man; for one article that 
summarizes various scholarly approaches to readmg this part o f trin., see David Vincent Meconi, 
"Gender and Imago Dei in Augustine's De Trinitate X I I " , in American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 74 (2000), pp. 47-62. 
^Оос(п_ҫһг. J. 17, aş translated by D.w. Robertson (Liberal Arts Press: Indianapolis, 1958). In 
this text, as in trin., the psychological emphasis is upon love֊its quality as formed by Its 
orientation. —— - - - — - … — — 
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A n important aspect o f the mar i ta l image o f scientia and sapientia is the 
idea o f s in as a fa i lure o f commun i t y . Th is is amply developed i n the account o f 
the fa l l i n СШ. , and it is summar i ly described in Book 12 o f trin. I t also recalls 
suggestively the develop ing ecclesiology i n the final books o f conf, August ine 
offers this succinct descr ipt ion at 8.14: 
What happens is that the soul , l ov i ng its o w n power , slides away f r o m the 
who le w h i c h is c o m m o n to a l l in to the part wh i ch is its o w n pr ivate 
property. B y f o l l o w i n g God 's direct ions and being perfect ly governed by 
his laws it cou ld en joy the who le universe o f creat ion; but by the apostasy 
o f pr ide w h i c h is cal led the beg inn ing o f sin i t strives to grab something 
more than the who le and to govern i t by i ts o w n laws; and because there is 
no th ing more than the who le i t is thrust in to anxiety over a part, and so by 
be ing greedy for more i t gets less. That is w h y greed is cal led the root o f 
a l l ev i ls .^ ' 
S in is i n part a fata l misunderstanding that arises f r o m an attempt to render a 
common good shared as a pr ivate good possessed.^^ The disharmony between the 
spouses begins, i n ciu. 11， when Eve enters into secret communicat ion w i t h the 
serpent; after they eat， both A d a m and Eve hide f r om the f r iendly conversat ion 
they prev ious ly enjoyed w i t h God. Scientia fa i ls when i t turns to the temporal 
realm in a manner independent f r o m the inf luence o f the pr inciples that guide and 
i l luminate natural reason. A d a m represents the grounding that temporal af fa i rs 
must have ш the eternal. I t is this g round ing that is " p u b l i c " and " c o m m o n to a l l . " 
M a n enjoys the most perfect fe l lowsh ip w i t h man in his spir i tual nature: recal l i n 
conf. 12 that the caelum caeli is described as the first " in te l lectual creature", the 
sapientia Dei, Augus t ine 'ร discussion o f Chr ist ian communi ty i n that book points 
37 Trin. 12.8.14. '''Potestatem quippe suam diligens anima, a communi universo ad privátam 
partem prolabitur: et apostatica illa superbia, quod 'ш/7/พ/พ peccati ， dìcitur, cum ín universitate 
creaturae Deunใ rectorem secuta, legibus eius optime gubernari potuisset, plus aliquid universo 
appetens, atque id sua lege gubernare molita, quia nihil est ampliuร universitate, տ curam 
partilem truditur, et sic aliquid ampliuร concupiscendo Iท inu і tur; unde ЄЇ avaritia dìcitur 'radix 
omnium mahrum ՚." 
3 8 PaıUİ Gri f f i ths develops the private/public dichotomy o f sin nicely ๒ Lywg: Aท Augustinián 
Theology of Duplicity (Brazos Press: Grand Rapids, 2004), esp. pp. 85-100. 
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to the heaven o f heavens as the Church in g lory . I n the stabi l i ty o f contemplat ion, 
man finds a perfect un ion w i t h his f e l l ow man even as he is incorporated i n Christ . 
The "p r i va te " is not the bod i ly or "ex ter io r " as such, but rather the part icular i ty o f 
an i l lusory independence that arises f r o m a "g rasp ing " attempt to make what is 
already one's o w n into something possessed exc lus ive ly , as an end in i tse l f and as 
a th ing contro l led by oneself. I n the analogy o f the marr iage o f A d a m and Eve, 
scientia and sapientia now exist i n a necessary but flawed commun i t y . A healthy 
commun i t y arises from humble submission o f the lower to the h igher according to 
a true modus. 
The t w e l f t h book concludes w i t h a short discussion o f what August ine 
cal ls Platonic reminiscence. Th is appears to be a defense o f August ine 's o w n use 
o f the term " reco l l ec t i on " (remimscentia), and in fact he on ly repudiates bod i l y re­
incarnat ion as an imp l i ca t ion o f anamnesis?^ I n th is book, August ine has said 
that he is d is t inguish ing between scientia and sapientia before proceeding to 
discuss them each i n turn. I n considering their d i f ference and re lat ion, he finds a 
l i n k i n memory . I t appears as though w isdom cannot be attained by the embodied 
soul . The m i n d cannot behold unchanging t ru th i n itself; however , i t can have an 
apprehension that is un l ike the th ing apprehended, a " t rans i tory thought o f a non-
transi tory t h i n g . " Th is transitory thought is immedia te ly lost to the sight o f the 
m i n d ; memory , however , " g ra f t s " the experience o f apprehension i n the m i n d , 
establ ishing a dialect ical l ink . Subsequently the m i n d , made more able i n its 
"^^ I talce the mätter ó f thè pre-existence o f the soul, as proposed by O'Connel l , to be closed; cf. 
O'Daly (1987), pp. 200֊201. ― 
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powers by t ra in ing i n the disciplinae, can return tíirough the memory to the th ing 
percei ved.՚"՛ 
This conf i rms our previous іп іефге їа і іоп: unchanging things such as the 
"e temal reasons" are k n o w n on ly through the media t ion o f some sort o f image, 
whether spatial, l inguist ic or otherwise. These images are the tools used by the 
magister i n order to tu rn the m i n d to the l igh t that i l lumines it."" I n trin., the m i n d 
encounters in te l l ig ib le t h i n g s ― a n d not on ly sensible t h i n g s ― t o o u g h the 
mediat ion o f memory i n that i t apprehends universal t ruths on ly through part icular 
instances. I n habitual recol lect ion, the m i n d is exercised i n the discernment o f the 
etemal i n and through part icular perceptions. August ine of fers a mathematical 
example o f th is l im i ted mode o f know ing : " the non-bod i l y and unchanging idea 
o f a square body, for example, may abide for ever the same; but a man 'ร thought 
does not abide in i t i n the same way , i f that is to say he cou ld ever attain to i t 
w i thou t a spatial image.，42 
There are therefore t w o aspects to the m i n d ' s k n o w i n g . O n the one hand, 
i t is "паШга ї їу sub jo ined" to the in te l l ig ib le reasons w i t h the result that m i n d 
"sees" th ings by v i r tue o f the i l l um ina t ion o f a "non -bod i l y l i gh t " ; on the other 
hand, by v i r tue o f its unl ikeness to these reasons, the m i n d must consciously and 
act ively cul t ivate the habit o f remembrance i n the hope that, by " c l eav ing " to 
these reasons, i t w i l l become l i ke them, more constant and stable by imi ta t ion. 
Th is is the paradox o f the caelum caeli that August ine is seeking after: the 
changeable creature par t ic ipat ing as much as possible in the unchanging d iv ine 
4 ° Recall the language o f synthesis and analysis from ord 2.19.48. Here, we have a more 
imagistic, epic play upon the same pattern. 
4 ' The passage we quoted at length from sol. 1.13.23 suggests that the mind, ๒ order to turn to this 
l ight, requires only faith, hope and chari ty―í/ this mind is "sawMj"; i f further help is required, a 
teacher_must direct the mind to the discernment o f the creative hand o f God in all things. 
4 2 12.14.23. 
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l i fe . The scìentia/sopìentia d icho tomy assures us that this is not accompl ished by 
a denia l o f the tempora l , but rather by engaging it i n a manner bef i t t ing its 
t ransi tory and impermanent nature. A s a matter o f present percept ion, the habit o f 
memory describes what th is engagement should look l i ke ; its f u l f i l lmen t is o f 
course who l l y eschatological . Th is readmg is in i t ia l ly con f i rmed by the thir teenth 
and fourteenth books. 
Hav ing dist inguished between scientia and sapientia, August ine proceeds 
to discuss each i n tu rn . The th i r teenth book seeks to discern a t r in i tar ian image i n 
the " ra t iona l cognizance o f tempora l th ings" {scientia) and presumably the 
fourteenth w i l l discuss the contemplat ion o f eternal th ings, i n w h i c h a t r in i t y w i l l 
most perfect ly be found . T w o observations should be made w h i c h we w i l l 
consider i n tu rn : first, the discussion o f scientia becomes a discussion o f fa i th in 
the incarnate Cfe is t ; second, despite the promise to attain w i sdom, both i n 
argument and exercitatio^ we never i n fact move beyond the rea lm οΐ scientia 
(conceived precisely as fa i th ) . Th is is not a surprise g iven what w e have read thus 
far; i t does however speak against most readings o f trin. w h i c h find in i t 
something l ike an apophatic ascent that rejects in turn what i t a f f i rms i n the quest 
for a "specu la t ive" sort o f un ion w i t h God. 43 
43 To speak in this manner is misleading; Augustine has been accused of various sorts o f "onto-
theological" techniques, but this is based on a misreading o f texts such as trin., and a failure to 
appreciate his r ich conception o f image and memory, as well as the Christological core o f his 
epistemology. On the one hánd， Augustine resists attributing being {substantia', cf. Gn. litt. 
5.16.34: 'Ίหeffabłiis substantia'') to God except in the sense o f existence ^abusive voćari...'\ trin. 
7,5.10); on the other hand, the fact that the soul is 5wèjoined to the eternal reasons and remains 
рефеШаІІу distinct from them highlights the role o f ¿ace and i l lumination in the life o f the 
resurrected body. For one recent example o f Augustine as epistemologica! idolator, see David 
Bradshaพ, Aristotle East and West (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004), who 
summarizeร ิ m p. 265 that, for Augustine, God "iš simple; He is intrinsically intel l igible"; and the 
alleged downfal l o f Western theological speculation fol lows from this. 
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The thir teenth book echoes the քօսրէհ.՛*՛* A t 13.19.24, August ine observes 
that the foca l po in t o f the un ion o f scientia and sapientia is " that most important 
temporal event" , namely, t h e j o m i n g o f God w i t h man i n t ime. A t 4.18.24, 
August ine says that the who le point o f fa i th is that man actual ly be healed through 
his experience o f temporal things. Fai th is thus speci f ical ly fa i th i n G o d as 
incarnate: l i ke man i n every way , except w i thou t sin."*^ 
Fa i th is not an іпЇеІІесШаІ assent, but a mode o f actual, and not mere ly 
eschatological , par t ic ipat ion i n the un ion o f temporal and eternal that is i n Christ. 
I f any th ing , the curious quest ion is w h y August ine has wai ted un t i l the thir teenth 
book ( i n the context o f 8-15) to discuss fa i th so exp l ic i t l y . A t th is po in t , w e w i l l 
on ly observe, a long w i t h Ayres , that 13 centers the discussion o f 12-14, since fa i th 
i n Chr is t incarnate both uni f ies scientia and sapientia, and gives access to 
sapientia by a par t ic ipat ion i n this un ion. The purposes o f argument and 
exercitatio come together most clearly here. The argument by proceeding through 
t r in i tar ian tropes continues, but is subordinated to the incamat ional mode l o f 
scientia and sapientia: not on ly is the former on its o w n over ly abstract, but at this 
po in t August ine is o f fe r ing an important qua l i f i ca t ion o f the ascensional pattern o f 
exteriora-interiora-superiora. The exterior, temporal rea lm d i m l y ref lects an 
ordo or modus i n Book 11 ； here, i n l ight o f the Incarnat ion, i t reveals d iv ine 
presence i n a concrete manner. August ine, by discussing fa i th , intends to show 
h o w this presence is manifested i n the soul that seeks to enjoy the l i fe o f the 
commun i t y o f the Tr in i t y . August ine has said up to this po in t that he must move 
" On the significance o f the relationship between these books, see Lewis Ayres' article, "The 
Christological Context o f Augustine's De trinitate X I I I : Toward Relocatmg Books V I I I - X V " , in 
Augustiman Studies 29:1 (1998), pp. 111-139. 
"^^TKāt is to say, without any disharmonious relation between scientia and sapientia in his person, 
but rather emDodying their perfect maiTİage; cf. 13,19.24. 
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beyond what is tempora l , bod i l y , external , i n order to find the highest part o f man, 
since this alone is f i t f o r en joyment . Fa i th i n Chr ist cal ls th is into q u e s t i o n ― 
hence the s igni f icant sh i f t i n the argument at the beg inn ing o f B o o k 14. 
I n the opening chapters o f B o o k 14, August ine begins to cr i t ic ize any sort 
o f t r in i tar i an image based upon fa i th , since fa i th depends on histor ical knowledge 
and impl ies a progress made i n t i m e / ^ The image o f God , he says, must be 
located in that w h i c h does not pass away. Even i f we dist inguish between 
part icular tenets o f fa i th , and the act o f fai thfulness on the part o f the be l iev ing 
soul , i t seems that even the latter is bound to pass away i n the fu l f i l lmen t o f 
contemplat ive caritas. 
August ine immedia te ly calls this in to quest ion: perhaps, he says, much as 
memory contains a trace o f a th ing even after i t has passed away, fa i th migh t 
abide even as i t passes a w a y . 4 7 August ine compares fa i th to the virtues.' '* He 
observes that these no t on ly abide, but are perfected in the fu l f i l lmen t o f 
happiness. The vi r tues chart out a seamless progress o f spir i tual per fect ion i n 
w h i c h the soul is ever more r igh t l y ordered to Օօձ . ՛ * ^ Perhaps fa i th abides i n a 
manner comparable to the exercise o f the v i r tues: the progress is complete, but the 
memory o f that progress is part o f the obta in ing o f the desired end. 
August ine explores this poss ib i l i ty by return ing to the psychological t r in i ty 
that is founded in memory . The fact that memory and knowledge are dist inct 
conf i rms the discursive mode o f the m i n d ' s apprehension. The m i n d , we have 
'C f . 13.2.5. 
' 14.8.11. 
' 14.9.12. 
49 Cf. mus. 15.50-51, where the virtues work together to order the soul rightly to God and to 
creation; there they are based upon prudence, by which the soul "knows its proper station"; by 
justice, the soul is made duly subject to God, and mmdft j l o f its natural superiority to material 
t l î i n p ; ШҮг/и., as in mus., Augustine is using the virtues to trace out the activity o f grace ๒ the 
s o u l ; a proDer esteem o f self on its own cannot offer any sor t o f f e l i c i t y . 
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seen, ๒10พร inte l lectual objects mediate ly, through the product ion o f an internal 
w o r d . The m i n d can be present to itself, but on ly i n the same manner i n w h i c h i t 
knows other th ings. M i n d as object coincides w i t h the th ink ing act iv i ty o f m i n d , 
but str ict ly speaking, i t is poster ior i n t ime (as object).^^ When the m ind in not 
act ively t h i nk ing about i tself, its relat ion to i tse l f is a func t ion o f memory , i n the 
passive sense o f a "storehouse." I t is on ly potent ia l ly an object o f knowledge. 
August ine defends the role o f memory i n se l f -knowledge; however , memory 
funct ions i n a special manner i n this case because, in j o i n i n g together t w o things 
that are the same i n k i nd , i t funct ions most pure ly as a mode o f making-present. I t 
is, i n the wel l - in tegrated soul , a un ion o f love. M i n d and its t h ink ing are j o i n e d 
together i n the act o f se l f - know ing ; that this re lat ion is described as " l o v e " 
preserves the otherness o f subject and object. Sel f -knowledge is not 
transcendental even in this re lat ion. I t is discursive, since dia lect ical . 
Augus t ine exp l i c i t l y says that we cannot proceed any "h igher " , indeed, 
that there is nowhere else to look i n man for that capacity to image God.^* 
M e m o r y reveals the discursive, t ime-bound character o f the k n o w i n g subject; i t 
also c i rcumscr ibes the most int imate self-presence possible. Sel f -knowledge is 
not immedia te , since m i n d depends on memory to make things "advent i t ious" to 
5 ° 14.10.13. Cf. 14.5.8, where Augustine observes that the mind, in knowing itself, only has m 
view what it is actually thinkmg. The discussion o f memory in conf. 10 shows that mind cannot 
contain itself in its potency. 
51 14.10.13. " [ I t is not] as though after getting to know itself, it should by recollection see itself 
fixed in its owฑ memory, as i f it had not been there before it had got to know itself The truth o f 
course is that from the moment it began to be it never stopped remembering itself, never stopped 
understanding itself, never stopped loving itself, as we have already shownT And therefore when it 
turns to itself in thought, a tr inity is formed in which a word too can be perceived. It is formed o f 
course out o f the very act o f thought, wi th the w i l l j o ๒ ๒ g the two together. It is here then more 
than anywhere that we should recognize the image we are looking for" (italics mine). '"Autpost 
cogmtionem sui recordando se ipsam velut ๒ memoria sua constituíam videt, quasi non ibi fuerit 
anîequam se ipsam cognosceret; cum profecto ex quo esse coepit, หนหquam sui meminisse, 
ทนทquam se mîelligere, nmquam se amare destiterit, skut iam osieทdimus. Ac per hoc quando ad 
se ipsam cogitaiione COทvertitur, fit trinitas, irt qua iam et verbum possit mtelligi: formatur quippe 
ex ipsa cogìtatioฑe, volúntate litrumque imgeme. Ibi ergo magis agnoscerìda est imago quam 
quaerimusľ 
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the m i n d . Sel f -knowledge is a th ing to be sought after as a habi tual exercitaiio, 
and it is mere ly enabled (and not guaranteed) by a pre-conscious sel f - re lat ion. '^ 
I n the l ikeness o f m i n d seeking to k n o w its t h i n k m g , August ine finds the greatest 
l ikeness i n man to God ; but i t is not the image o f G o d itself. I n the deliberate act 
o f se l f -knowledge, the m i n d is made more l i ke i tself , but as sel f-or iented, it is yet 
changeable. The solut ion is to combine the insight o f memory as a means o f 
presence, w i t h the eternity o f the d iv ine l i fe as ground for the soul 's steadfast 
we l l -be ing . The argument i n 14 therefore shi f ts focus f r o m seeking a d iv ine 
l ikeness i n man, to finding an anchor fo r man in a re lat ion to the d iv ine l i fe . I t is 
i n remember ing , know ing and l ov ing G o d , August ine says, that w e most r igh t ly 
find the image o f G o d i n man , for there is on l y one w i s d o m , one happiness and 
one "supreme l i gh t " , and i n these alone w i l l the soul find rest.^^ For the m i n d to 
remember and k n o w i tsel f is " foo l ishness" ; to remember and k n o w G o d is 
w i s d o m , and blessedness. 
I t is somewhat disingenuous fo r August ine to say that he has been 
consider ing up to n o w the soul as i t exists p r io r to any reference to God 
{antequam particeps Dei).^^ There is i n the soul a k i n d o f natural image, jus t as 
there is f o r August ine a natural immor ta l i t y ; this image however is gravely 
d is f igured. What is the substance o f the flaw? There is a lways th is tension i n 
Augus t ine ' ร thought : are the natural l imi ta t ions o f t ime-bound creatures s imply 
inherent i n their mode o f be ing, or are they mora l , bound up w i t h the effects o f 
52 H i l l ' s translation at 15.25 illustrates the distinction nicely, whi le avoiding the tr icky language o f 
"consciousness": "when [the mind] begins to think about something else it stops thinking about 
this, although it does not stop knowing i t ." Hence the possibility o f self-knowledge always exists, 
i f not the actuality. In Book 15, Augustine explains this as a function o f man's being and knowing 
being substantially distinct, whereas in God they are identical. 
" 14 ,12 .15 . 
5 4 14.8.11. 
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sin? Is the t r in i t y o f memory , knowledge and love an "adequate" ref lect ion o f 
t r iune equal i ty and re lat ion when ordered to sel f -knowledge? W i t h August ine, w e 
cannot say one or the other. H e w i l l never say, i n rapprochement w i t h Or igen, 
that the state o f nature is an ef fect o f s in ; on the other hand, the natural state o f 
things has inscr ibed in its very essence a radical and not merely i deo log i ca l 
dependence upon God. A habit o f se l f -knowledge is attamable, but its result is 
"fool ishness."^^ The m i n d is most god- l i ke when it is ordered to God i n a l l o f its 
facult ies. There may w e l l be a natural imago Dei inscr ibed i n the soul antequam 
particeps Dei; but i t is o f l i t t le account except as a pointer, a сарса, for the d iv ine 
l i fe that sustains and i l luminates i t . A t the conc lus ion o f the fourteenth book, 
August ine reiterates that a l l rat ional creatures can discern the t ru th by the 
i l l um ina t ion o f the etemal reasons; hence, they can infer the existence o f God and 
certain o f his attr ibutes, such as just ice and t ru th . A n d yet at par. 18， August ine 
insists that the m i n d cannot love or "es teem" i tse l f r igh t ly , let alone love its 
neighbour r igh t l y , unless i t first love God . Know ledge cannot happen apart f r o m 
an ef fect ive act o f w i l l . I t is precisely the key insight o f a " t r in i tar ian psycho logy" 
that knowledge and w i l l are inext r icably interdependent: a man cannot w i l l what 
he does not k n o w , nor can he k n o w that to w h i c h he is not directed. 
The soul cannot exist at a l l "apart f r o m " G o d , let alone flourish. A s the 
soul becomes more ordered to G o d , the subtle boundary between nature and grace 
becomes even less tangible. August ine says that to be close to God is to 
remember God.^^ M o r e accurately, "c loseness" to God is a funct ion o f 
remember ing, k n o w i n g and w i l l i n g God : i n th is case, the soul is ordered to G o d as 
" On self-love, see Oliver O'Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (Yale University 
Press: New Haven, 1980). 
56 14.13.17. 
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object because end. Because o f the unchanging character o f the desired end, the 
result is a greater in tegrat ion o f the psycholog ica l powers o f the soul. Im i ta t i ve 
par t ic ipat ion results in the perfect ion o f the soul 's natural potent ia l . 
The m i n d can indeed apprehend t ru th , but as August ine shows in conf. 10， 
the same m i n d immedia te ly despises t ruth, and instead chooses the falsehood that 
is more convenient to i t . Experience proves to August ine the t ru th o f this 
re f lect ion. The fa i lure o f the w i l l is repaired by the love o f G o d , and the fa l l o f 
the intel lect is reversed by the graceful i l l um ina t ion o f the t ru th . Hope therefore 
exists precisely i n the soul 's changeable паШге: i t can progress f r o m misery to 
happiness. Happiness w i l l be the result o f the soul be ing consumed w i t h and 
ordered toward the stabi l i ty o f the d iv ine l i fe . M e m o r y , intel lect and w i l l shal l be 
un i f i ed i n the un i ty o f the i r object. 
T o return to the th i r teenth book, it should be clear w h y the final w o r d i n a 
text that intends to better understand the t r iune God is fa i th . Fa i th is understood 
as a temporal order ing o f the soul to eternal t ru th . I t establishes a relat ionship o f 
par t ic ipat ion i n the incarnate God who enters in to the cond i t ion o f changeable 
man, and "confer red his g i f t s " upon the same, thereby myster ious ly b r ing ing 
together what hi therto has been паШгаїїу opposed /^ Lest the te rm "pa r t i c ipa t ion " 
seem over ly vague, August ine specifies this re lat ion in the terms o f the atonement. 
I t is by jus t ice , he says, that Christ overcomes death; he pays the debt o f sin w i t h 
his b lood and thereby of fers satisfaction. Subsequently, i n r is ing f r o m the dead, 
he demonstrates the power that he has i n h is person.^^ The result o f the t w o f o l d 
act ion o f death and resurrect ion is that men should marve l at the humility o f this 
" 13.10.13. For this reason, Augustine says that all who lack the mediator between the temporal 
and the etemal, ๒evitably fai l to understand the nature o f the etemal; cf. 13.19.24. 
՜^^ฯ"3714718. The language o f the atonement is not the exclusive manner in which this participation 
is described. That it occurs at this DO int highlights the Christological center o f this book. 
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jus t ice. Chr is t 's humi l i t y teaches the example o f obedience, and inspires i n the 
heart a love for the one w h o has condescended i n the act o f sacri f ice. 
The d ichotomy o f scientia and sapientia describes the un ion o f temporal 
and eternal i n Cfe is t ' s person. Scientia is most proper ly understood as the l i fe o f 
fa i th : i t is the temporal order ing o f a l l th ings to the w i l l o f God . Sapientia is the 
w i s d o m o f God himsel f . Bo th are contained i n the t w o f o l d nature o f Christ. 
Knowledge is ՇԽ ւտէ , and w i s d o m is Chr ist : hence, August ine says, " th rough h i m 
we go to h i m " , w i thou t ever depart ing f r o m him.^^ The t w o cannot be col lapsed, 
j us t as the human and d iv ine in Chr is t cannot be confused. However , the human 
is perfected տ submission to and myst ica l un ion w i t h the divine• 一indeed, 
submission, in the sense o f humilitas, is the sole cond i t ion o f un ion . For this 
reason the bodily character o f Chr is t 'ร resurrect ion is central to August ine 's 
theological psychology.^" Chr is t ' ร human body is as i t were a doorway ; to enter 
in to i t of fers ins ight into the manner o f man 'ร un ion w i t h God , bu t the threshold is 
never lef t behind. Just as a per fect ion o f obedience is achieved throughout 
Chr is t 'ร min is t ry and death, so also i n the spi r i tua l l i f e o f men is there the 
possib i l i ty o f a cont inuous progress t føough tempora l t r ia ls to the rest o f 
blessedness. 
Has the argument then fa i led , i f indeed w e rema in w i t h fa i th? A t the end 
o f the thir teenth book, August ine reminds the reader that the t r in i t y based on fa i th 
is a t r in i ty that pertains to the inner man , w h i c h is to say that i t is proper ly 
speculative. I t is i n fact a k i nd o f knowledge.^ ' Nevertheless, i t is based on 
5 9 13.19.24. Cf. Col . 2:1-3; G. Madec, "Christus, scientia et sapientia nostra: le principe de 
cohérence de la doctr๒e augustinienne", in Recherches Augustmiennes, Vo l . 10 (1975), pp. 77-85. 
On the eucharistie dimension o f this movement, see Io. ev. tr. 13.4. 
*°_On ţhe. flesh o f Christ, see G. Madec, La Patrie et la Voie (Desclée: Paris, 1989), pp. 170-177. 
6 ' 13.3.6. 
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histor ical events and a histor ical progress. Psychological ly speaking, i t is based in 
memory , and therefore pertains to the temporal.^^ The fourteenth book , w e have 
shown, seeks to find what is " i m m o r t a l l y insc r ibed" upon the soul. However , 
immor ta l i t y i n the end is found i n G o d alone. The сарса o f memory is capable o f 
inc lud ing both a memory o f past l i fe (progress in fa i th) , and a present percept ion 
o f the d iv ine (the graceful v i s ion o f God) . Th is is an adequate rest for the 
embodied creature, whether i n the midst o f th is l i f e , or in the bod i l y v i s ion o f 
g lory. 
Conclusions on trin.: Book 15 
W e began this chapter by descr ib ing the Incarnat ion as a via to the Father, 
and as a pr inc ip le o f un i f i ca t ion o f the temporal and the etemal. Fa i th is the term 
that best describes the task o f dwe l l i ng i n the tempora l : i t is not s imply the 
a f f i rmat ion o f certain statements as true, but rather a hab i t - fo rming act iv i ty 
whereby the soul comes to understand and love a l l things i n their proper ordo, or 
their proper re lat ion to G o d . Th is ac t iv i ty is p r imar i l y a w o r k o f m i n d , but the 
effect o f fa i th is on the who le person. I t is a heal ing that has its u l t imate 
fu l f i l lmen t i n the resurrect ion o f the body , described i n B o o k 15 as a state o f 
t ranqui l i ty i n w h i c h the body becomes a boon rather than a burden, perfect ly 
subject to onesel f even as the who le person is subject to God.^^ W e wished to 
h igh l igh t the central i ty o f the Incarnat ion, even i n a treatise on the T r i n i t y , as the 
only certain l i nk between the soul and the mystery o f the l i fe o f the d iv ine . 
For this reason, we focused on the chapters concerned w i t h the 




the methodology o f d iscerning evidence o f the creator i n the created. Augus t ine 'ร 
argument can i n no way be taken as merely negative i n method. Instead o f 
passing through the temporal i n order to find the etemal i n man, in the end 
Augustme concedes that the etemal is not mean ing fu l l y present " i n " man 
antequam particeps Dei. A s i n other texts, August ine observes a k i nd o f natural 
immor ta l i t y o f the soul , as w e l l as an i l l umina t ion o f reason that cannot be 
considered a direct in tervent ion o f grace. Augus t ine 's preferred p r o o f o f the 
natural g i f ts w i t h w h i c h man is endowed lies i n the universal desire that a l l men 
have for happiness: August ine геШгаร to this argument throughout /ГШ., 
s ign i f icant ly at the conclus ion o f B o o k 1 4 . ^ 
The focus on the creature thus shifts to a focus on the d iv ine , speci f ica l ly 
on i ts t r in i tar ian inter-relat ions as a k ind o f vita into w h i c h the sacri f ice o f the 
incarnate Chr ist has purchased access. The final book accord ingly develops t w o 
overarching themes. First , the undeniable unl ikeness o f man and G o d , g i ven the 
changeable паШге o f the m i n d o f the creature. Second, the w o r k o f the Spir i t as 
overcoming the น ฝ i k e n e s s ― t h e unlikeness preserved even in the t w o dist inct 
natures embodied i n Cføist . 
The fifteenth book, we in i t ia l ly observed, c la ims to treat o f the T r i n i t y i n 
i tself, what August ine has indeed been a im ing fo r a l l a long. A f t e r summar iz ing 
the argument thus far (as recapitulated above), i t concludes that the image o f G o d 
i n man is so dramat ical ly and fundamental ly un l ike the ref lected exemplar that the 
T r in i t y remains enshrouded in mystery. Th is conc lus ion is not a great зифг ізе to 
" Those who argue agamst the necessity o f faith for the fialfillment o f happmess wi l l f i jUy ignore 
what their reason tells them, namely, the evident manner in which the soul is "made for God." Cf. 
15.23.44. " B y despising the faith that purifies hearts, what are they do๒g ๒ understanding the 
nature o f the human ni ind, wi th their subtle discussions about it, but condemning themselves on 
ţh^ very evidence o f their own understanding?" 
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the reader. What we in i i i a l l y described as a fa i led enterprise is du ly fu l f i l l ed in 
the exercitatio o f faith.^^ August ine summarizes as f o l l ows : 
Our knowledge therefore is vast ly d iss imi lar to [God 's ] knowledge. What 
is God 's knowledge is also his w i s d o m , and wha t is his w i s d o m is also his 
being or substance, because i n the wonder f i i l s imp l i c i t y o f that nature i t is 
not one th ing to be w ise , another to be, but being wise is the same as 
being, and we have already said of ten enough i n p r e v i o u s books. B u t our 
knowledge, as regards most o f its objects, can be bo th lost and acquired for 
the very reason that fo r us to be is not the same th ing as to k n o w or to be 
wise, since we can be, even i f we do not k n o w and щ-е not wise to things 
we have learnt f r o m elsewhere. That is w h y , j us t as our knowledge is so 
dissimi lar to that knowledge o f God 's , so our w o r d is d iss imi lar to that 
W o r d o f God w h i c h is b o m o f the Father 'ร being.^^ 
God is ident ical w i t h his w i s d o m and his knowledge: i t is an attr ibute o f Ms 
essential nature to be wise and to know . M a n possesses th is attr ibute not on ly in 
greater or lesser degrees, but i n a fundamenta l ly d i f ferent manner (appropriate to 
his changeable nature). 
I t is true that man 'ร memory . . . has i n its o w n l i t t le way some sort o f 
likeness i n this image t r in i t y to the Father, however immeasurably 
inadequate the l ikeness may be. A g a i n , i t is true that man 'ร understanding, 
w h i c h is fo rmed f r o m memory by d i rect ing thought onto i t when what is 
k n o w n is uttered, and w h i c h is an inner w o r d o f no part icular language, 
has i n its enormous inequal i ty some k i n d o f l ikeness to the Son; and that 
man 'ร love, proceeding f r o m knowledge and j o i n i n g memory and 
understanding together, as be ing i tse l f c o m m o n to parent and o f fspr ing 
(wh ich is why i t cannot be i tse l f regarded as either parent or o f fspr ing) has 
m this image some l ikeness, though a vast ly unequal one, to the H o l y 
Spir i t . A n d yet , w h i l e i n th is image o f the t r in i ty these three are not one 
man but belong to one man, i t is not l i kewise the case i n that supreme 
651 agree wi th Hi l l that the sense in which Augustine is addressing "unbelievers" has to do wi th 
those who require "reasons" m order to believe (15.27.48). Instead, Augustine commends faith, in 
a manner describmg the methodology o f the whole work: first, one must place faith in the truth o f 
Scripture; then one must pray and seek to l ive rightly, and by this seek to understand what they 
hold by faith. 
66 15.12.22. "Խหge est ergo huic scientiae scientia nostra dissimilis. Quae autem scientia Dei 
est, ipsa et sapientia; et quae sapientia, ipsa essentia sive substantia. Quia in illius naturae 
simplicitate mirabili, non est aliud sapere, aliud esse; sed quod est sapere, hoc est et esse, sicut et 
in superioribus libris saepe iam dKİmus. Nostra vero scientia in rebus plurimus propterea et 
amissibilis est et receptibilis, quia non hoc est nobis esse quod scire vel sapere: quoniam esse 
possumus, et iam si nesciamus, neque sapiamus ea quae aliunde didicimus. Propter hoc, sicut 
riostra scietitia illi scientiae Dei, sic et nostrum verbum quod mscitur de nostra scientia, dissimile 
est illi Verbo Dei auod mtum est de Patris essentia." 
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t r in i ty o f w h i c h th is is the image that those three belong to one G o d : they 
are one G o d and they are three persons, not one.^^ 
W e have not described memory or the w i l l merely as facult ies: they are essential 
act iv i t ies o f the soul . B u t man is no t ident ical to them, nor is he ident ical to h is 
m i n d . Acco rd ing l y , they cannot real ly be equal i n themselves, except insofar as 
they meet i n an object o f contemplat ion (such as the m i n d itself, w h i c h 
nevertheless remains dist inct as object ) . The image t r in i ty o f se l f -knowledge 
seemed to promise the most hope fo r discerning such a capacity i n man , but 
August ine found that m i n d on ly actually knows i tse l f i n discursive acts o f 
knowledge, th rough the media t ion o f the product ion o f an internal w o r d . M a n is 
most l i ke G o d w h e n he has G o d before his eyes, filling up a l l the potency o f the 
soul w i t h h imsel f . 
What is d i f ferent then i n the final contemplat ion that is p romised to man? 
What is to be hoped for? I n the v i s i on o f g lory , says August ine, the who le person 
"sha l l see a l l his knowledge i n one glance."^^ M i n d does not cease to be wha t i t is 
and k n o w as i t o rd inar i l y does; and yet it is changed as its object changes. The 
sight o f the m i n d that passes over one object after another pauses, and finds i tse l f 
immovab l y he ld by beauty o f the d iv ine. What is changeable is not made 
67 15.23.43. ''Quamvis enim memoria hominis, et maxime illa quam pecora non habent, id est, 
qua res intelligibiles ita contineniur, ut non in earn per sensus corporis venerini, habeat pro 
modulo suo in hac imagine Trinitatis incomparabiliter quidem imparem, sed tamen qualecumque 
similitudme Patris; itemque intelligentia hominis, quae per ішешіопет cogitationis inde formatur, 
quando quod schür diàtur, et mílius linguae cordis verbum est, habeat in sua magna disparitate 
nonmllam similitudinem Filii: et amor hominis de scientia procedem, et memoriam 
intelligeหíiamque coniungem, tanquam parentiprolique communis, unde пес parens intelligiîur 
esse, пес proles, habeat տ hac imagine aliquant, licet valde imparem, simUitudimm Spiritus 
sancii: non tamen, sicut ไท ista imagine Trinitatis non haec tria ums homo, sed mius hominis 
sunt, ita in ipsa summa Trinitate cuius haec imago est, miuร Dei sunt illa tria, sed mus Deus est, 
et tres sunt ìllae, non una persona" 
68 15.16.26. "Förtass is etìam volubiles non ermi nostrae cogitatìones ab ali is in alia euntes atque 
redemtes, sed отпет scieทfiam nostrani uno simul compectu yidebimนร: tarnen cum et hoc fuerit, 
si et hoc fuerit, formata erit creatura quae formabilis fuit, ut nihil iam desit eim formae, ad quam 
pervenire deberet: sed tamen coaequanda non erit illi simplicităţi, ubi non formabile aliquid 
formattìfh Vēl reformátům est, sedforma; ทeque informis, ñeque formate, ipsa ibi aeterna est 
immutabilisque substantial _ 
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unchangeable, but is rather f i l l ed w i t h God , and so satisf ied i n its restlessness. 
August ine describes this as a fillfillment o f f o r m whereby wha t has not yet 
attained the stature o f what i t was made to be, is made complete. I t is what is 
promised to August ine in the caelum caeli o f conf. 12: the comple t ion o f the 
formatio begun by the H o l y Spir i t i n the f i rst moment o f creat ion, the "movemen t 
over the depths" o f formless matter. The var iable w i l l is fixed tener) by 
grace i n a relat ionship o f adorat ion, and the who le heart ( " ш affectน toto") is 
" f i l l e d " w i t h God . 6 9 August ine describes th is relat ionship as an in t imacy , or 
"c leav ing t o . " 
A s in Books 12 and 13 o f conf., the unl ikeness o f creature and creator is 
immedia te ly qual i f ied by a considerat ion o f h o w the H o l y Spir i t overcomes the 
same. I t is fo r this reason that, i n trin. 15, August ine first compares the unl ikeness 
o f man 'ร soul to Father and Son, and subsequently wonders as to the 
appropriateness o f naming the Ho l y Spir i t by the term o f " l o v e " . ^ ՚՛ The Spir i t is 
described as the mutual relat ionship between the Father and the Son: i t is the 
act iv i ty o f love that delineates the otherness o f their persons, and the in t imacy o f 
thei r " l i f e " together. 
I f there is noth ing greater than [ love] among God ' s g i f ts , and i f there is no 
greater g i f t o f God 's than the H o l y Spi r i t , what must w e conclude but that 
he is this chari ty w h i c h is cal led both G o d and from God? A n d i f the 
char i ty by พ Ы с һ the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father 
inexpressibly shows for th the commun ion o f them both , what more 
suitable than he who is the common Spi r i t o f them both should be 
d is t inct ive ly cal led chari ty?^' 
6 9 Conf. 12.11.12. It is no violation o f nature for a thing to be ful f i l led in its form by the activity o f 
a higher principle: it is a concept obvious to a Neoplatonist, Christian or pagan, whether the 
creative influence is understood to be mediated or unmediated. By way o f example, see Aqumas, 
Summa contra gentiles. Book 3, Chs. 16-22. on God as both the participated being o f all things, and 
as providential final cause. 
™ Trin. 15.17.27, ff. Here we find the explicit echo and conclusion to Books 8-9, which describe 
(cf. supra) love as a principle o f unification, a к ๒ d o f " l i f e " that unites lover and beloved. 
7 ' 15.19.37. "Deinde, si in donis Dei nihil maius est caritate, et nullum est maius donum Dei quam 
Spiritus sanctus, quid comequentius quam ut ipse sit caritas, quì dicitur et Deus et ex Deo? Et si 
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The importance o f the procession o f the Spir i t from the Son as w e l l as the Father 
is Mgh l igh ted at the conclus ion to the book , in a long quotat ion f r o m a sermon on 
the Gospel o f John. 
Bu t the H o l y Spir i t does not proceed f r o m the Father into the Son and then 
proceed f r o m the Son to sanct i fy the сгеаШге. He proceeds simultaneously 
from them both , even though the Father gave the Son that the Spir i t should 
proceed f r o m h i m as he does from h i m s e l f / ^ 
This language preserves a relat ional p r io r i t y to the Father i n the relat ionship 
between Father and Son, and yet i t h igh l ights the fundamental equal i ty o f the t w o 
i n the mutua l i ty o f the procession o f the Spir i t . The love that is the Spir i t is real 
enough i n i tse l f to be exempl i f ied i n the personhood o f the H o l y Spir i t ; i t is 
nevertheless ecl ipsed, so to speak, i n the in t imacy w i t h w h i c h i t binds together 
Father and Son in "consubstanţ ial commumon. "^^ B y "par t i c ipa t ion" , man is 
we lcomed into this in t imacy o f Father and Son. The Spir i t , "poured into our 
hearts" is that w h i c h "makes us abide i n G o d and h i m i n ստ."^՛ ՛ Fa i th "wo rks by 
l ove " ^^ meaning that i t is real ized, or ñ i l f iUed , i n the act iv i ty o f love. I n B o o k 13， 
fa i th was speci f ical ly ordered to a theology o f Cfø is t 's bod i l y Incarnat ion; here, 
love as the g i f t o f the H o l y Spir i t is the comple t ion o f what is begun by the bod i ly 
sacrif ice o f the Cross. Book 15 makes the picture complete: the w o r k o f the 
who le T r in i t y in t ime, i n creat ion, is an exhaust ive pedagogy o f salvat ion. 
caritas qua Pater diligit Filium, et Patrem dilìget Filius, ineffabiliter commmionem demonstrat 
amborum; quid comenientius quam ut ille dicatur caritas proprie, qui Spiritus esl com munis 
ambobusT 
72 Io. eu. tr. 99; trin. 15.27.48. "Spiritus autem sanctus non de Patre procedit in Filium, et de Filio 
procedit ad sanctiflcandam creaturam; sed simul de utroque procedit: quamvis hoc Pater Filio 
dederit, ut quemadmodum de se, ita de ilio quoque procedat. A t 15.17.29, Augustine says that 
Holy Spirit proceeds from both, but that he principally proceeds" from the Father {''procedit 
prmcipaliter"). 
73 15.27.49. 
7 4 15.17.31. 
" 15.18.32; Gal. 5:6. 
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I n conf., w e found that memory had to be t ransformed f r o m the dist ract ion 
o f bod i l y l i fe in to the fixed attent ion o f meditatio. I n trin., the language o f the 
theological v ir tues dominates, as is appropriate f r o m the conc lud ing emphasis on 
the w o r k o f the H o l y Spir i t . August ine argues for the cont inu i ty o f memory as the 
meaningfulness o f bod i l y l i fe . I n the l i fe o f the resurrection body, fa i th is no 
longer necessary, but there is nevertheless a memory (a " t race" ) o f fa i th , j us t as 
there is a sort o f memory o f bod i l y l i fe . Ind iv idua l personhood abides in the 
v i s ion o f g lo ry , and this personhood is summed up i n the concept ion o f memory 
as a l i nk bo th to a personal h is tory , and to a perpetual state o f be ing anchored i n 
the d iv ine , t r iune l i fe . Th is " i nd i v i dua l i t y " , for lack o f a r icher te rm, is real ly the 
ha l lmark o f the Chr is t ian narrat ive o f resurrect ion. The "d is t rac t ion" o f earthly 
l i fe gives way to the f i x i t y o f contemplat ion: but i n this contemplat ion, the loves 
(qffectiones) that charted the via o f bod i ly l i fe are not abandoned, but rather shape 
the dist inct ive character o f that contemplat ion. The loss o f sel f i n the beho ld ing o f 
God is at once a f i nd ing o f self, i n that al l o f these loves are seen most f u l l y i n 
thei r proper order. 
Augus tme concludes trin. i n prayer: he desires on ly to remember G o d , 
k n o w God and love God. M e m o r y , stretching out to "wha t is before"^^, is 
t ransformed into hope. 
•Conf. 11.30.40. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
I n an art icle publ ished i n 1975, Gou lven Madec wr i tes: " i l y a e n 
revanche... peu de travaux qu i analysent les ouvrages d 'Augus t i n , ses procédés 
d 'argumentat ion et de composi t ion, le mouvement propre de son discours et de sa 
pensée." Th is migh t seem on first reading an incredible c l a im , g iven the quant i ty 
o f secondary l i terature on Augustme i n c i rcu lat ion. H i s po in t is that a great deal 
o f scholarship imports questions and problems fore ign to Augus t ine 's texts and 
"espr i t . " ' Th is is mani fest ly t rue, and this dissertat ion takes its methodologica l 
cue f r om this observat ion. The concept o f memory is not the most impor tant 
aspect o f August ine 's a n t o o p o l o g y , bu t i t becomes foundat ional fo r August ine, 
and the fact that he makes i t the basis o f the m ind ' s imag ing o f God is clearly 
or ig ina l . Th is dissertation traces the emergence o f memory w i t h i n the context o f 
the argument o f part icular texts: our method can be contrasted to that o f G. 
O ' D a l y , w h o abstracts the phi losophical categories that he considers f r o m their 
loci? I n th is , he luc id ly іпЇЄфгеІ8 their sense, but w i thou t เท turn b r ing ing much 
new clar i ty to the texts themselves. I n August ine 'ร early wr i t ings (up to mus.), 
memory in i t ia l ly plays a c i rcumscr ibed ro le, and the exp lorat ion o f its f u l l 
s igni f icance is exp l ic i t l y deferred un t i l conf. Th is wo rk , a long w i t h trin., gives the 
cosmolog ica l , and especially chr is to logical , context that exposes memory as a key 
element i n the argument fo r the un i ty o f man w i t h the t r iune God . 
1 '^Christus, scientia et sapientia nostra". Recherches Augustiniennes 10 (1975), pp. 79. Madec is 
specifically concerned wi th an excessive pre-occupation wi th Augustine s "sources", the libri 
Platonicorum in particular, and the resulting ideological commitments that br ing to Augustine's 
texts an anachronistic opposition between philosophy and theology. 
^ For referenceร, see Bibliography, and infra. Our approach therefore intends to contribute 
constructively to O'Daly^s work. 
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Madec r igh t l y argues that the onto log ica l d ichotomy o f t ime and eterni ty, 
and the corresponding epistemologica! d icho tomy o f scientia and sapieทtia, 
constitute the structure o f Augus t in ian theo logy? Our interest i n memory 
intersects w i t h these d ichotomies, and w i t h their reconci l iat ion in Christ. 
The central place o f memory demonstrates August ine 's commi tment to the 
uni ty o f man, and therefore the integral ro le o f the body both in basic 
psychologica l funct ions and i n the e f for t to attain w i sdom: as a phi losopher, 
August ine is not a dual ist i n denial o f the phys ica l ; as a thinker who pr iv i leges a 
theology o f Chr is t ' s body, he cannot be. For August ine, as for the ancients, 
memory reveals the ab i l i ty o f m i n d to apprehend order in the physical w i thou t 
being subject to i t . I n conjunct ion w i t h the w i l l , and the i l l uminat ion o f the 
intel lect, memory is the intermediate th rough w h i c h the m i n d meets the w o r l d , 
w i t h j udgmen t and a f f ec t i on― in ten t i ona l i t y , pe rhaps―mean ing that the m i n d 
apprehends its objects i n a complex manner, framed either by caritas or cupiditas. 
For August ine, human k n o w i n g , and especial ly sel f -knowledge, does not purchase 
transcendence. The cond i t ion o f memory describes a way in wh ich the l imi ta t ions 
and ordinary condi t ions o f knowledge can become a via, l i nk ing the unstable m i n d 
to the unchanging t ru th . 
Epis temologica! fact thus becomes a basis both for spir i tual d i lemma ( i n 
conf. 10 and 11), and chr is to logical resolut ion ( in conf. 12 and 13, and trin. Π ­
ι 4 ) . The spi r i tual experience o f l i fe constrained by the discursiveness o f memory 
compels August ine to ref lect upon the radical otherness o f human know ing and 
experience, and the eternity o f the d iv ine l i fe . Th is otherness is overcome 
speci f ical ly by the humi l i t y o f the incarnat ion. This humi l i t y is shared i n , bo th by 
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im i ta t ion , and by par t ic ipat ion in Christ through his body֊the church֊֊the 
sacraments, and especial ly th rough the t ransformat ion o f the m i n d i n meditatio 
upon scripture."^ 
I n the f i rst part o f this dissertation, we consider the prob lem that Plato has 
set up for h imse l f w i t h the theory o f the forms: hav ing r igh t ly dist inguished the 
realms o f the in te l l ig ib le and the sensible, how should they be re-connected? 
Plato wr i tes i n Timaeuร (29b) , that the "creator must have looked to the etemal , 
for the w o r l d is the fairest o f creations and he is the best o f causes. A n d hav ing 
been created i n this way， the w o r l d has been f ramed in the likeness o f that w h i c h 
is apprehended by reason and m i n d and is unchangeable."^ I f the sensible w o r l d 
ref lects the orderl iness o f the in te l l ig ib le , the latter must be knowable一albeit i n a 
l im i ted manner֊through the sensible. The epistemologica! p rob lem becomes the 
relat ionship between sense-perception and knowledge. I n Republic^ Plato wishes 
for recol lect ion to exp la in the relat ionship between the m i n d and the forms. Bu t 
knowledge i n that text is not s imply an ascent to the contemplat ion o f the 
i l l um ina t ing รนท, or the T ru th ; the Good, as i t is also cal led, demands that the 
wise person "descend" again to the w o r l d as a c i t izen and teacher. The wise 
"d ia lec t i c ian" should not merely g ive an account o f the essence o f th ings, but also 
• On the church in conf., Hans Urs von Balthasar writes that " i t is 5ифгІ5Іп§ and yet logical that 
the personal t ime dialectic o f the Confessions should be seen ultimately, yet logically, wi th in the 
framework o f a social and universal view o f time. Memoria does not lead to the remembering o f a 
prenatal existence in heaven... but to the heavenly Civitas Dei. It is the pivot o f individual 
existence; to know this heavenly mother is to understand oneself. She is the unbroken unity o f 
men wi th God, that unity which existed for a moment in Adam, before it was shattered by sin." A 
Theological Anthropolog)' (Sheed & W a N e w York, 1967), p. 33. 
5 Trans. B. Jowett. The passage quoted immediately precedes 29c ("As being is to becoming, so is 
truth to belief."), to which Augustine refers at both at com. eu. 1.35.53, and trin. 4.18.24 
(''quantum ad id quod ortum est aeternitas valet, tantum ad fidem Veritas''). In both places, 
Augustine uses Plato to develop a sense o f how the temporal is "related" to the eternal, both 
ontologicallv and as accountmg for a dialectical theory o f wisdom. 
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demonstrate propor t ion and order i n his manner o f l i v i ng v i r tuous ly and 
courageously. I n the later Philebus, the act iv i ty o f dialect ic is more complex, 
described not in terms o f ascent and descent, but rather in terms o f umty and 
p lura l i ty . W i s d o m is an act iv i ty o f seeking un i ty i n a l l th ings, inc lud ing the 
vagaries o f embodied l i fe . M e m o r y takes on a new importance here i n that not 
on ly must i t account for an a priori l i nk to first pr inc ip les, but i t also must be a 
means to universal ize the data o f sense-perception for the m i n d . Hence the 
sensible w o r l d is not an opt ional d istract ion fo r Plato, but rather one means 
through w h i c h the order o f creat ion is beheld and enjoyed, and also an instrument 
by w h i c h i t is taught to the commun i t y o f the c i ty . W h i l e Plato does not exp l ic i t ly 
paral le l m ic ro and macrocosmic perspectives, the cosmolog ica! un i ty evident in 
Timaeuร and Symposium, at least, is ref lected i n the ab i l i ty o f memory in Philebus 
to connect m ind simultaneously to what is above and be low i t , hence m o v i n g 
Plato beyond a soul-body dua l ism w i t h w h i c h he is f requent ly charged. 
The commonplace that Ar is to t le of fers a more ' ' emp i r i ca l " epistemology 
has some truth to i t , but the picture o f Plato that we have prov ided here suggests 
that the antagonism between Plato and Ar is to t le on these matters, s t i l l maintained 
by scholars o f classical ph i losophy today, is overstated.^ A n attent ion to their 
іп іефге ї іуе history offers a r icher picture o f Plato and Ar is to t le for students o f 
patr ist ics. In part icular, i t helps the student o f August ine to interpret the inf luence 
o f Plot inus more contextual ly and c i rcumspect ly . Plot inus self-consciously 
distances h imse l f f r o m Ar is to t le even as he depends heavi ly on his psychology. 
6 The history o f the early Academy does not easily permit this reading, except when an ideological 
program is at stake. Scholars rightly observe that, from the Ր ՛ century CE on, іпіефгеїегз are 
excessively focussed on showing how Aristotle and Plato are in harmony, wi th the result that a 
curriculum is put in place that begins wi th Aristotle's logical works, and ends wi th Plato's middle 
or late dialogues, such as Parmenides. Scholars are right ๒ observing that this can result in 
strange readings o f texts, but they are wrong in de facto dismissing the assumption o f a certain 
cloctrTnal harmonv because of this situation. 
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He does not however agree i n ground ing knowledge exp l ic i t ly i n the abstraction 
o f іп їе І ІесШа І fo rms f r o m sensible th ings. W e have detailed the div is ions that 
arise w i t h i n the soul , fo r Plot inus, as a consequence o f this. Plot inus is clearly a 
s igni f icant inspi rat ion for Augus t ine 'ร at tent ion to memory not merely as a facul ty 
o f the soul , but to the experience o f the passage o f t ime as a spir i tual problemat ic . 
Nevertheless, the spir i t o f Augus t ine 's texts on these questions is closer to P l a t o / 
Th is becomes clear i n the second part, w i t h an analysis o f August ine 's 
Cassic iacum dialogues. W h i l e w e have said that the classical, pH losoph ica l 
t rad i t ion is jus t one o f several inf luences upon August ine, these early texts show 
August ine act ive ly engaging w i t h the tensions o f this t radi t ion i n a sophisticated 
and theolog ica l ly r igorous manner. I n ord., memory comes into play as the 
quest ion is raised o f what sense-perception has to do w i t h w isdom. W i s d o m is 
proposed as i nvo l v i ng a convers ion w i t h i n , away f r o m the senses, by means o f the 
l iberal arts. A n d yet, as August ine and his inter locutors are confronted by creat ion 
as a fact, v isua l ly exper iencing its beauty and orderl iness, he reminds his reader 
that the ratio o f creat ion must be evident to the senses. August ine is convinced 
that the ordo perceived by the intel lect, and the ordo perceived through the senses, 
are one as the creator is one. A n d yet , an ambigu i ty is present i n the early works , 
for the ordo o f the sensible is on ly apparent to one who "has his г е Ш т to God i n 
his heart ." Th is is the same ambigu i ty that w i l l abide throughout Augus t ine 'ร 
wr i t i ngs ; i t is not a later development that arises as the result o f a new pre­
occupat ion w i t h s in. A fu l l y theological resolut ion is int imated i n the economic 
act iv i ty o f the T r in i t y . I n beata ผ., i n a Stoic echo o f Philebus, w i s d o m is 
described as a mean, a measured prudentia. I t is a g i f t o f the Son, the t ru th , w h o 
On the decision to leave aside Stoic sources, see the introduction (supra). 
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descends f r o m the summus modus, i n order to d w e l l i n the midst o f men. The 
Spi r i t comprehends the "ex t remes" o f human existence, and gathers them into the 
"h ighest measure" , the Father. Even in the Cassic iacum dialogues, the redempt ive 
p rogram o f the T r i n i t y is evident. 
W i t h i n the t ime frame o f the w r i t i ng o f these texts, a deep doctr inal 
consistency emerges, even as August ine 's thought about the nature o f the soul 
develops i n a manner appropriate to his posi t ion i n the Church , and the genre o f 
his texts. I t is true that, f r o m imm. an. to trin., August ine continues to main ta in 
that the soul possesses a k i n d o f natural immor ta l i t y proper to an in te l l ig ib le 
substance. Nevertheless, he 8һаф1у dist inguishes between human and d iv ine 
m i n d , and associat ing t ru th i n essence w i t h the latter, commi ts h imse l f to a v i e w 
o f m i n d as changeable.* B y mus., however, he is nevertheless also commi t ted to 
an anthropologica l picture w h i c h is fa i r ly un i f ied , in w h i c h memory plays a 
central role i n the media t ion between the inte l l igent and the sensate. The early 
dialogues connect Augus t ine 'ร struggle w i t h epistemologica! questions w i t h 
mature t r in i tar ian and chr istological tropes. I t is t rue, for example i n the 
t r in i ta r ian ac t iv i ty o f beata น. described above, that the connect ion is sketchy 
compared to wha t we have in trin. Nevertheless, the doctr inal content is 
consistent, nor does retr. detract f r om this. 
A l t h o u g h memory is an emerging issue i n the early wr i t i ngs , our argument 
is c i rcumscr ibed by the exp l ic i t deferral o f its careful examinat ion. U p to mus., 
memory reveals the abi l i ty o f the m i n d to express and discern ordo i n the who le 
* M ind is changeable because it can be destroyed, and because the acts and habits o f mind are 
accidental to i t In Neoplatonic fashion, the mind comes to the ftilfilment o f its form only through 
the influence o f the higher principle. It is truest to Augustine's own language to understand this 
movement through the relationship between " image" and "l ikeness"; cf. R. Markus, "Imago and 
simįlitudo in Ąugustine",^evMe des Études Augmtinieimeร 10 (1964), pp. 125-143. 
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creat ion, by its dual func t ion o f l i n k i ng the m i n d to the in te l l ig ib le reasons—— 
al though this aspect, precisely as a w o r k o f memory (as opposed to knowledge in 
general), is not yet d e v e l o p e d ― a n d opening the m i n d to the sensible wo r l d as 
something possessing an int r ins ic ordo. Mus. con f i rms th is іп Їефге Їа ї іоп, and 
deepens i t by mak ing memory into the mora l filter, so to speak, through w h i c h the 
m i n d selectively chooses to attend to what is taken i n th rough the senses, purgmg 
images that correspond to the i l l -considered use o f physical goods. M e m o r y thus 
serves to order the soul w i t h respect to what is lesser, and i t does th is by mediat ing 
a higher ordo that is perceived th rough the m i n d . Hol iness, in mus,, is l i fe " l i v e d 
w i t h i n the bounds o f memory . "^ 
That the focus on the memory in conß takes on a new character o f gravi ty 
cannot therefore be attr ibuted to any new fascinat ion w i t h sin.*^ There may be a 
フ Mus. 14.45. The function o f imagination here is not merely uti l i tarian, dessicated; it retains its 
poietic function, but as submitted to the ordo o f providence. The sense o f "bounds" here points to 
the contiหentia o f conf. 
】G P. Cary nicely describes Augustine's continuity in this regard, whi le pointing out that his later 
thinking about the epistemologica! effect o f sin IS more universal and social in scope. Even in the 
early dialogues, August๒e is ready to observe that the '4raining" needed by the soul is best 
described in terms o f the Catholic faith (see our comments in Chapter 5 on sol. 1.13.23). Cary 
writes ( in Augustine 'ร Invention of the Inner Self (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000), pp. 74-
75): "To juage by the structure o f the first book o f the Soliloquies, wnere the treatment o f 
intellectual vision culminates in a discussion o f how to strengthen weak eyes, it seems the 
metaphor o f dazzlement played a large role in attracting Augustine to the Platonist metaphor o f 
intellectual vision in the first place. Whi le the talk o f intellectual vision provides apt metaphors 
for Augustine's theory o f knowledge and the splendid descriptions o f the sou ľs ultimate 
ftilfilment, talk o f weak, sick and dazzled eyes provides even more apt metaphors for Augustine's 
morality and pedagogy: it suggests in all the right ways the obstacles preventing us from seeing 
God and how we are to overcome them. The obstacles are in ourselves: they are the ignorance, i l l -
health, and inf i rmity o f our mind's eye, for which we are to blame because o f our love o f temporal 
things. It is as i f our bad habit o f staring at dim figures in the darkness has weakened our eyes and 
made them susceptible to all kinds o f disease ana corruption. Later Augustine combines this 
account o f the obstacles to salvation wi th the conception that human nature in general has suffered 
a kind o f corruption. But in his early works the spotlight is on individual failure: each sou ľs vices 
account for its own particular distance from beatitude, each sou ľs camal habits account for its own 
inability to bear the strong light o f the intell igible Truth, and each soul's lack o f training explains 
why it has not yet developed the abil i ty to see God." I would want to qualify the phrase -'see 
God" ; i f the term " t ra in ing" rankles as inegalitarian, or even quasi-Pelagian, read this instead in 
terms o f the exercise o f faith, something that must be nurtured in order to grow and thrive. 
Experience bears out the truth o f this, as IS the case wi th the practice o f the virtues. As Cary 
observes later (p. 75), the role o f the disciplime in this spiritual context seems an absurd account 
o f what education might look l ike, but it is nevertheless part and parcel o f the peculiar unity o f 
Augustiners thought—the way he holds together reason and rel igion, epistemology-and joy. 
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greater appreciat ion o f the impl ica t ions, epistemologica! and theolog ica l , o f the 
sacri f ice o f the G o d w h o enters into un i ty w i t h c r e a t i o n ― b u t even th is 
appreciat ion is bound up w i t h the autobiographical character o f the narrat ive. 
M e m o r y , in conf. 10, expresses the spi r i tual d i l emma o f the t ime-bound сгеаШге 
that has real ized that its per fect ion, i ts peace, cannot log ica l ly be real ized in the 
condi t ions o f ord inary existence. M e m o r y thus expresses a sense o f ab id ing 
dist ract ion and restlessness." Past and future do not i n real i ty exist, and the 
present is cont inuously impennanent , a mere becoming; memory makes that 
present avai lable to the m i n d , but as an image, a s ign, and not a th ing . The fact 
that memory is necessary even fo r the percept ion o f "present" objects becomes a 
negative. However , as expressing the l imi ta t ions, the otherness, o f man and G o d , 
memory opens up a f ru i t f u l space for spir i tual renewal . There is an element o f 
ar t fu l self-consciousness, again, appropriate to the autobiographical character o f 
the text. "La te have I loved y o u , Beauty ancient and new" , August ine c r i e s . H i s 
" la teness" to G o d is contrasted to the int imate presence o f God to the soul . Our 
analysis o f B o o k 11 shows that the discourse on the паШге o f t ime concludes w i t h 
an even more cosmic sense o f radical unl ikeness: " w h e n I shall be f u l l y uni ted 
w i t h y o u , w i t h a l l o f mysel f? Then I shall never have pain or labour, and m y 
who le l i fe w i l l be f u l l o f y o u . " ' ^ 
I n the early wr i t i ngs , memory is the locus o f un ion and communica t ion 
between soul and body, comparable to the role o f imaginat ion for Ar is to t le . The 
connect ion between the epis temologica! and onto logical to w h i c h Madec alludes 
' ' " Le temps est done ľ inqu iéณde du désir." N. Grimaldi , Le désir et le temps (Librair ie 
Philosophique J. V r in : Paris, 1992), p. 240. A t p. 247, Grimaldi quotes Bergson as finding that 
memory is the transcendence o f tne self, o f the "esprit." 
Conf, 10.27.38. 
" Ibid. 10.28.39. 
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depends upon the central i ty o f August ine 'ร c fø is to logy to his thought , and more 
speci f ica l ly upon a theology o f Chr is t 'ร body. I n d i f ferent but comparable ways, 
conf. and trin. demonstrate the impl icat ions o f physical un i f i ca t ion o f the 
paradoxica l elements o f the temporal and eternal. I n th is un ion , the otherness o f 
the creature is preserved, first i n the dual nature o f Cto is t , and second, i n the 
d ivers i ty imp l i ed i n August ine 's t r in i tar ian formula t ions. I n conf. 12, Chr is t 
br ings man into un ion w i t h h imse l f first t f eough the contemplat ion o f Scr ipture, 
t h o u g h w h i c h instrument the w i l l is submit ted to the t ru th , and the c o m m o n 
memory o f the church fo rmed; second, t t oough the commun i t y o f the church 
i tself , i n w h i c h the peace o f the caelum cae li is tasted i n the submiss ion to the 
shared (non privata) good o f un i ty . I n trin., Chiisl br ings man in to un ion է Խ օ ս § հ 
the reformatio o f the sel f that results f r o m the exercise o f fa i th . Fa i th here is 
conceived as a par t ic ipat ion in Chr is t 'ร body ; " t h rough h i m " August ine says, " w e 
go to h i m , never departiทg from him.'' Th is is a constant progress i n the order ing 
o f the af fect ions through the r ight use o f tempora l goods, not complete i n this l i fe 
o f memory , but nevertheless made more and more l i ke the intentio o f the heaven 
o f heavens. 
M e m o r y is the basis for soul 's progress i n the w o r l d precisely because it 
can conta in the dialect ical play o f knowledge and love. Nei ther o f these can 
precede the other as the memory must . ' " However , the fu l f i l lmen t o f memory in 
՚ 4 R. Wi l l iams, "The paradoxes o f self-knowledge in the De trinitate", J.T. Lienhard, et al. (eds.). 
Collectanea Augustiniána: Augustine, Presbyter Factus Sum (Peter Lang: New York, 1993), pp. 
12】-B^  Wi l l iams begins to offer a critique o f scholars who f ind Augustine to be proto-Hegel ian, 
even Cartesian, ๒ his theory o f knowing; we have spoken in response to Booth and Matthews, and 
Wi l l iams addresses the approach o f O'Daly and Mourant as wel l (ท. 2). Wi l l iams finds these 
anachronistic readings to be madequately theological, and inattentive to the trinitarian structure o f 
consciousness. The mind knows itself in the activity o f remembering, knowmg and loving, and 
this knowing must therefore include, and even presuppose, a rightly ordered w i l l . Wi l l iams only 
fails in not extending his critical analysis to include memory, and its importance in mediating the 
production o f the inner verè«OT֊bewis^Ayres (1995)r l ikewise, does not consider the significance 
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the intentio o f contempla t ion results f r o m the w i l l that is healed; and the heal ing 
o f the w i l l presupposes the m i n d be ing filled w i t h t ru th . M e m o r y as mere ly one 
aspect o f the tr iune soul cannot have the final w o r d . 
The def in ing attr ibute o f Augus t ine 's theory o f knowledge, to the extent 
that he has one, is humi l i ty . *^ M e m o r y can ho ld the m i n d together w i t h what is 
k n o w n but not yet possessed, w i t h wha t is desired but not yet perfect ly loved. The 
progress o f fa i th , for August ine , f inds th is to be suf f ic ient , 
О L o r d m y God， m y one hope, l is ten t o me lest out o f weariness I should 
stop want ing to seek y o u , but let me seek your face a lways, and w i t h 
ardour. D o yourse l f g ive me strength to seek, hav ing caused yourse l f to be 
found and hav ing g i ven me the hope o f finding y o u more and more. 
Before y o u lies m y strength and m y weakness; preserve the one, heal the 
other. Before y o u l ies m y knowledge and m y ignorance; where y o u have 
opened to me, received me as I come i n ; where y o u have shut to me, open 
as I knock. Let me remember y o u , let me understand y o u , let me love you . 
Increase these th ings i n me un t i l y o u refashion me entirely.*^ 
o f Augustine's preference for the image-trinity rooted in memory rather than in mem when he 
takes up Wi l l iams' position, 
՚ 5 Humi l i ty motivates this model o f spiritual progress, and not an abiding "skepticism", as Brian 
Stock maintains (1996, p. 278). There remains a current in scholarship,including those who find 
the birth o f modem semiotics in Augustine, arguing that i l luminat ion, the presence o f Christ as the 
inner teacher, and similar doctrines, drain signs, sacraments, or any external " things" o f real 
significatory power. This dissertation argues otherwise, given the meeting o f the ordo wi thin and 
without that memory mediates. A cursory reading o f doctr. chr. should also weaken this view. 
Cary (2000, p. 143) argues that, for Augustine, signs (such as sacraments) cannot be efficient 
means o f grace, since they are physical and therefore lesser creatures than the soul. He errs ๒ 
Іп1ефге1іп§ this as Aristotelian efficient causality, which is not Augustine's view o f how the 
sacraments are instrumentally used by divine grace. See B. Studer, "Sacramentum et exempluทา 
chez saint August in", Recherches Augustiniemใes 10 (1975), p. 136， ท. 244. 
16 Trin. 15.28.51. '^Domine Deus теш, una spes mea, exaudí me, ne fatigatus ทolim te guaerere, 
sed qmeram faciem tuam semper ardenter. Tu da quaerendi vires, qui imeหire te fecistì, et magis 
magisque invemendi te spem dedisti. Coram te estfìrmitas et ìnfìrmitas mea: Ulam serva, istarห 
sana. Coram te est scìentia et ignorantia mea: ubi mihi aperuìsìì, susàpe intrantem; ubi clausistì, 
aperi pulsanti. Mem inerim tui, intellìgam te, di ligam te. Auge in me ìsta, donec me reformes ad 
integrum'' — … —- — — — 
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